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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
The Aesthetics of Equality 
in Early Greek Poetry 
 
by 
 
Ben Radcliffe 
Doctor of Philosophy in Classics 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
Professor Alex C. Purves, Chair 
 
 
 
This dissertation asks how Homer, Hesiod, and Theognis envision egalitarian alternatives 
to the conditions of social stratification that prevail in the fictional worlds of early Greek poetry. 
I track moments when characters relegated to the lower ranks of their societies—beggars, 
plebian rabble-rousers, and masses of common soldiers—stage challenges to the social and 
narrative primacy of the texts’ protagonists, who invariably belong to the aristocratic or 
propertied classes. Even though these challenges fail on a narrative level, their rich aesthetic 
content invites readers to reflect on how each text’s poetic priorities could be subverted, 
reinforced, or transformed in a flattened social landscape. I draw on the work of contemporary 
philosophers and political theorists to model how egalitarian subjectivity—ways of organizing 
and belonging together—can surface in diverse venues, including forms of collective militancy, 
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ethical self-fashioning, and aesthetic expression. By locating a space of political contestation in 
sensory experience, this approach supplements the forms of deliberative politics that are more 
familiar to Classical Studies scholarship. It thereby offers a novel way of giving voice to the 
minor characters who pose a challenge from below to the fundamental social premises of early 
Greek poetry. 
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πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὃ 
ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερά ἐστιν 
 
everything in sensory experience reaches out for that pure 
equality—and falls short of it 
 
(Plato, Phaedo 75b) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Songs and festive dances resound from the royal palace on Ithaca at the start of Odyssey 
23. A bard strums his lyre and inspires men and women to strike the floor with their echoing 
feet; neighbors listening to the noise suppose that it means a wedding. Penelope, it seems, has 
finally acceded to her suitors’ demands and chosen one of them to replace her long-absent 
husband: 
ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκε δόμων ἔκτοσθεν ἀκούων·  
ἦ μάλα δή τις ἔγημε πολυμνήστην βασίλειαν· 
σχετλίη, οὐδ’ ἔτλη πόσιος οὗ κουριδίοιο  
εἴρυσθαι μέγα δῶμα διαμπερές, εἷος ἵκοιτο. 
ὣς ἄρα τις εἴπεσκε, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἴσαν ὡς ἐτέτυκτο.  (147-51) 
 
Someone listening outside of the palace would say, 
“someone has married the many-suitored queen 
—a wretched woman! She wasn’t patient enough 
 to keep the great house of her wedded husband until his return.” 
They would say this, but they didn’t know what had really happened. 
 
The wedding, of course, is a ruse.1 The festivities have been staged by Odysseus to forestall the 
discovery of what he has actually committed in the confines of his great house—the massacre 
                                                        
 
1 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. On the false wedding, see Segal 1996: 219 (regarding the 
irony of the performance and its tensions with the values of heroic kleos); Newton 1987: 16-17 (on parallels with 
dancing among the Phaeacians); Seaford 1994: 80 (on the relation of the wedding to the endings of the Odyssey 
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of Penelope’s suitors and their supporters. Odysseus’ blood-soaked partisans wash themselves 
and take to dancing in halls that were moments before heaped with corpses. The macabre 
device keeps the Ithacan public in ignorance just long enough for Odysseus to reunite with his 
wife and father and gather his supporters for the inevitable struggle with the kin of the 
murdered suitors. 
By confirming Odysseus, once again, as a master of dissimulation, the sounds of the 
decoy wedding feed into the text’s broader fascination with disguises, illusions, phantasms, and 
the deceptive power of aesthetic impressions. But it is striking that the narrator gives the 
anonymous persons listening outside (τις…δόμων ἔκτοσθεν ἀκούων) an opportunity not merely 
to be deceived but to evaluate the sounds critically and construct a narrative around them. The 
listeners are ignorant about what really happened but surprisingly perceptive about what could 
have happened: at the end of Book 21, Penelope did (apparently) decide that Odysseus had 
perished;2 she did resolve to marry one of her suitors that very night; and if not for the 
fantastical intervention of her husband, the sounds of song and dance might very well have 
signaled the end of her equivocal status as the wife of a missing king. What the listeners discern 
                                                        
 
and the poem’s compositional history). Peradotto captures the paradox of the anonymous listener’s judgment: 
“faithful Penelope’s name is in public disgrace, subject of a tale till then merely possible, now actual, but false” 
(1990: 157). Lynn-George (1988: 22-23) discusses how the false wedding resonates with the funerals that it has 
deferred and with the imminent reunion of Penelope and Odysseus. 
2 It is notoriously unclear whether Penelope recognizes the beggar as Odysseus, but she is never explicitly said to 
recognize him. See Vlahos 2007; Scodel 2002a; Winkler 1990: 155-60; Murnaghan 1987: 128-35, 1986; Emlyn-
Jones 1984; Russo 1982; and Scodel 2001: 323 n. 27 for further references. 
 3 
in the noise of merriment is not simply a false appearance but the semblance of the plot as it 
might have been.3 
This moment of dramatic irony turns out to be more complicated than it first seems. It 
invites us, as an audience, to grapple with how the plot impacts figures at the margins of the 
story-world who do not share our degree of epistemic and emotional involvement in the text. 
The anonymous listeners—Odysseus intends the performance for “passersby or neighbors” 
(23.136)—dream up a storyline that turns out to be far happier for Ithaca than the savage 
reality that has been instituted by Odysseus’ violence. The massacre of the suitors is a social 
and demographic cataclysm that wipes out a whole generation of the island’s youth, “the 
foundation of the city” (as Odysseus readily admits, 23.121), and sets in motion a further cycle 
of factional violence.4 Even before this bloody denouement, the restoration of Odysseus to the 
chieftaincy of Ithaca—the telos of the Odyssey—was always an ambivalent issue for the Ithacan 
populace (the dēmos, broadly construed5). It is an outcome that individual figures piously hope 
for, but as a collectivity the Ithacans fail to offer material support for Telemachus and Penelope, 
and on his return to the island in Book 13, Odysseus does not seek the support of the dēmos 
against the suitors.  
                                                        
 
3 Regarding the broader thematic functions of Odysseus’ disguises and dissimulations, Murnaghan 1987 remarks 
that “any account of disguise implies the plausibility, or even the probability, of the vision of reality that disguise 
falsely projects” (129-30). This observation could be applied to the falsely projected reality that the anonymous 
listeners discern at Od. 23.147-51. 
4 I refer to the final conflict between Odysseus and the relatives of the suitors in Book 24, which would have 
resulted in the wholesale slaughter of the latter if not for the intervention of Zeus and Athena, who mandate a 
peaceful settlement. 
5 See Donlan 1985a: 298. 
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The irony of the listeners’ perspective is that they find fault with Penelope for despairing 
of Odysseus’ return, but an Ithaca without Odysseus might be preferable to them in some ways 
than an Ithaca brutalized by his reinstatement. If Penelope had remarried, it seems likely that 
the suitors would have departed and Telemachus would have assumed his father’s place.6 What 
else would have remained to trouble the Ithacan dēmos, which had, apparently, enjoyed almost 
twenty years of peace between the departure of Odysseus and the arrival of the suitors?7 The 
world that they discern in the false sounds turns out to have been a utopian phantasm, the kind 
of reconciled society that Odysseus, in his role as an “agent of destruction,” habitually 
shatters.8  
This is not the only moment in the Odyssey—or, I argue, in early Greek poetry—when a 
sound or a vision, apparently out of joint from its narrative context, engages us with social and 
poetic possibilities foreclosed from the text as it actually exists. I am particularly interested in 
how such moments can be galvanized by the perspectives of marginal figures, like the 
“someone” listening outside of the Ithacan palace, a nameless representative of the dēmos.9 
Along with the common soldiers in the Iliad and the agricultural serfs of Works and Days, the 
                                                        
 
6 Penelope asserts at 18.269-73 that upon remarrying she will depart with her new husband, implying that the 
marriage will be virilocal and will therefore leave Telemachus’ inheritance intact. See Scodel (2001: 39) for an 
interpretation of the power dynamic between Telemachus, Penelope, and the suitors on the eve of the contest of 
the bow. 
7 See Od. 2.26-27: before Telemachus convenes the assembly in Od. 2, the body had not met since Odysseus 
departed for Troy. This inactivity is sometimes taken to mean that the Ithacan dēmos is powerless and inactive 
without the guidance of its absent leader (see Halverson 1985: 138; Barker 2009: 98), but the simpler explanation 
is that the island was essentially tranquil during most of the period after Odysseus’ absence, until the presence of 
the suitors precipitated a crisis that required collective deliberation. 
8 See Buchan 2004, especially ch. 7. 
9 On the role of the anonymous tis in Homer, see Scodel 1992; de Jong 1987; in Sappho, Purves 2014b. 
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Ithacan dēmos serves as a backdrop in the Odyssey’s social landscape and rarely acts with an 
independent agency to contend with the poem’s primary characters.10 Such collectivities are 
relegated to the margins of the story-world (δόμων ἔκτοσθεν), but it is precisely because of 
their poetic and social estrangement that they offer us—the text’s implied audiences, its 
insiders—access to a very different kind of perspective.  
This perspective consists in what T.W. Adorno calls “semblances,” aesthetic impressions 
that break away from their immediate context and incite reflections about how the social and 
poetic substance of an artwork might be organized under different conditions.11 In Odyssey 23, 
the false wedding offers its listeners a disembodied and decontextualized sonic profile whose 
true origins they are unable to access, precisely because they exist at a distance from the 
privileged circle of protagonists and antagonists. There is, further, an ironic misalignment 
between festive sounds of any kind and the brutality of the mnēsterophonia. These forms of 
aesthetic distancing endow the sounds with a suggestive power that they would not have 
otherwise: they hint at sites of resistance and discontentment with the triumphant return of 
Odysseus to a society that managed to survive without him. 
This dissertation asks how early Greek poetry situates its audiences in relation to these 
aesthetically charged, socially marginal perspectives. The social conflict in the scene of the false 
wedding is relatively subdued: the status of the anonymous listeners is unspecified (they could 
be land-owning farmers, wage-laborers, craftsmen, or slaves), and their complaints are 
                                                        
 
10 See pp. 17-19 for a discussion of instances in which the dēmos plays an active role in politics. 
11 Adorno 1997: 78, 110; 1973: 404-5. See Gritzner 2015. See pp. 37-40 for a more involved discussion of the 
aesthetics of semblance. 
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moralistic rather than overtly political. This vignette, however, is part of a larger constellation of 
moments in which early Greek poetry gives voice to figures usually denied narrative relevance. 
The most brilliant instances involve forceful challenges from below to the sociopoetic status 
quo: when Thersites urges the common soldiers in Iliad 2 to abandon the war; when Odysseus’ 
hetairoi in the Odyssey attempt to expropriate his outsized share of the spoils of their 
homeward voyage; when Works and Days surveys the lives of impoverished figures who cannot 
or will not engage in agricultural work; when the Megaran dēmos in the Theognidea claims 
political equality with the ancestral elite. These are the cases that this dissertation aims to 
elucidate. Scholars often focus on how the texts in question present these opposing voices as 
pathological or as foils that reinforce existing textual priorities.12 My object is to find an 
alternative mode of reading these moments that prioritizes, rather, the ways in which their rich 
aesthetic content opens up egalitarian alternatives to the socially stratified worlds of early 
Greek poetry. 
 
The political and aesthetic issues that I have outlined thus far are usefully gathered 
together under the larger social problem of “equality.” The narrator in Odyssey 23 hints at the 
inegalitarian disparities between the anonymous listeners outside the palace, who are defined 
by their lack of knowledge (τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἴσαν ὡς ἐτέτυκτο, 151), and the better-informed 
                                                        
 
12 In the case of Thersites, for instance, he has been shown variously to undermine the Iliad’s conventions of 
collective consensus (Elmer 2013a: 93-97), of praise poetry (Nagy 1979), and of kingly authority (Lincoln 1994: 14-
36); to be a double and foil for Achilles (Rousseau 2013), a scapegoat (Thalmann 1988), and comic relief (Meltzer 
1990). While recognizing the obvious pejorative force of the descriptions of Thersites, my project is aligned with 
views that emphasize his redemptive aspects (see Postlethwaite 1988, Rose 1988, Kouklanakis 1999, Stuurman 
2004). 
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protagonists inside. The whole episode comments implicitly on the exclusion of the vast 
majority of the Ithacan population from a consequential role in the action of the epic.  As a 
concept, equality is situated at an especially productive intersection of political and aesthetic 
form, as we will see shortly. It is, further, a notoriously difficult concept to define, but this 
difficulty points to its important role in unsettling received certainties about the distribution of 
collective agency in the social worlds of early Greek poetry.  
Modern political discourse refers to many varieties of equality,13 and Athenians of the 
fourth and fifth centuries BCE were no different, drawing on a ramified vocabulary to designate 
the various forms of isotēs that operated within their democratic regime: isonomia (equality of 
political rights), isēgoria (equal right of speech), isomoiria (equal shares), isopsēphia (equality of 
votes), and isokratia (equal rights).14 But Aristotle, writing in the fourth century, claimed that by 
its very nature, the idea of equality oversteps any itemized list of its own aspects.15 One of the 
root causes of political conflict and revolution in a city-state is the conviction among its political 
factions that power is not distributed equally. For oligarchs, “to be equal” means “to be equal 
proportionately,” such that their own supposed superiority of birth and education would entitle 
them to a greater share of civic power. For democrats, “to be equal” means “to be equal 
absolutely,” to be allotted the same share of wealth and power as every other citizen. The claim 
of absolute equality possesses an immense rhetorical potency that Aristotle considers to be 
                                                        
 
13 To list just a few possibilities, one might distinguish between equality of opportunity, of condition, and of 
outcome; between formal and substantive equality; or between equality before the law and equality of economic 
welfare. See Gosepath 2007 for a systematic taxonomy and bibliography on modern conceptions of equality. 
14 Ober 2006: 5. 
15 Politics 5.1301ff. See Polansky 1991: 328 and Weed 2007. On equality and the political emotions in Aristotle, see 
Sissa 2008. 
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logically illicit: the slogan of popular agitators is that “if [political actors] are equal in any 
respect, then they are equal absolutely” (ἐὰν κατὰ τὶ ἴσοι ὦσιν, ὅλως ἴσοι νομίζουσιν εἶναι, 
1301b).16 
This intimate connection between equality and political insurrection begins with Homer. 
As I discussed briefly above, the Iliad is nearly halted in its second book when the rabble-rouser 
Thersites claims equality with Agamemnon and urges the common soldiers to abandon their 
inept leaders and return home from the war. During Odysseus’ voyages in the Odyssey, his 
companions dispute his outsized share of the spoils of their voyage, complaining that he will 
return to Ithaca with tremendous wealth while they will return empty handed, “though we will 
complete the same journey” (ἡμεῖς δ’ αὖτε ὁμὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτελέσαντες, 10.41). An equal journey, 
an equal share. The logic of absolute equality repeatedly threatens to turn the distribution of 
wealth and status into an explicitly political issue, one that divides the Homeric protagonists—
invariably the beneficiaries of inequality—against the minor figures who populate the poems’ 
backgrounds. 
All political ideas are constitutively polysemic and contestable, and in this respect, 
equality belongs with other disputed terms like justice, freedom, fairness, or prosperity. But 
what sets equality apart, according to Aristotle, is that it is not only the object but the subject of 
political dispute. It is one of the “origins and founts” of stasis, an idea invested with the power 
to incite political transformations whose most extreme instance is the wholesale destruction of 
                                                        
 
16 This distinction between proportional and arithmetical (“absolute”) equality also appears in Isocrates (2.14, 3.14, 
7.21; he opposes the arithmetical variety) and Plato (Rep. 558c, Laws 757b; in both, interlocutors favor the 
arithemetical). 
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the constitutional order. Aristotle’s purpose in detailing the nexus between stasis and equality 
is to recommend ways to neutralize it. In a balanced constitution, the impulses toward radical 
democratic equality and radical oligarchic inequality can be moderated. But every state has to 
contend with this potential weakness in its regimented schemes for distributing power, wealth, 
and prestige. For advocates of greater equality, however, this is reason to hope: no social order, 
no matter how carefully designed, is immune to the subversive leap from τὶ ἴσοι (“equal in 
part”) to ὅλως ἴσοι (“equal absolutely”). Such leaps recur, in various guises, in each of the 
central case studies of this dissertation. 
 Aristotle reflects a wider Greek mentality in regarding stasis as an evil and, in extreme 
cases, as an utter catastrophe, the violent fracturing of the community through civil violence.17 
The project of maintaining a stable polis, then, is decisively advanced by neutralizing claims of 
absolute equality. The suspicion of equality is already well established in early Greek poetry, 
where it is repeatedly portrayed as an agent of social and poetic catastrophe. If Thersites had 
his way, the Achaean host would sail home in Iliad 2 without their aristocratic superiors. The 
social order would disintegrate and take the poem with it. Assertions that characters are 
absolutely equal are not common in Hesiod and Homer, but when they do occur, they are 
regarded by narrators and protagonists as the harbingers of disaster. For good reason: one 
could hardly imagine an Iliad in which the princes are replaced by common soldiers or a Works 
and Days that addresses the needs of the workless poor. Radical egalitarian claims must be 
                                                        
 
17 See Loraux 2001 on Athenian efforts to forget and suppress the role of civil strife in the city, despite the 
fundamental centrality of conflict in Athenian political life (“Civil war: for the Greeks it was an abomination of 
desolation,” 24). See Thalmann 2004 (esp. 381-83) on attempts in archaic Greek social representations to process 
the ambivalent role of eris and social conflict. 
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suppressed because they would compromise the exclusionary social premises of early Greek 
poetry. 
Yet their suppression is not complete. Egalitarianism can surface in other forms even as 
it disappears from the plot. Political language often draws on metaphors from originally 
apolitical domains,18 and indeed, the vocabulary of equality is sometimes applied in the Iliad to 
issues that appear intrinsically apolitical: the shapes of shields and ships (“balanced,” “well-
rounded”) and the height and size of bodies.19 But equality (isos, isotēs) is remarkable because, 
from its earliest attestations, it touches both on matters of human justice and on the formal 
properties of things. That is, it concerns both politics and aesthetics. My suggestion is not that 
applications of isos to objects or bodies invariably have a political gloss (as if every balanced 
shield were a monument to balanced social relations). Nor will I restrict aesthetic forms of 
equality to the lexical field of isos and related terms. Rather, the polysemy of isos suggests that 
there is a broader set of formal linkages between aesthetic and political modes of equality, and 
this common ground opens up the possibility that aesthetic forms can have unexpected 
resonances with problems that emerge in political speech and action. These potentialities can 
be activated under particular narrative conditions, especially when minor characters advance 
claims of absolute equality.  
It is at such moments, I argue, that aesthetic forms of equality can assume the character 
of semblances. The cases with which I am most concerned include the shape of violence in the 
                                                        
 
18 For Greek political metaphors, see Brock 2013; e.g. “ship of state,” “household,” “shepherd of the people,” 
“body politic,” etc. 
19 LfgrE s.v. ἶσος, 2b-2e. 
 11 
Iliad, the taste of equality in the Odyssey, the sublime vistas of the winter section in Works and 
Days, and the beauty ascribed to song performance in the Theognidea. I argue that, in their 
sensuous immediacy (as shapes, sounds, colors, tastes, and so forth), these details take on an 
evocative power that is partly autonomous from and even at odds with the social and narrative 
contexts in which they occur. They are the semblances of inexistent worlds in which the 
demands for absolute equality that accompany them have been realized. But in their 
momentariness and insubstantiality, semblances only hint at utopian possibilities that cannot 
be articulated fully within the confines of the texts that produce them. 
 
To recapitulate, my dissertation asks how, in special cases, forms of equality that are 
banished from political discourse find new life as aesthetic forms. I track the intersection of 
aesthetic and political equality in moments when characters relegated to the lower ranks of 
their fictional societies—beggars, plebian rabble-rousers, and masses of common soldiers—
stage revolts against the social and narrative primacy of the texts’ protagonists. The 
protagonists, who belong to the aristocratic or propertied classes, invariably prevail against 
such challenges. In the chapters on Homer, Hesiod, and Theognis that follow, however, I 
contend that even though these revolts fail on a narrative level, their aesthetic dimension 
leaves a lasting impression on the text. Each chapter traces a distinctive form of sensory 
encounter that opens up, if only momentarily, the possibility that the poem’s political 
structures and narrative priorities could be reconfigured on an egalitarian basis. I draw on the 
work of contemporary philosophers and political theorists to model how forms of inequality 
and domination in early Greek poetry can be inscribed in the immediate, sensory apprehension 
 12 
of social life. In the exemplary cases examined below, characters subvert this regimented 
aesthetic order and the inequalities that it underwrites. 
 
Politics and Poetics 
Almost every kind of figure in early Greek poetry is interested in equality: aristocrats 
consider one another to be coequals, and marginalized characters sometimes aspire to equality 
with their social superiors. Even among the gods, Poseidon claims to have an equal share of 
authority with Zeus (Il. 15.209). The word ἶσος is used in a wide range of contexts, some overtly 
political, involving conflicts over equal privileges or authority, and some shading into broader 
notions of fair treatment and equal exchange.20 Out of these diverse meanings, what kinds of 
equality provoke political dispute? What does “political dispute” mean in poetic 
representations of societies that differ substantially from the institutional setting of the 
classical polis? 
It will be useful to survey briefly some of the ways in which scholars of Homer have tried 
to address these interrelated questions. M. I. Finley (1954) opened up a new direction in 
Homeric research by treating the social representations in Homer as part of a coherent social 
system. His work conceives of Homeric society as a representation of historical Greek 
communities of the tenth century BCE that predate the rise of the polis and its attendant 
institutions. Such a society is little more than a collection of independent households. Even as 
the dating of Homeric texts was pushed into the eighth century and beyond, a line of 
                                                        
 
20 LfgrE s.v. ἶσος, 2a. 
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scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s followed Finley’s lead in assuming that Homeric societies 
lack the requisite institutional structures to support true “politics.”21 Subsequently a consensus 
has emerged that, at the very least, the rudiments of the classical polis are discernible in many 
of the societies that populate the Iliad and Odyssey.22 What is notable for our purposes about 
these approaches is how they situate politics in relation to poetics. The content of Homeric 
poetry—its plot, characterization, imagery, and so forth—is scrutinized as a kind of sociological 
data that can be plotted in a typology of social forms. “Politics” is an activity that belongs to a 
state, a form of organization that develops with the polis and that is either absent in Homer or 
present in an early stage.23 
In recent years, scholarship on Homer has turned to new ways of tracing the epics’ 
complex negotiation of communal life. These approaches contend that poetic narrative is more 
than a neutral medium through which one may discern an underlying social situation (whether 
historical, fictional, or both at once).24 Narrative is itself a mode of staging disputes about 
                                                        
 
21 See Donlan 1979, 1982, 1985a, and 1989, which situate Homeric societies in an evolutionary trajectory that 
culminates in the full-fledged polis of the late archaic and classical eras; Runciman 1982 on “semi-states” in Homer; 
Halverson 1985 on the absence of the polis in the Odyssey specifically. 
22 See Raaflaub 2007 (“the Homeric polis is an early forerunner of the classical polis… most if not all of the 
constituent elements of the latter exist in the former,” 629); important scholarship that supports the emergence of 
the polis in Homer includes Raaflaub’s earlier work (see 1997: 629 n. 25 for further references); van Wees 1992; 
Scully 1990, who also emphasizes the differences between Homeric and Classical conceptions of the polis; Morris 
1986.  
23 For a more thorough accounting of the vast bibliography on the question of Homer and the polis, see Hammer 
2002: 205-6 (n. 50) and Raaflaub 1997: 629-33. 
24 I include in this category the work of Dean Hammer, David Elmer (2013a), Elton Barker (2004, 2009), and Peter 
Rose (1992, 1988). See further Buchan 2012, Gottesman 2014, and Christensen 2015b. Several of these authors 
have rehearsed and rejected Finley’s methodology for reading politics in Homer (see Hammer 1998: 2-8, with the 
most extensive references and an eloquent rebuttal; Barker 2009: 89; Elmer 2013a: 3). For Barker (2009), the Iliad 
valorizes its political institutions as “place[s] where authority is challenged, resisted and explored; where the 
possibility of different responses gains communal sanction; and where the ideal is not one of total agreement so 
much as the due management of disagreement” (14). Elmer (2013a) argues that the Iliad’s prime political (and 
poetical) value is epainos (“consensus”), a value that is challenged by the dispute between Achilles and 
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authority, leadership, communal purpose, and identity, all of which are intrinsically political 
issues.25 Such readings have the virtue of treating politics not as a static backdrop to epic poetry 
but as a process keyed in to the latter’s narrative dynamics.26 In the Iliad, for instance, the 
central conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles is increasingly seen as a meditation on issues 
of collective authority and dissent—rather than a dispute between private individuals that 
(secondarily) spells disaster for the community of Achaeans. In this respect, Elton Barker has 
shown how practices capable of processing dissident speech are developed and consolidated in 
the assembly scenes of the Iliad. David Elmer, addressing a similar set of problems in the Iliad, 
traces how the norms of collective consensus (epainos) are unsettled and then gradually 
mended over the course of the epic.  
                                                        
 
Agamemnon but that is ultimately reinstated by the end of the poem. Substantial credit is owed to Dean Hammer 
for inaugurating this turn toward a synthesis of poetics and politics in his series of articles (including 1997a, 1997b, 
1998) collected in the 2002 volume The Iliad as Politics. Comparing his approach to that of Finley and Donlan, he 
remarks that “my interest is less to note instances of polis organization and more to explore the broader question 
of how the composition, as a whole, is engaged in a reflection on political life” (2002: 13). This statement neatly 
captures how the positivistic question “does Homer have poleis?” has been superseded in recent scholarship by a 
more expansive conception of politics as a narratively dynamic mode of negotiating and contesting communal 
organization. 
25 It is possible to make a weak distinction between this research into poetics-as-politics and an older (and still 
ongoing) line of research that blends poetics with sociology and anthropology. The prototype for the latter 
methodology in Homer is Redfield 1975, and more recent examples include Haubold 2000, Wilson 2002, Holmes 
2015, and Stocking 2017. The distinction has to do with a conceptual difference between politics and anthropology 
(on which, see Loraux 2001: 45-62): in extremely schematic terms, “politics” is aligned with history, with the 
unforeseeable development of novel forms of collective organization; “anthropology” (or sociology) would be 
concerned with more or less fixed synchronic patterns whose permutations inform and give meaning to social 
conflicts. For instance, in the latter camp is Haubold 2000, which (though it does not brand itself as 
anthropological) conceives of the Iliadic laos as an intrinsically pre-political entity, an undifferentiated social body 
juxtaposed with its leaders; the conflicts in the Iliad act out the pre-existing opposition between laos/leader 
without resolving or displacing it. Barker 2009 invokes this model (35-36) but—in a move characteristic of the 
political turn—proposes that the Iliad actually institutes the “people” as a novel social body whose relation to its 
leaders is undefined and contestable. 
26 Elmer (2013a), for instance, rejects “the assumption [attributed to Finley] that all behaviors depicted in the 
poem are uniformly unproblematic and that every example bears equal weight as more or less transparent 
evidence for an underlying system independent of the narrative’s poetic concerns” (65). 
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The issue of narrative structure is at the heart of such readings. Barker and Elmer 
envision political life in Homer, despite its manifest turbulence, as tending toward some kind of 
reconciliation—prototypically, with the reintegration of Achilles into the polity of Achaeans. 
The notion that the plot of the Iliad traces a gradual consolidation or resolution of the political 
field is disputed by Dean Hammer (1997b), for instance, who claims that the political tensions 
surrounding Achilles are left basically unresolved at the end of Iliad 24.27 Peter Rose (1992) 
identifies in the Iliad a clash between incompatible elite value systems: one, championed by 
Agamemnon, sees wealth and status as inheritable, while the other, championed by Achilles, 
demands that merit be demonstrated by actual exploits in battle. This ideological conflict is 
staged and sustained by the representational resources of Homeric poetry, but never resolved. 
Politics and poetics become inseparable: disputes about the parameters of collective existence 
are an engine for narrative conflict, and the narrative emplots various forms of political 
contestation.28  
 
                                                        
 
27 Hammer’s (1997b) reading of Achilles as a political figure, for instance, emphasizes that the tension between 
autonomy (represented by Achilles) and social conformity (represented by the Achaean host) goes unresolved. The 
clash of values is still unsettled by the conclusion of the epic: “Hektor’s funeral, upon which the narrative 
ends…does not represent closure but the eternal tears of human sorrow. Having introduced the destabilizing voice 
of the vagabond [i.e. Achilles], at first proudly autonomous but now destitute, Homer takes away from the elite the 
solace of privilege. In alerting us to how permeable the line may be between warrior and wanderer, Homer ends 
with the unsettling suggestion that we may be wanderers all” (366). 
28 These principles could be applied in a modified sense to the protreptic literature of Hesiod and Theognis. Both 
poets are involved in constructing programs of ethical instruction rather than involved narratives, but their 
respective discourses are set in motion and sustained programmatically by protest against injustice—for Hesiod, 
against the outrages of the corrupt, “gift eating” aristocrats; for Theognis, against the impingement of commoners 
on the formerly exclusive prerogatives of the ancestral nobility. 
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One of the key operations in this line of scholarship is to articulate the link between 
politics and poetics through the concept of action and plot.29 Political action—seen as the 
dynamic contestation of the forms of communal organization—plays out through the 
overarching action of the narrative, in plot as the structural totality of individual narrative 
events. Political agents are therefore the protagonists, the principle agents (prattontes) of the 
action (praxis), to borrow Aristotle’s formulation.30 But this conflation of narrative and political 
action excludes those who do not possess narrative agency from having a share of political 
agency. Indeed, it presupposes and renders extra-political the very distinction between those 
who have a central role in the plot (the protagonists) and those who do not (minor characters, 
bit parts). 
In the present study, by contrast, this distinction is the starting point of politics. The kind 
of politics that I am examining happens when characters who lack a substantial role in the 
narrative claim a greater share. It is easy to see why the act of contesting narrative agency is an 
intrinsically political issue. To be a protagonist in early Greek poetry is to possess a socially 
privileged position: in the Iliad, the vast majority of the important characters are members of 
the class of the ancestral nobility, the basilēes, whose power over the mass of common soldiers 
                                                        
 
29 Hammer 2002: 16, “the conceptual issues I will be addressing, issues such as authority, power, rights, and ethics, 
are not treated as abstractions but are given form within the context of dialogue, action, and plot.” Elmer 2013a: 
107, “The poem presents a number of other scenes in which epainos is negotiated or achieved among the 
Achaeans; …such scenes articulate the plot.” Barker 2009: 37, “The idea that dissent in the assembly is enacted 
and has its potential as a forum for managing dissent realized over the course of the Iliad may help get away from 
the notion that the Homeric poems, in some trivial sense, presuppose a socio-political framework or—a more 
sophisticated version of the same approach—challenge or question such a framework.” 
30 See Halliwell 1986: 140-44 on Aristotle’s conception of muthos, praxis, and pragmata in the Poetics. 
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is rarely (and never effectively) contested.31 The Odyssey features a more varied cast of 
characters, including peasants, household slaves, and women of every social order. But the plot 
as a whole is organized around the restoration of Odysseus’ patriarchal chieftaincy on Ithaca, 
and the central political contest in the second half of the epic is an intra-aristocratic feud 
between Odysseus and younger members of the same noble caste.32 Hesiod is often regarded 
as a critic of the social prerogatives of the ancestral elite, but his own discourse is addressed to 
an audience of prosperous farmer-patriarchs who command a population of women, slaves, 
and wage laborers omitted from Hesiod’s ethical address. 
Excluded from these conflicts among the holders of property, ancestral prestige, or 
both, is the rest of the population, the masses.33 I use the term “masses” without any positive 
sociological content.34 It designates, privatively, any groups that are not qualified—by some 
combination of birth, wealth, or sex, depending on the text in question—to assume a central 
role in a given poem. Masses in early Greek poetry function as props rather than protagonists, 
                                                        
 
31 See nn. 37 and 38 for scholars who would dispute this assessment. 
32 See Thalmann 1998: 13, “people of lower status are not represented for their own sake in this text, out of some 
egalitarian impulse…they are imagined and deployed in accordance with the poem’s ideological biases”; see Rose 
1992: 99-102 on the casting of the suitors as oligarchs. See my Chapter 2. 
33 Scodel 2002b puts the issue succinctly: “By concentrating on the deeds of kings, the poems imply that their lives 
and actions are more worthy of memory than those of common people. Epic as a genre marginalizes most of 
everyday life … By representing the exemplary past as a society in which great heroes ruled over anonymous 
crowds, epic legitimates such a social order” (183). 
34 Rancière uses the term “the poor” to mean the same thing, and with same non-sociological force (“the ‘poor,’ 
precisely, does not designate an economically disadvantaged part of the population, but simply the people who do 
not count, who have no entitlement to exercise the power of the arkhē, none for which they might be counted,” 
2010: 32). The term “masses” seems appropriate for several reasons. It translates the term plēthus, which 
designates the common soldiers in the Iliad who are not fully differentiated characters but interchangeable 
elements of the narrative background. The term also invokes the distinction between the oppressed but politically 
quiescent strata of the population (mass, people, working class) and the politically militant, galvanized portion of 
that population (party, proletariat, vanguard) in the work of thinkers like Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou (see Ruda 
2009: 184 n. 30).  
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as more-or-less reliable features of the social landscape who usually acquiesce to their own 
political and poetical marginalization.35 I am not claiming that masses are completely denied a 
role in the nascent social institutions of early Greek poetry. What they are denied are the social 
qualifications for playing an active role in shaping the plot.36 To develop this distinction further, 
consider that there are signs of a limited kind of social agency among certain mass 
constituencies in early Greek poetry.37 The princes in the Iliad actively seek the approval and 
consent of the peoples that they lead, particularly in the context of assemblies,38 and the 
relationship between rulers and ruled is mutualistic insofar as the princes are typically styled as 
shepherds who offer protection to their people in exchange for the latter’s gifts and 
                                                        
 
35 It is not surprising that scholarship that has promoted the idea of reading Homer for dynamic, narratively 
impactful forms of politics has largely passed over the role of slaves and women (for an exception, see Rose 1992: 
122-34); the texts themselves deny these groups such a role. Of course, there is a large body of scholarship on the 
role of women and slaves in early Greek poetry. For recent work on Homeric women, see Warwick 2018, Karanika 
2014, Lovatt 2013, Ransom 2011, Mueller 2010, Ebbott 2005, and Emily Wilson’s introduction to her translation of 
the Odyssey (2018: 37-48); for a bibliography of work before 2004, see Felson and Slatkin 2004. On slaves and 
slavery in the Odyssey, see Thalmann 1998. These studies tend to be engaged in sociological or anthropological 
critiques of Homeric society and poetics; the more recent turn toward “political” readings of Homer privileges the 
real-time contestation of collective power, enacted in a communal (usually deliberative) setting. On this distinction 
between the political and the social and its relation to issues of gender and class, see Loraux 2001: 15-21. 
36 Social exploitation thus engenders poetic exploitation. For a fuller elaboration of this analogy in the context of 
the nineteenth-century novel, see Woloch 2003: 26-30; “in terms of their essential formal position (the 
subordinate beings who are delimited in themselves while performing a function for someone else), minor 
characters are the proletariat of the novel” (27). 
37 Heiden 2008 argues that the Catalogue of Ships reveals the Iliad’s deep investment in the autonomy of the 
community from its leaders. Heiden also acknowledges that “mainstream Homeric criticism has long held and 
continues to hold that the Iliad celebrates heroes and by extension the historical class of nobles,” but in recent 
scholarship “the importance of the common soldiers and/or community in the Iliad has become increasingly 
recognized” (2008: 129 n. 7) On this development in Homer scholarship, see the following n. 38. 
38 Raaflaub and Wallace 2007; Raaflaub 1997: 633-34 strongly opposes the notion that the Iliad and Odyssey 
promote an elite ideology: “the elite seem to hold a monopoly in politics and war. This impression, though quite 
wrong, combined with other instances of the poet’s selective focus on the elite and its ideology, has led many 
scholars to consider the role of the commoners negligible” (634). See Donlan 1998, “the evidence of Homer is 
overwhelming that in the long run the dêmos has the final say” (69). 
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reverence.39 Ruth Scodel has interpreted the capaciousness of Homeric social representations 
as a means of appealing to both elite and non-elite audiences: 
Homeric epic is the genre of social cohesion. This cohesion requires the people to 
accept elite dominance but simultaneously allows them to view individual 
aristocrats with a critical gaze. It celebrates a shared moral perspective that gives 
the common people a decisive voice, even as it defines their opinions as based on 
the same principles as those of the elite. (2002b: 182) 
 
Beyond Homer, there are other well-documented instances of anti-elite sentiment scattered 
throughout early Greek poetry that contest the individualistic, honor-seeking values of the 
ancestral nobility.40 
There is indeed a strong inclination toward social cohesion and conciliation in early 
Greek poetry and a fascination with how disputes can be settled, how consensus can be 
achieved, and how power can be shared or negotiated. Discontent with the disparities between 
elites and masses is shored up more often through persuasion and consensus than through 
direct coercion. Indeed, this conciliatory disposition can assume more ominous valences in the 
Iliad and the Odyssey, as William Thalmann has shown, when rulers use ideological devices to 
persuade the masses that acquiescence to the status quo is in their best interests.41 But this 
recognition of the voice of the people never seriously unsettles the systematic preference that 
the Iliad and Odyssey assign to hero-princes (as protagonists) and that Works and Days assigns 
to propertied farmers (as didactic subjects). 
                                                        
 
39 Haubold 2000. See Hammer 2005 on the exercise of popular power in plebiscitary politics. 
40 Donlan 1973; Griffiths 1995. For Raaflaub and Wallace 2007, at least, the importance of the people in early 
Greek poetry figures in an optimistic construal of literary-political history. Hesiod fulfills the nascent egalitarianism 
evident in Homer by overtly promoting a social order that displaces the “gift-eating kings” in favor of a class of 
independent small farmers, which is in turn the precursor of the dēmos of later democratic regimes. 
41 Thalmann 1988, esp. 4-5; 1998: 287-89. 
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Despite their tolerance for certain forms of mass political agency, the protagonists of 
early Greek poetry respond with revulsion, contempt, and even violence to a very particular 
kind of challenge from below. A handful of figures in the corpus—the subjects of this 
dissertation—lay claim to poetic and political equality with the elite protagonists, an equality 
for which they do not possess the requisite social status. These challenges may be more or less 
direct, more or less militant, but from the perspective of the protagonists, they threaten 
catastrophe, the irrevocable overturning of the social order and of the poetic projects that this 
order underwrites.42 The tendency of these texts to catastrophize certain kinds of egalitarian 
claims recalls Aristotle’s figure of isotēs as an agent of disastrous revolution, of the doublet 
phthora/metabolē.43 There is no possibility of acceding to claims so inimical to the narrative 
and protreptic substance of the poem, only of silencing them or of reducing them to a kind of 
harmless mockery.44 But these forms of narrative and characterological suppression, as we 
                                                        
 
42 In Iliad 2, Thersites’ “disorderly words” urge the common soldiers to abandon their noble commanders and sail 
home, a defection that would bring the Iliad to a premature end. When Odysseus’ companions in the Apologoi 
contest his unequal share of the expedition’s spoils, they doom the expedition and nearly deprive Odysseus of his 
nostos. On the early modern literary history of catastrophization and its intersections with philosophical 
materialism, see Passannante 2019. For a contemporary example, see Mulhern 2013, who develops a Marxian 
concept of metatextual catastrophe in twentieth-century British novels. The genre that Mulhern identifies as 
“condition of culture novels” is centrally concerned with the question of how “culture” (and the novelistic tradition 
itself) can be accessed and appreciated by its characters and readers. In these representations, efforts by working 
class characters to access “culture” result in death and disaster. Catastrophe thus figures the inability of the British 
novel to imagine, under capitalism, the broadening of its own socioformal limits to include the working class. 
43 Pol. 5.1301a. See Polansky 1991: 325. 
44 To address the latter case, it is important to acknowledge that there are archaic genres capable of 
accommodating non-elite protagonists, especially iambos. Much closer to Homeric epos, however, is the tradition 
of “low-mimetic epic” (Thalmann 1988: 16 n. 41) attested in Margites, which Aristotle adduces as the Homeric 
precursor of Attic comedy (Poetics 1448b) derived from an earlier genre of psogos, “blame poetry.” It is the 
mimēsis of “inferior persons” (phauloi); hence figures like Thersites, Dolon, Irus, and Hephaestus are perhaps 
reflexes of this tradition (Nagy 1979: 260 notes in particular the rhyme between Thersites and Margites; see 
further Buchan 2012: 60-66). As a versatile “matrix genre” (Bakker 2013: 2), Homeric epos is entirely capable of 
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have seen, are not the end of things; the dream of absolute equality lingers in aesthetic form 
even as it disappears from the plot. 
The intersection of catastrophe and egalitarian agitation organizes the general outlook 
and scope of this study.45 Not every claim of equality provokes a catastrophizing response. 
Indeed, many claims leave untouched the poetic and political prioritization of wealth, birth, and 
status. The figures of Achilles and Thersites represent a paradigmatic opposition in this regard, 
a litmus test for distinguishing between two kinds of egalitarian logic: one that is 
accommodated within the socionarrative order, and one that is vigorously rejected as the 
harbinger of catastrophe. In his famous assembly speech in Iliad 1, Achilles protests that 
Agamemnon’s share of the spoils of the war is out of proportion with his material 
contributions. In Iliad 2, a second assembly is convened in which Thersites makes the same 
claim. In their outcomes, these parallel protests are very different, but so too are the kinds of 
equality that they advance. Achilles asserts that all of the princes, Agamemnon included, are 
coequals, “peers.” The precise details of this principle are contested, of course, but every 
character seems to recognize its abstract validity. Achilles’ cri de coeur would redistribute 
resources among characters, the princes, who are already entitled to a share of the plot. Thus 
his egalitarian claim can be processed and resolved, albeit “with countless woes,” by the plot of 
                                                        
 
including comic and low-mimetic episodes (Nagy 1979: 253; on the complexities and ambiguities of this process, 
see Rosen 2007: 67-116). But this flexibility does not in fact open up the genre to more egalitarian forms of 
characterization. The social, ethical, and somatic inferiority of the non-elite figures in epic makes them the objects 
of blame, and their access to narrative prominence is usually gained at the cost of their abasement as characters.  
45 My study focuses specifically on social conflicts that each text invests with catastrophic moment: in the Iliad, the 
princes against the Thersites as the voice of the plēthus; in the Odyssey, Odysseus against his hetairoi; in Works 
and Days, the landowning laborers against the workless poor; and in the Theognidea, the disaffected aristocrats 
against the emergent mercantile class. 
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the Iliad. Indeed, it is this process of political settlement that drives the story in the first place. 
But what Thersites proposes—the kind of equality that interests us—is beyond the pale: his 
egalitarian reasoning illicitly asserts the equality of common soldiers with the princes on the 
basis of their common belonging to the army of Achaeans. 
Homer, Hesiod, and Theognis offer the same diagnosis of the threat of “absolute” 
equality: there is a kernel of social antagonism that cannot be processed within the prevailing 
forms of political contestation, consensus building, and persuasion. It can only be ignored or 
repressed, because to resolve it in favor of equality would be to level the genre’s most 
fundamental social premises and, therefore, to level the genre itself. As a literary figure, 
catastrophization serves several purposes. The notion that radical equality will effect a textual 
and political catastrophe creates opportunities in which these texts can characterize their 
protagonists and develop important ideas regarding authority, violence, and dissent, as we will 
see; it also serves as an ideological pretense for elites who wish to cling to their privileges. But 
what recommends the notion most urgently is its truth. The content of early Greek poetry 
discerns with astonishing lucidity that it is an enterprise founded on social exclusion and that it 
cannot metabolize demands for radical equality. At the same time, it engages with these 
impossible demands and even envisions the kind of world that they would usher in. It is 
through such an impasse that these texts develop a remarkable fusion of egalitarian politics and 
utopian aesthetics. 
I should acknowledge here that the credence and conceptual prominence that I grant to 
the figure of catastrophe may for some readers betray a naïve investment in a model of 
hyperbolic social antagonism according to which claims of radical equality either change 
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everything or change nothing.46 Against such a model, one might maintain that no forms of 
exclusion are in any sense necessary to protect the social order from catastrophe. Authority is 
by its nature negotiated, structures of domination are constructed, and the task of socially 
informed literary criticism is to uncover the openness and contingency of relations of power.  
I think, however, that these assumptions are sustained by an implicit confidence in the 
dynamism of our own political order and its capacity for non-catastrophic emendation.47 
Through halting, incomplete reforms, capitalist democracies have extended political equality to 
groups that were once denied a share in public life. But these achievements have not curbed 
the fundamental injustice of economic exploitation and the inequality that is its precondition 
and result. The protagonist of our own collective futures is capital, the service of wealth, and it 
has been this way for nearly two centuries. This stark fact should weigh heavily on our 
interpretations of the political life of ancient texts—whether to prioritize mutability or impasse, 
institutional actualities or dreams of revolution. These choices are informed to some extent by 
                                                        
 
46 This kind of polarity figures centrally in Rancière’s political thought (see pp. 29-30). “Whoever has no part—the 
poor of ancient times, the third estate, the modern proletariat—cannot in fact have any part other than all or 
nothing” (1999: 9). For a similar formulation, see Badiou 2009b: 140-41; both ultimately draw on the language of 
socialist agitation and sloganeering (e.g. in the Communist Manifesto and the Internationale—“nous ne sommes 
rien, soyons tout”). Hallward 2006 offers an incisive criticism of this idea in the context of egalitarian political 
strategy: “Rancière doesn’t consistently recognize the immeasurable difference between ‘nothing’ and ‘very little’, 
between ‘no part’ and a ‘minimal part’. Yet there are many who, rather than having no part, have a very small one, 
a minimal or marginal share that is nonetheless something rather than nothing. It is vital for any universalist 
project to be appropriately articulated with this interested, assertive or defensive aspect” (128).  
47 Liberal political theory has a long history of denigrating militant, uncompromising activism, especially if it 
espouses principles of radical equality; for a critical theory of zealotry, intransigence, and fanaticism, see Toscano 
2010. On the traditions of political extremism in an American context (especially concerning radical abolitionism), 
see Olson 2007, 2009; and Toscano 2014, who remarks “by treating fanaticism as an aberration, the pejorative 
tradition that Olson identifies and which I tried to explore in my own Fanaticism, presents political extremism as in 
some regard unpolitical, while often backhandedly recognising that it is in fact too political. This oscillation is 
symptomatic of the ways in which liberalism in particular seeks to monitor the boundaries of proper politics, to 
adjust political conviction and action within a tolerable bandwidth” (1). In my readings of political subjectivity in 
early Greek poetry, I attempt to preserve the fanatical and intransigent qualities of radical egalitarianism. 
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one’s outlook on the political situation of modernity. To paraphrase Fredric Jameson, it can be 
easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism, or of whatever regime seems 
to fill the horizon of our shared future.48 In this sense, the Achaean princes are correct: there 
are certain kinds of inequality that cannot be abolished without abolishing the order of things, 
and the beneficiaries of the existing order would regard such a loss as the end of the world. This 
is why the tendency in early Greek epos to catastrophize radical equality deserves to be taken 
seriously. 
 
Subjective Figures 
In the previous section, I examined some of the blind spots of approaches to early Greek 
poetry that identify political agency with narrative agency. It must be conceded, however, that 
this identification has some considerable advantages. Because protagonists are the most 
familiar and richly articulated characters, they provide us with an abundance of material for 
understanding their political motives and tracing their actions over the duration of the plot. By 
contrast, egalitarian politics is staged in rare, punctual events and by minor characters whose 
identities and motives tend to be obscure. To understand how this kind of political subjectivity 
is rooted in conditions of social and poetic exploitation, I turn to the work of contemporary 
                                                        
 
48 Jameson 2003: 76; widely quoted but often attributed to Slavoj Žižek. The expression probably dates back, in a 
slightly different form, to an essay by H. Bruce Franklin on J. G. Ballard’s post-apocalyptic fiction (1979). For a more 
recent elaboration of the dictum, emphasizing the loss of hope in alternatives to capitalism rather than fear of 
future catastrophes, see Fisher 2009. The figure of catastrophe, of course, is not restricted to cultural expressions 
and imaginaries. It is a material reality, as a number of contemporary social and environment critics have 
observed. For just one example, see Mike Davis’ Planet of Slums on the catastrophic consequences of neoliberal 
economic policy in the third world. 
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Marxian political theorists Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière. It will be useful to briefly situate 
their approaches in the broader context of Marxian political thought and in engagements 
between Marxism and Classics more specifically.  
One of Marx’s core intellectual commitments, which he shares with the traditions that 
followed him, was to understand the relation between political mobilization and the objective 
forces of social and economic production, between proletarian revolution and the science of 
human history. There are subtle and varied ways of putting these two terms into relation, but 
as Étienne Balibar has argued, Marx and his epigones developed two divergent classes of 
answers.49 The first kind prioritizes “science,” the explication of how objective social conditions 
(exploitation, alienation, crisis, etc.) variously galvanize or stymie revolutionary political 
activism in the working class. The second kind considers working class consciousness and 
organization to have a distinctive logic that cannot be treated as an epiphenomenon of 
objective social forces. This kind of approach prioritizes the subjective commitment of 
revolutionaries to their cause, their sense of timing, tactics, and strategy, and the way that they 
put themselves in relation to the state, the bourgeoisie, and the working class.50 
Marxist methodologies in Classical Studies draw overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, from 
the first tradition, that is, the historiography and sociology of class struggle.51 The most familiar 
                                                        
 
49 Balibar 1995: 115, “In the one case, revolutionary practice takes absolute priority over all thought (truth is 
merely one of its moments). In the other, that practice is, if not subject to thought, at least presented in all its 
various ramifications by a science of history.” 
50 There are a number of variations on this distinction, for instance, between ethics and sociology, idealism and 
materialism, and humanistic and scientistic brands of Marxism; see Goldmann 1957 (“Is There a Marxist 
Sociology?”). 
51 Major works of Marxian scholarship in Classical Studies include the historiography of de Ste. Croix 1981; Wood 
1989; Garlan 1988; and Hindess and Hirst 1975; see McKeown 1999 for further references. Peter Rose is the 
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Marxists in Classics include historians such G.E.M. de Ste. Croix and literary scholars such as 
Peter Rose, whose work is closely attuned to the material and historical contexts of archaic 
poetry.52 A similar preference characterizes Marxist intellectual traditions in general, in which 
the term “voluntarism” is sometimes used to disparage arguments that focus on revolutionary 
subjectivity per se, conceived as an autonomous activity, for being insufficiently grounded in 
the analysis of political economy.53 One important exception is the work of a circle of 
philosophers who lived through and participated in the abortive uprisings in France of May 
1968. The most prominent are Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou, both of whom appear 
regularly in the chapters that follow. 
The depth of Badiou’s philosophical interventions exceeds the scope of this chapter, but 
his significance here is his unusual conception of the historical discontinuity of egalitarian 
                                                        
 
leading proponent of Marxist literary readings in Classics (see 2012, 1997, 1993, 1992, 1988). On class conflict and 
Athenian drama, see the work of George Thomson and David Roselli (esp. Roselli 2014 for an overview); see 
further Konstan 1995 and 1994 for readings of Greek tragedy informed by Marxian ideology critique. J.-P. Vernant 
drew extensively on Marx’s work (see Vernant 1990: 11-28; Rose 2012: 187; and a criticism of one of Vernant’s 
readings in Ste. Croix 1981: 63). There is also the extraordinary case of Sebastiano Timpanaro, whose life and work 
blended philology with militant Marxism. There are, as far as I know, no edited volumes on Marx and Classics and 
only two journal editions devoted to the topic in the last 45 years: the 1975 edition of Arethusa and the 1999 
edition of Helios (26.2). In the latter, see especially Morley’s despondent editorial introduction. But it is misleading 
to gauge the impact of Marx on Classics by the number of programmatically “Marxist” studies. Many thinkers who 
have impacted Classics—Lacan, Žižek, Althusser, Deleuze, Foucault, Benjamin, Adorno, Gramsci, and Timpanaro (to 
name just a few)—are deeply indebted to Marx. Likewise, my explicit references to Marx are infrequent (except in 
Chapter 3) compared to the work of some of his twentieth and twenty-first century inheritors. Even so, I find 
Francis Mulhern’s description of “Marxist formalism” well suited to the present study: “the noun emphasiz[es] the 
making of meaning as the proper object of literary study, the modifier mark[s] off an orientation in historical 
understanding and a political commitment” (2013: 1).  
52 Rose is very attuned in his readings of Marx to the competing claims of “science” and of “revolution,” seeing the 
terms involved in a dialectical process in which utopian aspirations for freedom have to work through concrete 
material conditions (see Rose 1992: 17-20). 
53 See Blackledge 2008. Hallward 2009 proposes a conception of “dialectical voluntarism” and identifies 
voluntaristic dimensions in Marx. 
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militancy.54 For Badiou, politics is a process, “a procedure,” that assembles a collection of 
militant activists around the shared conviction that some momentous event has transpired, an 
event that has opened up the possibility of reconfiguring the social situation on the basis of 
radical equality. Deliberately narrow, this definition of politics finds its examples in communist 
and proto-communist uprisings since the French Revolution, and before that, in the scattered 
slave and peasant revolts of the preindustrial world (including, notably, Spartacus’ rebellion).55 
This process is always localized: it unfolds in response to current events and crises, and it 
grapples with a sequence of singular examples rather than with abstract concepts.  
On the other hand, Badiou’s brand of Marxism is unconventional in that it essentially 
passes over the critique of political economy, which is arguably the most influential aspect of 
Marx’s work in an academic context.56 Militant subjectivity for Badiou is organized around an a 
priori commitment (“fidelity”) to the truth of the revolutionary project, a truth that cannot be 
verified within the existing sociopolitical order and that therefore appears nonsensical to its 
opponents. It does not draw its motivation or persuasiveness from a factually exhaustive 
analysis of economic conditions. The very existence of a state, a system that regulates 
participation in social and civic life on the basis of unequally distributed qualifications, means 
that there will be sites around which this militancy can organize itself. For Badiou, the 
                                                        
 
54 Badiou’s magnum opus is his 1988 Being and Event (2005a), developed into a trilogy with Logics and Worlds 
(2009a) and L’Immanence des vérités (2018; not yet translated). On politics specifically, see Metapolitics (2005b) 
and The Communist Hypothesis (2008b). In the vast secondary literature on Badiou, the best introduction to his 
work is still Hallward 2003; see Bosteels 2011a and Ruda 2009 on Badiou and politics. His approach to aesthetics 
(in Handbook of Inesthetics, 2005c) does not have real traction on the issues in my study. 
55 On the organization of a militant, collective subject in Spartacus’ rebellion, see Badiou 2009a: 51-54. 
56 See Toscano 2008 on Badiou’s distinctive understanding of Marxism, contrasted both with Marxian political 
economy and with the post-Marxian turn to discourse (e.g. in the work of Laclau and Mouffe). 
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emergence of revolutionary sequences in history is the intermittent actualization of a 
transhistorical idea, namely, that the egalitarian transcendence of class society is possible.57 It is 
a hypothesis that, after several millennia of testing, has been neither verified nor refuted. 
My readings of early Greek politics assume a similar relation between historical 
conditions and egalitarian subjectivity. I am interested in how claims of radical equality attempt 
to intervene in specific sociopolitical contexts: how Thersites challenges the nexus of violence 
and authority in the Iliad, how the hetairoi subvert the privileges of chieftaincy in the Odyssey, 
how the workless poor undermine the central role of private agricultural estates in Works and 
Days, and how Theognis reconfigures partisan factionalism in the Theognidea. On the other 
hand, my goal is not to provide an exhaustive account of the manifold inequalities that these 
disparate social situations engender. Nor is it to explain how, in an historical or sociological 
sense, such conditions give rise to egalitarian challenges. The conditions represented in these 
texts are quite varied, ranging from nomadic warrior bands to stable chieftaincies and 
bourgeoning city-states. The continuity of these cases, the reason that they belong in the same 
study, has to do with their common subjective design.  
                                                        
 
57 “What is the communist hypothesis? In its generic sense, given in its canonic Manifesto, ‘communist’ means, 
first, that the logic of class—the fundamental subordination of labour to a dominant class, the arrangement that 
has persisted since Antiquity—is not inevitable; it can be overcome … As a pure Idea of equality, the communist 
hypothesis has no doubt existed since the beginnings of the state. As soon as mass action opposes state coercion 
in the name of egalitarian justice, rudiments or fragments of the hypothesis start to appear” (Badiou 2008b: 35). 
On the critical reception of Badiou’s claim, see Bosteels 2011b: 34-37. 
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In the following section, I discuss in detail the work of Jacques Rancière, Badiou’s 
contemporary, but I should acknowledge here that I have already deployed a version of his 
distinction between two senses of the word “politics.”58 
Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and 
consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution 
of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution. I propose to 
give this system of distribution and legitimization another name. I propose to call 
it the police. (1999: 28) 
 
The initial gloss accounts for what in ordinary language would be recognized as “politics.” In a 
typically polemical move, Rancière reclassifies this entire field under the heading of “police,” 
meant as a pun on polis.59 The conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon is, paradigmatically, 
an exercise in police politics, because it is a question of negotiating the apportionment of 
power and wealth between individuals who already have a determinate place in the social 
order.60 But the kind of politics that Rancière valorizes amounts to a dislocation or torsion in the 
social order, “whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s 
                                                        
 
58 Rancière’s central work on politics is Disagreement (1999); see further On the Shores of Politics (2007) and the 
concise “Ten Theses on Politics” (2001). See n. 72 for general introductions to his work. On Rancière’s political 
thought, see Clarke 2013; May 2008 and 2012, who reads Rancière specifically in relation to anarchist politics. 
59 Rancière insists that his use of “police” is “non-pejorative.” It should not be confused with actual police 
departments, the military, or “state apparatus” in general. It is simply the social order of a community, its division 
into determinate social spaces and classes with determinate functions. “It is police law, for example, that 
traditionally turns the workplace into a private space not regulated by the ways of seeing and saying proper to 
what is called the public domain, where the worker’s having a part is strictly defined by the remuneration of his 
work. Policing is not so much the ‘disciplining’ of bodies as a rule governing their appearing, a configuration of 
occupations and the properties of the spaces where these occupations are distributed” (1999: 29). The pun on 
“polis” derives from Rancière’s reading of Plato, especially Republic, which, he contends, is the canonical vision of 
the polis as a functionally regimented order (1999: 65-69 on Plato’s “archipolitics”; see Tarnopolsky 2010 for a 
critical reconstruction and evaluation of Rancière’s reading of Republic). 
60 In a suggestive sketch, Rancière adduces the community of Homeric heroes as an expression of police politics 
and Thersites as a political subject who exposes the forms of domination that underlie heroic communal equality 
(2010: 30, 32). See Chapter 1 for a fuller discussion. 
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destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen and makes heard a discourse 
where once there was only a place for noise.”61 This is precisely the kind of activity that early 
Greek poetry invests with catastrophic danger: efforts to make seen and heard bodies and 
discourses that lack the qualifications to be seen or heard on the stage of poetic 
representation.  
The modes of collective militancy that Rancière and Badiou identify as “politics” are not 
fully realized in early Greek poetry. As I emphasized earlier, the egalitarian claims that are 
allowed to surface are typically silenced in the span of a few passages. But the silencing is not 
necessarily absolute, because radical equality is excluded only from the parts of the poetic 
edifice that cannot dispense with aristocratic or wealthy protagonists. In other words, equality 
is excluded from a poetics that, in an Aristotelian fashion, privileges plot as the mimesis of 
action and in which the actors are qualified and motivated by their character traits (narrowly 
speaking, by their wealth and status). But to restrict egalitarian politics to what can be 
emplotted in the action of a poem is to overlook other forms of expression that poetry can 
support. One of these expressions is aesthetics: involved descriptions of sounds and images 
that would be left out of any concise summary of a plot. Aesthetics, I argue, constitutes a 
sheltered medium for the expression of egalitarian politics, an enclave within the hostile 
                                                        
 
61 Rancière 2010: 30. There is another wrinkle, because in addition to distinguishing between police (la police) and 
(properly) egalitarian politics, Rancière sometimes divides the former into la politique and le politique, a distinction 
(hinging on the masculine and feminine French articles) that has a critical significance in the political thought of the 
French left, amounting to the difference between “politics as usual” (la politique) and the ontological conditions of 
possibility for human community in general (le politique). The significance of the distinction for Rancière is 
contested; see Marchart 2007: 159-62 and Chambers 2011. 
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contexture of the poem at large in which the idea of equality can take on utopian valences. 
Expelled from the plot, egalitarian claims return as aesthetic forms. 
 
Aesthetics 
There is a deepening interest among Classicists in how Greeks and Romans represented 
sensory experience in general and the experience of art in particular. This interest has drawn 
renewed attention to traditions of aesthetic thought in philosophy and art history and inspired 
new methods for attending to the complex entanglements of thought and sensation in 
Antiquity.62 Notable examples include James Porter’s materialist aesthetics, which identifies in 
sensory experience a power that renders thought sensuous and form palpable;63 Steven 
Halliwell’s work on the dialectical interplay between truth and ecstasy as modes of poetic 
engagement;64 and Anastasia Peponi’s aesthetics of fusion, which locates archaic and classical 
mousikē on the cusp between various speculative oppositions (the bodily and the mental, the 
                                                        
 
62 See Halliwell 2002 on the aesthetics of mimesis, and 2011 on truth and ecstasy in ancient aesthetic thought; Telò 
2016 on genre aesthetics in Aristophanes; Gurd 2016 on ancient auditory aesthetics; Grethlein 2017 on aesthetic 
involvement and the interplay between narrative and images in ancient and modern texts; see nn. 63 and 65 on 
Peponi’s and Porter’s contributions. In Latin literature, see Martindale 2010, 2005; Roman 2014; Dressler 2016. 
Collected volumes and journal editions on aesthetics include Arethusa 43.2 (2010), Aesthetic Value in Antiquity (ed. 
Sluiter and Rosen 2012), and A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics (ed. Destrée and Murray 2015). There are also 
dozens of recent articles and chapters on the topic. The upsurge can be roughly gauged by the observation that, 
before 2002, only two to four publications in Classics dealt explicitly each year with “aesthetics” (as indexed by the 
search term “aesthetics” in L’Année philologique); since then the rate has doubled or tripled. The increased 
interest in aesthetics overlaps with several allied topics: the ancient senses (see Purves 2016; Butler 2015; and the 
six volumes of the Routledge “Senses in Antiquity” series), affect (Telò and Mueller (eds.) 2018; Telò 2016), new 
formalism (Wohl 2015), and a renewed attention in Classical art history to style (Neer 2010, 2005) and sensation 
(Platt 2016; Art History 41.3, eds. Platt and Squire). In the broadest terms, these varied approaches share a 
commitment to investigating the experiential and embodied aspects of ancient texts and art objects without losing 
contact with their sociohistorical situatedness.  
63 See Porter 2016, 2010a; articles on aesthetics include 2017, 2013, 2010b, 2009, and 2008a. 
64 See n. 62. 
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conscious and unconscious, among others).65 Despite representing very distinct intellectual 
projects, they share a common interest in the power of sensation to unsettle received 
categories of experience.66 
It is striking, however, that Classicists writing specifically on aesthetics rarely relate its 
disruptive potential to questions of political subjectivity.67 Important exceptions include the 
work of Luke Roman on the social character of aesthetic autonomy in Roman poetics, and of 
Victoria Wohl on Euripidean tragedy.68 It is true that the relation between politics and 
                                                        
 
65 Peponi 2012; “aesthetic response…resides both in and outside language. Or better, it is often situated on the 
cusp between the articulate and the inarticulate, the bodily and the mental, the conscious and the unconscious” 
(7). Peponi’s readings attend to the ways in which these distinctions are blurred and complicated in exemplary 
moments of aesthetic response. Her reading of Odyssey 8, for instance, shows how Odysseus functions as a model 
listener during Demodocus’ song-performance among the Phaeacians. Odysseus famously weeps in response to 
the bard’s tale about an episode of the Trojan war in which Odysseus and Achilles quarrel. From other examples of 
song-performance in the Odyssey, one might infer that the ideal listener remains emotionally removed from the 
contents of song. Hence, Odysseus’ weeping might be thought to impede his aesthetic appreciation. But in fact, 
Odysseus demonstrates later in Book 8 that he was carefully attending to and enjoying the ironies of Demodocus’ 
performance. His pain is mixed with pleasure, his affect with cognition, his self-as-listener with his self-in-song. 
These manifold fusions define the experience of beauty as a melding of supposed opposites. See Halliwell 2011: 
77-92 for a convergent reading of the Demodocus scene. 
66 See Porter 2010: 47, “Aesthetic questions are in different ways undisciplined questions, and that is their virtue. 
They obey few rules, and they tend to fall out of line whenever one wishes to muster them into closed ranks. It is 
on this tendency to refuse to be pinned down to a single place that a larger, more capacious view of aesthetic 
inquiry can be capitalized.” See pp. 37-38 for a similar notion in Rancière. 
67 I say “specifically on aesthetics” because adjacent topics, like the ancient emotions, are frequently related to 
political questions (see Sissa 2009 for an introduction and bibliography). In the case of aesthetics, it is also rare, 
however, for classicists expressly to disavow politically engaged understandings of aesthetics. The typical stance is 
one of silence or neutrality (e.g. Martindale 2005; see n. 68). An exception is Grethlein (2017), who explicitly 
distances aesthetic experience from questions of ideological and class critique (regarding the art criticism of 
Adorno and Horkheimer: “there is not much room for aesthetic experience in a concept that envisages art 
primarily in its relation to ideology,” 4; a dubious characterization—see Rose 1992: 37).  
68 In addition, see Porter 2005 on the aesthetic and political dimensions of self-fashioning in Foucault’s work, 
especially in his evaluations of sexual ethics in Antiquity; Porter 2010: 66-68 for some examples of the “crossover 
effects” between ancient aesthetics and political ideology. Martindale 2005 offers a defense of the value of 
aesthetic judgment in reading Latin literature, as well as a detailed exploration of the political valences of 
aesthetics, referring especially to the traditions of Marxian and socialist art criticism (108-29). Martindale, 
however, ultimately uses these reflections to argue for the indifference (or “non-determinacy”) of aesthetic 
judgments vis-à-vis politics, not for their intersection (see esp. 166). For one appealing way of defining this 
intersection, see Wohl 2015: 7, e.g. “ancient theorizations of tragic psukhagōgia suggest that it is by operating on 
the psyche that dramatic form achieves political force. Aesthetic form provides a syntax for the imaginary 
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aesthetics has been historically fraught. The thesis that art or aesthetic experience is in some 
sense autonomous from other kinds of social practice (ethics, knowledge, or politics, for 
instance) has played a formative, if contested, role in modern aesthetic thought.69 The notion 
of aesthetic autonomy fell under sustained criticism in the 1970s and 1980s from a diverse 
array of thinkers for whom autonomy was an ideological pretense by which aesthetics could 
disavow its own embeddedness in fields of cultural and political domination.70 Under these 
pressures “aesthetics” was denigrated and for a time largely excluded from the lexicon of 
critical theory. The recent revival of aesthetics as a topic of research depended in part on 
efforts by a number of contemporary writers to reconceptualize the political potentialities of 
aesthetic experience, refusing to characterize aesthetics either as absolutely autonomous (l’art 
pour l’art) or as a mere screen for ideology.71 
Of these various approaches, none is more attuned to issues of egalitarian subjectivity 
than the work of Jacques Rancière, who since the late 1990s has synthesized his theorizations 
of leftist militancy and workers’ movements with post-Kantian traditions of aesthetic 
                                                        
 
articulation of the audience’s real conditions of existence; it ‘leads the soul’ to adopt certain subjective relations to 
that reality.” 
69 See Eagleton 1990: 8-9, 23; Roman 2014: 3-11. 
70 See Armstrong 2000: 25-82 and Loesberg 2005 on the critics of aesthetic autonomy, including Derrida, De Man, 
Bourdieu, and Eagleton. More recently, Rockhill 2014 develops an anti-autonomism synthesized with Rancière’s 
account of politics and aesthetics. On the question of aesthetic autonomy in the ancient world, see Porter 2010b 
and Roman 2014. 
71 For example, Eagleton 1990; Loesberg 2005, 1991; Agamben 1999; Armstrong 2000; Scarry 2006, 2000; Badiou 
2005c. On Rancière’s interventions, see n. 72. It is unclear to me why, in terms of the sociology of academic 
disciplines, the return to aesthetics in fields like English and Comparative Literature was so vitally engaged with 
emancipatory politics, whereas in Classics the issue has been far more subdued. On the possibility of intersections 
between research in ancient aesthetics and the field of cultural poetics in Classics (which is perennially engaged 
with political and social questions), see Porter 2010: 68. 
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criticism.72 For Rancière, “aesthetics” is not concerned, in the first instance, with how art 
objects are produced or crafted but with the sensations that art produces in those who 
experience it, a perspective implied by the term’s etymology, as is frequently noted.73 The 
political implications of this definition are illustrated by the place of aesthetics as an historically 
specific mode in which art is experienced and interpreted. Before the eighteenth century, in 
Rancière’s periodization, European theories of art habitually inscribed the form of social 
hierarchy into the production and consumption of art objects. In this “poetic regime of the 
arts,” artistic genres are assessed according to their dignity or value and assigned a place in a 
hierarchy of genres. 
Aristotle’s Poetics is for Rancière the theoretical archetype of the “poetic regime.”  
The representative primacy of action over characters or of narration over 
description, the hierarchy of genres according to the dignity of their subject 
matter, and the very primacy of the art of speaking, of speech in actuality, all of 
these elements figure into an analogy with a fully hierarchical vision of the 
community. (2004a: 22) 
 
In a characteristically condensed fashion, Rancière summarizes a number of well-known (if 
sometimes contested) claims about the Poetics: that it defines drama as the mimesis of action 
                                                        
 
72 Rancière’s book-length studies on aesthetics include The Flesh of Words (2004c), Mute Speech (2011), and 
Aisthesis (2013), and his collections of interviews and essays include The Politics of Aesthetics (2004a), The 
Emancipated Spectator (2009a), Aesthetics and Its Discontents (2009b), and Dissensus (2010). For an introduction 
to Ranciere’s work on aesthetics and politics, the edited volume by Bowman and Stamp (2011) offers a balance of 
summary, application, and criticism (sometimes acute); see further Davis 2013 and Hallward 2006. 
73 See Sluiter and Rosen 2012, whose investigation of aesthetic value in Antiquity strips aesthetics of its modern 
philosophical accretions (“nor will we engage with the problem of ‘modern aesthetics’ as articulated in the 
eighteenth century onwards”) and grounds the term in its Greek etymology: “We take our cue from the 
etymological meaning of the word, derived from the verb αἰσθάνομαι, ‘to perceive,’ and will be looking for 
historicized, embodied, and (potentially) culturally specific reactions to and evaluations of how the outside world 
impinged on the senses of ancient Greeks and Romans” (1-2). For other discussions of αἰσθάνομαι and aesthetics, 
see Halliwell 2009: 10; Porter 2010: 2; Peponi 2012: 2. 
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in the first instance and thereby demotes characterization and narration to subsidiary roles;74 
that it engages in the construction of genre hierarchies;75 and that by promoting the verbal 
medium of plot, it demotes spectacle to the “least artistic and least essential part of poetics” 
(1450b).76 These particular ideas in Poetics reflect a broader outlook—with a long history 
before and after Aristotle—that conceives of art as a regulated way of “making” artifacts 
(poiein, poiēsis). This mode of making privileges certain kinds of language, technique, and 
interpretation over others. The really crucial assertion in the passage above is that poetics in 
this sense “figure[s] into an analogy with a fully hierarchical vision of the community” (22). One 
might be tempted to evaluate this claim in sociological terms, to compare the value hierarchies 
of the Poetics with the social hierarchies of fourth-century Athens, for instance. This response 
would miss the axiomatic force of Rancière’s concept of hierarchy.77 For him, all societies are 
hierarchies. There is no concept of the social, as a mode of organizing human life collectively, 
that does not privilege certain ways of doing, speaking, and thinking over others. It is in this 
axiomatic sense that poetic hierarchies are analogous to social hierarchies: both are sustained 
                                                        
 
74 On the “primacy of action” over character at 1450a, see Halliwell 1986: 149-57; on the tension between enactive 
mimesis and narrative (esp. at 1460a), Halliwell 1986: 127-32. 
75 In Aristotle’s natural history of genres, tragedy is said to surpass epic (1449a); and comedy to surpass lampoon 
(1449b). Poetry is “more philosophical” than history-writing (1449a). 
76 See Halliwell 1986: 66-67, 337-43 on the “devaluation of opsis,” although he also shows that “[Aristotle’s] 
attitude is not as straight-forwardly anti-theatrical as is sometimes alleged” (342).  
77 On “anti-sociology” in Rancière, see Toscano 2011 and Clarke 2013. 
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in part by assumptions about the worthiness and functionality of the activities that constitute 
collective life.78 
At the end of the eighteenth century, in Rancière’s narrative, the conventional system of 
poetic hierarchy began to break down even as new strains of emancipatory politics challenged 
the naturalness of social hierarchy. Gradually and unevenly, artistic forms and media became 
detached from any necessary relationship to artistic content and function.  
Along with genres, the system of representation defined the situations and forms 
of expression that were appropriate for the lowliness or loftiness of the subject 
matter. The aesthetic regime of the arts dismantled this correlation between 
subject matter and mode of representation. This revolution first took place in 
literature: an epoch and a society were deciphered through the features, clothes, 
or gestures of an ordinary individual (Balzac); the sewer revealed a civilization 
(Hugo); the daughter of a farmer and the daughter of a banker were caught in the 
equal force of style as an ‘absolute manner of seeing things’ (Flaubert). (Rancière 
2004a: 32) 
 
There are counterexamples to this trend, as Rancière is well aware,79 but in many quarters of 
19th and 20th-century artistic practice and consumption, art was identified with a distinctive 
mode of sensory experience set apart from other kinds of sensation. Artistic aisthēsis was 
understood to be paradoxical, to scramble the distinctions that organize our experience of the 
world—in Rancière’s idiom, “[a sensation that is] the locus for a form of thought that has 
                                                        
 
78 “In the classical system of representation [i.e., the poetic regime], the tragic stage would become the stage of 
visibility for an orderly world governed by a hierarchy of subject matter and the adaptation of situations and 
manners of speaking to this hierarchy” (Rancière 2004a: 18). 
79 See Rancière 2004a: 24-30 on conceptions of artistic modernism that, in his view, attempt to suppress the 
anarchic decoupling of form, content, and media in 19th- and 20th-century arts. 
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become foreign to itself.”  This formulation is intended less as a definition of aesthetics than as 
a conceptual incitement to underscore art’s historically disputed status.80 
Framed in this way, art harbors intrinsic democratizing and egalitarian potentialities. 
There is no reliable way to delimit in advance what kind of thing art is or is not because the 
singular and unforeseeable dynamics of aisthēsis are the only valid guide. Aesthetic experience 
is thus implicitly an exercise in egalitarian politics—both are activities in which, in ideal terms, 
prior qualifications (social or artistic) are discounted and the distinctions between high and low 
genera (of people or art objects) are dissolved. Just as art has been stripped of any necessary 
relation to genre and form, so egalitarian politics attempts to level the social order such that 
occupation, class, education, race, and so forth are stripped of any necessary relation to the 
exercise of political power. 
What Rancière identifies as “aesthetics” is a kind of intellectual trope rather than a fully 
articulated theory.81 Once one becomes sensitized to his formula, it begins to appear in 
unexpected places. But this analytic promiscuity is, I think, precisely its virtue. For Rancière, 
there is no such thing as aesthetics per se, a field set apart from the vast terrain of sensory 
experience and given over to its own internal concerns. His aesthetics is vague because it is 
                                                        
 
80 See Badiou 2005b: 107-9 on Rancière’s deployment of provocative and methodologically anomalous 
formulations in order to “reactivate conceptual sediments [e.g. egalitarian strains in aesthetic thought] without 
lapsing into history [viz. a detailed analysis of the intellectual history of aesthetics]” (107).  
81 “For me, the term aesthetics does not refer to a discipline. It does not designate a branch of philosophy or a 
knowledge of works of art. Aesthetics is an idea of thought, a mode of thought that unfolds about works of art, 
taking them as witnesses to a question: a question that bears on the sensible and on the power that inhabits the 
sensible prior to thought, as the unthought in thought” (Rancière 2004b: 1-2). 
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essentially conjunctive; it needs to intersect with other fields: aesthetics and historiography,82 
aesthetics and psychoanalysis,83 aesthetics and politics.84 Even his periodization of the 
eighteenth century as the advent of the “aesthetic regime” should not be taken as a terminus 
post quem for instances of egalitarian aesthetics.  
In adapting Rancière’s conception of aesthetics to the contents of archaic poetry, I 
dispense with his restriction of aesthetics to art and human artifacts.85 Aesthetic experiences 
can be provoked by sounds and images that would not qualify as “artistic” in any modern or 
ancient sense of the term. It is worth noting in this respect that many ancient aesthetic 
categories are not limited to any particular kind of object, manmade or otherwise.86 This 
opening of aesthetics beyond art and artifactuality is also a deep commitment of the 
                                                        
 
82 See Rancière 2004a: 35-41 for how the aesthetic revolution undermined the distinction between “writing history 
and writing stories.” 
83 See Rancière 2009c on the “aesthetic unconscious” in Freud. 
84 The formula “aesthetics and X” would seem to refuse the notion of aesthetic autonomy, but Rancière retains this 
notion in a paradoxical but appealing way (2010: 115-19). Aesthetic experience is autonomous, but precisely 
because it refuses to conform to the (capitalistic) sundering of sensation from reason, activity from passivity, etc. 
In other words, aesthetics is autonomous precisely because of its singular and unforeseeable modes of 
heteronomy (entanglement with external fields). It defines a field set apart by its illicit and ungrounded 
connections with politics, philosophy, and “forms of life.” 
85 It is more correct to say that Rancière restricts aesthetics to human artifacts when he refers to the “aesthetic 
regime of the arts” (2004a: 22), i.e. the contemporary configuration of artistic production and consumption since 
Kant. But he also conceives of a “primary aesthetics” that is concerned with the underlying ways in which sensory 
experience is configured in any given social order (this is his famous “distribution of the sensible”). The primary 
aesthetics is prior to any notion of the arts. On the thorny problem of defining art or “the arts” in archaic Greek 
thought, see Finkelberg 1998; Porter 2010: 25-48 and 2013.  
86 See Porter 2010: 39-40 on “aesthetics more broadly conceived,” 48-49 on the aesthetics of the everyday; 2015, 
esp. on the “material sublime” and the figure of nature in Longinus (382-536). But “ancient aesthetics” is 
sometimes taken to mean, in the first instance, reflections on and theorizations of ancient art (e.g. the usage in 
Destrée and Murray 2015). 
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philosophical tradition in which Rancière intervenes.87 One of the concepts that I have invoked 
in the preceding discussion—semblance—plays a crucial role in Adorno’s effort in Aesthetic 
Theory to situate the aesthetics of artworks in the broader context of sensory experience, and 
especially in relation to natural beauty.88 
Nature is beautiful in that it appears to say more than it is. To wrest this more 
from that more’s contingency, to gain control of its semblance [Schein], to 
determine it as semblance as well as to negate it as unreal: This is the idea of art. 
(Adorno 1997: 78) 
 
The “more,” for Adorno, is the sense that nature harbors potentialities in excess of human 
mastery.89 Because these potentialities cannot be realized under the conditions of capitalist 
exploitation, the “more” is a semblance—at once a false illusion of the world as it is not and an 
illumination that hints at (without directly depicting) a utopian world that could exist. Adorno 
takes the semblance character of natural beauty as a model for aesthetic experience in general, 
because the latter too hints at the possibility of an emancipated society.90 Semblance thus 
                                                        
 
87 Kant, Hegel, and Adorno, for instance, each situate the beauty of art in relation to the beauty of nature. For 
Hegel, natural beauty is deficient in various ways but anticipates human art as the fullest realization of the Idea of 
beauty (1975: 143, “The Deficiency of Natural Beauty”). On Adorno, see n. 89; on Kant, see Chapter 3. 
88 “Semblance” translates German Schein in Adorno’s work. Commenting on the use of this vocabulary in Adorno 
and Walter Benjamin, Weiss (2011: 10 n. 7) notes that “‘Semblance’ captures the potentially illusory aspect of 
Schein but does not quite connote the German sense of the shining or lighting involved in Schein. What is more, 
there is no escaping its close link to Erscheinung, appearance.” There is no succinct definition of semblance in 
Adorno, but he discusses the concept programmatically in Aesthetic Theory (esp. 100-18). The value of semblance 
emerges through its dialectical interplay with truth. “Thus the semblance character of the work of art is its ability 
to reach beyond the limitations of art’s material object-ness to suggest the possibility of an ontological difference 
that is captured by the notion of a ‘more.’” (Gritzner 2015). More recently, Brian Massumi (2016) has repurposed 
“semblance” in his work on affect theory and the contemporary arts. His use of the term in certain respects 
complements Adorno’s: semblance is a sensory event that implicates some immaterial potentiality (“the virtual”) 
in excess of what actually exists (like Adorno’s “the more”).  
89 See Flodin 2011 on natural beauty in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory.  
90 “Art not only challenges the dominance of exchange value and instrumental rationality but also raises the trace 
of the nonidentical into a hint of reconciliation between nature and culture, a reconciliation that would 
presuppose an end to class domination” (Zuidervaart 1997: 6). 
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entails that sensory experience become “more than it is,” that it exceed the immediate 
functions and concepts that circumscribe it. 
It is all too easy to find instances in early Greek poetry in which sensory experience is 
circumscribed by the interests of the political and poetic status quo. For instance, the 
distinctions between basilēes and the dēmos or between prosperous farmers and the workless 
poor are not merely understood on a cognitive level. They are made perceptible in the 
phenomenal characteristics of bodies: the ugliness of Thersites is notorious (see Chapter 1), and 
Hesiod portrays in minute detail the repulsive physical effects of hunger and poverty (see 
Chapter 3). In the assembly scenes of Iliad 2, the dēmos shouts inarticulately, like waves and 
wind (209-10, 333-35, 394-97), in response to the articulate speeches of the princes. The 
formed and the unformed, the ugly and beautiful: these are the blunt aesthetic coordinates of 
social exclusion.91 The readings that I develop in the following chapters attend to still more 
complicated channels through which the regularities of sensory experience become coopted by 
regimes of inequality.  
These sensory certainties can collapse under the impact of an egalitarian claim. One of 
the purely descriptive results of this study is the observation that scenes of egalitarian agitation 
tend to be imbued with rich sensory language. To anticipate my reading in Chapter 1: when 
Thersites is struck on the back by Odysseus and silenced, he falls before the eyes of the 
assembled Achaeans, and his back curves down and out in an unusual shape that has no exact 
                                                        
 
91 See Vernant 1991: 36, “the Greek body of antiquity … appears like a coat of arms, and through emblematic traits 
presents the multiple ‘values’ concerning the life, beauty, and power with which an individual is endowed, values 
he bears and which proclaim his timē, his dignity and rank.” 
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counterpart in Homer. In isolation, these details have no particular importance, but in the 
context of this scene and of the Iliad at large, they figure Thersites as suspended in a state 
between falling and rising, between succumbing to coercion and resisting it. The appearance of 
his arched back confounds the expectation, reinforced endlessly in the battle scenes of the 
Iliad, that violence is a tool of physical compulsion that necessitates obedience among the 
ordinary soldiers. Thersites expresses through an aesthetic semblance what he cannot express 
with his eloquence: an egalitarian situation in which bodies, no matter how despised, are 
indifferent to political coercion. 
One of the virtues of Rancière’s aesthetics is his refusal to posit any definite relation 
between aesthetic experience and political action (or inaction). He makes no promises that 
audiences, spectators, or readers can or should be inspired by art to organize collectively 
against “the police.”92 Indeed, he opposes the very notion that action (rallies, strikes, or 
electoral organization) is in any sense the fruition of aesthetic experiences seen, in themselves, 
as not fully political. Such a notion would only recapitulate the regressive value hierarchies that 
egalitarian politics are supposed to confront.93 Conceiving aesthetics as a political end in itself is 
helpful in some ways for reading early Greek epos, in which, as I have argued, egalitarian 
agitation is generally suppressed on the level of the plot and never reaches an external telos. 
And yet, there is an abiding sense in this material that egalitarian aesthetic encounters are 
                                                        
 
92 Rancière’s concept of aesthetics, in other words, has no didactic function vis-à-vis politics, pace Davis 2013. 
93 See Rancière 2009a: 16-19.  
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interrupted, partial visions of alternative social and poetic worlds.94 Thus aesthetic expressions 
of equality do not simply echo the content of discursively articulated demands for political 
equality, because the figures who advance such demands in early Greek poetry are not 
permitted to articulate their visions of equality at any length. Aesthetic forms pick up where 
these figures are forced to leave off, by gesturing toward forms of egalitarian subjectivity—
ways of organizing and belonging together—and offering a glimpse at a world in which the 
senses are not complicit in maintaining the political and poetic status quo. 
 
Utopias 
When a claim of radical equality surfaces in a poem, it opens up diverging paths.95 If the 
claim were realized, as I have discussed, then the poem would veer in a fundamentally different 
direction—an Iliad of peasant soldiers, an Odyssey of coequal comrades, a Works and Days for 
the workless poor. But egalitarian politics is ultimately excluded from the protreptic and 
narrative substance of early Greek poetry. It finds, however, a provisional expression in another 
medium, in the utopian semblances that flash up at the very moment when the threat of 
catastrophe suppresses each egalitarian claim. 
Hellenists working on the intersection of politics and aesthetic form have developed a 
similar concept of literary utopianism. Drawing on Frankfurt School theorists, Peter Rose traces 
                                                        
 
94  As I argue in the following section. If Adorno shares Rancière’s reluctance to assign aesthetics any kind of direct 
political efficacy, he also is better attuned than Rancière to the presence of unrealized political aspirations in 
aesthetic experience; this is the significance of “semblance.” 
95 On narrative multiplicity, counterfactuals, and alternative storylines in Homer, see Russell 2013; Louden 1993; 
Morrison 1991. 
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how literary texts allow their narrow ideological content—their advocacy for particular class 
interests—to expose its own contradictions, thereby pointing to the utopian transcendence of 
the text’s sociohistorical limits.96 In the Iliad, for instance, the ideological conflict between 
Agamemnon and Achilles ultimately projects “a utopian vision of a just community of truly 
excellent men who exercise their innate capability” (91). Working on Euripidean tragedy, 
Victoria Wohl has identified a “formal egalitarianism” at work in the dramas’ realism, their 
lower-class characters, and their tendency to undermine the mythological and heroic source 
material.97 But this utopian tendency is suppressed by the very resources that engender it. In 
her reading of Electra, Wohl shows how the generic conventions of tragedy demand that 
audiences disavow the drama’s own utopian outlook, “a vision of egalitarianism premised on 
the claim that a man’s virtue cannot be judged by his wealth or birth but only by his ethos” 
(64).98 For both Rose and Wohl, literary utopianism does not involve explicit programs or 
images of ideal social orders but, rather, a formal projection, the presentation of scattered 
elements from which a better society could be constructed.99 This variety of utopian expression 
is in some sense alien to or at odds with the texts that produce it. 
                                                        
 
96 See Rose 1992: 33-42 for a detailed discussion of Jameson’s double hermeneutic and the utopian impulse. 
97 Wohl 2015: 63-88, esp. 63 on Edith Hall’s notion of a “utopian tendency” in tragedy, also cited by Martindale 
2005: 121 in his discussion of Marxian aesthetics. 
98 “This tragedy raises egalitarian ideas that cannot be developed within its own generic structure, and it is the 
structure itself, the deadweight of tragic form, that prevents their development” (2015: 65). 
99 This is what Adorno called (after Stendhal) the promise of happiness—when the formal structure of an artwork 
intimates the possibility that society could be formally renovated, that social inequality and alienation could give 
way to something utopian. Adorno 1997: 12, 82, 311. See Finlayson 2012 on promesse du bonheur in Aesthetic 
Theory. Rose 1992: 42 uses the expression effectively. 
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The aesthetic visions that so reliably attend moments of egalitarian subjectivity in 
archaic epos invites readers, I argue, to see beyond the catastrophic barrier that these texts 
have erected between their actual poetic priorities and their implicit utopian desire.100 “Desire” 
may be too strong of a word: literary texts do not have univocal objectives, and it is difficult to 
assign an ideological message to texts as notoriously polyvalent as the Iliad and Odyssey.101 
Among the texts in this study, Works and Days comes closest to conveying a persistent and 
programmatic yearning for other worlds in which the hardships of the Iron Age are finally 
alleviated. But the desire for utopia does not have to be a desire to see utopias realized, only to 
see them. Even the most self-interested aristocrats in the archaic audiences of Homer might 
have enjoyed the glimpses of strange egalitarian worlds that are allowed to surface in and 
alongside the narrative.102  
Formal utopianism can be shadowed by its more concrete counterparts, the mythical 
utopias of the early Greek imaginary—island paradises, lost races, and divine sanctuaries.103 
Marxian critical traditions are generally averse to utopian fantasies, preferring the more 
dialectically sophisticated notions of utopian form or impulse.104 But in many of the cases 
examined in this study, the two ideas are inseparable. Odysseus’ companions, for instance, 
                                                        
 
100 “Aesthetic theories seem to shadow Utopian ones at every turn, and to make themselves available for plausible 
resolutions of otherwise contradictory Utopian dilemmas” (Jameson 2005: 152). 
101 On the complexities of reconstructing the class and status of the audiences of Homer and Hesiod, see Rose 
1988: 12-13 and 1992: 89-91; Thalmann 1988: 2-3, 26-28.  
102 Jameson (2005: 5) comments on the affective motivations that audiences might have for entertaining utopian 
imagery: “Utopian figures seep into the daily life of things and people and afford an incremental, often 
unconscious, bonus of pleasure unrelated to their functional value or official satisfactions.” 
103 See Clay and Purvis 1999. 
104 See Jameson 2005: xi-xvi. 
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develop formally egalitarian modes of seeing, tasting, and hearing even as they traverse 
fantastical and utopian locales during their doomed homeward voyage. To conclude this 
section, I want to illustrate through an example how these two senses of utopia are related 
and, in some cases, how they cooperate in a common project.  
 
Hephaestus’ workshop in Iliad 18 is stocked with mechanized tripods, voice-activated 
bellows, and robotic servants.105 With the aid of these devices, the Olympians enjoy an eternal 
respite from menial labor. For Aristotle, the Homeric image of an automated utopia confirmed 
an argument at the heart of his Politics: that slaves are functionally interchangeable with 
machines.106 Both are tools that supply livelihood for masters, who are thereby empowered not 
only to live (zēn) but to live well (eu zēn), to devote themselves to the governance of the 
polis.107 
If each tool [ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων] could perform its own task either at our 
bidding or anticipating it, and if shuttles shuttled to and fro of their own accord 
and lyres played themselves—as they say of the statues made by Daedalus or the 
tripods of Hephaestus, of which the poet says, “self-moved they enter the 
assembly of the gods”—then master-craftsmen would have no need of assistants 
nor masters any need of slaves. (Pol. I iv, 1253b) 
 
                                                        
 
105 For the bellows, Il. 18.470-73; for the servants, 417-22. Olympus has automatic gates described at Il. 5.749 = 
8.393. Hephaestus also constructs animate metallic watch dogs for Alcinous at Od. 7.91-94, on which see Faraone 
1987. 
106 On slaves and robots in the Athenian social imaginary, see Devecka 2013, who also discusses the passage at Pol. 
I iv cited below and argues that Aristotle conceives of the replacement of (slave) labor by automata as a real 
possibility (54-55). 
107 See Saunders 1995: 73-74. Marx comments on this passage in Capital 15.3, sardonically comparing Aristotle’s 
(precapitalist) belief that mechanization would alleviate labor and create free-time with the situation under 
capitalism, in which increasing mechanization has in fact placed greater demands on labor and lengthened the 
working day. 
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 Aristotle cites “the poet” here not as a neutral source of science-fiction hypotheticals but as an 
ideological ally. For the Iliad presents a world in which a small class of aristocrats wins 
imperishable kleos while the common soldiers, their subjects, are consigned to a tool-like 
supporting role. Hephaestus’ robots are more perfect, Olympian analogues to the masses who 
toil in obscure obedience on the battlefields before Troy. In this the Iliad follows an axiom that 
persists in many guises throughout early Greek poetry, according to which, as we have seen, 
those with wealth or nobility are assigned the role of dramatic protagonists and those without 
it assume the part of props.  
This close alignment between poetics and politics, however, is occasionally pried apart. 
Consider the passage of Iliad 18 that describes the automated tripods. Thetis finds Hephaestus 
constructing the tripods before she asks him to construct a shield for her son: 
χρύσεα δέ σφ’ ὑπὸ κύκλα ἑκάστῳ πυθμένι θῆκεν, 
ὄφρά οἱ αὐτόματοι θεῖον δυσαίατ’ ἀγῶνα 
ἠδ’ αὖτις πρὸς δῶμα νεοίατο θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι. (18.375-77) 
 
He attached golden wheels under each of their bases, 
so that self-moved they could enter the divine meeting 
and then return home, a wonder to behold. 
 
What excites wonder is presumably that manufactured tools are exercising a kind of autonomy 
from the hands of their masters. But it is equally wonderful that this autonomy is paradoxically 
constrained, as the tripods respond to the beck and call of the gods without detracting one iota 
from their masters’ authority. In this sense, the robots are implicitly contrasted with the human 
servants and subordinates whose role they would fill on Olympus. Among the Achaean and 
Trojan hosts, the common soldiers on rare occasions emerge from the background of the 
narrative and openly defy the wishes of the princely protagonists. But Hephaestus’ devices 
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would in principle usher in a world without social friction between masters and their laboring 
subordinates. This is a kind of world that Hephaestus might be personally invested in creating, 
since his labor as the cup-bearer of the gods is cruelly ridiculed in Iliad 1 (599-600).108 
The Homeric fantasy is also Aristotle’s fantasy: to factor out some of the social-material 
underpinnings that make the political life—or the heroic vocation—possible. The wonder that 
the tripods elicit therefore responds to one of the deepest aspirations of epos, but it also 
concedes that the aspiration is utopian. Only the gods could possess such fantastical devices, 
and even for them it is not a sure thing. The tripods are left, after all, in a state of incompletion, 
as Hephaestus breaks off his work to begin new work on the Shield. Just as utopian semblances 
cannot be realized within the texts that harbor them, so the utopian locales in the early Greek 
imaginary tend to be constitutively inaccessible—situated on spatially remote islands, in the 
distant past, or among the gods. But this very impossibility can have additional utopian 
valences. Thus the laborers who populate the background of early Greek poetry—by virtue of 
their distance from Hephaestan automata—must possess some crucial degree of vitality and 
resistance that distinguishes them from robotic instruments or poetic devices. 
As an image of utopian labor, the description of Hephaestus’ craft stands out against the 
background of the Iliad’s construction of work and class, and it engages in an implicit appraisal 
of the poem’s social content. The aesthetic quality of the description is essential in this respect. 
                                                        
 
108 Indeed, Hephaestus is involved in the only two instances of collective laughter among the gods in Homer, the 
other being at Od. 8.326 (= Il. 1.599). But in the scene from the Odyssey, the assembled gods are laughing at 
Hephaestus’ tekhnai, the invisible chains that he forged to bind Ares and Aphrodite in flagrante (τέχνας εἰσορόωσι 
πολύφρονος Ἡφαίστοιο, 327). Hephaestus’ crafted objects become a kind of substitute for Hephaestus himself, 
saving him both the labor of trying to catch Ares by hand and the social humiliation of laboring. See Brown 1989 
(esp. 287); Thalmann 1988: 17 n. 41. On the politics of laughter in the Iliad, see Buchan 2012: 53-72. 
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The tripods are said to be visually arresting, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι, a phrase that often accompanies 
digressive descriptions of armor, chariots, buildings, and other constructed objects.109 The 
image is a momentary respite from the urgency of the plot, which from the beginning of Book 
18 speeds along with Thetis on her mission to obtain armor for her son. In the decelerated time 
of aesthetic involvement, the poem reflects for a moment on how it and its social premises 
might be otherwise. 
The question is all the more salient because Thetis’ mission culminates in a very 
different kind of image. As Hephaestus constructs the Shield of Achilles, he decorates its surface 
with figures of happy laborers, heroic princes, weddings, communal disputes, and battle. The 
battle scenes reflect specifically Iliadic content, but they are situated among the broader, 
prototypical content of hexameter poetry as a genre.110 As a mise en abyme for the poem that 
contains it, the shield is likewise a grand affirmation of the status quo.111 To complete this 
monument, Hephaestus stops working on his automatons, as if he faced a forced choice 
between two kinds of (metapoetic) labor: to reaffirm the generic priorities of the Iliad or to 
pursue some other, eccentric work that points at obscure possibilities just beyond the vision of 
the story. Even the tripod’s aesthetic appeal is hypothetical, conditioned by powers that only 
                                                        
 
109 Prier 1989: 93-97 remarks that “the existence of a quasi-archaeological, wrought object as a thauma idesthai 
appears each time Homer employs the phrase” (95); he also refers to the wondrous objects in Hephaestus’ 
workshop (96). 
110  See Taplin 1980: 12; Giesecke 2007: 195. Thalmann 1984: 32 discusses hexameter poetry as a way of knowing 
“man’s place in the whole scheme” and as a genre that “exhibited the world’s fullness and variety and discovered 
its essential order.” It is also possible to read the Shield as a far more subversive artifact; see Buchan 2012: 73-93 
on the suspension of purpose and the fracturing of human community figured in many of the Shield’s details. 
111 See Becker 1995 (esp. 4-5) on the Shield as a mise en abyme for audience responses to the Iliad. 
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might be realized (δυσαίατο, νεοίατο).112 The feeling of wonder that attends these unfinished 
devices measures the distance between the story as it is constructed and the utopian 
aspirations that flash in and out of existence at pivotal moments in its construction. 
 
Chapters 
 Each chapter in this study is concerned with a single text: the Iliad (Ch. 1), the Odyssey 
(2), Works and Days (3), and the Theognidea (4). In the following outline, I discuss the 
arguments in each chapter and situate them in the context of the study as a whole.  
Chapter 1, “The Aesthetics of Violence in the Iliad,” examines the role of the masses of 
common soldiers who fight on both sides of the Trojan war. They participate in the war despite 
the fact that its profits (in plunder and glory) are allotted primarily to their aristocratic 
commanders. Their place in this unequal social order and in the narrative project that it 
underwrites is enforced coercively, under the occasionally realized threat of violence by their 
social superiors. I consider two rare instances in which minor characters, Thersites and 
                                                        
 
112 In the context of an oral and aural poetry, what is the significance of the closing detail—that the automatons 
are missing, of all things, their ears? (οἳ δ’ ἤτοι τόσσον μὲν ἔχον τέλος, οὔατα δ’ οὔ πω / δαιδάλεα προσέκειτο: τά 
ῥ’ ἤρτυε, “they had reached this degree of completion, but the wrought ears [handles] were not yet affixed; he 
was forging them…” 378-79.) The term οὔατα (οὖς) refers elsewhere in Homer only to human or animal ears, 
except at Il. 11.633 where it again refers to golden ear-handles on a cup. It is used in idioms that mean “to hear” 
(e.g. αἲ γὰρ ἀπ’ οὔατος εἴη ἐμεῦ ἔπος, “may what I say stay away from my ear!” Il. 22.454, cf. 18.272, 15.129, 
12.442), and Odysseus famously seals his companions’ ears to prevent them from hearing the Sirens (ἑτάροισιν ἐπ’ 
οὔατα πᾶσιν ἄλειψα, Od. 12.177). It seems that at least some of the Olympian automata can speak and hear: the 
bellows seem to take verbal commands from Hephaestus (κέλευσέ τε ἐργάζεσθαι, 18.469) and the synthetic 
servants have voices (18.417). Perhaps the tripods would have the capacity to hear through their ear-handles. In 
this sense, they are unfinished precisely because of their incapacity to receive commands, a deficit that resonates 
with Hephaestus refocusing his efforts on crafting the Shield, a visual, non-aural artifact. The expression 
τόσσον…τέλος could be read differently, however, to mean that the tripods have in fact already reached their 
telos: they are completed, autonomous, non-functional beings deaf to commands and (presumably) blind to the 
glorious epic synopsis of the Shield. 
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Poulydamas, militate against this coercive regime on behalf of the common soldiery. Both cases 
revolve around public acts of violence, when a crowd of soldiers witnesses a body being struck 
and injured. I focus on the aesthetic details of both scenes: the injured bodies bend and bow 
into singular shapes that appear, momentarily, to resist the physical necessity of violence. 
Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, I argue that these scenes are aesthetic 
events that intimate the possibility that collective life could be reorganized on the basis of non-
violent equality. For the Achaean soldiers, this would entail abandoning the war and returning 
home without their commanders; on the Trojan side, it would mean retreating behind the 
safety of the city walls. Such outcomes are clearly incompatible with the Iliad on a thematic 
level, and both moments of popular resistance are suppressed, but the poem offers us 
resources for imagining a utopian alternative to the story as it is actually constructed. 
Chapter 2, “Comrades and Candor in the Odyssey,” considers the band of Ithacan 
soldiers who accompany Odysseus on his voyage home after the conclusion of the Trojan War. 
These companions (hetairoi) share food and plunder equally with one another and practice a 
form of social organization more characteristic of egalitarian hunter-gatherer bands than the 
regimented chiefdoms that prevail in the Homeric world. Their ethos of equality leads them to 
contest the social authority and privileges of Odysseus, who aspires to reestablish himself as 
chief on Ithaca. In particular, Odysseus claims privileged access to the sights and sounds of the 
world that he passes through on his homecoming journey. The companions challenge these 
sensory privileges at crucial moments in the story: they encounter three dangerous objects—
the song of the Sirens, the lotus fruit, and Aeolus’ bag of winds—that are offered to the sensory 
appreciation of anyone who possesses the bare faculty of perception. Building on Jacques 
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Rancière’s notion of the “distribution of the sensible,” I argue that in these encounters, the 
companions experiment with ways of seeing, tasting, and listening that constitute an egalitarian 
rejoinder to Odysseus’ claim of primacy among the crew. 
Chapter 3, “Utopian Poverty in Works and Days,” is a study of Hesiod’s didactic poem 
about farming and household management, in which the author promotes private property and 
self-sufficiency as conditions of the good life. Farmers are exhorted to attend to their ergon 
(“work”), that is, to the management of small agricultural estates. The prerequisite of land 
ownership excludes landless slaves and laborers from Hesiod’s ethical address. In this didactic 
project, Hesiod speaks in the language of injunctions and commands, but the audience is also 
guided toward the good life through a series of exemplary images—for instance, of prosperous 
neighbors working or poor neighbors neglecting to work. This mode of ethical seeing, however, 
can extend beyond the narrow confines of the propertied agrarian interests that initially 
motivate it. I focus on a passage in Works and Days that envisions life in the winter months. The 
section contains a profusion of obscure and evocative figures (shivering old men with three 
feet, an impoverished man whose limbs are at once emaciated and swollen, the “boneless one” 
who gnaws his foot in his fireless home), who are usually interpreted as negative exempla that 
illustrate the steep price of laziness. I argue, however, that these figures are composed in a 
precise way that prevents their assimilation by Hesiod’s practice of ethical image-making. What 
the winter figures have in common is that they lead lives without ergon, without the 
combination of private property and agricultural management whose promotion is the central 
project of Works and Days. By attending closely to the aesthetic details of the winter scene and 
to related descriptions of “worklessness” (aergiē), I argue that the text entertains the possibility 
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that human life and community could be reconfigured without Hesiod’s regime of private 
property. The social inequalities of the era in which the text situates itself are represented not 
as eternal verities but as a temporally variable condition. 
The final chapter, “Song, Beauty, and the Logic of Reaction in the Theognidea,” 
examines the corpus of elegies attributed to Theognis, dated (with uncertainty) to the sixth 
century BCE. Parts of the corpus situate themselves in the aftermath of a successful egalitarian 
revolt in which commoners (deiloi, kakoi) have taken center stage in the political and social life 
of the city of Megara at the expense of the ancestral nobility (esthloi, agathoi). Theognis 
identifies strongly with the latter camp, but he rejects the conservative project (advanced by a 
politically kindred poet, Alcaeus) of attempting to restore aristocratic dominance of the state as 
it was before the egalitarian event. Rather, Theognis’ politics are reactionary: he attempts to 
develop a new kind of collective subject that does not have a place in the defunct social 
taxonomy that formerly restricted participation in the state to the nobility. This account draws 
on contemporary theories of political reaction, in particular those of Alain Badiou. One of the 
chief venues for Theognis’ reactionary experiments, I argue, is song performance in the 
symposium. Theognidean elegy represents its audience as distinct from the ancestral elites as 
traditionally conceived. The aesthetic categories of song appreciation (sophiē, to kalon) are 
constructed to be logically incongruent with the categories of partisan political affiliation. The 
collective subject that Theognis assembles around the beauty of his song subtracts itself from 
public politics, but in doing so it supports the broader project of political reaction by promoting 
and circulating an anti-egalitarian ethos. 
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In these four chapters, I trace how an egalitarian impulse gives rise to divergent 
configurations of political and aesthetic invention: the demand for equality can be effected 
through militant agitation or through silent suffering; it can be voiced by the workless poor or 
by disgruntled aristocrats. Equality signals the presence in archaic poetry of a strange current of 
thought concerning the social and the political. In its most utopian moments, the subjects of 
equality dream not of alternative societies but of alternatives to society as such, a vision in 
which human community is relieved of all bonds, interests, and dissymmetries. We would be 
left with a pure multiplicity of individuals, together but undifferentiated and structureless, like 
dust or sand. In its sheer impracticality, this image and variants that resemble it have elicited 
reproach from advocates of political moderation both within archaic poetry and among its later 
interpreters. Egalitarianism can indeed be associated in these texts with a desire—sometimes 
rebarbative and defeatist—to be done with the social, to disengage from its necessities and its 
impasses and to access an immediate utopian alternative. But as if to compensate for its retreat 
from social actuality, this strain of egalitarianism harbors a deep affinity for sensuous 
experience and for conjuring up aesthetic semblances of worlds that do not and perhaps 
cannot exist.  
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Chapter 1. The Aesthetics of Violence in the Iliad 
 
In Iliad 4, the Achaeans complete their protracted preparations for battle against the 
Trojans. As Agamemnon inspects the assembled army,113 in turn praising and berating his 
commanders for the order of their troops, he comes across Nestor drawing up the Pylian 
contingent: 
ἱππῆας μὲν πρῶτα σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφι, 
πεζοὺς δ’ ἐξόπιθε στῆσεν πολέας τε καὶ ἐσθλοὺς 
ἕρκος ἔμεν πολέμοιο· κακοὺς δ’ ἐς μέσσον ἔλασσεν, 
ὄφρα καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων τις ἀναγκαίῃ πολεμίζοι.  (4.298-301) 
 
First Nestor set up the horsemen with the chariots and wagons, 
and the footmen behind them, many and brave 
to be a bulwark of battle; and he drove the kakoi into the middle 
so that each would have to fight by necessity, even though he was unwilling. 
 
Nestor anticipates that the kakoi, the cowardly soldiers in his contingent, will flee in the face of 
actual combat, so he organizes the battle lines to confine them between their more reliable 
comrades. This particular battle is probably not the only occasion when the kakoi are reluctant 
to fight: the very fact that Nestor can identify them in advance suggests that they constitute a 
class of Achaeans who are habitually unwilling to participate in the war. Nestor must use 
compulsion (ἔλασσεν) even to position them in their ignominious station. 
The word ἀναγκαίη signals that more is at stake in Nestor’s arrangement than shrewd 
battlefield tactics. When characters in the Iliad explain why and how they are participating in 
battle, they often refer to “necessity.” The Trojans fight because of anankē, to protect their 
                                                        
 
113 On the Epipōlēsis or “Tour of Inspection” and its relation to the Catalogue in Book 2 and the Teikhoskopia in 
Book 3, see Kirk 1985: 353; Elmer 2013a: 52. 
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wives and children (8.56-57) or because they would be too ashamed to retreat (6.85). Anankē 
compels the Achaeans to fight in defense of their ships during the Trojan onslaught in Book 12 
(12.178) and soldiers on both sides to advance or retreat when they have no other choice.114 In 
a poem whose central actions play out on or near the battlefield, questions about the causal 
consistency of war assume an architectonic significance for the epic narrative as a whole.115 
Why are given characters advancing or retreating? Why are they joining in battle? Why are they 
participating in the war at all? Aristotle famously assigns a metanarrative function to anankē 
when he recommends in the Poetics that each action in a well-constructed story should follow 
from the preceding actions “by necessity or by probability” (ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς).116 I 
refer to the complex system of necessities that motivate the conduct and continuance of the 
story of the Iliad—especially the story of martial conflict—as the poem’s narrative order. There 
are many kinds of necessity that structure the narrative order: characters are kept engaged in 
their roles through a mix of personal and political commitments, natural forces, and 
psychological needs.117 This chapter is about characters, like Nestor’s kakoi, who are integrated 
                                                        
 
114  For instances of battlefield tactics motivated by anankē, see Il. 11.150, 14.128, 15.345, 15.655, 16.305, 24.667. 
115 The Iliad occasionally thematizes the centrality of battle to its own narrative project. Zeus, for instance, sends 
his deceptive dream to Agamemnon at the beginning of Book 2 precisely in order to “create suffering and groaning 
for Trojans and Danaans through strong battles” (2.38-39). See n. 147 on the “plan of Zeus.” 
116 This expression and its variants occur in Poetics at 1450b, 1451b, and 1452a. See Halliwell 1990: 99-101 and 
Frede 1992 on the meaning of anankē in the expression; O’Sullivan 1995 and Wohl 2014 on eikos; and Heath 1991 
on the relation between the expression and Aristotle’s notion of poetic universality. 
117 See Redfield (1975: 20) on the system of social and psychological necessities that motivate Homeric characters: 
“In the Iliad…individuals are not seen as free, self-defining creatures confronting a society whose structures and 
values they are free to accept or reject. Rather, the Homeric actors are seen as embedded in a social fabric; they 
are persons whose acts and consciousness are the enactment of the social forces which play upon them.” 
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into the narrative order by a particular species of necessity: violence and the threat of violence 
from their social superiors. 
We do not know precisely who the kakoi in 4.300 are, but they are definitely not heroes 
and almost certainly not aristocrats.118 They belong to the mass of undistinguished soldiers who 
populate the background of the epic. This class appears almost exclusively in the context of 
battle or in deliberations about the war, but their participation in both contexts—and by 
extension, their belonging to the Iliad’s narrative order—is rarely justified explicitly. By 
contrast, the Iliad explicates in subtle detail why the central, aristocratic characters (the 
“princes,” basilēes) participate in the war. Achilles, of course, famously questions his own role 
in the conflict, and Agamemnon, Menelaus, and Hector each expresses reservations at various 
points about the necessity of the war.119 Ultimately each overcomes his doubts and commits to 
the task of the poem, not by physical coercion, but out of a sense of duty or honor or out of a 
desire for revenge.120  
It is always worth underscoring that the freedom of these characters to grapple with the 
terms of their own involvement in the war is matched by the relative unfreedom of their social 
inferiors. The treatment of the kakoi in Iliad 4 represents in especially stark terms the kind of 
necessity that can sometimes bind the larger class of common soldiers—designated variously as 
                                                        
 
118 On the place of hērōes in Homeric social structures, see Haubold 2000: 3-9. On the likely meaning of kakoi in the 
Iliad, see van Wees 1992: 352 n. 48. 
119 Agamemnon urges the assembled Achaeans to return home at 9.16-28; Menelaus despairs at the war’s 
apparent interminability at 13.630-35; Hector’s resolve is never really compromised, but he does confess to 
Andromache that he conceives of his own death and the destruction of Troy as inevitable (6.447-49).  
120 These are social and psychological motivations, the “shame and necessity” of Williams 1993; see too Redfield 
1975: 113-19. 
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dēmos, laos, or plēthus—to the conflict.121 It is rare for the princes to use physical violence to 
compel the commons to fight. More often, the compulsion that they apply is indirect and 
structural.122 It is neatly figured by Nestor’s tactical organization of the army: just as the kakoi 
are passively compelled to fight because of their position in the battle lines, so the common 
soldiers in general occupy a position in Iliadic society that compels them to participate in the 
war, “even if [they are] unwilling” (καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων). This is not to say that the members of the 
dēmos are, at any given moment in the narrative, forced to fight against their will. Their 
willingness is just not usually an issue that engages the poem’s attentions; it is given in advance, 
a social fact as self-evident as the distinction between princes and the people.123 I refer to social 
                                                        
 
121 The Iliad presents a vague picture of class structure, even on the level of its terminology. As van Wees (1992) 
observes, this vagueness follows from the poetic priorities of the epic itself, which is not concerned with the 
common soldiers or their relationship with the princes: “if the people lead a shadowy existence in the epics and 
are not often explicitly distinguished from the princes, this is because in the heroic world the social distance 
between prince and ‘common’ man is such that personal contact between them is infrequent, or regarded as 
insignificant, or both, and deemed an unsuitable topic for a story” (81). But we can make some lexical 
observations. The term plēthus refers primarily to a mass of some group of people, but it can, secondarily, refer to 
the ranks of common soldiers as opposed to the aristocratic leadership; LfgrE s.v. πληθύς. The case at Il. 11.305 
expressly refers to the ordinary fighters as opposed to the hēgemōnes. The term plēthus in the assembly scene of 
Il. 2 seems to oscillate between encompassing the whole army (2.143, princes and commoners flock together to 
the ships) and selecting the demotic portion in particular (2.278, the commoners resent Thersites’ attack on the 
princes, referred to as a third party). In any case, conceived as a totality, the Achaean army must be composed 
largely of common soldiers, not elites. One may be reasonably certain that another case, in the proem to the 
Catalogue of Ships at Il. 2.488, refers to the commoners and not the chiefs. See Ford 1992: 86. Dēmos, likewise, 
usually refers to the entire “people” populating a territory but also, in certain cases, to the common people in 
particular. The specifically plebian sense of dēmos appears at Il. 2.198, when, during the flight to the ships, 
Odysseus threatens commoners with his scepter but gently persuades the elites to return the assembly. Most 
often, however, dēmos means “people” in a generic sense indifferent to class. See Donlan 1989: 13-15; van Wees 
1992: 352 n. 48; Geddes 1984; Calhoun 1934. Laos, according to Haubold 2000, refers indistinctly and inclusively to 
“a people” defined primarily by their relation to a leader. See further Donlan 1989: 15-18. On the distinction 
between dēmos and laos, see Haubold 2000: 58 n. 60 and 144 n. 316 for further bibliography. 
122 One important exception, as we will see, appears during the flight to the ships in Iliad 2. See p. 64. 
123 The common soldiers constitute a class in the Marxian sense insofar as they share a relatively disadvantaged, 
exploited relation to the means of production, where “production” is the acquisition and distribution of the spoils 
of war. But the Iliad is extremely vague in its depiction of the social conditions experienced by the plēthus, laos, or 
dēmos (even the terms are difficult; see n. 121). We are offered few details about their status and ancestry, their 
lives before the war, their hopes of advancement, or their internal divisions. This opacity is a serious hinderance to 
understanding the plight of the common soldiers in conventional Marxian terms. Far from belonging to a complex 
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order as a shorthand for the specific kind of inequality between the basilēes and the common 
soldiers. Commoners cannot speak in the assembly and do not have seats in the war council, 
and they obey commands from their aristocratic superiors, on whom they are materially 
dependent for the distribution of spoils. But the subordination of the dēmos is as much a poetic 
as a social issue, because it empowers the poem to focus its tremendous resources on the 
travails of a small group of privileged protagonists, each of whom is endowed with varying 
degrees of martial prowess, wealth, and noble ancestry.124 
In most of the Iliad, this complicity between social and narrative order operates almost 
silently. It is simply assumed that the commoners are quiescent and available to fight for the 
princes, whose exploits and tribulations after all constitute the real interest of the story. This 
regime becomes conspicuous only in the rare moments when it is challenged and when its elite 
supporters must resort to violence to enforce it. I focus on two such moments of socio-
narrative upheaval in this chapter: (1) in Book 2 the rabble-rouser Thersites denounces 
Agamemnon’s exploitation of the common soldiery and tries to incite a popular revolt. He 
                                                        
 
social totality, the common soldiers exist in a kind of void at the edge of the far more articulated world of the 
princes and their retainers. But the commoners’ lack of place precisely is their place in the social order. This 
formula for social domination has been richly theorized by thinkers such as Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou (see 
Introduction, pp. 26-31). Rancière (e.g. 1999: 7-10) explores how political dissent can be exercised by “the part that 
has no part,” people who are not recognized as possessing the qualifications to participate in the existing order. 
For Badiou, the possibility of political novelty depends on the existence of a set of people (the proletariat, 
undocumented immigrants, etc.) who objectively belong to the social situation but who have no official 
designation in it. One of the crucial features of these approaches is that they valorize a kind of heightened politics, 
the contestation of the entire assignment of social places, over the ordinary politics of consensus and the 
administration of interests among those who already occupy a place in the social order. “Ordinary” politics may be 
intensely tumultuous, and, as I discuss in more detail below, I acknowledge that social conflict and ideological 
contestation are legible at almost every level of the Iliad, especially among the princely elites. But my reading 
attends to a qualitatively distinct kind of politics that concerns the void of the social order, the largely invisible 
plēthus. 
124 See van Wees (1992: 78-89, 153), who discusses the stratified social structure of the Iliad and the nexus of birth, 
wealth, and aptitude that characterizes aristocratic self-representation. 
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proposes that the army abandon Agamemnon and his war and return home. Odysseus censures 
Thersites for insubordination against the princes and silences him with a single scepter-blow. 
(2) In Book 12, Poulydamas urges Hector not to lead the Trojan laos over the outer defenses of 
the Achaean camp, because an omen has portended that the expedition will end in a draw. 
Hector threatens to murder Poulydamas if, by questioning the necessity of the anticipated 
battle, he undermines the determination of the rank and file.  
Both challenges are suppressed and have few definite consequences for the narrative. 
This in itself is unsurprising: violence is often implicated in the exercise of power, and the story 
of the Iliad could not progress without its unequal social order and the forms of coercion that, 
in the final instance, enforce it. Although these revolts are confined within the narrative, the 
text develops their poetic and political implications by resorting to a non-narrative mode of 
representation: besides being a device for advancing the story, violence acts on bodies 
materially and causes them to assume various shapes and configurations. When living things in 
the Iliad are injured or die, they tend to become inert and heavy. They are compelled to fall to 
the earth or are swept away by the forces that assail them. These somatic forms correspond to 
the narrative and social function of violence as a means of compulsion. But this chapter attends 
to the morphology of violence precisely because it is not always consonant with narrative 
outcomes. In the central acts of violence in the Thersites and Poulydamas scenes, the victims 
assume singular shapes that momentarily defy the expectation that violence compels bodies to 
submit to physical necessity. For a moment in each scene, it seems that Thersites or 
Poulydamas might successfully resist the compulsion to make war. In the end, neither does. But 
the Iliad gives us resources for reading around the end, or for different ends. In the heart of the 
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violence that sets a seal on their revolts, the Iliad entertains a chance of radical subversion 
against its own social and narrative orders. 
 
Social Order, Narrative Order, Violence 
Simone Weil famously identified martial violence, la force, as “the true hero, the true 
subject, the center of the Iliad” (1965: 6), a power that strips humans of their spiritual freedom 
and subjects them to absolute material necessity.125 In this capacity, violence contributes to the 
narrative consistency of the Iliad, to its Aristotelian anankē: characters advance or retreat, fall 
or triumph under an irresistible compulsion. In this section, I address a second-order problem 
raised by this characterization of Iliadic violence: if violence necessitates many of the events of 
the plot, what makes this use of violence itself necessary (or seem to be), especially for non-
elite characters who participate in the war on such unequal terms? What compels them to use 
martial compulsion? 
I noted earlier that the involvement of the common soldiers in the war usually appears 
to be a natural consequence of their subordinated social position. The structure of Iliadic 
society, with its radical division between princes and commoners, exerts a structural force, the 
force of custom, that silently motivates the dēmos to commit to the conflict. But the Iliad also 
offers a complex portrayal of the ways in which concrete acts of violence are used to found and 
perpetuate social order.126 There are many words for “violence” and related notions in the 
                                                        
 
125 See Schein 2016: 151-54, Holmes 2015, Purves 2015, and Stocking (forthcoming) on Weil’s account of force and 
dehumanization. 
126 By itself, “violence” in English is also related to social order, but in a uniformly negative way; it tends to connote 
an intrinsically illegitimate or illegal exercise of physical force. The experience of violence for the characters in the 
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Iliad,127 and explicit lexical references scarcely exhaust the countless instances in which violent 
acts are performed throughout the narrative. My goal in this section is to describe the specific 
use of violence in the infrequent moments when the subordination of the dēmos to the basilēes 
is challenged. It will be necessary, especially in the conclusion, to draw connections between 
this particular species of political violence and the more frequent use of violence in other 
contexts, including the Iliadic battlefield.  
A useful starting place is the term biē, which is in its most neutral sense any act of brute 
force or the capacity to wield such force.128 It is specifically physical as opposed to intellectual, 
associated with Achilles and his martial supremacy rather than with Odysseus and his mētis. But 
when exercised in certain social contexts, biē has a normative character. Unjust, unlawful force 
is opposed to dikē. It is the hallmark of the notorious hubristai of early epic who transgress the 
elementary social compact between guests and hosts: Polyphemus uses it against Odysseus and 
                                                        
 
Iliad is more equivocal. They sanction or oppose it depending on how they evaluate the context of its use. In 
particular, there are forms of violence that they judge to be consonant with and even foundational for the 
prevailing social order, as well as forms that they perceive as inimical to that order and ruinous for communal life 
in general. In any case, Iliadic characters are constantly engaged in violence as a means of asserting and 
maintaining their social status (see van Wees 1992). Hamacher 1991 (1133 n. 2) clarifies the connotations of 
“violence” in English as opposed to German Gewalt, the term that Walter Benjamin uses in his essay on violence 
and that informs my usage of “violence” in this chapter (see pp. 70-74): “Gewalt in German may have any of the 
meanings of the English words force, power, might, and violence, depending on the context. It seems to me, 
however, that in the context of Benjamin’s text, there is no doubt that any translation other than violence runs the 
risk of euphemizing the problems in question here. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that where Gewalt 
appears in a standard expression such as Staatsgewalt (state power) or a formula such as ‘Alle Gewalt geht vom 
Volke aus’ (‘All power rests with the people’), it can be translated only as power, or sometimes force. This is due to 
socio-historical, political, and ideological differences between the English and German linguistic cultures that I 
cannot go into here.” See further Derrida 1992: 6, “In English, as in French, [Gewalt] is often translated as 
‘violence’ … but these two translations, while not altogether injustes (and so not altogether violent), are very 
active interpretations that don’t do justice to the fact that Gewalt also signifies, for Germans, legitimate power, 
authority, public force. … Gewalt, then, is both violence and legitimate power, justified authority.” 
127 See Stocking (forthcoming) for an analytic compendium of the instances of seven words for “force” in early 
Greek hexameter poetry (including kratos, alkē, menos, sthenos, biē, (w)is, and dunamis). 
128 LfgrE s.v. βία; Chantraine s.v. βία; see further Stocking (forthcoming), esp. Chapter 3 and the Appendix. 
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his crew, as do Penelope’s suitors against Odysseus’ household.129 Hesiod bids his brother 
Perses to abstain from biē and obey dikē.  
 Ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσι  
καί νυ δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ’ ἐπιλήθεο πάμπαν. 
τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων,  
ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς  
ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετ’ αὐτοῖς·  
ἀνθρώποισι δ’ ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη 
γίνεται·       (Op. 274-80) 
 
O Perses, cast these things into your mind 
and obey justice, but pay no mind at all to violence. 
For the son of Cronos arrayed this law [νόμον διέταξε] for humans; 
it is for fish and beasts and winged birds 
to eat each other, since there is no justice among them; 
but he gave justice [δίκην] to humans, which is by far the best thing 
 
Here nomos as “customary practice” or “way of life” approaches the semantics of its parent 
verb nemein, “to allot, distribute.”  Zeus distributes a life-mode to humans that distinguishes us 
from animals.130 Our capacity to be with each other without eating each other is the minimal 
degree of non-violence that conditions human sociality. But this disposition toward non-
violence is not guaranteed. It is not phusis but nomos, a gift that humans often fail to accept. Its 
contingency implies that some external force is sometimes required to sustain the division 
between the human and the animal. 
Thus Zeus, and those ruling in his name, have the charge of establishing and maintaining 
the exclusion of unlawful violence from social affairs. Such sovereign acts, however, can 
                                                        
 
129 Κύκλωπός τε βίης μεγαλήτορος, ἀνδροφάγοιο, Od. 10.200 and 12.210; that the suitors wield biē is a 
commonplace, e.g. Od. 11.118, 13.310 = 16.189, 15.329 = 17.565, 16.255, 23.31. 
130 On the semantic derivation of nomos from nemein, see Chantraine 1968: 79 and Pohlentz 1948. For a dissenting 
view, see Ostwald 1969: 21, who argues that even in Op. 276 nomos retains little or no sense of “division.” 
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themselves be intensely violent. In a simile from Iliad 16, Zeus releases devastating floods 
against a community whose rulers “issue crooked decrees in the assembly with biē and drive 
out dikē” (οἳ βίῃ εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέμιστας / ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι, Il. 16.387-88).131 It 
is surprising that biē here qualifies the act of “issuing crooked decrees,” which is not a 
manifestly physical form of violence but a kind of administrative malpractice. What the rulers 
do is “violence” in the sense that it does harm to the constituted order of things and therefore 
exposes the community to a higher, divine violence whose purpose is the maintenance of that 
order.132 The flood itself is not called biē, but Zeus’ acts of correction frequently have that 
name. The political community of the Olympians is founded and sustained by Zeus’ might, 
whose personifications, Kratos and Biē, live in Zeus’ home and attend him everywhere (Th. 385-
88).133 Zeus overthrows the regime of the Titans by releasing the hundred-handers, “who have 
overwhelming biē,” from Erebus (Th. 670), and through this use of force, the Olympians 
establish their new political community (βίηφι, 881-82).134  
This brief survey suggests that, in early Greek poetry, biē is supposed to maintain the 
norms of communal life—the themistes—by the necessity of physical force. This legitimate use 
of biē is in turn motivated by the ideal of orderly human community free from illicit biē. This 
                                                        
 
131 On the associations between Zeus, themis, and dikē, see Bouvier 2002: 234. 
132 Themis (plural themistes) and dikē are closely related terms. See Benveniste 1969b on themis (99-105) and dikē 
(107-110).  
133 Although this order is founded on mētis, as Detienne and Vernant have shown (1974: 90-91), biē is its 
indispensable safeguard. See Thalmann 1988: 12-13 on themis, Zeus’ biē, and the Homeric king’s prerogative to 
wield violence. 
134 The conclusion of the Titanomachy by biē marks the beginning of the new political order and the distribution of 
privileges to its members: αὐτὰρ ἐπεί ῥα πόνον μάκαρες θεοὶ ἐξετέλεσσαν / Τιτήνεσσι δὲ τιμάων κρίναντο βίηφι 
(“but when the blessed gods completed their toil / and decided by violence their rights with respect to the Titans,” 
Th. 881-82). 
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circular relation between violence and order comes into play in the aftermath of Agamemnon’s 
notoriously misguided speech to the assembled Achaeans at Iliad 2.110-41. He pretends to 
suggest, by way of testing the army’s resolve, that the war is unwinnable and that the 
expedition should return home.135 The mass of the army takes his words at face value and 
stampedes toward the ships to prepare their return journey. Odysseus uses various emergency 
measures to direct the army back to the assembly. He gently persuades the princes to return to 
the assembly, but he threatens the common soldiers he meets with the royal scepter and 
explains to them the necessity of their obedience: 
ὃν δ’ αὖ δήμου τ’ ἄνδρα ἴδοι βοόωντά τ’ ἐφεύροι,  
τὸν σκήπτρῳ ἐλάσασκεν ὁμοκλήσασκέ τε μύθῳ· 
δαιμόνι’ ἀτρέμας ἧσο καὶ ἄλλων μῦθον ἄκουε, 
οἳ σέο φέρτεροί εἰσι, σὺ δ’ ἀπτόλεμος καὶ ἄναλκις 
οὔτέ ποτ’ ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναρίθμιος οὔτ’ ἐνὶ βουλῇ· 
οὐ μέν πως πάντες βασιλεύσομεν ἐνθάδ’ Ἀχαιοί· 
οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω, 
εἷς βασιλεύς, ᾧ δῶκε Κρόνου πάϊς ἀγκυλομήτεω 
σκῆπτρόν τ’ ἠδὲ θέμιστας, ἵνά σφισι βουλεύῃσι.  (2.198-206) 
 
Whenever he saw and found a man of the people shouting, 
he would strike him with the scepter and reproach him with a speech: 
“Good sir! Sit still and listen to the instructions of others 
who are better than you; you are unwarlike and cowardly 
and never of any account in battle or in council. 
In no way will all of us Achaeans be kings here. 
Plural-rule is no good thing. Let there be one ruler, 
one king, to whom the son of crooked-counselled Cronos 
gives the scepter and themistes, to advise his people.” 
 
Odysseus might have stopped speaking after verse 200, with the threat of force and a 
command, or perhaps with the insult in verse 202. But he presumably feels that threats are not 
                                                        
 
135 On the narrative peculiarities of the Diapeira, see Christensen 2015a; Cook 2003; Knox and Russo 1989. 
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alone sufficient to impose order on the vastly more numerous dēmos. He therefore strengthens 
his rebuke by appealing to an ideological principle that power should not be distributed equally 
(οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη) but should be concentrated in the hands of “one king” whose 
authority is a gift from Zeus.136 The skēptron that Odysseus holds objectifies this complicity 
between coercive and ideological forms of necessity: it is initially wielded as an instrument of 
bare sovereign violence (τὸν σκήπτρῳ ἐλάσασκεν, 199), but by 206 it is sublimated into a 
symbol of the divine origin of the social order.137  
What is more, the themistes to which Odysseus appeals is in principle an inclusive term, 
covering a diverse range of customary norms and practices that permeate communal life. But 
here, as Odysseus addresses the commoners, themistes amounts simply to the “social order” in 
the narrow, inegalitarian sense that I defined in the introduction: the subordination of the 
common soldiers to their social betters (φέρτεροι). The purpose of Odysseus’ intervention is 
not simply to check the flight of the dēmos in this particular scene, but to affirm the principle 
                                                        
 
136 Odysseus’ assertions in 203-6 are slightly oblique. By “one king,” he is referring proximately to Agamemnon’s 
supremacy over the army, but more generally to each prince’s authority toward the commoners. The real problem, 
as he remarks in 200-1, is that the common soldiers are disobeying “those who are better” (οἳ σέο φέρτεροί εἰσι), 
the aristocrats. “One king” means that power is not disseminated throughout the whole host (polukoiraniē) but 
reserved for the elites, each of whom is one king toward his plural subjects. Thus the bT scholion to 2.203 explains 
οὐ μέν πως πάντες βασιλεύσομεν to mean “there will not be democracy” (οὐκ ἔσται δημοκρατία); if Odysseus had 
said this to the princes, he would have incited them to revolt (εἰ δὲ τοῖς μείζοσι ταῦτα ἔλεγεν, ἐξῆπτε τὴν στάσιν). 
See Stocking (forthcoming) on interpretations and receptions of Odysseus’ speech. 
137 The phrase recalls passages in which Zeus intervenes to prevent or punish political biē: Hesiod’s admonition to 
Perses in which dikē is a gift from Zeus (ἀνθρώποισι δ’ ἔδωκε δίκην, Op. 279); and the simile from Iliad 16 in which 
Zeus punishes “those who issue crooked themistes in the assembly” (οἳ βίῃ εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέμιστας, 
387). The genealogy of the scepter is described in Il. 2.100-9. The scepter is widely discussed: Thalmann 1988: 10-
11 argues that Odysseus’ appropriation of the scepter as a tool of overt violence materializes a crisis of royal 
authority, which now must rely on force rather than persuasion. Similarly, Rose 1988: 15-17 suggests in Gramscian 
terms that the affair “is a demonstration that Agamemnon’s hierarchy of power has retained domination, but lost 
hegemony.” For a discussion of royal scepters in Hesiod and in Iliad 2, see Stein 2016; Unruh 2011; Clay 2003: 74-
75; Combellack 1948. Drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Stocking (forthcoming) discusses how the Iliadic 
scepters are implicated in the performative (and contingent) construction of power. 
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that violence is justified to preserve the social order and that social order in turn is backed by 
violence. This explains the didactic tone of the speech: by appealing to the divine authority of 
kings, Odysseus aims to instill in the dēmos a sense that this reciprocal relation is necessary and 
natural.138 
Odysseus’ intervention succeeds, and the army returns to the assembly. But a marginal 
character immediately challenges the restoration of the status quo.  
  Ἄλλοι μέν ῥ’ ἕζοντο, ἐρήτυθεν δὲ καθ’ ἕδρας·  
Θερσίτης δ’ ἔτι μοῦνος ἀμετροεπὴς ἐκολῴα,  
ὃς ἔπεα φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἄκοσμά τε πολλά τε ᾔδη  
μάψ, ἀτὰρ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν (2.211-14) 
 
The rest sat down and were restrained in their seats 
But Thersites of measureless speech alone still bawled, 
he who knew in his mind many disorderly words,  
rashly, to quarrel without order with princes  
 
The narrator introduces Thersites with one of the longest descriptions of a character’s 
physiognomy in Homer. Its tone verges on open antipathy. His appearance is ugly and 
misshapen, his words are “disorderly,” and he habitually criticizes the Achaean leadership.139 
Several features of the description are often taken to mean that Thersites is a lower-class 
soldier, or at least, not one of the elites.140 It is difficult, however, to positively identify 
                                                        
 
138 In this sense, Odysseus’ act of violence is both physical and symbolic in character. In addition to physically 
impeding some of the common soldiers, it is also a spectacle that broadcasts the social potency of violence in 
maintaining elite authority. On the linguistic and symbolic mediation of force in the Iliad, see Stocking 
(forthcoming). 
139 The well-known polyvalence of kosmos is at work here: it is order (social, political, discursive, etc.) and also 
beautiful adornment. On the meaning of kosmos, see Puhvel 1976 (esp. 156-57); on its dual ideological/aesthetic 
sense, Briand 2011.  
140 He lacks several of the hallmarks of elite identity. Heroes always have patronymics and are usually physically 
attractive, but Thersites has no patronymic and is gratuitously ugly. 
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Thersites’ class membership and status, and his very unplaceability in the social hierarchy 
complements his disorderly character.141 Whatever his personal identity might be, it is clear 
that Thersites poses a challenge from below to the Achaean elites.142 Echoing and intensifying 
the rhetoric of Achilles in Book 1, Thersites opens his speech by condemning Agamemnon for 
exploiting the common soldiers and appropriating the spoils won through their martial labor.143 
The argument is directed against Agamemnon personally but has affinities with a broader anti-
aristocratic discourse in archaic poetry that questions the privileges and pretensions of 
hereditary status.144 The narrator, Odysseus, and the masses each at various points criticize 
Thersites for “quarreling with the princes”—with an entire class—not simply with its flawed 
leader.145 
                                                        
 
141 Marks 2005 construes the encounter between Odysseus and Thersites as an intra-aristocratic dispute for status, 
“elite competition.” Marks also provides a bibliography on the issue of class in the Thersites scene. Elmer 2013a 
claims that Thersites’ class identity is indistinct and that he represents a purely formal threat to the decorum of 
deliberative politics. Rose 1988 and Thalmann 1988 follow the consensus view that Thersites is a commoner. 
142 Readings of the Thersites scene reach different assessments of the character and impact of this challenge. 
Thersites has been shown variously to undermine the Iliad’s conventions of collective consensus (Elmer 2013a: 93-
97), of praise poetry (Nagy 1979), and of kingly authority (Lincoln 1994: 14-36). As for his function in the broader 
narrative, he may be a double and foil for Achilles (Rousseau 2013), a scapegoat (Thalmann 1988), or comic relief 
(Meltzer 1990). On the role of comic shame and satire in this scene, see Lowry 1991 and Rosen 2007. While 
recognizing the obvious pejorative force of the descriptions of Thersites, my reading is aligned with views that 
emphasize the redemptive aspects of Thersites (see Postlethwaite 1988, Rose 1988, Kouklanakis 1998, Stuurman 
2004). On the ancient receptions of Thersites, see Collins 2019. 
143 Thersites attempts to align himself with Achilles at the end of his speech (241-42). But despite their rhetorical 
similarity, Thersites and Achilles make fundamentally different demands. The quarrel between Agamemnon and 
Achilles plays out in the idiom of aristocratic status, as a struggle for recognition between notional equals. In the 
wake of their dispute, the Achaeans continue to fight without Achilles. They suffer from his wrath, but the war and 
the story about the war go on. The break is not permanent: Achilles withdraws from the war in order to exact 
concessions from his antagonist. Despite his notorious stubbornness, Achilles’ strategy of abstention is at least in 
principle negotiable, and the narrative is centrally concerned with the process by which he and the Achaeans 
reconcile with one another. What Thersites proposes, by contrast, is a rupture in the social order: if the masses 
returned home, the war—the Iliad itself—would cease without any hope of reconciliation. See Introduction, p. 21. 
144 See Donlan 1973. 
145 The narrator characterizes Thersites as “one to contend with the princes” (Il. 2.214, ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσι), the 
same expression that Odysseus uses later at 247; the plēthus finally criticizes him on similar grounds at 277 
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Near the conclusion of his speech, Thersites makes explicit the narrative consequences 
of his social subversion. He calls on his comrades to depart once again from the assembly and 
sail home: 
ὦ πέπονες κάκ’ ἐλέγχε’ Ἀχαιΐδες οὐκέτ’ Ἀχαιοὶ 
οἴκαδέ περ σὺν νηυσὶ νεώμεθα, τόνδε δ’ ἐῶμεν  
αὐτοῦ ἐνὶ Τροίῃ γέρα πεσσέμεν, ὄφρα ἴδηται  
ἤ ῥά τί οἱ χἠμεῖς προσαμύνομεν ἦε καὶ οὐκί· (2.235-38) 
 
You soft, cowardly disgraces, no longer men but women of Achaea,146 
let us return home with our ships and leave Agamemnon  
here in Troy to digest his prizes of honor, 
so that he may see whether we are helping him at all or not. 
 
Despite Odysseus’ claim at 202 that the common soldiers are “of no account in battle,” the 
aristocratic heroes obviously could not fight the Trojans without the sheer numerical support of 
the masses. If realized, Thersites’ proposal would bring the Iliad to a premature end, cut off 
while “the plan of Zeus was being accomplished” (Διὸς δ’ ἐτελείετο βουλή).147 The social order, 
represented by the person of Agamemnon, is in Thersites’ view the only force that keeps the 
commons fighting on behalf of the elites. Thus by discrediting the social order, Thersites 
                                                        
 
(νεικείειν βασιλῆας ὀνειδείοις ἐπέεσσιν). Van Wees (1992: 84) confirms that “when [Thersites] interrupts a 
particular speaker, he is seen as attacking ‘the princes’ collectively.” 
146 On the gendered language in this scene, see n. 184. 
147 The “plan” is not spelled out in explicit terms, of course, and invites various interpretations. Lynn-George (1988: 
37-41) draws out the paradoxical mix of completeness and incompleteness, finality and development in the verse. 
From the perspective of the Iliad alone, the plan seems to involve Thetis’ request that Zeus restore Achilles’ status 
among the Achaeans and win honor for him; but the Cypria claims that the more overarching plan is to reduce the 
human population of the Earth. See Clay 1999 and Marks 2002. Whatever the boulē is, it is certainly not completed 
by Book 2; see Murnaghan 1997. 
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supposes that he has exposed the fundamental non-necessity of the common’s participation in 
the war.148 
Odysseus answers this challenge by denouncing Thersites and threatening to strip, beat, 
and chase him out of the assembly if he continues his insubordination. He then strikes Thersites 
once on the back with the scepter, causing him to weep and sink into his seat, unable to resist 
the force of the scepter-blow. Witnessing this outcome, the Achaeans feel sorry for his plight 
but mock him for his failed effort. I will return to Thersites’ fall and to the army’s reaction in the 
following sections. It is enough here to stress that in the wake of Thersites’ defeat, the social 
order is definitively restored and never again challenged in such explicit terms.149 According to 
the sequence of events at the beginning of Book 2, society-preserving biē seems to be an 
irresistible instrument for maintaining the social order, which in turn guarantees the 
participation of the commoners in the war. 
 
Immediate Violence 
As Mark Buchan has observed, the very fact that Odysseus enforces the Iliad’s social and 
narrative orders through the violent use of his scepter actually puts their necessity into 
                                                        
 
148 After Odysseus humiliates and strikes Thersites, the masses notoriously celebrate the silencing of their only 
advocate (272-77). They accuse Thersites of precisely the kind of insubordination with which Odysseus charged 
them. In their interpretation, Thersites threatens to disrupt the civil peace with his violent use of language (τὸν 
λωβητῆρα ἐπεσβόλον). Odysseus acts in the mold of Zeus (in Il. 16.387 or Op. 279), wielding sovereign violence to 
exclude biē from the space of the assembly. 
149 After speeches by Odysseus and Nestor, the assembly is dissolved and the troops are “marshalled to order” 
over the battlefield by Agamemnon, ready to be exploited again by their masters. Overt class conflict disappears 
from the remainder of the poem. 
 70 
question.150 Ιf these orders were absolutely necessary, then Odysseus would not need to resort 
to violence to preserve them; they would perpetuate themselves automatically. And although 
violence is a force of necessity, it is also contingent in the radical sense of the term—it works 
through a touching-together of bodies (con-tingere) whose outcome is never entirely 
foreseeable. Could Thersites have reacted differently than he does to the contact of the scepter 
on his back? Could he have continued to stand and declaim instead of sinking into his seat? 
Many victims of violence in the Iliad are wounded mortally and cannot resist their fate. But 
Thersites, as we will see, suffers a relatively minor wound that has no exact equivalent in 
Homer. I argue that before Thersites falls into his seat and disappears from the story, the Iliad 
deliberately maximizes the sense that some other outcome might be possible. It invites us to 
entertain the possibility that the text’s own social and narrative orders could be subverted. 
I need to address some methodological issues before articulating this claim more 
precisely. How could the outcome of the violence against Thersites be contingent if any other 
outcome—especially one that affirms his proposal to abandon the war—would mean the ruin 
of the Iliad’s narrative project? In exactly what sense and by what means could the Iliad 
represent this void in the logic of its own story? Walter Benjamin’s influential essay, “On the 
Critique of Violence” (Zur Kritik der Gewalt), raises a similar problem concerning the history of 
                                                        
 
150 Buchan 2012: 61 compares Odysseus’ intervention to save Agamemnon’s power to Hephaestus’ inadvertant 
role in staving off a challenge to Zeus’ authority in Il. 1. “In both cases, the fragility of power is put on display: were 
it not for the intervention, it is entirely unclear what would have happened.” Concerning this scene, Rose (1988: 
17) observes that “disgruntled peasants might find a certain bitter solace in so blatant a demonstration that this 
particular status quo rests on violence alone, that its mask of legitimacy has been torn away.” 
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political violence.151 The essay is interested in how violence is judged in relation to the received 
order of political and juridical norms—Recht in Benjamin’s parlance, roughly translated as 
“law.”152 From the perspective of law, violence is justified when it enforces the existing legal 
order or when it establishes a new order that validates it retroactively.153 But even illegitimate 
violence—rebellions, revolts, or ordinary crimes that seem to subvert law—are ultimately 
appropriated by it in some new or renewed instantiation. Civil unrest thus becomes a pretext 
for strengthening the security state; revolutions waged in the name of emancipation are 
captured by new regimes of oppression. Standing behind the existing order, then, is a 
centuries-long history of violent transgressions and police actions, revolutions and reactions, 
                                                        
 
151 The essay was composed in Berlin near the end of 1920, at a moment when European political history took a 
distinctly Thersitean turn. When the Great War ended in November of 1918, workers and soldiers had revolted 
across central and eastern Europe (most famously in Russia and in Germany) refusing to fight or work in the 
service of a catastrophic and seemingly interminable conflict; many demanded that the underlying structures of 
imperialist and capitalist exploitation be dismantled. For a history of political violence during this period, see 
Schumann 2009. Benjamin began writing about political issues after finishing his doctorate in 1919. The Critique 
was initially developed as part of an unfinished book-project on politics. On the essay’s history and Benjamin’s 
early political thought, see Moran and Salzani 2015: 2-3. The essay has attracted a great deal of critical attention in 
continental philosophy and political theory; see in particular Derrida 1992 and Agamben 1998. My reading is 
especially indebted to Hamacher 1991. 
152 In Benjamin’s “Critique,” “law” (more precisely, “positive law”) often refers broadly to the order of juridical and 
governmental administration, especially in modern states, but it is not limited to that context. Benjamin considers 
boundary markers and borders to be hallmarks of the law, and his examples span ancient Greek history and myth, 
the Old Testament, and contemporary European politics. Formulated generally, law is a system of received, 
apparently impartial norms that regulate collective life. They are deeply implicated in the structures of the modern 
state, but they also exist in stateless societies as a means for perpetuating the social order. Hence, even though 
there is a daunting gulf between the concept of law in modern states and the Homeric notion of themis, for 
instance, Benjamin’s notion of “law” allows one to think incisively about both. For accounts of early Greek law, see 
Gagarin 1986; Ostwald 1969. 
153 In modern states, law is enforced by and in turn justifies police violence. The themistes that prescribe the 
conduct of human societies in early Greek poetry are twice ordained by Olympian violence: first, “the laws and the 
scepter” are gifts of Zeus, and his authority is in turn founded on the universal conflagration of the Titanomachy; 
second, transgressions of the law are suppressed by Zeus through natural cataclysms. In the first case, violence 
establishes a new juridico-political order by which it is authorized retroactively (“lawmaking violence”), and in the 
second, in the manner of a policing power, violence shores up an existing order that already authorizes violence in 
defense of the law (“law-preserving violence”). 
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and on the basis of this interminable cycle, law claims for itself a kind of historical necessity, 
which Benjamin calls “fate.” 
In the Poetics, Aristotle defines history as a record of contingent events; poetry is “more 
philosophical” (51b) precisely because its events are constrained to follow one another by 
necessity. In Benjamin’s account, political history from the perspective of the law is more poetic 
than historiographical. Just as the Iliad’s narrative order is internally necessitated by the 
interplay between themis and biē, so political history is apparently constrained by the iron-clad 
cycle of law and violence. Even so, Benjamin claims that the chief task of emancipatory politics 
is to interrupt this cycle—not only because violence is intrinsically destructive, but because law 
(like the “social order” in the Iliad) sustains and legitimates social and economic inequality.154  
Not even the overwhelming regularities of historical experience compel us to regard the 
correlation between violence and law as necessary. Even if it is exceedingly probable that every 
act of violence will perpetuate the law, Benjamin argues that one cannot rule out the possibility 
that some hitherto-undiscovered exercise of political violence might be able break the cycle. 
This is because, in itself, violence is simply an act of destruction with no necessary relation to its 
consequences. This principle of non-necessity can be staged or exhibited in particular acts of 
violence that make conspicuous their destructive immediacy at the expense of whatever 
external, contingent effects they might have. Benjamin calls such violence “immediate” 
                                                        
 
154 Like the State in Marxian theory, “law” serves the interests of particular classes at the expense of others but 
conceals its partiality under an apparently abstract and impartial outlook. The law of modern states is akin to 
Homeric themis in this respect, at least: both present themselves as rules for impartially regulating collective life, 
but under this cover they safeguard unequal distributions of power. There is no clearer illustration of this 
complicity in Homer than the moment at Iliad 2.206 when Odysseus invokes the timeless authority of “themistes 
and scepter” to halt the absconding masses. 
 73 
(unmittelbar).155 Immediate violence testifies to the existence of a space of political maneuver 
beyond the closed circle of violence and law, a space in which violence does not necessitate the 
reproduction of state power. We do not know what forms of communal life might populate this 
space nor what kinds of immediate violence could actually arrest the cycle. Benjamin advocates 
a proletarian general strike (recall Thersites’ appeal to the army to return home) but admits 
that this strategy is only provisional. The bearing of immediate violence on political reality is 
suggestive and indeterminate; it is a question of how violence appears—its aesthetics—rather 
than what it effects. 
The strike that incapacitates Thersites has the effect of suppressing a challenge to the 
social order. But if we isolate the act from its consequences, we can access its immediacy, an 
aspect of pure appearance that exceeds any statist instrumentality. In the next section I argue 
that the particular way in which Thersites buckles under the scepter-blow figures the possibility 
that violence in the service of the social order can be resisted. The gesture that he makes with 
his body, as we will see, can occur only on the condition that violence has momentarily 
appeared to become inefficacious, a cause without any necessary effects. This particular act of 
violence is an exemplary application of the “scepter and themistes,” the circle of violence and 
law. Before Thersites takes his seat and consigns himself to silence, it seems that the circle 
might be interrupted, even for the briefest moment. The text allows us to glimpse obscurely in 
these lines the possibility that Thersites’ proposal to the masses, despite its utopian 
                                                        
 
155 “Immediate,” like the German unmittelbar, has the sense of closeness and self-containment. The translation, 
however, loses the etymological transparency of unmittelbar, which is literally the negation of Mittel, “means” or 
“instrument.” The term is prominent in German philosophy; in Hegel, for instance, the first stage of dialectic is 
unmittelbar, not-yet mediated or externalized. 
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exorbitance, could come to pass. But this chance is deeply equivocal and its context ironic: the 
possibility of a general strike by the soldiers is allowed to manifest itself precisely in the 
violence that suppresses it. 
 
Aesthetics of Violence 
The task, then, is to hold the actual narrative and social consequences of violence 
momentarily in suspense while attending to how violence appears and to the unrealized 
possibilities that its appearance implies. Let us return to the scene of Thersites’ humiliation at 
the hands of Odysseus. In what forms does violence appear in this scene? How does it progress 
in time up until the point when Thersites takes his seat and the scene starts to register the 
social and narrative consequences of Odysseus’ act? 
Ὣς ἄρ’ ἔφη, σκήπτρῳ δὲ μετάφρενον ἠδὲ καὶ ὤμω 
πλῆξεν· ὃ δ’ ἰδνώθη, θαλερὸν δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε δάκρυ: 
σμῶδιξ δ’ αἱματόεσσα μεταφρένου ἐξυπανέστη 
σκήπτρου ὕπο χρυσέου· ὃ δ’ ἄρ’ ἕζετο τάρβησέν τε, 
ἀλγήσας δ’ ἀχρεῖον ἰδὼν ἀπομόρξατο δάκρυ. (Il. 2.265-69) 
 
So Odysseus spoke, and with the scepter, he struck Thersites 
on his back and shoulders; he folded over (ἰδνώθη), and warm tears fell out; 
a welt rose up under his back, bloody, 
beneath the golden scepter; and he was seated and trembled with fear, 
and in pain gave an oblique look and wiped away a tear. 
 
Thersites’ posture seems to follow a simple trajectory. He signals the beginning of his dissent at 
2.211 when he alone remains standing while the rest of the army takes their seats in the 
assembly (ἄλλοι μέν ῥ’ ἕζοντο…Θερσίτης δ’ ἔτι μοῦνος). When Odysseus first strikes him, he 
must still be standing, because speakers in Homeric assemblies generally stand before the 
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community to signal their intention to speak.156 The force of the scepter-blow causes Thersites 
to crumple and sink to his seat.  
As Thersites sinks, he moves along a declivity traced by countless other victims of 
violence in the Iliad. Most of these falls occur on the battlefield, where bodies are forced to the 
earth when transfixed by spears and arrows, chopped apart by swords, or “subdued by the 
hands” of other humans. As they fall, such bodies have a distinct material consistency. Homeric 
bodies contain an innate vital springiness, consisting of tendons and sinews under tension that 
support the limbs against their own weight.157 When this internal force is destroyed, the body 
collapses: the victor “unstrings the limbs” or “unstrings the knees” of the victim.158 Under the 
impact of violence, human bodies become like inert matter, subject to the inexorable pull of 
gravity.159 As a recurring motif, this kind of fall represents the necessity to which violence 
subjects Iliadic characters on the battlefield. This is precisely the kind of necessity so integral to 
                                                        
 
156 For standing postures in Iliadic assemblies (ἀνίστημι), see Il. 1.58, 68, 101; 2.76; 9.52; 19.55, 175, 269. There is 
an important exception involving Agamemnon at 19.77; see further Barker 2009: 80 and Arend 1933: 116-21. 
157 The sinews and tendons are variously called τένων (8× in Iliad, from τείνω, “to stretch”); ἴς (2×, pl. ἶνες, see nn. 
165 and 166 on the etymology); and νεῦρον (1×, cf. νευρή, “bowstring”). More generally, the body has a “force” 
(ἴς) as well as “spring” (κῖκυς, once in Homer at Od. 11.393: ἀλλ’ οὐ γάρ οἱ ἔτ’ ἦν ἲς ἔμπεδος οὐδ’ ἔτι κῖκυς). 
Related but more specific terms include βίη, σθένος, and μένος, which denote markedly active kinds of corporeal 
power. The importance of these internal forces becomes apparent when they fail. Warriors routinely die with the 
formulas λῦσε δὲ γυῖα, γοῦνατ᾽ ἔλυσε, or variants (see Purves 2006: 183 n. 9). At Il. 17.522-24, a spear “unstrings 
the limbs” of the Trojan Aretus, and his death is compared to that of an ox whose “sinew is cut all the way 
through” (ἶνα τάμῃ διὰ πᾶσαν, 522) by an ax-man. The ox and Aretus both leap forward as they die, as if a rubber 
band of sinew inside them were cut and its tension released. That “limbs are unstrung” in death implies that, while 
alive, Homeric bodies are held aloft by the internal tension of their sinews and muscles.  
158 Violence does not need to be fatal to have this effect: wounded heroes tend to fall half-way to the ground, as if 
to measure their half-traversed distance from death. See Purves 2006: 184 n. 17 on these “half-falls,” when 
warriors are injured, fall to their knees, and manage to recover. Non-fatal woundings are rare, however; see Griffin 
1980: 90. 
159 See Weil (1965: 22) on the power of violence to render still-living people into things, into inert, enervated 
bodies that cannot even flinch before the terrible forces the hang over their heads. 
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the narrative order: each thud of a fallen warrior marks the end of a life and the conclusion of a 
little episode in the plot.160 
When Thersites falls to his seat at 2.268, it is the only moment in Homer when 
something akin to battlefield-violence intrudes into the assembly (the plēthus even compares 
the beating to Odysseus’ battlefield exploits at 2.272-74).161 Odysseus, of course, does not 
intend to kill Thersites, only to make him take his seat and thereby subject him to the social 
order. Once the mass of the army returns to the assembly and sits, its political agency is 
effectively suspended. The commoners shout to vaguely signal their consent, but none of them 
is permitted to stand to address the assembly and participate actively in its deliberations.162 
There is a spatial logic, then, to Odysseus’ use of violence as a force that makes bodies fall. 
Whereas on the battlefield falling marks the end of a life, in the assembly it marks the end of 
overt political dissent. And indeed, after Thersites sits (ἕζετο) with the rest of the commoners, 
dissent over issues of class disappears for the remainder of the poem.  
The course of this scene seems directed toward various forms of closure and finality. By 
compelling Thersites to sit and by suppressing his radical proposal, Odysseus’ violence lends 
physical necessity to the social subordination of the masses and thereby necessitates their 
continued participation in the war. This is why many interpretations of this scene emphasize 
                                                        
 
160 As Purves (2006) notes, “usually, the fall signals a turn towards the end—a gesture of finality and closure for the 
individual who experiences it. As the moment of closure, though, the movement of turning towards death is 
startling for its seriality, as each fall ensures that the battle—and the poem—will go on” (184). 
161 There are cases of unrealized threats of violence: enraged by Agamemnon, Achilles begins to draw his sword to 
murder him but is restrained by Athena (Il. 1.210-11). In the Odyssey, Eurymachus threatens Halitherses during his 
speech to the Ithacan assembly (Od. 2.161-207). 
162 See Elmer 2013a: 93 on this detail. 
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the decisiveness of Odysseus’ intervention. And yet, Thersites does not fall easily. There is a 
convoluted gap between the initial impact of the scepter in 266 (πλῆξεν) and the moment when 
he takes his seat in 268 (ἕζετο). By focusing on this interval and on the violence that happens 
there in its aesthetic immediacy, we can discern a form of resistance to class oppression that 
escapes the logic of narrative and social necessity. 
 
Thersites’ first reaction to the scepter-blow is not to fall into his seat but to “fold,” 
“bend,” or “double over”: πλῆξεν· ὃ δ’ ἰδνώθη.163 I claimed earlier that in the vast majority of 
violent encounters in the Iliad, once a body is seriously or fatally injured, it loses its internal 
tension, succumbs to gravity and falls to earth. There are a handful of cases involving the verb 
idnoomai, however, in which the sinews in a wounded body are not “unstrung” but strain even 
more intensely under the shock of injury. Such a body curls up on itself as it falls: ἰδνώθη (Il. 
2.267), ἰδνωθεὶς ὀπίσω (12.206), ἰδνώθη δὲ πεσών (13.619), κάππεσεν ἰδνωθείς (Od. 22.85).  
                                                        
 
163 Cunliffe s.v. ἰδνόομαι, “to bend or double up one’s body, curl oneself up: ὁ δ᾽ ἰδνώθη (in pain) B 266.” Likewise, 
LSJ, “bend oneself, double oneself up, esp. for pain, ἰδνώθη Il. 2.266.” LfgrE, “to bend oneself forwards or 
backwards, double oneself up.” The preposition “up” in these definitions implies bending forward. The LfgrE, at 
least, highlights the directional ambiguity between forward and backward with this verb. In the case of Thersites, 
however, LfgrE follows the usual forward-bending interpretation, “B 266…doubled up in pain and fright.” In the 
end all of these glosses for Il. 2.266 are probably derived from the verse’s D scholion (Ὁ δ’ ἰδνώθη. Οὗτος δὲ ἀπὸ 
τῆς ὀδύνης συνεκάμφθη, “he doubled up from pain”); likewise, the exegetical (Τ) scholion to Il. 13.618 reads 
ἰδνώθη: συνεκάμφθη ἐπὶ τένοντα, “he doubled up on his tendons.” Popular translations of the Iliad generally 
follow this consensus: “the rascal doubled over” (Fagles), “the poor devil quailed” (Fitzgerald), “the man crumbled 
in pain” (Lombardo), “he doubled over” (Lattimore, the most literal). These all mean, as far as I can tell, that 
Thersites bends forward to shield himself out of fear. 
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Idnoomai occurs only five times in Homer, and it has a scant post-Homeric career.164 
Eustathius records several ingenious etymologies,165 but modern researchers derive the verb 
from a lost adjective *(ϝ)ἰδνός, “bent,” in turn descended from an Indo-European root *ui-, “to 
curve, turn.” Its cognates in Greek include ἶρις “rainbow” and ἴτυς “felloe, wheel rim.”166 The 
curvature that these cognates express is intrinsically dynamic. It entails an act of bending a 
straight body out of shape or deflecting a straight trajectory: in the Iliad, wheel rims are formed 
by bending the trunk of a small tree into a closed loop (ὄφρα ἴτυν κάμψῃ περικαλλέϊ δίφρῳ, 
“so that he might bend a felloe for a very beautiful chariot,” Il. 4.486), such that the bough’s 
elastic deformation exerts a counter-force on the vehicle it supports; the personified rainbow, 
Ἶρις, does not take a direct route through the sky but, in defiance of gravity, bends her path in a 
miraculous arch until she plunges, “like a lead weight” into the sea (Il. 24.77-82). By contrast, 
other kinds of curves are static and formed without internal strain or tension; for instance, the 
wagon wheel at Hesiod Op. 426 (ἁψίς) is carved rather than bent into a loop.167 What the 
family of *ui- cognates shares is a distinctive notion of bending-as-deformation. 
                                                        
 
164 Apart from commentaries and citations of the Homeric usages, the word does appear, significantly, in two 
passages from the Hippocratic De Mulierum Affectibus and two from the Greek Anthology; see nn. 169 and 184. 
165 Defining ἰδνωθῆναι as συγκαμφθῆναι, “to bend together,” “double up,” Eustathius (echoing the exegetical 
scholium at Il. 12.205) favors deriving the word from the phrase τὸ ἰνίον δονηθῆναι (“the occipital muscles are 
shaken”), with the metathesis of the nu in ἰν- and the delta in δο-. This explanation may have a (coincidental) grain 
of truth, since ἰνίον is a diminutive of ἴς, “sinew, tendon,” which Pokorny, at least, derives from *ui-. 
166 There is also a family of Greek cognates denoting willows and vines, i.e., pliable plants that can be bent into 
curves (οἶσος, ἴτεα, οἶνος). Cognates in Latin include vieo, “to bend together” and in Sanskrit vyáyati “to turn.” 
English “wire,” likewise, is derived from *ui- through the notion of twisting or plaiting together constituent strands. 
Because the root has been extended with various formants (-r, -t, -d, etc.) and the digamma has dropped out, the 
only inherited element that the Greek cognates share is the iota. See Chantraine s.v. ἰδνόομαι, ἴτυς, ἶρις; Frisk 
under the same lemmata; Pokorny s.v. uei- (1). Beekes reconstructs an etymon with a laryngeal, *ueh1i-, and 
seems skeptical about deriving ἰδνόομαι and ἶρις from it. 
167 On hapsis in Works and Days, see Richardson and Piggott 1982; West 1978: 265-66. 
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Likewise, the other four Homeric cases of idnoomai describe bodies strained by intense 
forces and bent out of shape. At Iliad 13.618, Menelaus caves in Peisander’s face with a sword, 
causing him to “double over and fall” (ἰδνώθη δὲ πεσών); in Odyssey 22, during the 
mnēsterophonia, Eurymachus is shot with an arrow and, “sprawling over the table, doubles 
over and falls” (περιρρηδὴς δὲ τραπέζῃ / κάππεσεν ἰδνωθείς, 84-85).168 Both victims seem to 
assume this posture as a paroxysm passes through them at the moment of death. Among the 
living, only skilled athletes can “bend” themselves in this manner: on Phaeacia, two 
professional dancers arch backwards to throw a ball, amazing onlookers with their gravity-
defying flexibility (Od. 8.375).169 It is no surprise that the only non-human subject of idnoomai is 
a notoriously limber animal: a snake in the clutches of an eagle bends backwards to strike its 
captor (Il. 12.206). 
When Thersites “bows over,” then, his body is subjected to a degree of curvature far 
removed from the sphere of ordinary human experience. But Thersites, after all, has a famously 
marked physiognomy. Apart from having bowed legs (φολκὸς ἔην, 217), a lame foot (χωλὸς δ’ 
ἕτερον πόδα), and a bulbous skull (φοξὸς ἔην κεφαλήν, 219), his shoulders are drawn together, 
concave over his chest (τὼ δέ οἱ ὤμω / κυρτὼ ἐπὶ στῆθος συνοχωκότε, 217-18). Simms (2005) 
                                                        
 
168 This case is not entirely secure: the scholia attest variants κάππεσε δινηθεὶς/δινωθεὶς, which may be preferable 
because Eurymachus’ curling motion seems lateral—he spins around and splays out, whereas idnoomai elsewhere 
involves curling up or back, minimizing oneself. 
169 Eustathius infers that the athlete’s body must be “extremely flexible on account of the bending backwards” 
(εὐλύγιστον δὲ σῶμα δηλοῦται διὰ τοῦ ἰδνωθῆναι ὀπίσω). The two cases of idnoomai in the Greek Anthology 
resonate with the athletic spectacle in Od. 8: in IX 553, an acrobatic “beast-fighter” vaults up a pole, bending over 
head-first (δέμας δ’ εἰς ἠέρα ῥίψας / ἰδνώθη προκάρηνος), and narrowly escapes a ravenous animal below, much 
to the amusement of his audience (λαοὶ δὲ μέγ᾿ ἴαχον· ἔκφυγε δ᾿ ἀνήρ). In XII 97, the speaker describes a life-like 
bronze statue of Heracles wrestling Antaeus, where the latter “doubles over and groans” (ἰδνωθεὶς δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ 
στοναχὰν ἱέναι) with such vividness that the speaker can almost hear what he sees. 
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argues that these are symptoms of a rare genetic condition, cleidocranial dysplasia, that results 
in the underdevelopment of bones in the chest, head, and torso. Underdeveloped collarbones 
“give the affected individual a unique hypermobility that allows bilateral approximation of the 
shoulders over the chest” (35-36, cf. συνοχωκότε…ὤμω). Deformity of skull and hip bones 
would explain phoxos and pholkos, respectively. One might mistrust the positivism of mapping 
contemporary medical science onto representations in the Iliad, but there is still value in 
Simms’ insight that Thersites’ several deformities share a common trait: a bone condition that 
renders his body curvilinear rather than rectilinear. Within the physiognomic imaginary of the 
text, he is a living formation of arches and spherules—curving shoulders, a bulging head, bowed 
legs. Thersites conforms to this exceptional, inborn geometry when he arches over. 
Only certain kinds of bodies bend themselves in the manner of idnoomai. Thersites is 
disposed to abnormal pliability by his condition; acrobats can train themselves to attain the 
same capacity; snakes are constituted that way. Otherwise, without training or disposition, 
humans manage to assume this posture only in the agony of death. The underlying logic is that 
idnoomai and other *ui- cognates denote curves formed under intense strain. Bending a person 
is like bending Odysseus’ bow: the horn and wood in the bow, or the bone and sinew in us, 
resist the application of stress and want to return to an unbent state.170 Certain kinds of bodies 
                                                        
 
170 There are extensive parallels in Od. 21 between Odysseus’ bow and the human body in terms of their tensile 
strength, i.e., both kinds of bodies possess an internal force that pushes back against external pressure. Indeed, 
the bow is probably supposed to incorporate bone and sinew (like a human body) into its wooden components; on 
Od. 21 and composite bows, see Haller 2009: 411; Rose 1934. For the relatively feeble suitors, the bow is too ridgid 
to bend, even when heated with a flame. But when Odysseus receives the object, he carefully inspects it for signs 
of worms and rot (μὴ κέρα ἶπες ἔδοιεν, 21.395), presumably out of concern that the bow might break if he applies 
his ample strength. The capacity of the bow to bend without breaking is a sign of its internal strength and 
therefore of the strength of its user. By testing whether the bow has retained its elasticity (during its master’s 
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under sufficient pressure can form an arch or loop, and this curvature can be fixed in place—a 
bow can be stringed, the two ends of a felloe can be joined together, and the two ends of an 
arch planted in the ground. 
Under this static deformation, however, a curved body becomes springy and resistant to 
external forces. There is an especially clear example in a simile from Iliad 4 that accompanies 
the death of the Trojan hero Simoeisius at the hands of Ajax: 
He dropped then to the ground in the dust, like some black poplar, 
which in the land low-lying about a great marsh grows 
smooth trimmed yet with branches growing at the uttermost tree-top: 
one whom a man, a maker of chariots, fells with the shining 
iron, to bend it into a wheel (ἴτυν κάμψῃ) for a fine-wrought chariot, 
and the tree lies hardening by the banks of a river. (4.482-87) 
 
This passage imagines a poplar tree in three positions: (1) standing upright, with boughs 
growing on the top; (2) lying on its side by a river bank, not yet bent; and (3) bent into a 
felloe.171 In the first position, the poplar towers over the ground, its vital energy concentrated 
at its top-most point (ἀτάρ τέ οἱ ὄζοι ἐπ’ ἀκροτάτῃ πεφύασι). In the second position, the tree is 
stripped of life and thus exchanges its vertical distance from the earth with a horizontal position 
that contacts the earth along the poplar’s entire length. The transition from (1) to (2) 
accentuates the pathos of Simoeisius’ demise, a young life succumbing to the earth-bound 
                                                        
 
absence, ἀποιχομένοιο ἄνακτος, 395), Odysseus shows that his own body has retained its strength, as he declares 
at 282-84. On the bow’s epithet palintonos (21.11), see p. 83. 
171 The closest English equivalent of ἵτυς is the somewhat archaic term “felloe” (or “felly”), the rim of a wheel. Its 
originary meaning involves bending a segment of pliable wood into a circle, or perhaps into several arches that are 
then fixed together into a circle. Kirk (1985: 390) discusses the construction of the ἴτυς and has concerns about the 
realism of using a soft-wood tree like an ash to make chariot wheels. There is also a golden felloe in Hera’s chariot 
at Il. 5.724. In the Shield of Heracles, the rim of the shield is called an ἴτυς. 
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forces of death.172 But the third position, the circular felloe, cuts across this analogy between 
life and loftiness, death and gravity. As a closed circle supporting a chariot car, only the very 
bottom of the felloe touches the ground; the rest is held aloft by the object’s own internal 
strain, which resists the weight of the chariot.173 The chariot-maker can thus resuscitate the 
tree he kills by deforming it into an object for which the ground is a medium of mobility rather 
than a final resting place. This is where the Homeric simile characteristically, and tragically, 
diverges from its tenor: Simoeisius, unlike the poplar, is destined to remain in the second 
position, fallen irrecuperably.  
The force of gravity pulls Simoeisius and the poplar to the earth, but in the figure of the 
felloe, this downward impulse is curbed. The same paradoxical composition of weight and 
buoyancy characterizes other curves in the *ui- family. When Iris (ἶρις < *ϝι-ρις) courses from 
Olympus to the sea in Iliad 24, bearing a message for Thetis, she initially sets herself in motion 
(ὦρτο δὲ  Ἶρις ἀελλόπος ἀγγελέουσα, 77), light with “wind-feet,” but then, between Samos and 
Imbros, plunges into the water “like a lead weight” (ἣ δὲ μολυβδαίνῃ ἰκέλη, 80). My 
assumption is that, true to her name, her movements replicate the shape and interplay of 
forces at work in a curved bow: at the peak of her trajectory, she is “wind-footed” and light, just 
as the top of a rainbow seems to have a gravity-defying buoyancy. But when she plunges into 
                                                        
 
172 See Schein 1976 on this episode. Fenik 1968: 125-26 discusses the comparisons of fallen warriors to trees: “This 
is a favorite simile subject, and occurs besides here [i.e. with Imbrius at 13.178-80], at E 560, N 389, Ξ 414, Π 482, Ρ 
53. A tree simile is also used to describe standing warriors at Μ 131 and N 437.” See further Stein 2016: 461-63. 
173 Chariot wheels are supported by spokes that connect the hub to the rim/felloe (ἴτυς or ἁψίς) 
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the water, she is as heavy as a lead weight; likewise a rainbow’s lower termini cross the horizon 
at nearly a right angle and seem to straighten out under the full force of gravity.174 
Iris is the daughter of Thaumas, the personification of thauma,175 “wonder,” which is 
unsurprising—except for the fact that neither Hesiod nor Homer ever refers to what modern 
eyes might consider a rainbow’s most arresting feature, its spectrum of colors.176 But one of the 
signal traits of thauma in early Greek thought is a paradoxical unity of opposites,177 and Iris 
embodies a kind of tangible contradiction: weight and weightlessness, the straight and the 
curved, up and down are composed in a single figure. She anticipates certain paradoxical 
formulations in the fragments of Heraclitus, who took a special interest in curves and circles.178 
In fragment 51, Heraclitus reproaches humanity for “not understanding that [a thing] at 
                                                        
 
174 Indeed, when Iris enters the water, the simile suggests that she is no longer travelling along a curved path. The 
lead weight is part of a fishing apparatus, a kind of plumb line, that sinks directly into the depths, “carrying doom 
for fishes.” 
175 The genealogy is mentioned in Theogony 266 and 780. The equation of Thaumas with thauma is Plato’s 
interpretation, at least; see Theaetetus 155d, οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη [sc. θαῦμα], καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν 
Ἶριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν (“for there is no other beginning for philosophy than she, 
and the one who said that Iris is the offspring of Thaumas appears not to have genealogized badly”). Cornford 
(1935: 43) explains: “The Cratylus connects Iris with εἴρειν (408b) and εἴρειν (λέγειν) with dialectic (398d). So Iris 
(philosophy) is daughter of Thaumas (wonder).” 
176 Iris’ predominant characteristic in Homer is speed: she is “wind-footed,” “storm-footed,” “swift,” “swift-
footed.” Only one epithet refers to color, but monochromatically: “golden-winged” (χρυσόπτερον, Il. 8.398, 
11.185). The Presocratics, on the other hand, are fascinated with the rainbow as an optical phenomenon; e.g. 
Xenophanes fr. 34, ἥν τ’ Ἶριν καλέουσι, νέφος καὶ τοῦτο πέφυκε / πορφύρεον καὶ φοινίκεον καὶ χλωρὸν ἰδέσθαι 
(“what they call Iris, this too is a cloud / purple and red and green to look at”). 
177 See Hunziger 2015, “this perception [of thauma] entails the simultaneous awareness of two antithetical 
phenomena…of a gap between two poles, of a paradoxical duality. Thus, despite its referential diversity, the 
concept’s unity resides in the awareness of a paradox and the acknowledgment of a gap” (424). The pseudo-
Aristotelian Peri Mekhanikon theorizes the wondrous quality (to thaumaston) of arches and circles: “the most 
wondrous thing is the being of opposites with one another” (θαυμασιώτατον δὲ τὸ τἀναντία γίνεσθαι μετ’ 
ἀλλήλων, 847b). 
178 Apart from fr. 51, Heraclitus evinces the circle as a figure in which opposites (beginning and end) coincide: 
ξυνὸν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρας ἐπὶ κύκλου περιφερείας. 
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variance with itself agrees with itself, just as the back-stretching harmony of bow and lyre” (οὐ 
ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῶι ξυμφέρεται· παλίντονος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ 
λύρης).179 The interpretation of this fragment is, naturally, contentious, but Kirk (1970: 216) 
pinpoints the relation between the notion of strain (in παλίντονος) and the Heraclitean unity of 
opposites: 
the two-way tension that exists between the frame and the string in bow or lyre 
is said to resemble the way in which something which is at variance (with itself) 
agrees with itself; or, taken more concretely, the way in which something which 
is being carried apart is simultaneously drawn together. 
 
Heraclitus leaves unspecified the precise nature of the self-difference illustrated by the bow 
and lyre. It may consist (as Kirk see it) in the strain that pulls the instruments apart even as it 
holds them together; or perhaps their curvature implies a closed circle that would connect their 
disparate ends.180 In any case what the fragment suggests is that curves can figure the 
paradoxical unity of opposites. A trace of this thinking is evident in Iris’ path as she plunges 
down into the ocean but also soars lightly over it; and in the felloe from Iliad 4, which is made 
from part of a fallen tree that, when curved back on itself, becomes buoyant and gravity-
defying. 
In Odyssey 8, two Phaeacian dancers play a game that exploits this curvilinear logic to 
entertain an audience: 
One of them would throw the ball up to the shadowy clouds 
                                                        
 
179 I follow Kirk’s (1970) edition of the fragment, which notably reads παλίντονος rather than (the more commonly 
accepted) παλίντροπος. The notion of stretching and strain in -τονος is essential to his interpretation. 
180 Snyder 1984 argues that, since bows and lyres are segments of circles, they imply completed circles: “The 
opposite ends of each object would, while apparently tending away from each other, nevertheless partake of the 
unity of a circle” (92-93). Circles and bows are related in the Iliad: note Pandarus’ bow at Il. 4.124-25, stretched 
into a circle. 
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bending backwards [ἰδνωθεὶς ὀπίσω], and the other would rise from the earth 
aloft and easily catch it before his feet came back to earth. 
       (Od. 8.374-76) 
 
The narrator mentions in 377 that the dancers are throwing the ball “straight up” (ἀν᾽ ἴθυν). As 
it rises and falls back to earth, the ball travels along a vertical axis and therefore continually 
registers the downward force of its own weight. The challenge of the game is to keep the ball 
from realizing its telos: after the first player casts the ball up, the second player catches it in 
midair before either the ball or the player touches the ground. The audience (chiefly Odysseus) 
delights in the spectacle of gravity negated: the ball is exposed, again and again, to the 
possibility of falling to earth, but the weightless dancers—who do not leap but “rise” from the 
ground—rescue it every time.181 The dancers themselves figure what they effect: by “bending 
backwards” they expose their bodies in a particularly precipitous way to the force of gravity—
the implication is that only the “most skilled dancers” (βητάρμονας… ἀρίστους, 383) can do this 
without toppling over.182 They tense their muscle and sinew to defy their own weight. We must 
imagine their feet planted on the ground, their backs curving to an apex, and their hands at that 
level or slightly lower. Their pose, a kind of arrested parabola, mirrors the trajectory of the 
sphaira, which rises from the ground but does not fall all of the way back. Thus the dancers 
mime their own dance. 
 
                                                        
 
181 For a psychoanalytic reading of the Phaeacian sphaira, see Buchan 2004: 195-97; see further Olsen 2017. 
182 It is not a coincidence that these dancers are called βητάρμονες—a rare and obscure word, but widely 
interpreted as meaning “wheel-walkers” (βαίνειν + ἅρμα; on ἅρμα as “wheel” rather than “chariot,” see Panagl 
1992). See further Stefanelli 2008: 23; Risch 1973: 53; Bechtel 1914. There is a kind of sub-formulaic doublet here 
comprising a compound of ἅρμα and a reflex of *ui-. The act of bending backward (ἰ-δνόομαι) forms the body into 
a wheel-like curve (ἅρμα), just as the felloe (ἴ-τυς) in Iliad 4 is formed by a wheel-maker (ἁρματο-πηγός).  
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In these examples, the curves denoted by ἰδνόομαι and the *ui- cognates exert a 
counter-force against gravity and embody a paradoxical tension between falling and rising. If 
the fall to earth, as we have seen, figures necessity imposed by violence, there are sometimes 
intervals of buoyancy along the way that seem to resist the teleological sway of gravity. 
Thersites’ instant reaction to Odysseus’ blow is to “bend” (ὃ δ’ ἰδνώθη). The Phaeacian dancers 
expressly bend backwards (ἰδνωθεὶς ὀπίσω, Od. 8.375), but without such a qualification the 
default meaning of ἰδνόομαι involves curling up, doubling over, bending forward (see n. 163). 
The force of the blow on his shoulders causes Thersites to reflexively bend down, away from 
the shock, and ultimately into his seat. The bT scholion to 266 elucidates ἰδνώθη with a 
valuable observation: “he bends up such that his hunchback protrudes more” (ἀνεκλάσθη, 
ὅπως πλεῖον προκύψῃ τὸ κυρτόν).183 The “hunchback” or “hump” (τὸ κυρτόν) refers to 
Thersites’ shoulders, which are said to be “bulbous” in the physical description at 217-18 (τὼ δέ 
οἱ ὤμω / κυρτὼ). The scholion pinpoints a paradoxical aspect of Thersites’ movement in these 
lines: because of his distinctive physiognomy, when he arches over on himself, one of the 
already-existing arches on his upper back (the hunch) would emerge more prominently.184 Even 
                                                        
 
183 Eustathius elaborates on the same formulation used in the exegetical scholion: Τινὲς δὲ ἰδνωθῆναι τὸ 
ἀνακλασθῆναι νοοῦσιν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐτυμολογίας, ἵνα πλέον, φασί, προκύψῃ τὸ τοῦ στήθους κυρτὸν καὶ 
συμπράξῃ τι πρὸς γέλωτα (“some think that ἰδνωθῆναι is ‘to bend up’ from the same etymology [i.e. as the 
previous theory, see n. 165], so that, they say, his hunchback protrudes more and contributes somewhat to the 
laughter,” 1.330.2). 
184 There may be a gendered or sexualized quality to the language in this passage. The only other cases of idnoomai 
in the ancient Greek corpus (apart from commentaries and the Greek Anthology) are found in two passages from 
the Hippocratic On the Diseases of Women. In the first, 1.2, the author remarks that a woman’s menstrual cycle 
can be interrupted if the opening of her womb is closed (τῶν μητρέων τὸ στόμα μεμύκῃ) or if it “folds away” (ἢ 
ἰδνωθῇ) from the cervix. Consequently, the menstrual blood is blocked and deflected to various internal regions of 
the body—including, after several months, to a tumor on the abdomen that “stands out, since it is filled with 
[menstrual] blood” (καὶ ἐξίσταται ἅτε πληρευμένη τοῦ αἵματος ἡ σάρξ); compare the standing boil on Thersites 
(σμῶδιξ δ’ αἱματόεσσα μεταφρένου ἐξυπανέστη, 2.267). In 1.10, conversely, if the cervix is “not straight but bent” 
(τὸ στόμα οὐκ ὀρθόν ἐστι τῆς μήτρης, ἀλλ’ ἰδνοῦται), then it will not receive semen (οὐ λάζυται τὴν γονήν), 
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without the scholiast’s speculation, we know that part of Thersites’ back is moving contrary to 
the direction of his downward curvature: “a bloody welt stood up from under his back” (σμῶδιξ 
δ’ αἱματόεσσα μεταφρένου ἐξυπανέστη, 267) even as his head and neck are bending down. 
The geometrical discord is accentuated by the juxtaposition of ἔκπεσε δάκρυ in 266 and 
ἐξυπανέστη at 267, both after the bucolic diaeresis. 
Thersites’ body is moving at cross-purposes. The arch that he makes is at tension with 
itself, a unity of opposites that Heraclitus might have appreciated. Odysseus intends to use the 
royal scepter to definitively suppress the threat of popular revolt, and the apparent efficacy of 
this violence is figured in the change of Thersites’ posture, from standing defiantly to sitting in 
obedience to princely power. This change might have been portrayed simply and decisively. Yet 
Thersites does not sink into his seat directly but folds up and swells for three verses in a zone of 
indirection.  
The effect is that the actual outcome—Thersites’ silencing and the end of overt popular 
resistance—is shadowed by another possibility. Idnoomai signifies the paradoxical composition 
of rising and falling such that an observer is unable to discern in which direction a body is 
tending: it seems to move both ways. Verses 266-68 capture a moment when it seems that 
                                                        
 
resulting in infertility. In both instances (1.2 and 1.10), the curvature of reproductive organs blocks the exchange of 
fluids into and out of the body and suspends the telos of “natural” biological processes. Thersites’ curved body 
suspends the telos of Odysseus’ scepter-wielding (hence phallocentric) violence. There is also Thersites’ gendered 
insult at Il. 2.235 (ὦ πέπονες κάκ’ ἐλέγχε’ Ἀχαιΐδες οὐκέτ’ Ἀχαιοὶ, “o you soft, wretched disgraces, Achaean 
women, no longer Achaean men”). Vocative πέπονες is usually a term of endearment (“kind,” “gentle”) but it also 
has a physical sense of “ripe,” and even a medical sense in a 5th c. comic fragment of Hermippus (fr. 30, φήμης 
ἱερᾶς ἐξοιγνυμένης ὥσπερ πέπονος δοθιῆνος, “of a sacred story opening up like a ripe boil”). Perhaps Hermippus 
attests an association between πέπων and physical comedy that existed in Homer as well. In that case, Thersites’ 
gendered insult is turned back at him when he is afflicted with a “ripe” boil. The role of idnoomai in medical 
discourses on reproductive biology suggests something similar. 
 88 
Thersites is not falling to his seat; that, like the crest of an arch or a wheel or flexing dancers, he 
continues to stand in contravention of the laws of violence and gravity. Of course, this 
curvilinear tension resolves in the act of sitting, which confirms only one of the two 
appearances implicated in idnoomai—falling down. It is the unrealized appearance, however, 
that has political import: if Thersites had stood up (ἀνίστημι185) in response to Odysseus’ attack, 
his act would have voided the rule that prevails throughout the Iliad according to which 
violence compels bodies to fall down. And in particular, he would be a sign that the Achaean 
social order is not in any ultimate sense necessary, not even by violent compulsion. 
Thersites in this moment becomes a kind of apparition. He appears, the untimely 
specter of buried class antagonisms, but is powerless to effect anything beyond his own 
appearing; he then disappears without a trace. It is possible to read this scene by focusing on 
how, by vanishing, Thersites and his divisive politics are apparently exorcised from the Iliad. By 
turning instead to the form of his appearance, I have argued that Thersites’ political rhetoric—
which denies the necessity of the social order and of the war that it sustains—is crucially 
developed into a critique of political violence. 
 
Poulydamas: Divining Violence 
Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” ends not with a confident call to revolution against 
the forces of militarism and capitalism, but with a note of uncertainty. Immediate violence 
                                                        
 
185 Standing up would signal not only resistance to violence but also Thersites’ right to speak before the assembly, 
because individuals in the Iliad generally stand up (ἀνίστημι) before speaking to assembled groups; see n. 156. 
Perhaps it is appropriate, in tragicomic way, that Thersites’ standing welt (ἐξυπανέστη, 267) seems to address itself 
to the assembly like a standing speaker (e.g. τοῖσι δ’ ἀνέστη, Il. 1.68, 101). 
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manifests a power that “might be able to call a halt” to the cycle of violence and law (297). It 
only manifests a possibility; it does not necessarily change the political situation to make this 
possibility actionable. The immediate violence that befalls Thersites, likewise, does not 
demonstrate that his general strike is likely to succeed but only affirms the contingency of 
violence as a means of enforcing social order. It is not surprising, then, that Thersites’ audience 
does not take up his call to arms. Even if they discern the significance of his curved posture on 
an aesthetic level, they may still be reluctant to commit to an act of overt resistance on the 
basis of a mere apparition.186 
On the other hand, a no less ambiguous apparition plays an important role in securing 
the cooperation of the plēthus in the aftermath of Thersites’ silencing. Once the assembly is 
done mocking Thersites, Odysseus, perhaps sensing that the mass of the army is still restive, 
delivers a speech in which he reminds the assembly of a portent from nine years earlier, before 
the host had left Aulis.187 A serpent famously devoured a nest of eight chicks and their mother 
before being petrified by Zeus. In Odysseus’ retelling, the seer Calchas interprets the scene to 
                                                        
 
186 The response of the plēthus to the silencing of Thersites is deeply ambivalent. They laugh at him (αὐτῷ ἡδὺ 
γέλασσαν, 271) but they also feel grief (ἀχνύμενοί), presumably at his plight and theirs. On some level, the laugher 
expresses or effects a distancing between the masses and Thersites. They count themselves fortunate for not 
being in his situation. What is his situation? For Rose (1988), the masses laugh at Thersites because he stupidly 
forgets that he—and they—are powerless against the princes. Their laughter is possible only because of a 
profounder solidarity among the suffering masses that they feel with renewed intensity (ἀχνύμενοί) when they see 
Thersites struck. For Thalmann (1988), the masses laugh because they align themselves with the princes against 
Thersites, the outsider and scapegoat whose humiliation purges the community of its tensions. On the other hand, 
Thalmann concedes that the masses do feel some kind of affinity with Thersites on the basis of their common 
mistreatment by the princes: “They laugh, although grieved—but at the way Thersites, or they themselves, have 
been treated? There is not, finally, much difference, since the former is merely a specific instance of the latter” 
(18). 
187 On the role of this portent in restoring social cohesion in the army, see Elmer 2013a: 98-99. On the rhetorical 
strategies at work in Odysseus’ retelling of the portent, see Collins 2002: 23-25 
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mean that the war will continue for nine years and be won in the tenth. The portent is 
supposed to confirm that martial violence will be a source of anankē, an instrument to compel 
the war and the plot to advance toward their conclusions. It is akin to immediate violence in 
this specific sense: it interprets an act of violence, on the basis of its appearance, to disclose 
something about the practice of violence in the future. The Achaean assembly finds this 
interpretation convincing enough that they redouble their commitment to the war.  
Apparitions of violence, however, can also make characters question this commitment. 
In this section, I examine a case in Book 12 in which a character similar to Thersites also 
contests the social and narrative necessity of martial violence. This case directly involves a 
portent: the Trojan army witnesses a struggle between a bird and a snake in which, unlike 
Calchas’ portent, the violence ends in stalemate. In the Trojan reaction to this vision, the Iliad 
explicitly countenances the mode of reading violence that we developed in the previous 
sections. The witnesses, led by Poulydamas, wonder whether the image portends that their 
own project of martial violence will turn out to be ineffectual, bereft of the force of necessity. 
 
In Iliad 12, the Trojans, led by Hector, sustain an offensive against the fortified Greek 
camp. During Achilles’ absence, the Achaean resistance falters. But as the Trojans advance 
toward the Greek wall, they hesitate before the outer trench, pondering whether to hold back 
or to risk the crossing in pursuit of their prize—to burn the Greek ships. A bird-omen appears to 
them: 
ὄρνις γάρ σφιν ἐπῆλθε περησέμεναι μεμαῶσιν     
αἰετὸς ὑψιπέτης ἐπ’ ἀριστερὰ λαὸν ἐέργων 
φοινήεντα δράκοντα φέρων ὀνύχεσσι πέλωρον  
ζωὸν ἔτ’ ἀσπαίροντα, καὶ οὔ πω λήθετο χάρμης,  
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κόψε γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔχοντα κατὰ στῆθος παρὰ δειρὴν  
ἰδνωθεὶς ὀπίσω· ὃ δ’ ἀπὸ ἕθεν ἧκε χαμᾶζε     
ἀλγήσας ὀδύνῃσι, μέσῳ δ’ ἐνὶ κάββαλ’ ὁμίλῳ, 
αὐτὸς δὲ κλάγξας πέτετο πνοιῇς ἀνέμοιο. 
Τρῶες δ’ ἐρρίγησαν ὅπως ἴδον αἰόλον ὄφιν 
κείμενον ἐν μέσσοισι Διὸς τέρας αἰγιόχοιο.   (12.200-9) 
 
For a bird approached them while they were eager to cross, 
an eagle, high-flying, holding to the left of the people, 
carrying in its talons a blood-colored snake, prodigious, 
alive, still breathing, and it had not forgotten its eagerness for battle, 
for it struck the eagle that held it on the chest beside the neck 
bending back (ἰδνωθεὶς ὀπίσω); the eagle threw it from itself to the ground, 
suffering from pain, and cast it down in the middle of the throng. 
And the bird, shrieking, flew on the wind’s breath. 
And the Trojans shivered when they gazed at the sleek snake 
lying in their midst, a portent of aegis-bearing Zeus. 
 
One of Hector’s advisors, Poulydamas, immediately interprets the portent as a warning against 
attacking the Achaean camp.188 The Trojans are the eagle and the Achaeans the snake: the 
conflict will not be resolved in favor of either, but if the Trojans break into the fortified camp, 
they “will not return in good order from the ships” (οὐ κόσμῳ παρὰ ναῦφιν ἐλευσόμεθ’, 225) 
and “will leave behind many of the Trojans” (πολλοὺς γὰρ Τρώων καταλείψομεν, 226), just as 
the eagle fails to carry home its prey. Hector, however, vehemently rejects this reading and 
excoriates Poulydamas’ reluctance to fight. The attack proceeds. 
Before scrutinizing Poulydamas’ interpretation further, let us provisionally observe how 
closely this scene approaches the plot and phraseology of Thersites’ beating.189 Two opponents 
                                                        
 
188 On the relationship between Hector and Poulydamas, see Redfield (1975: 143-52), who construes Poulydamas 
as Hector’s cautious alter-ego or externalized inner monologue; see further Courtieu 2007; Clark 2007; Schofield 
1986: 18-22. 
189 For further similarities between Thersites and Poulydamas, see Courtieu 2007. Rancière (2010: 30, 32) notices 
the similarities between the two figures as dissenting voices (although he mistakenly calls Poulydamas Hector’s 
brother). 
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are locked in a struggle before the eyes of the laos, “in their midst.” The spectacle comprises a 
mutual exchange of violence: Thersites attacks Odysseus verbally, and Odysseus reciprocates 
with the scepter-lash; the eagle crushes the snake in its talons, and the snake strikes back. The 
phraseology of the two passages begins to align at 12.205/2.265: 
Il. 12.205-7     Il. 2.265-26, 269 
κόψε γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔχοντα κατὰ στῆθος παρὰ δειρὴν  Ὣς ἄρ’ ἔφη, σκήπτρῳ δὲ μετάφρενον ἠδὲ καὶ ὤμω 
ἰδνωθεὶς ὀπίσω· ὃ δ’ ἀπὸ ἕθεν ἧκε χαμᾶζε  πλῆξεν· ὃ δ’ ἰδνώθη, θαλερὸν δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε δάκρυ· 
ἀλγήσας ὀδύνῃσι, μέσῳ δ’ ἐνὶ κάββαλ’ ὁμίλῳ, … ἀλγήσας δ’ ἀχρεῖον ἰδὼν ἀπομόρξατο δάκρυ.  (269) 
 
The snake strikes (κόψε) the eagle’s chest, and Odysseus smacks (πλῆξεν) Thersites’ back; the 
snake curls back (ἰδνωθεὶς ὀπίσω), and Thersites curls over (ἰδνώθη—more on this below); the 
snake is cast to the earth, and a tear falls from Thersites’ eyes; the eagle and Thersites are both 
incapacitated with anguish (ἀλγήσας).  
The parallels are not exhaustive: in particular, various roles—the one who strikes, the 
one struck, the one who bends—are distributed differently. But in each scene, a precise form of 
violence appears before an assembled people as they hesitate at an uncertain juncture. The 
Trojans cannot decide whether to go forward with their assault on the Achaean camp; the 
Achaean masses have only just returned to their seats and have not yet affirmed their 
commitment to the war. The laoi face decisions about their collective destinies, whether to 
continue to fight and risk disaster or to stop and save themselves.190 In other words, these are 
fundamentally political decisions that concern the very survival of the community in its role as 
an agent of violence. The people do not speak for themselves, but their interests are spoken for 
by singular representatives whose own social position is undefined or liminal. Thus, like 
                                                        
 
190 See Haubold 2000 on the trope of the leader destroying his laos, esp. 83-95 on Hector. 
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Thersites’ position in the Achaean army (see pp. 66-67), Poulydamas’ status in Troy seems 
somehow conflicted: he claims at 12.213 to be dēmos, “of the people”191 apparently in contrast 
with Hector’s princely status, but he is clearly one of the aristocratic heroes, and his father is 
described as one of the “elders of the people” (δημογέροντες, 3.149) who sit with Priam during 
the teikhoskopia. Whatever his personal social status, it is clear the Poulydamas, like Thersites, 
fashions himself as a voice of the dēmos in opposition to its leadership.192 
Characters in Homer frequently contest the interpretation of bird omens. Interpreters 
can be professional seers (like Calchas) or individuals without specific qualifications (like 
Poulydamas); and the act of interpretation depends on a rhetorically compelling construal of an 
apparition whose meaning is not automatically accessible to human understanding.193 But 
certain basic principles are widely accepted: birds flying to the right are favorable, to the left, 
adverse. Poulydamas interprets the snake-bird omen in accordance with this principle. A 
reliable advocate of martial caution, he naturally argues that the bird’s leftward trajectory (ἐπ’ 
ἀριστερὰ) amounts to a warning. If the Trojans pass over the ditch, they will break through the 
                                                        
 
191 οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδὲ ἔοικε / δῆμον ἐόντα παρὲξ ἀγορευέμεν (“it is not fitting for me, being dēmos, to speak against 
you,” 12.212-13). It is not entirely clear how to read δῆμον as an adjective here. The scholion (A) remarks ἀντὶ τοῦ 
δημότην, ἰδιώτην, hence “of the people” (like δήμιος, but with iota reduced to an unwritten glide). Hainsworth 
(1993: 341) thinks that this language is figurative—Poulydamas is not actually “demotic” but is merely being self-
effacing. Allen (1906) has even proposed reading δήμον(α), from unattested δήμων, meaning “knowing, prudent” 
(on the grounds that “Polydamas is in no sense peuple: he was no Thersites, but the wisest of Trojans and the only 
one who stood up to Hector,” 5). Schofield 1986: 19 n. 30 takes the adjective as “bitterly sarcastic”; Poulydamas 
implies that he is treated by Hector as merely one of the rabble. See Welwei 2000: 29, who relates Poulydamas’ 
position to the institutional role of hetairoi in archaic Greece, who could mediate between their leader and the 
broader community. 
192 See Courtieu 2007: 18. 
193 See Collins 2002 on the performative and rhetorical dynamics of oiōnomanteia in early epic; Flower 2008: 133-
34 on the Poulydamas/Hector episode in Iliad 12; Bushnell 1982 on the unstable place of oiōnomanteia between 
reading and writing, narrative and simile, internal characters and external audiences. 
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gates, but, like the eagle losing its prey, they will fall short of their prize and retreat in disarray 
with heavy losses.  
Hector refuses to retreat. He cannot dispute the semiotic logic of Poulydamas’ 
interpretation—there is no ambiguity in the bird’s leftward path—so he disputes the very 
purchase of bird-signs on reality.194 It does not matter to him “whether birds go on the right…or 
go on the left” (239-40), since Zeus, through Iris, promised him in Book 11 (187-94 = 202-9) that 
the assault on the camp would go favorably (at least, “until you reach the ships”).195 What is 
more, Poulydamas’ caution smacks of cowardice, and in the final calculation, Hector declares, 
“only one bird-sign is the best: to defend the fatherland” (243).196 Poulydamas is ultimately 
vindicated, of course, and Hector’s disregard for the portent underscores deeper problems with 
his disposition as a leader.197 But why does Hector dismiss the very premises of oiōnomanteia 
rather than Poulydamas’ competency alone? And why does Poulydamas’ reading fail so 
completely to persuade an audience that was already hesitating to advance? 
                                                        
 
194 Skepticism about the validity of divination is widespread in Homer. See Collins 2002: 23-24; Flower 2008 ch. 5 
on skepticism about seers in the archaic and classical periods. 
195 Zeus “guarantees [the Trojans] the power to kill men / until [Hector] reaches the well-benched ships” (192-94). 
Iris then informs Hector of this decree, repeating Zeus’ words (τότε τοι κράτος ἐγγυαλίξει / κτείνειν εἰς ὅ κε νῆας 
ἐϋσσέλμους ἀφίκηαι, 207-8). 
196 εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης. Notice the stylistic similarity between Hector’s dictum and that of 
Odysseus at 2.204-6 in the leadup to the Thersites episode (εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω / εἷς βασιλεύς ᾧ δῶκε Κρόνου πάϊς 
ἀγκυλομήτεω / σκῆπτρόν τ’ ἠδὲ θέμιστας). Both are affirmations of the oneness of social authority, and both 
statements refer to an authoritarian notion of the father: monarchy is the patrimony of Zeus and Cronos (Κρόνου 
πάϊς) and patriotism means deference to the fatherland (περὶ πάτρης). Thank you to Kathryn Morgan for pointing 
out this parallel. 
197 See Schein 1984: 185. Redfield (1975: 146-47) sees Poulydamas at fault as well (for timidity); thus Hector’s error 
is also an expression of his heroic courage. 
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The struggle between bird and snake at 12.201-7 is not an ordinary portent. The 
Homeric portents involving birds of prey—oiōnoi, denoting both the bird and the portent—
almost invariably herald victory for one party and defeat for their opponents,198 a dispensation 
of divine favor for one of the two sides arrayed in violent contention. The direction of the bird’s 
flight is crucial in some cases, but just as often the direction is unspecified, and the omen 
derives its force from exhibiting an act of predation. In the Odyssey, various omens feature an 
eagle or hawk attacking doves or geese, and all of them are taken to signal the ultimate 
ascendency of Odysseus over the suitors.199 In the Iliad, an eagle carrying away a fawn gives 
heart to the Achaeans (8.247), and Calchas’ famous omen, in which a snake consumes a nest of 
birds, maps Achaean victory onto serpentine (rather than avian) predation.  
Oiōnoi thus signal that human conflicts will be resolved through the simple compulsion 
of animalistic violence. The asymmetrical, “natural” encounter between predator and prey is 
precisely the kind of scenario that, for Hesiod, exemplifies unjust biē (see above, Op. 274-80; 
likewise, the ainos of the hawk and nightingale at 202-12). Whereas Hesiod warns his audience 
against the dangers of applying such biē to human affairs, Homeric characters interpret avian 
violence as a sanction for violence among humans, a model for how their own conflicts might 
be decided once and for all through the application of irresistible force. The oiōnos, then, 
involves a conception of violence similar to the one that we encountered in the first section of 
                                                        
 
198 More precisely, in omens involving birds of prey (oiōnoi), the bird’s superior strength is generally interpreted as 
a sign of the victory of one party (the avian predator) over another (its prey). Collins 2002: 35 lists a number of 
instances in Homer. 
199 See Collins 2002: 35 for examples at 15.160 (eagle and goose), 15.526 (hawk and dove), 19.536 (eagle and 
geese). We should add the omen in the Ithacan assembly (involving two eagles, 2.146), which is interpreted by 
Halitherses as heralding Odysseus’ imminent return and victory. Heath (1999: 398) lists the same set of cases. 
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this chapter, denoted by biē. It is violence as an instrument whose value and justification are 
bound up in its extraordinary capacity to compel. 
The struggle in the sky over the Achaean walls in Iliad 12 reverses this principle.200 The 
Trojans witness a kind of violence that is portentous precisely because it fails to necessitate 
anything. The oiōnos, the eagle, is injured and loses its prey, and in Poulydamas’ construal, it 
flies home without food to a nest of hungry chicks. The prey’s counter-violence is similarly 
inefficacious: the snake escapes but is injured, perhaps fatally, and its captor flies to safety. The 
struggle results in mutual injury, a suspension of finality rather than a clear assignation of 
victory and defeat. It is arguably the only omen in early Greek poetry that presents such an 
impasse.201 The content of Poulydamas’ interpretation depends more on these antiteleological 
details than the bare negative signifier of leftward flight. The crucial fact is that the bird drops 
its prey before reaching home (πάρος φίλα οἰκί’ ἱκέσθαι), before its predatory undertaking 
progresses to the telos (οὐδ’ ἐτέλεσσε φέρων).202 Likewise, the Trojans will not exactly suffer 
defeat—but they will fall short of victory and suffer substantial casualties in the process.  
                                                        
 
200 Collins 2002: 22 aptly remarks, “As we have already seen, the aggressive behavior of eagles and other οἰωνοί 
are typically interpreted in positive terms. But similar to Hesiod’s inversion of the traditional οἰωνός paradigm, 
Poulydamas stresses the failure of the eagle to return home and feed its children, rather than its superior power to 
carry the serpent aloft. I suggest that this nontraditional reading may also factor into Hektor’s skepticism. Most 
striking, though, is how Hektor makes the whole concept of οἰωνός and the system behind it a metaphor for 
warfare.” 
201 The most similar case is the notorious omen that concludes Odyssey 24. Zeus casts a thunderbolt to dissuade 
Odysseus from continuing to attack the army of the suitors’ vengeful relatives. The omen, in conjunction with 
Athena’s explicit instructions, forces the two sides to reach a settlement and refrain from further violence. It is an 
act of divine violence that puts an end to the efficacy of political violence. Odysseus himself initially assumes the 
posture of an oiōnos swooping down upon his prey and portending his own victory—but his autopoietic omen is 
interrupted by Zeus’ superior omen (538); see Purves 2019: 93-96. 
202 The bT scholion notices the spatial aspect of the portent’s atelic meaning: μέσῳ <δ’> ἐγκάββαλ’ ὁμίλῳ: τῷ 
μεταιχμίῳ πρὸς τὸ μὴ διαβῆναι· ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἀετὸς ἐπὶ τὰ ξένα ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ τέλους ἠστόχησεν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ Τρῶες 
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Poulydamas’ interpretation is utterly unpersuasive to his fellow Trojans.203 After Hector 
rejects his reasoning and accuses Poulydamas of cowardice, the rest of the army follows Hector 
over the ditch without further hesitation. Hector supplies several reasons for ignoring the 
omen,204 but surely the most devastating is the charge that Poulydamas is afraid of violence 
(“why are you so afraid of war and strife?” τίπτε σὺ δείδοικας πόλεμον καὶ δηϊοτῆτα, 244). This 
question is intended to effect a kind of character assassination: Poulydamas is too cowardly to 
be trusted in battle or in his divinations concerning battle.205 But surely Hector and the other 
Trojans are aware that Poulydamas is an eminently capable and reliable soldier in actual 
combat.206 The charge of “fearing war and strife” is implausibly hyperbolic if it is taken literally 
to mean that Poulydamas is a coward, but Hector’s words do contain a grain of truth on a more 
impersonal level. What Poulydamas fears is the possibility that martial violence might 
accomplish nothing—merely a draw, not even defeat. This premise is incompatible with the 
received principles of oiōnomanteia and, if generalized sufficiently, with the project of war 
itself. Poulydamas may not intend to question the necessity of violence tout court, but this is 
                                                        
 
(“‘the bird threw the snake into the middle of the throng’: meaning that [the Trojans] will not traverse the space 
between the armies; for just as the eagle misses its telos in enemy territory, so will the Trojans”). 
203 Poulydamas addresses his concerns directly to Hector (12.210), but Hector fears that Poulydamas’ words might 
discourage the rank-and-file (248-49), and Poulydamas compares his interpretation to that of “an interpreter of 
the gods…whom the laoi believed in” (θεοπρόπος…οἱ πειθοίατο λαοί, 228-29). It seems likely then, that even if 
Poulydamas’ speech is addressed to Hector directly, either it is overheard by the mass of warriors hesitating before 
the ditch or, at the very least, it is designed to be persuasive not only to Hector but the laos in general. 
204 See p. 94.  
205 Hector doubles down on this notion in the following lines, implying that Poulydamas (whose “heart is not 
enduring in battle,” οὐ…κραδίη μενεδήϊος, 247) would break ranks before facing any real danger. 
206 Hainsworth 1993: 343, “The charge of cowardice, which at this moment we have no evidence to refute, is quite 
unjustified by the sequel; he is ranked beside Aineias, Agenor, Sarpedon, and Glaukos at 14.425-26, rescued 
Satnios and scored a success at 14.449-57, and fought well in Book 15.”  
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how Hector, at least, understands him. The problem with Poulydamas’ interpretation, then, is 
not simply that it predicts failure for the Trojans and thereby displeases its intended audience. 
Rather, it subverts the deep interpretive structure of bird-portents, which requires the 
portended violence to appear to be effective, to necessitate the defeat of one party and the 
victory of the other. 
 
Poulydamas’ oiōnomanteia approaches the reading strategy that we have been 
developing in this chapter.207 The oiōnos, according to Poulydamas, does not portend victory or 
defeat for either party; rather, it prefigures the failure of the armed expedition to resolve the 
conflict either way. To reach this conclusion, Poulydamas has to suspend the prevalent 
conception of violence as an effective instrument for forcing a decision between opponents. 
Freed from this assumption, his reading can attend to violence in its aesthetic immediacy, and 
he discovers that this portended act of violence, far from necessitating victory or defeat, 
reaches a desultory impasse. This interpretation poses a metanarrative problem. The soldiers in 
the Iliad require a complex system of motivations (anankai) to keep them committed to the 
war. If Poulydamas convinces the Trojan host that their next expedition will result in a draw, 
then their commitment to the war and to the continuation of the plot is compromised. Just as 
in the case of Thersites, the Iliad allows this disastrous challenge to the narrative order to 
surface very briefly before suppressing it with an act of violence.  
                                                        
 
207 Bushnell 1981: 5, “Polydamas holds for this moment the paradoxical position of being at once character and 
poet, both inside and outside the narrative.” 
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The most striking resonance between the Poulydamas and Thersites scenes has to do 
with the aesthetic form that violence assumes in each. Poulydamas’ omen is the only one in 
Homer that involves our favorite verb: the snake “bends backwards” (ἰδνωθεὶς ὀπίσω) to strike 
the eagle. The usual constellation of forms associated with the *ui- cognates and idnoomai 
resurfaces here. The snake is held in the bird’s talons, presumably dangling below its body. 
“Bending back” to strike the bird’s neck means bending upward, away from the talons. But the 
strike causes the bird to cast the snake to earth. Rising in order to fall, rising-falling, the snake’s 
body composes opposing directions in a single form.  
We have seen how the *ui- cognates, and ἰδνόομαι in particular, can connote precisely 
this kind of paradoxical resistance to violence as a force that pulls bodies downward. Here the 
geometry of violence is reversed—the bird forces the snake to stay aloft—but it does not lose 
its essential configuration. For the snake, staying aloft in the airy domain of its assailant means 
the subjection of its body to violence, immobilization, and death. By bending backwards like an 
inverted rainbow, the snake manages to escape the bird’s predatory grip (its anti-gravity, as it 
were) and to fall to safety. The preternatural capacity of the snake’s body to bend out of shape, 
to flex against the force of the eagle’s talons, allows it to resist the fatal telos of violence. 
Poulydamas does not mention the phrase ἰδνωθεὶς ὀπίσω in his interpretation, perhaps 
because he is concerned more with the failure of the Trojans to reach their telos than with the 
specific capacities of the Achaeans to resist violence. Indeed, Poulydamas repeats verbatim 
more than two verses from the actual portent (201 ~ 218, 202-4 = 219-21) but cuts off the 
citation after the beginning of 221, omitting the nearly three verses (206-8) that describe the 
snake’s counterattack.  
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νῦν αὖτ’ ἐξερέω ὥς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἄριστα.    
μὴ ἴομεν Δαναοῖσι μαχησόμενοι περὶ νηῶν. 
ὧδε γὰρ ἐκτελέεσθαι ὀΐομαι, εἰ ἐτεόν γε 
Τρωσὶν ὅδ’ ὄρνις ἦλθε περησέμεναι μεμαῶσιν 
αἰετὸς ὑψιπέτης ἐπ’ ἀριστερὰ λαὸν ἐέργων 
φοινήεντα δράκοντα φέρων ὀνύχεσσι πέλωρον   
ζωόν· ἄφαρ δ’ ἀφέηκε πάρος φίλα οἰκί’ ἱκέσθαι,  
οὐδ’ ἐτέλεσσε φέρων δόμεναι τεκέεσσιν ἑοῖσιν.  
ὣς ἡμεῖς, εἴ πέρ τε πύλας καὶ τεῖχος Ἀχαιῶν 
ῥηξόμεθα σθένεϊ μεγάλῳ, εἴξωσι δ’ Ἀχαιοί, 
οὐ κόσμῳ παρὰ ναῦφιν ἐλευσόμεθ’ αὐτὰ κέλευθα·    
πολλοὺς γὰρ Τρώων καταλείψομεν, οὕς κεν Ἀχαιοὶ 
χαλκῷ δῃώσωσιν ἀμυνόμενοι περὶ νηῶν.   (12.215-27) 
 
Now once more I will declare how it seems best to me. 
Let us not go to fight the Danaans around their ships. 
For I think it will end in the following way, if truthfully 
this bird came to the Trojans while we were eager to cross over, 
an eagle, high-flying, holding to the left of the people, 
carrying in its talons a blood-colored snake, prodigious, 
alive; but the bird released the snake before it returned to its home 
and did not finish carrying it to give to its children. 
So we, even if we break the gates and wall of the Achaeans 
with our great strength and the Achaeans give way, 
we will retrace our way from the ships not in good order; 
for we will leave behind many of the Trojans, whomever the Achaeans 
slay with bronze as they protect their ships.  
 
The omen is recounted from the perspective of the eagle, and this focalization reinforces the 
identification between the eagle and the Trojans. This is not the only possible identification. 
The portent predicts a violent confrontation between two parties, and like all portents it leaves 
its referents unspecified. The scene immediately after the portent comprises the confrontation 
between Poulydamas and Hector, which culminates in a death threat: Hector proclaims that “if 
you [Poulydamas] shrink from the murderous work or turn back some other man from the 
fighting…at once beaten down under my spear you will lose your life” (249-50).  
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The content of the portent resounds in the scene that interprets it. In schematic terms, 
Poulydamas plays the snake to Hector’s eagle, the victim of (the threat of) aggressive violence; 
like the snake, Poulydamas is attempting to stop his eagle, Hector, from crossing into the 
Achaean camp and thereby to suspend the act of violence before it can attain its telos. By 
omitting the snake’s counter-violence from his interpretation, Poulydamas is perhaps hoping to 
preempt any identification between himself and the snake—and thereby to avoid presenting 
himself as Hector’s opponent in this interpretive dispute. But his abrupt omission draws 
attention to the comparison all the more pointedly. 
This scene, then, contains two exhibitions of violence. The first—the portent itself and 
Poulydamas’ representation of it—intimates that the violent designs of the Trojan host might 
stall and accomplish nothing. But while this portent is still being interpreted, another 
manifestation of violence supervenes: Hector’s threat instantly confirms, beyond the hazy 
intimations of the portent, that violence can and does force a decision between antagonists. 
Following a well-worn pattern, Hector combines this threat of violence with an appeal to 
patriotic themis: “one bird-sign is best: to defend the fatherland” (εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος 
ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης, 243). The army progresses over the ditch without further comment. 
We have already encountered this double apparition of violence in Iliad 2: the striking of 
Thersites can be interpreted, against its ostensible meaning, to signal the possibility that 
violence in the service of social order can be stopped. But the plēthus is already disposed to 
overlook this possibility precisely because Odysseus has threatened them with scepter-lashes in 
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the previous episode and thereby impressed upon them the manifest efficacy of law-preserving 
violence.208 
 
Conclusion 
In this parallel reading, Poulydamas and Thersites present images of violence as 
ineffectual and contingent, images that are rejected, violently, by Hector and by Odysseus. Each 
scene, likewise, occurs at a crux in the narrative, when characters face a decision about 
whether to progress and entangle themselves further in violent conflict or to halt themselves 
and, in effect, the plot. In the event, they decide to go forward and to dismiss the subversive 
implications of immediate violence. But in the image of bodies bending in resistance to 
violence, the Iliad countenances the destitution of the violent necessity that compels many of 
its characters—especially the anonymous masses of the armies—to commit themselves to the 
war. In these scenes, the text engages briefly in a critique of violence whose full implications 
would be ruinous to the consistency of the story and its characters. If not for the social efficacy 
of violence, the Achaean plēthus might have taken up Agamemnon’s (false) proposal for 
homecoming or Thersites’ sincere incitement to revolt, which in either case would have ended 
the war. If Poulydamas’ portent had not been silenced, the Trojan host might have retreated 
from the battlefield and found safety inside its fortified bastions.  
                                                        
 
208 These scenes belong to a common type. At a moment of hesitation or weakness among the leaders, the plēthus 
must choose whether to continue their collective martial endeavor, and the deciding factor in their choice is the 
question of the efficacy of violence. 
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Why continue to fight if unilateral ceasefire is an option for both sides? This is a 
question asked especially by groups of characters at the margins of the aristocratic, male 
communities whose objectives and desires propel the Iliad forward. Thersites questions why 
the common soldiers should continue to fight for a cause that chiefly benefits Agamemnon and 
the princes. Hector is committed to attacking the Achaean camp despite Poulydamas’ portent, 
and also despite Andromache’s plea (Il. 6.431-34) that he retreat with the host safely behind 
the city walls. To the set of Hector’s motivations, we might add one more: he is absolutely 
confident in the fact that martial violence will eventually bring the conflict to an end—even 
though he knows that this end may involve the destruction of his city and his family (6.447-
49).209 Any resolution, including personal and collective annihilation, is preferred to the 
unthinkable alternative, namely, to stop fighting and thereby to leave the conflict unresolved, 
without winners or losers. For Thersites and Poulydamas, who channel a non-elite perspective, 
and for Andromache, who speaks for the Trojan women, this alternative is eminently 
preferable. What is remarkable is that the Iliad entertains this alternative, the void at the center 
of its social and narrative orders.  
It is crucial not to conflate these dissenting voices with the more tractable forms of 
conflict whose gradual resolution propels the Iliad to its conclusion. The breach between 
Achilles and Agamemnon constitutes the central dynamism of the plot,210 which can reach its 
                                                        
 
209 On the tragic fatalism of Hector, see Schein 1983: 181-83; Hector concedes to Andromache that “there will be a 
day when” (ἔσσεται ἦμαρ ὅτ’, 6.448) Troy will be destroyed, but he does not recognize its imminent arrival. See 
further Redfield 1975: 123-27. 
210 Redfield (1975: 10) puts the point dogmatically: “any honest interpreter of the [Iliad]” must accept that “the 
poem moves through a long process of mounting tension and then to some sort of healing at the end.” 
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conclusion only when Achilles is reconciled with the community of elites and convinced to 
resume his indispensable role in the war effort.211 This breakdown of consensus is a problem 
that principally concerns the elites and the princes—at least, apart from the brief moment 
when Thersites makes it a problem for the commoners as well. The princes have institutional 
conduits for resolving this crisis, and the protracted process of resolution is the plot itself. But 
the rupture that Thersites proposes is one that the Iliad could never repair, that would mean 
the instant dissolution of the story. How could an epic about war and princes ever 
accommodate Thersites’ demand for peace and equality? But this is a question, after all, that 
the poem poses to itself and its audiences. Michael Lynn-George has suggested that the Iliad is 
insistently concerned with its own incompleteness as a poetic monument and with the 
indefinite possibilities for its future reading and interpretation.212 This concern, I think, is part of 
what motivates the Iliad to stage these moments in which Thersites and Poulydamas look 
beyond the inegalitarian violence that can seem to constitute the poem’s outermost horizons. 
 
The final instance of idnoomai in the Iliad is in Book 13. Menelaus faces the Trojan 
prince Peisander, and each attacks the other simultaneously with a sword and with an ax (ἅμα 
δ’ ἀλλήλων ἐφίκοντο, 613). Peisander misses by an inch, but Menelaus lands a blow on 
Peisander’s nose. An exceptionally gory scene ensues.213  
                                                        
 
211 Two recent treatments of political dispute in the Iliad show in detail how this rupture in the aristocratic political 
consensus is gradually mended over the course of the epic: Elmer 2013a, Barker 2009; see Introduction, pp. 13-15. 
212 Lynn-George 1988. “The epos tells of the word’s relation with time in a narrative which, even in the presence of 
its performance, keeps open within itself the indefinitely prolonged possibility of a great poetic promise” (272). 
213 On the “gruesome phantasia” that caps the episode, see Fenik 1968: 145. 
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Menelaus struck him as he came onward 
in the forehead over the base of the nose, and smashed the bones, so that 
both eyes dropped, bloody, and lay in the dust at his feet before him. 
He fell, curling (ἰδνώθη δὲ πεσών), and Menelaus, setting his heel on 
his chest, stripped off his armor and spoke exulting over him  
(13.615-19) 
 
This is evidently a moment of triumph for Menelaus: he has killed a son of Priam and narrowly 
evaded death himself. But in the monologue that he delivers after the slaying, Menelaus 
becomes transfixed by the image of a more profound struggle that he is powerless to resolve.  
After boasting that the slain Peisander—who stands in for the Trojans collectively—has 
met his just deserts for the abduction of Helen, Menelaus wonders why Zeus allowed the 
abduction and why he continues to favor the Trojans, despite their insatiable and irrational lust 
for conflict: 
But you [Trojans] will be checked somewhere, though you are so eager for  
battle. 
Father Zeus, they say your mind surpasses all others, 
of men and of gods, and yet from you all of these things come to be, 
the way you grant these outrageous people (ὑβριστῇσι) your grace,  
these Trojans whose strength is reckless, nor can they ever 
be satiated with the din of deadly warfare.   (13.630-35) 
 
Menelaus maintains his faith in the ultimate justice of Zeus, the protector of guests and hosts 
and therefore the avenger of Paris’ violation of xeniē; he boasts that the Trojans will be checked 
and that Zeus will “someday utterly sack [their] steep city” (13.625). Zeus is the name—as it is 
earlier (see n. 147)—for narrative closure. Despite the winding ways of the plot and its 
protracted reversals, there can be no doubt that the boulē of Zeus will ultimately be realized, if 
not in the Iliad, then in a later stage of the Cycle. This is why Menelaus and his people must 
continue to fight: because violence is the divinely sanctioned instrument by which the conflict 
will end. 
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But Zeus also, perversely, continues to will the city’s survival, and so Menelaus must 
struggle with doubts about the efficacy of martial violence. The Trojans remain “insatiable for 
war” (ἀκόρητοι ἀϋτῆς, 621; μάχης ἀκόρητοι, 639) despite their impossible struggle against 
superior Achaean arms. The potential for future conflict is likewise unlimited. Hence the slaying 
of Peisander amounts to nothing: there is an irresolvable remainder, the Trojan insatiability for 
violence, perpetrated by and against themselves, sustained by Zeus and destined to outlive the 
body of a perishable warrior. 
Menelaus is perplexed.214 Against expectation, against the guarantees of poetic closure, 
violence continues unabated. He calls the Trojans ὑβριστῇσι, guilty of hubris (633). This is an 
overdetermined concept that can assume diverse connotations, but here, it amounts to the 
prototypically hubristic disposition to “think big” (μέγα φρονεῖν), to feel an excess of 
confidence and to deny the fragility of one’s existence.215 The Trojans do not recognize that 
they are manifestly facing defeat and draw out the conflict beyond necessity. This reproach, 
however, generalizes the specific case of Peisander: Menelaus perceives that his violent death 
in particular has failed to bring the conflict nearer to closure. Peisander forms a series with 
Thersites and Poulydamas. Each represents a rupture between violence as an instrument of 
necessity and the overarching program (social order, an expedition, the war) that violence is 
supposed to advance. From the perspective of the characters who are committed to these 
                                                        
 
214 See Janko 1994: 122, “His speech is full not of ‘hatred and bitterness’ against the Trojans, but of grief and 
indignation based on his sense of injustice. He is also bewildered that, far from making reparations, they are 
compounding their offence by fighting on, and—stranger yet—that they enjoy the apparent connivance of Zeus, 
who has already ignored Menelaos’ prayer at 3.351-54.” 
215 This is what Cairns (1996) identifies as the essence of hybris—a disposition for exceeding limits. 
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programs, Thersites is an ugly braggart, Poulydamas a coward, Peisander a hubristēs—all kakoi 
arrayed against the theodicy of Zeus, who sanctions violence as a righteous instrument for the 
furtherance of the social and narrative orders. 
But if these figures are maligned by other characters, the Iliad’s aesthetic perspective is 
resolutely open-ended. It presents Peisander’s death as a bloody spectacle closely allied on an 
aesthetic level with the beating of Thersites: two opponents draw together, each offering 
humiliation or extinction for the other. In the encounter, one is vanquished (Thersites, 
Peisander) while the other comes out vindicated (Odysseus, Menelaus); the loser, struck, folds 
over (ἰδνόομαι) and sinks down. Tears fall from Thersites’ eyes (ἔκπεσε δάκρυ), and a bloody 
(αἱματόεσσα) welt rises; Peisanders’ eyes fall out (ὄσσε…πέσον), covered in blood 
(αἱματόεντα). When Menelaus strikes Peisander fatally, he seems to have attained his object, 
but something evades the direct impulse of his strike, and the telos of violence is deferred. We 
can see this evasion of the end made palpable in the curvature of Peisander’s fall to death—like 
Thersites under Odysseus’ scepter-blow, he does not fall directly to earth but curls as he falls, 
and he falls slower even than his ejected eyes, which hit the ground before him. Menelaus 
seems to win unequivocally, casting Peisander to the earth in death, but in the middle of this 
declivity, in medio, immediately, the simple weightiness of violence seems to be lightened. So 
Menelaus finds that he can compel individual enemies to die but he cannot compel the war to 
reach the conclusion that he piously hopes for. 
In this brief battle scene, we can discern an echo of the violence committed against 
Thersites and Poulydamas. The comparison offers some preliminary sense of how the Iliad’s 
critique of political violence can have a broader purchase on the countless forms of violence 
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exchanged between enemies, friends, and strangers over the course of the story. The text 
proffers images of violence as suspended and ineffectual, and although these images ultimately 
do not change the direction of the narrative, they invite characters like Menelaus—and the 
poem’s audiences—to adopt a different perspective on the manifold anankai that hold the 
story together. It often seems that the characters of the Iliad suffer from a tragic condition, 
repeatedly exposed to the knowledge of a flaw in the logic of their action but unable to alter 
their course because the alternative, non-violence, is unthinkable. But in these virtual images of 
suspended violence, and in Thersites’ call for revolt, the Iliad does think the utopian possibility 
of a form of life—especially of collective life—in which violence is not an instrument and 
compels nothing.  
 
Coda: Aesthetics of Non-Violence 
Recall the scene in Odyssey 8 when the Phaeacian dancers Halius and Laodamas play 
catch with a scarlet sphere. King Alcinous boasts to Odysseus that these two are the best (383), 
“since no one rivals them” (ἐπεί σφισιν οὔ τις ἔριζεν, 371). If both are the best, then they are 
equally matched. But is it possible to maintain this parity? Which of them is uniquely, singularly 
the best? This is the implicit challenge of the game: if one of the two were to miss the ball as it 
is cast “up to the clouds” and out of reach, he would no longer be one of the best. The paradox 
is accentuated by Alcinous’ request that the pair dance mounax, “alone,” but also together. 
They are playing with a kind of mock violence, hitting a projectile at each other that at any 
moment could strip the other of his competitive equality. In such a moment, “violence” would 
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resolve the players’ contest in favor of only one; it would become the instrument for 
necessitating a new situation of inequality between them.216 
The marvel of the game is that through their matchless athleticism—and despite it—the 
two dancers can keep the ball aloft and thereby maintain their parity. The principle of agonistic 
dominance that pits Odysseus against Thersites and Menelaus against Peisander is suspended 
on Scheria, as both players wondrously defer the moment of decision when one will best the 
other. By folding backwards into unwonted configurations, their bodies can ward off the 
necessities of violence indefinitely. This is immediate violence in its most manifestly aesthetic 
form, an appearance that spectators enjoy only as an appearance, as something that 
accomplishes nothing outside of itself. “Wonder holds Odysseus as he watches them” (384). 
Suspended violence is especially at home among the Phaeacians. Their society 
represents in many respects an ideal in the Odyssey, but it is not exactly a Thersitean utopia: 
there are “chiefs and commanders” (Od. 8.11), “scepter-bearing kings” (8.41), and a largely 
anonymous dēmos.217 But it is a society in which the communal activity par excellence is a 
particular form of dance.218 Alcinous says so: “we are not blameless boxers or wrestlers, but we 
run swiftly with our feet and are the best with ships, and always dear to us are feasting, the 
cithara, and dances” (8.246-48). Their dances have no victors, it seems, and even the dancers 
who are deemed “the best” have no exclusive claim to that title. Halius and Laodamas finish 
                                                        
 
216 On this scene and the significance of competitive dance in the liminal space of Scheria, see Olsen 2017. 
217 On the political organization of Phaeacia, see Welwei 2000: 32. 
218 In Books 6, 7, and 8, dancing is ubiquitous on Scheria. Antinous’ sons like to have fresh clothes for dancing (ἐς 
χορὸν ἔρχεσθαι, 6.65), families rejoice to see their children dance (6.157), Alcinous avows that the Phaeacians in 
general love feasting and dance (248). There are further instances of χόρος at 8.260 and 264, and ὀρχέομαι at 
8.371 and 378. 
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their special performance by rapidly changing places, blurring into a single, seamlessly 
coordinated figure (ταρφέ’ ἀμειβομένω, 379). A troop of boys stamps a beat for them, filling 
the communal space with the noise of the multitude (κοῦροι δ’ ἐπελήκεον ἄλλοι / ἑσταότες 
κατ’ ἀγῶνα, πολὺς δ’ ὑπὸ κόμπος ὀρώρει, 379-80). The self-image that the Phaeacians present 
to outsiders is one of a community in which violence is suspended in an endless, egalitarian 
performance. This is a utopian imaginary that the Iliad approaches perhaps only once, in the 
festive dances inscribed on the Shield of Achilles. But Thersites and the other figures who curl in 
response to violence give formal expression to the possibility of this social configuration, as 
portents intimate fate. 
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Chapter 2. Comrades and Candor in the Odyssey 
 
In the proem of the Odyssey, the narrator absolves Odysseus for the loss of his 
companions on their voyage home: he did his utmost to secure their nostos, but they decided 
to slaughter the cattle of Helios and consequently “perished by their own recklessness” 
(σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὄλοντο, 1.7).219 The doom of the companions could be attributed to 
any number of factors—the enmity of Helios or Polyphemus, the meddling of Eurylochus, fate, 
even adverse winds—but as far as the narrator is concerned, ultimate blame rests either with 
Odysseus or with his men. From the poem’s earliest verses, then, readers are conditioned to 
assume a kind of sociological perspective that traces the failure of nostos back to a structural 
antagonism within the Ithacan warrior band between the leader and his followers. In what 
sense are Odysseus and his hetairoi opposed to each other? What does each faction stand for, 
and how is their antagonism related to the central narrative project of nostos? 
When Odysseus relates his travels to the Phaeacians in Books 9-12, he depicts a number 
of instances in which one or more of his companions contest his leadership and thereby 
endanger the expedition.220 Their motives are complex. Odysseus implicitly censures the 
                                                        
 
219 The proem seems to align the narrative decisively with Odysseus’ point of view (see Clay 1976: 313-17). But 
Donlan 1998 observes that “it becomes apparent in the course of his own narrative that Odysseus’ ἀτασθαλίη 
contributed to their destruction” (61). Bakker 2013: 119-20 unpacks the notion of atasthaliē as “an abuse of 
abundance”; cf. Friedrich 1987 on atasthaliē and Zeus’ theodicy. Pucci 1982 compares the proems of the Odyssey 
and the Iliad; Nagler 1990 draws out the resonances and contradictions between the proem and the rest of the 
narrative. See Haubold 2000: 132 n. 392 for further references. 
220 The hetairoi collectively refuse his command to retreat after defeating the Cicones, thereby exposing the army 
to a counterattack; several eat the fruit of the lotus and refuse to journey home; they open the bag of the winds to 
seize Odysseus’ xeneia, thereby sweeping the expedition off course within sight of Ithaca; Eurylochus opposes 
Odysseus’ proposal that the band lodge with Circe; finally, the hetairoi collectively slaughter the cattle of Helios, 
thereby sealing their doom. 
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hetairoi for greed and cowardice, because they tend to disobey him when they desire short-
term material advantage or when they fear material loss. But, as we will see, this opportunism 
is fully compatible with political principle. In Aristotle’s account of political stasis,221 factions are 
motivated at once by material interests and by a formal conception of equality. In the latter 
capacity, factionalists may claim that the members of a political community should be treated 
as equals absolutely—simply on the basis of their membership—or proportionately, according 
to their wealth or status. This formulation neatly captures the core of the dispute between 
Odysseus and his companions. Odysseus treats the hetairoi as equals in many respects and 
sometimes defers to their collective decisions, but he reserves for himself a larger share of the 
expedition’s food and spoils. His equality is thus weighted to reflect his immense personal 
prestige and princely status. For their part, the companions resent Odysseus’ privileges and, in 
several passages, articulate a conception of community defined by radical equality among all 
members of the crew. 
The companions’ ethos of equality has profound narratological implications. The poet 
invokes the Muse in the Odyssey’s first line to “tell of a man,” a singular subject. The hetairoi 
are, like Thersites and the dēmos of the Achaean host in the Iliad, ancillary characters whose 
claim on the main characters’ (and readers’) attention is represented as impertinent and 
                                                        
 
221 See Aristotle Pol. 5.2 1302a. On how conflicting conceptions of equality can produce stasis in Aristotle’s 
account, see Reed 2007: 23-60 and my Introduction, pp. 7-9. See Loraux 2001 on the egalitarian potentialities of 
stasis in Greek thought (esp. 113 on the “egalitarian law of Ares”; violent conflict between factions exposes all of 
the participants to an aleatory—and therefore socially undiscriminating—risk). It is also worth noting that hetaireia 
can be a synonym for stasis; see Herodotus on the Cylonian conspiracy (ἑταιρηίην τῶν ἡλικιωτέων, “a hetaireia of 
age-mates,” 5.71) and Thucydides on civil conflicts during the Peloponnesian war (when centrists where called 
“destroyers of their factions,” τῆς τε ἑταιρίας διαλυτὴς, 3.82.5). 
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destabilizing. The companions’ efforts to challenge Odysseus’ leadership are thus doomed from 
the outset—it is the Odusseia, not the Hetaireia, and the architecture of the plot is oriented 
toward accomplishing its hero’s nostos.222 This chapter would be very short if it only addressed 
the vanishing number of cases in which the companions successfully contest Odysseus’ political 
and narrative primacy.  
On the other hand, the novelty of the companions’ egalitarianism is actually a kind of 
narrative asset for the Apologoi, in which Odysseus relates his travels through strange outer 
worlds where the forms of ordinary communal life are subverted. Furthermore, as a story-teller 
whose abilities complement and in some sense rival those of the poem’s primary narrator,223 
Odysseus seems keenly interested in relating narratives in which he loses his enviable status, 
becoming a beggar, a wanderer, or a “no one.”224 This is precisely the kind of outcome that the 
crew threatens to effect in a number of dangerous encounters. I focus on three uncanny 
objects that mediate such encounters: the bag of winds that Aeolus gives to Odysseus, the 
Lotus fruit, and the Sirens’ song. Each involves ways of seeing, tasting, and listening, 
respectively, that are dangerously egalitarian from the standpoint of Odysseus’ claim to 
primacy among the crew. His advantages as a leader are not just material and administrative—
they also involve privileged sensory access to the world that they pass through, a higher and 
more discerning perspective than what is available to the crew. To preserve these privileges 
                                                        
 
222 On the tensions between narrative teleology and digression in the Odyssey, see Peradotto 1990: 32-58. 
223 Bakker 2013: 16-24 discusses the complex interplay between aoidē (the Odyssey’s frame narrative) and epos 
(embedded character-speech, especially the tales of Odysseus). 
224 On Odysseus as a story-teller, see Bakker 2013 and Scodel 1998. Van Nortwick 2009 discusses Odysseus’ more 
general desire to suspend his own status and explore the world in anonymity. On the Cretan tales, see Ahl 2002. 
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from the hetairoi, Odysseus conceals gifts from their eyes, stuffs their ears with wax, and drags 
them away from the taste of honey-sweet fruit. 
Odysseus polices the companions’ sensory experience to secure what Jacques Rancière 
has called the “distribution of the sensible,” a system of self-evident facts about how sensory 
experience is articulated.225 To anticipate the examples that I develop in this chapter, this 
system involves the fact that tastier meat in Homeric feasts is allotted to high-status guests; 
that guest-gifts are offered to chiefs but not to their followers; and that the subject-matter of 
epos prioritizes the deeds of aristocratic heroes. Political norms are thus inscribed at the level 
of primary experience, in the immediate, aesthetic, and misleadingly innocent apprehension of 
social existence (Rancière 2004a: 12-13). Egalitarian politics entails experiments with modes of 
appearing and perceiving that challenge this regimented aesthetic order and the inequalities 
that it underwrites. Such experiments are not necessarily successful: the hetairoi are only 
granted a limited scope to contest Odysseus’ chiefly prerogatives within the narrative, but their 
insurgent politics finds expression in the strange sensoria that they encounter throughout their 
doomed return. 
 
The Politics of Hetaireia 
In Book 10, Odysseus relates how the expedition comes tantalizingly close to Ithaca. The 
companions, of course, thwart this premature nostos by opening a sealed bag given to 
Odysseus by Aeolus. It contains violent winds that, once liberated, sweep the fleet back across 
                                                        
 
225 Rancière 2004a: 12-19. On Rancière’s periodization of aesthetic regimes, see Introduction, pp. 33-37. 
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the sea to Aeolus’ island. The companions commit this error under the false impression that the 
bag contains gold and silver, a guest-gift from Aeolus to their leader.  
οἱ δ’ ἕταροι ἐπέεσσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀγόρευον  
καί μ’ ἔφασαν χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον οἴκαδ’ ἄγεσθαι, 
δῶρα παρ’ Αἰόλοο μεγαλήτορος Ἱπποτάδαο.  
ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον·  
  ‘ὢ πόποι, ὡς ὅδε πᾶσι φίλος καὶ τίμιός ἐστιν 
ἀνθρώποισ’, ὅτεών κε πόλιν καὶ γαῖαν ἵκηται. 
πολλὰ μὲν ἐκ Τροίης ἄγεται κειμήλια καλὰ    
ληΐδος· ἡμεῖς δ’ αὖτε ὁμὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτελέσαντες 
οἴκαδε νισόμεθα κενεὰς σὺν χεῖρας ἔχοντες. 
καὶ νῦν οἱ τά γε δῶκε χαριζόμενος φιλότητι  
Αἴολος.       (10.34-44) 
 
The comrades talked to each other 
and said that I was bringing home gold and silver, 
gifts from Aeolus, great-hearted son of Hippotes. 
One of them would talk like this, looking at the man closest him: 
“Damnit! How welcome and honored this man is 
to all the people whose cities and lands he visits. 
Many fine treasures from the plunder are being brought back from Troy; 
but we, though we will complete the same journey, 
we will return home holding our hands together, empty. 
And now Aeolus has given him these things 
in gratitude for his friendship.  
 
This deliberation reveals that Odysseus has been able to accumulate a substantial fortune 
during the expedition, comprising spoils from Troy and guest-gifts from benevolent hosts.226 
Both sources of personal enrichment depend on Odysseus’ preeminent position on Ithaca and 
his fame among the Achaean elites. By their own accounting, his less-illustrious comrades 
                                                        
 
226 All of this property is lost after the Thrinacian disaster but then replaced by the Phaeacians’ unsurpassed 
generosity. It is notable that the companions do not complain about a third possible source of enrichment for 
Odysseus: goods acquired during the return voyage (e.g. plunder from the Cicones) distributed to and by the crew. 
Odysseus sometimes receives a special surplus-share (geras) in excess of the equal allotment shared among all 
crew members. The geras is usually a token of respect rather than a source of enrichment—in one case it amounts 
to a tenth goat added to the set of nine given to the crew of each Ithacan ship (Od. 9.159-60). 
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receive a negligible share of the Trojan spoils and, we can assume, are not treated by hosts like 
Aeolus as “welcome and honored” to the same degree as Odysseus. 
Odysseus does not explicitly defend this state of affairs. He does not have to: his status 
and the material advantages it affords him are effects of the social order established on Ithaca 
and in the world of Homer at large, a system that rewards people of higher rank with an 
outsized share of goods obtained through communal effort. In a chiefdom, the chief maintains 
his preeminent status by constantly distributing his own wealth to his subjects.227 Generosity 
takes several forms—feasting (dais), collective redistribution, and the division of newly 
acquired land.228 On balance, however, this disbursement of wealth is extremely profitable for 
the chief. Through generosity he can cultivate his own prestige and secure the loyalty of his 
subjects, who reciprocate by offering their goods, services, lands, and honors as his “chiefly 
due.”229 
Odysseus’ strategic decisions during the return assume this status quo as both a means 
and an end: by accumulating guest-gifts through his elevated social position, Odysseus hopes to 
facilitate his restoration to the pinnacle of the Ithacan chiefdom. He notoriously delays or 
jeopardizes his homecoming on several occasions to accumulate more xeinia, with the express 
                                                        
 
227 On Homeric chieftaincy and redistributive economies, see Seaford 1994: 21-22; Donlan 1998 treats the 
reciprocal relation between Odysseus and the hetairoi; Donlan 1982 deals with reciprocity in Homer more 
generally, with a note on the hetairoi. “The poet, I believe, has used that super-simplified world [of the nostos-
voyage] to reduce or refine the complex reality of the chief-people relationship, as he and his audiences know it, 
into its ideal essence” (63). 
228 For examples, see Donlan 1982: 163-65. 
229 “The ability to distribute food is attended by political privilege. The dais is an occasion for rewards to 
subordinates, which displays the chief’s generosity, increases his prestige, and is a means of further integrating the 
group under the chief’s control” (Donlan 1982: 164). 
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assumption that additional wealth will bolster his prestige and authority on Ithaca.230 Most 
pointedly, he offers to remain with the Phaeacians for a year if they give him more gifts, 
because then “[he] would be more revered and welcome to all the men who see [him] 
returning home (νοστήσαντα) to Ithaca” (11.360-61).231 Nostos for Odysseus does not amount 
only to a return to Ithaca as a geographical location; it entails his return to the Ithacan kingship 
and to the inegalitarian social order that surrounds it. 
From Odysseus’ perspective, then, the wayfaring community that he forms with his 
comrades is a transitory arrangement to support his own restoration to preeminence within the 
Ithacan chiefdom. It is precisely for this reason that, according to Haubold (2000), the relation 
between Odysseus and his hetairoi overturns the normative social bond between leader and 
people (laos) in early Greek hexameter poetry.232 In the latter model, which is especially 
prominent in the Iliad, the leader is the “shepherd of the people” and is obliged to protect his 
followers, who reciprocate by providing him with honor and fame. Most leaders fall short of 
this ideal and cannot protect their laos from destruction, but by a principle of negative 
reciprocity, they suffer blame or disgrace for their failure.233 The Odyssey inherits this 
normative model but strategically disassembles it in the case of the hetairoi in order to release 
                                                        
 
230 A notable episode in this respect is his encounter with Polyphemus in Book 9. His express purpose for lingering 
in Polyphemus’ cave (despite his comrades’ objections) is to exact guest-gifts from his would-be host (εἴ μοι ξείνια 
δοίη, 9.229). Eurylochus later reproaches Odysseus for the fact that Polyphemus’ victims thus died “by [Odysseus’] 
recklessness” (ἀτασθαλίῃσιν, 10.437). 
231 See Scott 1938. 
232 “While the ‘shepherd of the people’ ought to save his people, Odyssean groups die for their leader” (Haubold 
2000: 136-67). 
233 See Haubold 2000: 37-40. 
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Odysseus from his obligations to them. The hetairoi, unlike a proper laos, do not form a 
cohesive, corporate unit in relation to their leader, and Odysseus is not faulted by the narrator, 
at least, for failing to save them.234 The hetairoi constitute a kind of liminal formation halfway 
between the laos that fought at Troy and the laos that is awaiting them at Ithaca. Hence they 
have no legitimate claim on Odysseus’ wealth or on the political conditions of his nostos.235 
Despite lacking the authoritative status of a laos, the companions consistently assert 
their own egalitarian forms of social organization.236 Walter Donlan compares the redistribution 
of goods among the hetairoi to the practices of egalitarian hunter-gatherer bands.237 Whenever 
the crew captures plunder or game, it redistributes the takings equally among its members.238 
                                                        
 
234 A group of hetairoi is usually represented as a collection of individuals, each of whom maintains a separate 
relationship with the leader (See Haubold 2000: 126-31). The very staging of the bag-of-winds episode quoted 
above exemplifies the weakness of the social bond between them. Odysseus fails to inform his hetairoi that the 
“gift” from Aeolus contains wind and not gold; and because he is so occupied with single-handedly piloting the 
ship, he fails to discern the crew’s discontent. In this respect, at least, he acts as if he were returning to Ithaca 
alone, attended not by men but by tripods and gold. See Esposito 2015: 140-202 on the breakdown of hetaireia in 
the Odyssey. 
235 Strikingly, the companions sometimes consent to this diminution of their role, especially when they fear that 
their nostos is in jeopardy. After Odysseus sets out in Book 10 to rescue the hetairoi who were spell-bound by 
Circe, the remaining crew expects that Odysseus will perish as well. On his return, they weep with joy and exclaim 
that, “we are as happy at your return (νοστήσαντι), Zeus-nourished one, as if we had reached Ithaca, our 
homeland” (10.419-20). 
236 After writing this chapter, I discovered that my affirmative reading of hetaireia dovetails with the work of Jodi 
Dean (esp. 2017) on comradeship in modern left politics. She uncovers the political valences of the “comrade” in 
twentieth century socialist movements and attempts to reactivate the concept as a resource for contemporary 
anti-capitalist activism. Notice especially her emphasis on the concept’s egalitarianism and utopianism, its 
indefinite address (it is open to “anyone”), and its opposition to the private, individual subject—all issues that 
figure in the following discussion of hetaireia in the Odyssey. 
237 “Among the hetairoi, pooling and distribution by lot was a fixed custom; no other method of distribution was 
thinkable. … Anthropologists associate this pure sharing with putatively primitive levels of socio-cultural 
integration, as in egalitarian bands and tribes” (Donlan 1998: 60). 
238 After leaving Troy, the expedition sacks Ismarus and takes the city’s women and property, which are 
apportioned equally among the crew (ὡς μή τίς μοι ἀτεμβόμενος κίοι ἴσης, 9.42). When the Ithacans land on the 
uninhabited island off the coast of the Cyclops’ land, they hunt for goats in three parties. Each of the twelve ships 
receives nine goats, but Odysseus’ ship receives ten (ἐς δὲ ἑκάστην [νῆα] / ἐννέα λάγχανον αἶγες: ἐμοὶ δὲ δέκ’ 
ἔξελον οἴῳ, 9.159-60; according to Heubeck (1989: 23), ἐμοὶ must in context refer to Odysseus’ ship, not him 
individually). After successfully escaping from Polyphemus’ cave, the survivors share the stolen sheep with all of 
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This norm is remarkably robust: when Odysseus and the eight survivors of Polyphemus return 
to the fleet at the end of Book 9, they bring stolen sheep with them that are redistributed to 
the entire band, despite the fact that only a small subset of the band acquired the flock, and at 
great personal risk. It is important to stress that this egalitarian mode of distribution was not 
practiced at Troy. The hetairoi report in the bag-of-winds scene that they are returning home 
empty-handed, despite the “many treasures” being brought back from the plundered city 
(10.40-41). In the Iliad, Thersites confirms this report in his notorious speech to the assembly in 
Book 2, when he suggests that Agamemnon—and by implication, the other basilēes—are 
receiving an outsized share of the spoils.  
The egalitarian band also differs fundamentally from the chiefdom system established in 
the Achaean homeland. Odysseus, as leader of the band, does sometimes receive a special 
surplus share (geras) in excess of his followers’ allotment, a practice that resembles the “chiefly 
due” exacted by a chief from his subjects. But Donlan argues that these privileges are 
fundamentally distinct: it is the companions who control the allotment of the geras as a sign of 
their esteem. Odysseus never demands it from them as he might demand his chiefly due on 
Ithaca. The practice therefore affirms the basic egalitarian premise that the band decides 
collectively how to allot its common property.239 I should also add that both of the gerea given 
                                                        
 
their crew (μή τίς μοι ἀτεμβόμενος κίοι ἴσης, 9.549), while Odysseus is given the ram by his hetairoi as a special 
honor, which he then sacrifices to Zeus (ἀρνειὸν δ’ ἐμοὶ οἴῳ ἐϋκνήμιδες ἑταῖροι / μήλων δαιομένων δόσαν ἔξοχα, 
550-51). 
239 “The difference, however apparently slight, between these two ways of sharing is significant. The distinction lies 
in the competence to initiate and to control the process of distribution, and reflects, therefore, the presence of 
differing (or ‘shifting’) systems of social organization. In the one (the vast majority of cases) we observe ‘true’ 
sharing, that is, egalitarian, noncentralized, distribution, which is associated with the social organization of tribes; 
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to Odysseus by his companions are materially insubstantial and that their value must be largely 
symbolic.240 The Ithacan band therefore constitutes a social formation fundamentally distinct 
from the chiefdom polity as it exists either on Ithaca or in the war camps near Troy.241 
Odysseus’ role in this wayfaring society is deeply equivocal. In Book 9, he is not 
consistently recognized by his crew as their master and commander but is counted as one of 
their number: a hetairos himself, at best first among equals, and at worst, a discordantly 
authoritarian outlier from the group consensus. It is when Odysseus is absent or indisposed 
that his followers make their most explicit and disruptive appeals to the rights of their 
community against its self-aggrandizing leader. Like enchanted furniture that comes to life as 
soon as its owner leaves the house, the minor characters take center stage with an abrupt 
                                                        
 
the other is actually a form of ranked distribution, characteristic of the centralized economies of chiefdoms. The 
economic and political consequences of this shift are great” (Donlan 1982: 158) 
240 On the symbolic (rather than material) value of geras, see van Wees 1992: 300-2 and Stocking 2017: 43-45. 
Donlan 1998 sees the interplay between Odysseus and the followers as a sandbox version of the Dark Age social 
order, simplified to set its contradictions and impasses into sharper relief. Hence the fraught relation between 
Odysseus and the hetairoi models the broader relation between the basileus and his laos in the chiefdom system 
that prevails on Ithaca and in other Achaean communities. Donlan argues that the Homeric chiefdom is 
“imperfect,” “displaying elements associated with the egalitarian tribal model” (154), and further that “if it were 
not for the phrase ‘ten for me alone’ (160) [Odysseus is allotted ten goats instead of nine by his followers after 
sacking the Cicones], which tells us that we are looking at a society of established rank, we might view this scene as 
an event in the life of an unranked primitive hunting band” (1998: 60). 
241 The companions have a distinctly egalitarian phase during Book 9. But Aeolus’ winds set in motion a chain of 
disasters that render the hetairoi increasingly reliant on Odysseus’ leadership and expertise. Aeolus refuses to help 
the expedition a second time; all but one of their ships is sunk by the Laestrygonians; and half of the diminished 
crew is temporarily transformed into animals by Circe on Aeaea. Only Odysseus’ solitary heroism saves the crew 
from destruction. There is an especially revealing sign of the companions’ reduced independence: before the bag-
of-winds episode, as we have seen, the companions redistribute quarry and spoils equitably throughout the whole 
band, regardless of who acquires it. But after the release of the winds in Book 10, there are no subsequent cases in 
which the band is the agent of its own distributions. They receive almost all of their food from Odysseus or from 
Circe herself. In this sense, the release of the winds marks a turning point in the political dynamic between 
Odysseus and the crew. 
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energy in Odysseus’ absence.242 In the bag-of-winds scene, Odysseus has literally fallen asleep 
at the helm, and the hetairoi immediately begin deliberating in the manner of an ad hoc council 
or assembly (ἀγόρευον, 34; βουλὴ, 46).243 In this act of collective political agency, the 
companions articulate a precise conception of equality that is opposed to their leader’s chiefly 
pretensions. Their central grievance, as we have seen, has to do with the distribution of the 
spoils from Troy and the gifts acquired by Odysseus. They complain that, 
ἡμεῖς δ’ αὖτε ὁμὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτελέσαντες 
οἴκαδε νισόμεθα κενεὰς σὺν χεῖρας ἔχοντες.  (10.41-42) 
 
but we, though we will complete the same journey, 
will return home holding our hands together, empty. 
 
There are no other instances of the phrases “same journey” or “empty hands” in Homer.244 It is 
as if the companions are experimenting with new forms of language to express a notion of 
equality that is largely absent from archaic epos. Every member of the crew is due an equal 
share of whatever profits are acquired during the journey because they have travelled the same 
journey together. This demand for equality raises questions about the fundamental parameters 
of communal life. The hetairoi already receive an equal share of goods acquired through 
hunting and pillaging. They now intend to annex Odysseus’ private gifts into this category of 
                                                        
 
242 See Woloch 2003 on how minor characters fit into literary “character spaces,” with an example involving 
Achilles and the minor characters of the Iliad (1-11). For the furniture analogy, I am thinking of de Maupassant’s 
short story, “Who Knows?” 
243 It is difficult to square this scene with Haubold’s characterization of the hetairoi as a collection of individuals 
without a strong sense of group identity. 
244  It is the only case of ὁμή + ὁδός in a noun phrase until Quintus’ Posthomerica (12.551); of κενός + χείρ until 
Euripides (Helen 1280, Rhesus 792); and of ἐκτελέω + ὅδον as a verb phrase until Theognis (1.72), although τελέω + 
ὅδον is common in Homer. There also appear to be no other cases of συνέχω + χεῖρας in Homer. 
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common property by virtue of the fact that these too have been acquired during the “common 
journey.” 
The ideal outcome for the companions is to return home together (on the ὁμὴ ὁδός) 
with hands full of shared wealth (that is, not with κενεὰς χεῖρας). They conceive of nostos as a 
project that they undertake and hope to accomplish collectively. Against any claim to social 
priority, it ratifies their coequal status. As far as Odysseus is concerned, however, his superior 
status among the hetairoi is indispensable for accumulating the guest-gifts and plunder that he 
needs to restore his position on Ithaca. Nostos without these resources—and without the 
inequality that is their precondition—is not really nostos. As a social and narrative event, then, 
nostos cannot fulfil the competing demands of Odysseus and the hetairoi. Bound by what Jenny 
Strauss Clay has called a “partisanship for [its] hero,”245 the Odyssey resorts to a simple 
solution: if the hetairoi refuse to return home “empty handed,” then they cannot return home 
at all. Their doom in Book 12—punishment for slaughtering the cattle of Helios on Thrinacia—
resolves the narrative impasse exposed in Book 10, when they hinder Odysseus’ nostos by 
attempting to expropriate his guest-gifts.246  
                                                        
 
245 Clay 1976: 315. 
246 Their final act of disobedience on Thrinacia, however, is not politically motivated. Stranded there by 
unfavorable winds after surviving Scylla, the companions exhaust their stores of food and begin to starve. 
Odysseus has already informed them that the gods will punish anyone who kills Helios’ sacred cattle, but, trapped 
between certain starvation and the threat of divine punishment, Eurylochus addresses them with a 
characteristically subversive speech in which he proposes that they risk the latter. Eurylochus’ final speech at 
12.339-51 continues a pattern of subversion first manifested on Aeaea, when he urges the companions not to 
follow Odysseus back to Circe’s home and blames Odysseus for recklessly endangering his companions in 
Polyphemus’ cave (10.431-77). It is not an accident that this character comes to prominence after the bag-of-winds 
episode, which marks a turning point in the companions’ sense of political agency. The companions no longer 
oppose Odysseus collectively or in pursuance of egalitarian principles, but under the direction of one “bad apple.” 
Eurylochus is also responsible for convincing the crew to land on Thrinacia, against Odysseus’ objections (12.279-
93). This speech is more critical of Odysseus than the later speech that persuades the companions to slaughter 
Helios’ cattle: Eurylochus calls Odysseus “reckless” and remarks that he “is possessed of exceptional strength, and 
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Candor and the Aesthetics of Equality 
Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian (1985) follows a band of mercenaries as they 
wander and pillage along the Mexican-American border in 1849. They have no ultimate 
destination and no charismatic leader; the protagonist is one of their number, known only as 
“the boy.” The story of the band’s violent encounters on the unsettled frontier loosely 
resembles the Odyssean Apologoi, but without any role for a figure like Odysseus. These 
nineteenth-century hetairoi maintain a flat and structureless polity, and their nominal leader 
does not have the authority to bind them to an overarching narrative project. McCarthy 
portrays them as elemental forces sprung from the brutal desert landscape. After departing 
Tuscon, for instance, they pass through a dried lake bed: 
In the neuter austerity of that terrain all phenomena were bequeathed a 
strange equality and no one thing nor spider nor stone nor blade of grass 
could put forth claim to precedence. The very clarity of these articles 
belied their familiarity, for the eye predicates the whole on some feature 
or part and here was nothing more luminous than another and nothing 
more enshadowed and in the optical democracy of such landscapes all 
preference is made whimsical and a man and a rock become endowed with 
unguessed kinships. (244-45) 
 
The equality of the playa is “strange” precisely because landscapes tend to be structured into 
foreground and background, brighter and darker regions, curves and lines that draw or attract 
                                                        
 
[he] never gets tired at all in his limbs” (σχέτλιός εἰς, Ὀδυσεῦ: περί τοι μένος, οὐδέ τι γυῖα / κάμνεις, 279-80). The 
criticism is virtually a compliment. It is an admission that Odysseus is stronger and more resourceful than his 
followers; as a leader, he is not always cognizant of their relative frailty. Eurylochus’ final speech does not even 
refer to Odysseus or criticize his leadership: he is as powerless as the companions before the fearsome injunction 
of Circe. Far from political struggle between the companions and their leader, what transpires on Thrinacia is an 
impossible confrontation between mortals and gods that must resolve in favor of the latter. 
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the eye. But this sunwashed terrain outside Tuscon is only the bare set of what it contains. 
Everything is so completely and equally visible that there is no privileged framework for 
explaining how the contents are related; no viewer can claim that their perspective on the 
landscape or their evaluation of its contents is more qualified (“All preference is made 
whimsical”).  
The scene is called an “optical democracy,” then, because the objects within it are 
presented without hierarchy or distinction—which in turn implies an egalitarian form of 
spectatorship in which all interpretations and judgments of taste are equally valid.247 In the last 
sentence, McCarthy shifts our perspective on the landscape to include the humans travelling 
through it: “a man and a rock become endowed with unguessed kinships.” This atomizing, 
levelling gaze encompasses everything that it encounters in a community of equals, indifferent 
even to the distinction between human beings and nonhuman things. What if this gaze turned 
to regard the novel itself? Every event, character, and word would have to possess equal 
significance; the text would be reduced to the “neuter austerity” of a playa.248 It is no surprise, 
then, that the band quickly rides through this unsettling flatness and onto more varied terrain, 
but this notion of a democratic form of vision continues to surface in various guises. It is as if 
the unordered multiplicity of minor characters, landscapes, stones, and spiders periodically 
breaks out of the periphery of the novel and asserts its equality with the central story line. 
                                                        
 
247 On the concept of “optical democracy” in McCarthy’s work, see Shaviro 1999 and Holloway 2000. 
248 Glanton’s gang, likewise, never attains such a radical degree of equality: some of its members have more 
authority than others, and the fate of the group hinges especially on the uncanny expertise and discernment of the 
novel’s most menacing figure, Judge Holden. 
 125 
During their own journey across unmapped islands and featureless seas, Odysseus’ 
companions militate for a kind of egalitarianism that would be ruinous to the epic’s narrative 
teleology. This threat is suppressed after the Aeolus episode, when the hetairoi are 
subordinated to the narrative and social purposes of their leader. In lieu of actual equality, 
however, the band encounters until nearly the final chapter of their doomed journey various 
forms of aesthetic equality: the outer worlds that they pass through are strange and dangerous 
in part, at least, because they offer ways of seeing, tasting, and hearing that would level the 
hierarchical distinction between the hetairoi and their leader. Consider the scene in which the 
companions decide to open Aeolus’ bag. Although their intention is certainly to appropriate 
Odysseus’ guest-gifts, their precise words are more innocent: 
“ἀλλ’ ἄγε θᾶσσον ἰδώμεθα, ὅττι τάδ’ ἐστίν,  
ὅσσος τις χρυσός τε καὶ ἄργυρος ἀσκῷ ἔνεστιν.”  
ὣς ἔφασαν, βουλὴ δὲ κακὴ νίκησεν ἑταίρων: 
ἀσκὸν μὲν λῦσαν, ἄνεμοι δ’ ἐκ πάντες ὄρουσαν.  (10.44-57) 
 
“Come on, quickly, let’s see what these are, 
how much of any gold and silver there are within the pouch.” 
This is how they spoke, and my companions’ wicked plan prevailed: 
they opened the pouch; all the winds sprang out. 
 
Before any act of appropriation, the hetairoi want only to see what the bag contains. That its 
contents are mysterious to them is symptomatic of Odysseus’ attitude toward the companions. 
As far as possible, he operates independently and hence does not think it necessary to inform 
them about Aeolus’ confinement of the winds.249 Throughout the Apologoi, Odysseus manages 
                                                        
 
249 The scholion to 10.34 speculates that Odysseus does not tell the companions about the contents of Aeolus’ 
xeinion because he expected them to be satisfied with his earlier generosity: διὰ τί οὐ προεῖπεν αὐτοῖς [i.e. the 
hetairoi]; ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἤλπιζεν ὑπονοήσαντας ὡς κακουργῆσαι. καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐν Ἰσμάρῳ λαφύρων τὴν ἴσην μοῖραν 
ἔδωκε καὶ τῶν ἀγρίων αἰγῶν καὶ τὰ περὶ Κύκλωπας (“Why did he not tell them in advance? Because he did not 
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the companions by strategically disclosing and withholding information that he has acquired 
through his privileged relationships (with Circe in particular).250 In this sense, he maintains a 
private store of knowledge that complements his private store of guest-gifts. By opening the 
bag and gazing on its contents, the companions are attempting to institute a kind of “optical 
democracy,” to bring Odysseus’ secret, personal property into a space of common vision and, 
potentially, of common ownership. 
The events that lead to the opening of Aeolus’ bag underscore how the companions’ 
egalitarian politics involves a particular way of knowing and sensing things in common, which I 
refer to as “candor.” In colloquial usage, “candor” has to do with frank and honest talk, but its 
root meaning is more distinctly aesthetic: candor in Latin is “clearness, brightness, splendor,” 
from candēre, “to shine.” I want to use this term to track moments in the Odyssey when 
characters encounter analogs to McCarthy’s desert playa: objects that appear with such an 
abundance of raw, unconsolidated, and uniformly illuminated detail that they refuse any 
authoritative interpretation.251 Everyone is qualified to experience these objects with 
approximately equal discernment merely by possessing the faculty of perception. It is 
                                                        
 
expect that they would be suspicious and commit wickedness; for he had given them an equal share of the spoils in 
Ismarus and of the wild goats and the belongings of the Cyclopes”). 
250 Circe directly communicates with Odysseus but not with the companions. When the latter desire to return 
home after a year on her island, they depend on Odysseus to relay their intentions to Circe (10.472-86). She in turn 
shares crucial information with Odysseus that he relays—sometimes with omissions or crucial modifications—to 
his crew (at 10.487-540, she tells him to consult Teiresias in Hades and how to do it; at 12.37-141, she instructs 
him—“apart from his hetairoi,” 33—how to navigate home.) These instructions are then conveyed to the 
companions, but not verbatim. This is only one instantiation of Odysseus’ savvy management of information in the 
epic (especially about himself). 
251 Jeffry Green (2010) develops a model of modern liberal democracy as a kind of mass spectatorship (“ocular 
democracy,” cf. McCarthy’s “optical democracy”) whose chief ideal is candor, the idea that “leaders not be in 
control of the conditions of their publicity” (13). On presidential debates, see 182-87. 
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important to stress that candor is distinct from transparency: objects can be presented candidly 
even if their origins and purposes are kept obscure, as long as its viewers or audiences are 
equally uninformed. 
Eric Auerbach famously characterized Homeric narrative in terms of its candor: “the 
Homeric style knows only a foreground, only a uniformly illuminated, uniformly objective 
present” (2003: 7).252 This formulation assumes the perspective of Homer’s audiences, who can 
access a radiant and generous vision of the story from the narrator. But within the narrative, 
the characters of the Odyssey are everywhere operating with incomplete knowledge, sifting 
through rumors, lies, and half-truths and seeking advantages by knowing what others do not 
know. The narrative could not function if these internal disparities between knowledge and 
ignorance were leveled. Hence the Odyssey associates candor, at its furthest limit, with a kind 
of incapacitating, sterile illumination. Imagine the Sirens’ infinitely “clear” song and the sailors 
exposed to it, reduced to a heap of gleaming bones. The baleful consequences of candor, 
however, do not detract from its aesthetic appeal: in the examples that we will consider, it is 
visually “bright” (phaeinos) and sonically “clear” (ligus); its taste is sweet (meliēdēs). This form 
of perception, in which every member of the community can participate equally, is above all 
pleasurable. To save their nostos—that is, to advance the epic’s narrative teleology—Odysseus 
and his crew must disavow these pleasures even as they disavow the egalitarian politics of 
hetaireia. 
 
                                                        
 
252 For engagements with Auerbach’s reading by Classicists, see Haubold 2014; Purves 2014a; Porter 2010c, 2008b; 
Bakker 1999; de Jong 1999; Lynn-George 1988: 1-49. 
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Optical Democracy 
The companions’ desire for candor plays a crucial role in the bag-of-winds scene in Book 
10. We have already seen how, after Odysseus falls asleep at the helm, the companions 
immediately begin plotting to appropriate his gift from Aeolus: “one of them would talk like 
this, looking at the man closest him” (ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον 10.37). This 
formula points to the role of vision (ἰδών) in organizing this conspiratorial community. It is used 
in other instances253 when a crowd of spectators with a strong sense of collective identity 
witnesses some remarkable spectacle: the Achaean assembly sees Thersites being thrashed by 
Odysseus (Il. 2.271); the Trojan host sees Athena rushing against them from Olympus like a 
shooting star (4.81); and the suitors watch with alarm as Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, 
begins to string his bow (Od. 21.396).254 After witnessing this spectacle, the onlookers look at 
each other to discuss what they have seen. The act of looking, then, happens twice and involves 
a kind of double recognition: the spectators recognize an object of common concern for the 
group and, by turning to discuss it, thereby recognize one another as the group’s coequal 
members. 
                                                        
 
253 The formula occurs at Il. 2.271, 4.81, 22.372; Od. 8.328, 10.37, 13.167, 18.72, 18.400, 21.396. There are also a 
number of related formulae (e.g. ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν ἰδὼν εἰς οὐρανὸν εὐρύν, 7.178 = 201, cf. 19.257). See n. 255. 
254 Other cases include: the Achaean army looks upon Hector’s recently slaughtered corpse (22.372); the male 
Olympians gaze at the enchained bodies of Ares and Aphrodite (Od. 8.328); in the Odyssey, the assembled 
Phaeacians see Odysseus’ returning escort ship petrified by Poseidon (13.167); the suitors repeatedly witness 
Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, performing remarkable feats that belie his outward appearance (fighting Iris, 
18.72; dodging a stool thrown by Eurymachus, 18.400; about to string the bow, 21.396). 
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The subject of this kind of spectatorship is “anyone”: it is an activity that involves every 
member of a community without regard for status or expertise.255 In Odyssey 13, Poseidon is 
enraged at the Phaeacians for successfully delivering Odysseus to Ithaca. With permission from 
Zeus, he petrifies the Phaeacian escort ship on its return journey as it approaches off the coast 
of Scheria. The narrator repeatedly emphasizes that “all of the people” (πάντες…λαοί, 155-56; 
ἅπαντες / ἄνθρωποι, 157-58) witness the portent and marvel at it:256 
ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον:  
ὤ μοι, τίς δὴ νῆα θοὴν ἐπέδησ’ ἐνὶ πόντῳ 
οἴκαδ’ ἐλαυνομένην; καὶ δὴ προὐφαίνετο πᾶσα. 
ὣς ἄρα τις εἴπεσκε: τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἴσαν ὡς ἐτέτυκτο.  (13.168-71) 
 
One of them would talk like this, looking at the man closest him: 
Oh my! Who has bound our swift ship on the sea 
as it was coming home? And it was just appearing in its entirety.” 
Thus someone would say, but they did not know how it had been done. 
 
The meaning of this fearful sign initially escapes the spectators, but they agree that its very 
candor—the fact that it has “appeared in its entirety”—means that it is addressed to the entire 
community (πάντες…λαοί) and pertains to their collective existence. The scene neatly illustrates 
how aesthetic and social forms of equality can intersect: as spectators, the Phaeacians are all 
equally awestruck and mystified by the image of the ship, and this prompts them to talk and 
look among themselves as a single community, without rank or distinction. This configuration 
                                                        
 
255 Concerning the “anyone” who is the subject of tis-speeches, de Jong 1987 remarks, “tis-speeches fulfil an 
important function: they offer the hearer/reader the opportunity to get a glimpse of the mind of the masses, 
which are normally bound to silence in epic.” See as well Scodel 1992. 
256 Poseidon petrifies the ship “so that all of the people may wonder” (ἵνα θαυμάζωσιν ἅπαντες, 13.157). On the 
role of wonder in archaic visual perception, see Neer 2010: 57-69; Prier 1989. For Prier (whose approach Neer 
develops), thauma involves an “intermediation” between the two poles of phenomenal experience (a deictic 
center, “this,” and a visual referent, “that”), where “this” is mortal and “that” is charged with divine potency. It 
amounts to “a hinge or joint” between human perception and divine epiphany. 
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seems to be undone when king Alcinous offers his own, apparently better-informed 
interpretation of the portent: he recalls that, according to an old prophecy, Poseidon would 
punish the Phaeacians by petrifying one of their ships and encircling the island with mountains. 
He therefore advises the people to make sacrifices to stave off the looming second disaster. We 
never find out if Alcinous’ prescription is actually correct, because the scene is famously broken 
off before the second part of the prophecy occurs.257 No one—not Alcinous, the Phaeacians, or 
even the Odyssey’s audience—ultimately has a superior perspective on the portent. Every 
spectator is left in the same interpretive aporia, contemplating Poseidon’s sign but faced, in the 
final calculation, with only the image of the petrified ship, illuminated on the edge of the 
horizon. 
When the anonymous hetairoi “talk and look” to one another at 10.37, Odysseus would 
occupy Alcinous’ role as the lone member of the group uniquely qualified by his knowledge and 
social authority to interpret the object of the group’s inquiry—but he has fallen asleep. His nap 
is inopportune but not unjustified: Odysseus has been steering the ship single-handedly for nine 
days in order to reach Ithaca as quickly as possible, “without giving the task to any of the other 
companions” (αἰεὶ γὰρ πόδα νηὸς ἐνώμων, οὐδέ τῳ ἄλλῳ / δῶχ’ ἑτάρων, ἵνα θᾶσσον ἱκοίμεθα 
πατρίδα γαῖαν, 32-33). This detail is further evidence of Odysseus’ authoritarian tendency: he is 
the only crew member with reliable knowledge of Ithaca’s location and is unwilling to share this 
knowledge with the crew. It is only when Ithaca appears on the horizon that he feels confident 
in relinquishing his self-appointed task: 
                                                        
 
257 See Buchan (2006, ch. 4) on lithos, laas, and laos in this scene; Friedrich 1989 on an Aristophanic alternative to 
the vulgate. 
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τῇ δεκάτῃ δ’ ἤδη ἀνεφαίνετο πατρὶς ἄρουρα,  
καὶ δὴ πυρπολέοντας ἐλεύσσομεν ἐγγὺς ἐόντας. 
ἔνθ’ ἐμὲ μὲν γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἐπέλλαβε κεκμηῶτα (10.29-31) 
 
On the tenth day now there shone forth the ancestral ploughland, 
and we caught sight of the fire-tenders since they were so close.  
Then sweet sleep overtook me in my weariness 
 
Ithaca appears abruptly (ἀνεφαίνετο; compare to the petrified ship at 13.170, προὐφαίνετο), 
not as a point on the horizon but as farmland and gleaming watch fires that somehow outshine 
the light of the sun.258 This is the phenomenology of candor: the island’s location becomes 
richly and vividly perceptible to everyone. Thus the crew is no longer reliant on Odysseus’ 
private expertise to direct the ship home, and they can now afford to contest his outsized share 
of spoils and guest-gifts without jeopardizing their nostos (or so it seems). They want to subject 
Odysseus’ private wealth, his xeinia, to the same kind of brilliant candor that has brought to 
light Odysseus’ formerly private knowledge of Ithaca’s location. 
In the event, the companions suffer for their illicit curiosity, because by opening the bag 
of the winds, they commit a grievous error that ultimately dooms their nostos. Odysseus frames 
this error in precise terms. He does not fault the companions for suspecting that the bag 
contains gold and silver, or least some precious gift. It is Aeolus’ only xeinion to Odysseus,259 
and the companions correctly observe (10.38-39) that Odysseus is treated with hospitality—
                                                        
 
258 The verb ἐλεύσσομεν, according to Prier (1989: 68-71), has to do with “clear sight,” an unimpeded vision of 
distant objects, including of the horizon. 
259 See Heubeck 1989: 44 on Aeolus’ guest-friendship with Odysseus: “everything is done κατὰ μοῖραν (16): the 
friendly welcome; the host’s questions and the guest’s reply; the request for πομπή; and the bestowal of a 
ξείνιον.” 
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and by implication, with generous gifts—wherever he goes.260 As the scholion to 10.34 
observes, the outward appearance of the bag strengthens their inference: Aeolus has tied the 
bag shut with a gleaming silver cord (μέρμιθι φαεινῇ / ἀργυρέῃ, 23-24) such that the 
companions could hardly fail to suspect that the bag contains silver as well.261 There is only one 
other example of silver associated with the adjective phaeinos in early Greek poetry.262 This 
singular detail is motivated, I think, by the fact that phaeinos prototypically describes the 
brightness of fires,263 like the watch-fires gleaming on Ithaca that the companions catch sight of 
on the tenth day.264 The bag with its gleaming silver knot appears to the companions in much 
the same way as the image of their homeland on the horizon. What had been the hidden 
privilege of their leader could be exposed to the brightness of their collective scrutiny. 
The companions’ error, then, is not that they have misinterpreted the sensory 
information available to them—Odysseus represents their aesthetic reasoning 
sympathetically—but to have pursued their enquiry at the expense of Odysseus’ chiefly 
prerogatives.265 If they had only gone as far as disgruntled speculation, then they would have 
attained their nostos, but they insist on knowing “what these are and how much of any gold 
                                                        
 
260 The Phaeacians’ enormous collection of gifts for Odysseus—levied from the entire aristocratic class on the 
island—confirms the companions’ impression. 
261 ἐβάσκαινον γὰρ τὸ πολυτελὲς τοῦ δεσμοῦ εἰς ὑποψίαν λαμβάνοντες. ἴσως οὖν τὸ πολυτελὲς τοῦ δεσμοῦ 
ἠπάτησεν αὐτούς (“they were envious because they interpreted the expensiveness of the cord with suspicion; so 
perhaps the expensiveness of the cord deceived them,” scholion to Od. 10.34). 
262 The other case is at Od. 15.121, when Menelaus gives his most precious possession, a “bright, silver crater” 
(κρητῆρα φαεινὸν… ἀργύρεον, 121-23) as a guest-gift to Telemachus. 
263 Il. 5.215, φαεινῷ ἐν πυρὶ; 18.610, θώρηκα φαεινότερον πυρὸς αὐγῆς; cf. H. Ven. 86. 
264  The common brightness of precious metals and fire anticipates Pindar’s ὁ δὲ χρυσὸς αἰθόμενον πῦρ, O. 1.1. 
265 In the moral figuration of this scene, Odysseus plays a kind of Socrates to the Athenian dēmos, asserting the 
rights of a hidden, esoteric knowledge against the manifest evidence of the senses. 
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and silver is within the bag” (ὅττι τάδ’ ἐστίν, / ὅσσος τις χρυσός τε καὶ ἄργυρος ἀσκῷ ἔνεστιν, 
10.44-45). For the companions, this kind of questioning is egalitarian and inclusive. In the 
language of the passage, there is an echo of the “someone” who speaks and looks in the 
“something” that he regards and questions: 
ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον 
… 
ἀλλ’ ἄγε θᾶσσον ἰδώμεθα, ὅττι τάδ’ ἐστίν,  
ὅσσος τις χρυσός τε καὶ ἄργυρος ἀσκῷ ἔνεστιν.   (10.37, 44-45) 
 
Thus someone would say, looking at the man next to him 
… 
Come now, let’s take a closer look at what these are 
and how much of any gold and silver is within the bag.  
 
Likewise, when the Phaeacians gaze over the sea at their petrified ship, “someone (τις) would 
ask who (τίς)” committed this frightening act: 
ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον:  
ὤ μοι, τίς δὴ νῆα θοὴν ἐπέδησ’ ἐνὶ πόντῳ  (13.168-69) 
 
Thus someone would say, looking at the man next to him: 
Oh dear, who has fastened our swift ship on the sea? 
 
Anyone who can see this candid omen can speculate with equal discernment about its meaning, 
precisely because the question “who is the portent’s agent?” is unanswered. In each scene, the 
interrogative (τίς, ὅττι) encompasses the community of spectators indefinitely and universally: 
“anyone and everyone” is in a position to ask the question.266 But in Odysseus’ moral figuration 
of the Aeolus scene, this democratic empiricism amounts to hubris. There is a kind of 
knowledge—knowledge that pertains to gods and heroes—that cannot be acquired so easily by 
                                                        
 
266 We will see this pairing of τίς/τις again, when the hetairoi encounter the Lotus Eaters and once more as they sail 
past the Sirens. 
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common people and minor characters, even under conditions of candor. How could the 
companions have inferred that the bag contained not gold and silver but all the winds in the 
world? 
 The companions, in any case, could not have seen the winds even when they uncovered 
them—they are roaring, tactile forces, but invisible. This final irony highlights how, in the 
moments before they open Aeolus’ bag, the companions are fixated on a specifically visual 
form of candor at the expense of tactile and auditory evidence. The scholion to 10.35 asks why 
they thought that the bag contained gold and silver (πόθεν τεκμηράμενοι), given that a bag full 
of winds would feel light (ὁ γὰρ ἀσκὸς κοῦφος ἅτε πλήρης ἀνέμων).267 An earlier description of 
the bag (10.20) implies, further, that the winds within it are noisy (βυκτάων…ἀνέμων, if buktos 
indeed is from buzein, to “hoot”). One possible explanation for their oversight: the companions 
rely on visual candor when they inspect Aeolus’ gift because vision is what sparks and sustains 
their political revolt. They begin conspiring after they catch sight of Ithaca (ἐλεύσσομεν) and 
share looks with one another (ἰδών ἐς πλήσιον) as they discuss their plot. The politics of 
hetaireia, however, can surface in diverse contexts that are not necessarily oriented around the 
exercise of vision. In the following examples, I explore cases in which the companions 
encounter egalitarian ways of tasting food and listening to song that threaten Odysseus’ social 
and narrative supremacy. 
 
                                                        
 
267 The answer: they saw the expensive silver cord and jumped to conclusions, without ever testing the bag’s 
weight and heft. The T scholion puts the question somewhat differently: πῶς ἄγοντες αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν ναῦν οὐκ 
ᾔσθοντο κοῦφον ὄντα; (“how did they fail to perceive that the [bag] is light when they were bringing it to the 
ship?”). 
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Commensal Utopias 
οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ γέ τί φημι τέλος χαριέστερον εἶναι   
ἢ ὅτ’ ἐϋφροσύνη μὲν ἔχῃ κάτα δῆμον ἅπαντα,  
δαιτυμόνες δ’ ἀνὰ δώματ’ ἀκουάζωνται ἀοιδοῦ  
ἥμενοι ἑξείης, παρὰ δὲ πλήθωσι τράπεζαι  
σίτου καὶ κρειῶν, μέθυ δ’ ἐκ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσων  
οἰνοχόος φορέῃσι καὶ ἐγχείῃ δεπάεσσι·   
τοῦτό τί μοι κάλλιστον ἐνὶ φρεσὶν εἴδεται εἶναι. (9.5-11) 
 
For I think that there is no occasion more lovely 
than when good cheer holds fast the whole people, 
and feasters throughout the palace listen to a singer, 
sitting in order, and the tables beside them are filled 
with bread and meat, and drawing wine from the krater 
the wine-pourer brings and pours it into goblets; 
this seems to my mind to be the finest thing there is. 
 
At the beginning of Book 9, as he feasts with the Phaeacians and prepares to narrate the 
Apologoi, Odysseus construes feasting as an aesthetic event in which a community presents 
itself as a luminous, sensuous whole through the act of consuming food together. But this 
spectacle of communal unity is also an occasion for reaffirming the community’s social 
divisions. The “good cheer” of the feast is not distributed equally: the participants measure 
their status by the order in which they sit (ἥμενοι ἑξείης) and are served wine, and by the 
quality of the cut of meat that they receive. The Homeric word for “feast,” dais, is from 
daiesthai, “to divide.”268 The feast is a division of meat into portions but also a division of the 
community into ranks based on the apportionment of food in which the greatest honors accrue 
to the paramount basileus. 
                                                        
 
268 See Nagy 1979: 218. 
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It is no accident that Odysseus, who aspires to reclaim the chieftaincy of Ithaca, 
expresses this admiration for the social unity-in-division of the grand banquet. As we will see, 
he promotes similarly hierarchical dining practices among his hetairoi, who are inclined, on the 
contrary, toward a kind of egalitarian dining that suits the politics of hetaireia. I argue that the 
first of their encounters in the fantasy world of the Apologoi figures the utopian limit of the 
companions’ egalitarian commensality: the Lotus Eaters, “who eat the flowery food,” subsist on 
a homogeneous diet of lotus fruit. The intensely sweet flavor of the fruit is available in 
unlimited quantities to every member of their community, without rank or distinction.269 Their 
commensal aesthetic is the inverse of the ordered, differentiated feast that Odysseus 
celebrates on Scheria. Like the community of rocks, humans, spiders, and blades of grass 
equally illuminated on McCarthy’s desert playa, the community of Lotus Eaters participates in 
the same feast on the same terms, transfixed one and all by the sweetness of the lotus fruit. 
The lotus is enticing to the hetairoi, then, not (only) because of the magical or narcotic powers 
often attributed to it by readers, but because it represents a form of utopian commensality that 
complements the companions’ egalitarian ethos.270 
                                                        
 
269 Utopian dining naturally complements utopian politics. In medieval Europe peasants dreamt of far-off lands of 
milk and honey, such as fabled Cockaigne, where feudal hierarchies were abolished, where tasty fish would leap 
into one’s open mouth, and buildings were made of pastries. See Pleij 2001. 
270 Bakker 2013 traces how the consumption of meat organizes an opposition between fantasies of unlimited 
abundance and the realities of material scarcity. Several of the episodes in the Apologoi (especially Thinacia and 
Polyphemus) stage this opposition. The case of the Lotus Eaters, however, does not figure prominently in Bakker’s 
study precisely because the issue there is vegetarian abundance. 
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The communal consumption of meat and wine (and often bread or grain, sitos) is 
ubiquitous in Homeric society.271 It takes many forms, ranging from grand sacrificial feasts that 
involve the whole community to private meals with no particular occasional significance. Within 
this spectrum, by far the most common type of feast in the Iliad and Odyssey is a private 
gathering of male elites hosted by their princely superior, “a well-ordered royal banquet.”272 In 
the Iliad, these gatherings are often occasions for commanders to discuss strategy and tactics, 
and in the Odyssey, for chiefs to entertain their guests together with kin and peers.  
On the surface, such proceedings have an air of inclusivity and equality: everyone eats 
together and “no one’s heart lacks an equal share” (οὐδέ τι θυμὸς ἐδεύετο δαιτὸς ἐΐσης), as 
the common formula goes.273 Feasts are often held for strangers and guests from abroad; 
Telemachus even insists that the beggar (Odysseus) be given a share of the feast dominated by 
the suitors.274 But this gesture belies the routine exclusivity of the “equal feast,” which is rarely 
open to anyone other than princes and heroes.275 Isos in this context denotes a very rarified 
                                                        
 
271 Sherratt 2004 puts it well: “feasting is ubiquitous and constant—it is what Homeric heroes do in company at 
every opportunity” (182). See Bakker 2013: 38-42.  
272 Wecowski 2014: 201. Women participate only rarely in Homeric banquets: Helen is a prominent participant in 
the feast at Sparta in Od. 4, and Arete in the feast held by the Phaeacians for Odysseus. See Wecowski (2014: 207-
8) and Van Wees (1995: 154-63) on the limited role of women in the dais. 
273 Il. 1.468, 602; 2.431; 7.320; 23.56; Od. 16.479; 19.425. The formula also occurs with various extensions and 
contractions. See n. 275 and p. 138 on the meaning of the phrase δαὶς ἐίση. 
274 At Od. 20.279-83, for instance, Odysseus-in-disguise is served an “equal portion.” The suitors, of course, object 
to Telemachus’ generosity. For them, the beggar is the “destroyer of feasts” (Od. 17.200, 337). See Rundin 1997: 
197-98; Wecowski 2014: 229-34. 
275 van Wees (1995) remarks, “The feasts described in the epics are upper-class affairs, hosted and attended by 
kings and princes, and to take part in the cycle of invitations and counter-invitations is in fact seen as a criterion of 
elite status” (174). On passages that might complicate this account (e.g. Od. 14.77 and 14.429), see Rundin 1997: 
191 (“the workmen’s deipnon, which consists of cereal, is separate from the dais, which is a division of meat”). On 
the proportional equality of the dais eïsē, see further Stocking 2017: 8-9, 44. 
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kind of equality, similar to the use of English “peer” for members of the aristocracy in that only 
those with sufficient wealth and status can claim to be equal to one another.276 Among feasting 
peers, furthermore, food and drink are not distributed along entirely egalitarian lines. The host 
gives the most honored banqueters superior cuts of meat (gerea, “honors”) and may have wine 
served to them first.277 The spatial organization of the feast may reflect social hierarchy: 
privileged guests sit nearer the host, and the feasters sit hexeiēs, “in order,” presumably of 
status.278 Despite its conventional translation, then, the ἐίση in δαὶς ἐίση seems to denote 
something closer to “fair” or “proportional” rather than strictly “equal.”279 These practices of 
social distinction reflect the broader political function of the Homeric dais, which, as Rundin 
(1996) has argued, provides chiefs an opportunity to share their private wealth in exchange for 
their followers’ loyalty and admiration.280 The redistributive economy of the Homeric chiefdom 
operates by means of these acts of commensal reciprocity.281 
                                                        
 
276 As Rundin (1997: 195) observes, “In this, Greek usage is reminiscent of the English word peer, which on the one 
hand denotes an equal, but can, in the case of nobility, also be used specifically to denote high ranking individuals 
who nominally enjoy an equal status. Accordingly, the equal feast instantiates the relations of equal and balanced 
reciprocity that characterize exchange among those of high status who are, in some sense, not subordinate to one 
another.” 
277 See Rundin 1997: 96; Sherratt 2004: 190; Wecowski 2014: 212. 
278 Wecowski 2014: 198-99, 209. Wecowski argues that this regimented commensality is contrasted within Homer 
to more egalitarian dining practices that anticipate the aristocratic symposium. 
279 See Bakker 2013: 52-53. 
280 “The equal feast, then, defines a community of high-ranking peers, who are involved in a network of reciprocal 
exchange, and its participants are bound in a definite social relationship” (Rundin 1997: 198). 
281 “The king supervises the collection of wealth in his estate. Some of this wealth is redistributed to those who 
labor for him. Some of the wealth is siphoned off, however, and used to hold feasts for others of elevated political 
status” (Rundin 1997: 192). 
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 Feasting on meat and bread is an essentially human activity in Homer. Indeed, the term 
dais almost never describes “feasting” by animals.282 After Odysseus passes beyond the 
ordinary human world during the Apologoi, his first encounter is with a society defined, 
appropriately, by its eccentric form of commensality. The Lotus Eaters do not feast on particular 
occasions; rather, their whole existence seems to be an endless act of consuming the “flowery 
food” of the lotus.283 It is often observed that their vegetarian diet decisively sets them apart 
from civilized communities, which consume the meat of animals, just as—in a structurally 
equivalent manner—the Cyclopes are set apart by their consumption of human meat.284 The 
rustic quality of their diet also evokes the condition of humanity during Hesiod’s golden age 
(Op. 109-26), when the earth bore endless bounties without any input of human labor. 
 The issue of labor, however, is not especially prominent in Odysseus’ description of the 
Lotus Eaters. It is not clear how this society produces its staple crop—whether through 
foraging, farming, or something in between—or if it enjoys anything approaching Golden Age 
living conditions.285 One might make a closer comparison with the rustic community that 
                                                        
 
282 Rundin 1997: 188 observes, “dais is not generally used in Homer to describe the eating activity of animals… 
rather it is applied to meals eaten by people and gods. In fact, the dais is one aspect of a culinary divide that 
separates humans from the animal.” Very rarely, predatory animals are said to have a “feast,” at least in similes, 
e.g. a lion’s meal of flock animals at Il. 24.43. Another exception would be the famous variant of Il. 1.5 attested by 
Athenaeus, if indeed it begins with οἰωνοῖσί τε δαῖτα (see Renehan 1979). 
283 Odysseus introduces them as Λωτοφάγων, οἵ τ’ ἄνθινον εἶδαρ ἔδουσιν (9.84), “Lotus Eaters, who eat a flowery 
food.” The adjective anthinos may be more accurately translated as “vegetable,” since they eat the whole fruit and 
not simply the flower (λωτοῖο φάγοι μελιηδέα καρπόν, 9.94); see Aitchinson 1963: 273. 
284 See Vidal-Naquet 1986; Heubeck 1989: 18. 
285 The evident lack of bread (sitos) among the Lotus Eaters implies that they do not practice cultivation in the 
manner of civilized Greeks. Vidal-Naquet claims that, on a structural level, the whole geographical space traversed 
during the Apologoi (after the Cicones and before the Phaeacians) is devoid of cultivation and hence not properly 
human (“man—that is, of course, a Greek—is one ‘who eats bread,’” 2). This characterization applies to the Lotus 
Eaters only by implication: it is not said whether or not they cultivate the lotus plant. In Works and Days, Hesiod 
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Socrates and his interlocutors construct and then reject as their first draft of the ideal city in 
Republic 2 (369c-372e). Every member of this simple society specializes in producing some 
material necessity (τὰ ἀναγκαῖα) or in trading such products on the market—there are farmers, 
herders, merchants, and craftsmen of simple wares. This rudimentary division of labor carries 
no hint of social hierarchy.286 Socrates imagines that these happy people would spend their 
leisure feasting together on rustic fare: bread, wine, and a handful of vegetable and dairy 
condiments (372b-372d). Glaucon objects that this minimalist vegetarian diet would suit “a city 
of pigs.” To truly dine (δειπνεῖν) one needs cooked meat and the other refinements of 
symposia, like comfortable couches and a proliferation of dishes and cooks to make them, as 
well as hetairai for entertainment. Dining requires a whole staff of service workers who are 
present at the feast but who do not participate in it as equals. The humble vegetarians cook 
their own meals and are content to eat together without servants or entertainment (apart from 
their own spirited singing). Even though their society is divided into different occupations, 
when it comes to meals, everyone assumes the same roles and has an equal share. This is a 
model of candor in the dining room: every item of food is equally available to the gustatory 
discernment of every participant, and through this common exercise of the senses, the 
                                                        
 
says that the heroes on the Isles of the Blessed consume “honey-sweet fruit” (μελιηδέα καρπὸν = Od. 9.94)—
precisely the fruit that the Lotus Eaters consume; but the heroes cultivate this fruit in their “fertile plough-lands.” 
286 The lowest class in this imagined society are apparently the wage-laborers (μισθωτοί), whom Socrates describes 
as “not worthy of our community in terms of intelligence” (τῆς διανοίας μὴ πάνυ ἀξιοκοινώνητοι ὦσιν, 371e) but 
still valuable for their manual labor. Slaves are not included in this society; at least, not explicitly. See Calvert 
(1987: 368) on the status of slavery in this passage and in the Republic as a whole; Dombrowski 1989 discusses the 
role of meat (especially the word ὄψον) in the exchange between Glaucon and Socrates. 
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participants recognize each other as social equals. They enjoy the simple pleasure of one 
another’s company (ἡδέως συνόντες ἀλλήλοις, 372b). 
 This Platonic exchange illustrates how vegetarian and carnivorous forms of dining can 
entail radically divergent social configurations. The bread-eaters maintain an egalitarian ethos 
both in the act of eating and in their community at large. Dining with meat, conversely, implies 
various sorts of social differentiation—recall the class- and status-conscious etiquette of the 
Homeric dais.287 These rival political gastronomies engage the sense of taste in the service of 
social differentiation, on the one hand, and dedifferentiation on the other. In most varieties of 
Homeric feasting, meat and wine with the tastiest flavors are apportioned according to social 
status, and lower-class members of the community are excluded entirely (except, apparently, 
for grand sacrificial feasts, e.g. on Pylos and Sparta).288 The vocabulary of flavor in Homer is 
fairly limited,289 but meals called “tasty” (menoeides) invariably contain meat.290 The smell and 
                                                        
 
287 The fundamental connection between meat and elite tastes is clearly economic. Meat is vastly more expensive 
than vegetarian alternatives. Sherratt (2004: 185) notes that in Homer, “meat can be eaten on a regular basis only 
by a wealthy elite (though even then, not every day, let alone at every meal), and by others mainly as a result of 
the former’s beneficence on certain regulated occasions.” 
288 For instance, at Od. 4.66, Menelaus honors his guests, Telemachus and Peisistratus, by giving them his own 
geras, a slice from the bull’s fat back (νῶτα βοὸς παρὰ πίονα).  
289 The most frequent taste-adjectives in the Iliad and Odyssey denote sweetness: glukeros (21×) qualifies honey, 
wine, milk, figs, and water (but also, more abstractly, sleep, desire, homecoming, and dance); glukus (27×) applies 
mostly to sleep and desire, rarely to food (only honey and nectar); hēdus (21×) is never applied to food in the Iliad; 
in the Odyssey, it frequently qualifies wine (oinos, methu), in one case the smell of roasting meat (Od. 12.369), and 
once a rich meal prepared by the suitors (20.391). Meals are called menoeikes (“tasty”), e.g. παρὰ δέ σφι τίθει 
μενοεικέα δαῖτα (Il. 9.90), and frequently in the Odyssey, but the term is more often applied in non-gastronomical 
contexts, where it means “agreeable,” or “plentiful” (e.g. δῶρα Il. 19.144; ὕλην 23.139; θήρην Od. 9.158). There is 
also meliēdēs (22×), “honey-sweet,” used most frequently of wine, but also grain (πυρὸν, Il. 10.569), clover, and 
fruit (including the fruit of the lotus). 
290 There are nine such cases in the Iliad and Odyssey, and each of them confirms that menoeikes principally 
qualifies provisions of meat (that is, hearty, substantial food; LfgrE s.v. μενοεικής, was das Hertz begehrt, 
herzerfreuend). In Il. 9.90, Agamemnon serves a dais for the Achaean chiefs (minus Achilles, of course), a meal that 
would include meat by default; likewise at 9.197, when the embassy greets Achilles; the funeral feast at Il. 23.29 is 
menoeikes because of its quantity and variety of roasted animals. At Od. 5.166, Calypso promises to provide food, 
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taste of roasted meat is called “sweet” on two occasions (κνίσης…ἡδὺς ἀϋτμή, 12.369; 
δεῖπνον…ἡδύ, Od. 20.391-92), and cuts of pork and beef containing the most fat (piōn) are 
especially prized.291 Wine and fruits are “sweet,” but there is otherwise no vocabulary for the 
flavor of vegetable and grain-based foods. The flavor profiles presented in Homer thus 
presuppose an aristocratic perspective: only the rich, expensive flavors of the royal dais—of 
meat and wine—warrant any real sensory detail. This is, in essence, the mentality of Glaucon, 
for whom cuisine prepared and enjoyed under egalitarian conditions tastes too plain.292 But is 
there a Homeric counterpart to the image of the vegetarian utopia that Glaucon snobbishly 
rejects?293 
I argue that the Lotus Eaters fill precisely this role. But before we examine the political 
valences of vegetarianism in the Apologoi, it will be useful to consider how the companions and 
Odysseus negotiate their commensal relationship. The hetairoi eat their meals together and 
                                                        
 
wine, and water—menoeikes—for Odysseus’ voyage home; in 5.267 she delivers on her promise, and it is the 
portion comprising opsa (meats) that is called menoeikes (ἐν δέ οἱ ὄψα τίθει μενοεικέα πολλά). Arete prepares 
μενοεικέ’ ἐδωδὴν for Nausicaa, including opsa (Od. 6.76). Penelope recounts how the Thesprotians wanted to 
depose their king and “devour his plentiful substance” (ζωὴν φαγέειν μενοεικέα πολλήν, 16.429), which must have 
included herds of animals. At 20.391, the suitors prepare a menoeikes meal, “since they slaughtered many 
animals” (ἐπεὶ μάλα πόλλ’ ἱέρευσαν). Finally, there is a difficult case at Od. 13.409, where Athena describes how 
Eumaeus feeds his pigs βάλανον μενοεικέα (“plentiful/tasty acorns”)—an unambiguously vegetarian usage. The 
point, however, is that this food “thickens the pigs’ luxuriant lard” (τά θ’ ὕεσσι τρέφει τεθαλυῖαν ἀλοιφήν, 410); 
hence menoeikes, even in this case, is licensed by a context of meat-consumption by humans. 
291 On the “fat chine” at Od. 4.66, see n. 288. At Od. 14.80-81, Eumaeus explains to Odysseus-in-disguise that 
whereas the slaves (dmōes) are allowed to eat the young pigs, the older fattened pigs are reserved for the suitors 
(ἔσθιε νῦν, ὦ ξεῖνε, τά τε δμώεσσι πάρεστι, / χοίρε’: ἀτὰρ σιάλους γε σύας μνηστῆρες ἔδουσιν). 
292 What is tasty for Glaucon and his contemporaries, however, is not precisely Homeric: it is noted at Rep. 404 that 
Homeric characters abstain from eating fish. 
293 A modern equivalent comes to mind: during the Cold War, Soviet cuisine was depicted in American media as 
crushingly bland, dispensed from understocked State Food Stores and compromised by perennial meat 
shortages—all juxtaposed with the infinite variety of branded food products under American capitalism. This 
ideological deployment of food and flavor was especially evident, for instance, in the “Kitchen Debate” between 
Khrushchev and Nixon in 1959.  
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share their common store of food,294 but throughout their journey, they have access to meat 
only through Odysseus’ leadership. Even during Book 9, when they still maintain an egalitarian 
ethos, they offer him choice portions of meat on two occasions in which he plays a vital role in 
acquiring the quarry (at 9.162 and 9.557; see n. 238); after Book 9, Odysseus acquires all of the 
meat that they consume either single-handedly or through his personal relationship with Circe 
(excepting, of course, for the fatal sacrifice on Thrinacia).295 After most of the fleet is 
annihilated by the Laestrygonians, Odysseus boosts the survivors’ morale on Aeaea by 
capturing and serving an enormous hart, calling on them to “set their minds on food and not be 
consumed by hunger” (177): 
ὣς ἐφάμην, οἱ δ’ ὦκα ἐμοῖσ’ ἐπέεσσι πίθοντο·  
ἐκ δὲ καλυψάμενοι παρὰ θῖν’ ἁλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο 
θηήσαντ’ ἔλαφον· μάλα γὰρ μέγα θηρίον ἦεν.  
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ τάρπησαν ὁρώμενοι ὀφθαλμοῖσι,  
χεῖρας νιψάμενοι τεύχοντ’ ἐρικυδέα δαῖτα.  
ὣς τότε μὲν πρόπαν ἦμαρ ἐς ἠέλιον καταδύντα 
ἥμεθα δαινύμενοι κρέα τ’ ἄσπετα καὶ μέθυ ἡδύ· (10.178-84) 
 
So I spoke, and they quickly obeyed my words; 
Uncovering themselves from beside the shore of the barren salt sea 
they marveled at the hart; for the beast was very great. 
But once they had enjoyed looking with their eyes, 
they washed their hands and made a splendid feast. 
So then for the whole day until the sun set 
we sat feasting on endless meat and sweet wine. 
                                                        
 
294 The companions eat together on many occasions: against Odysseus’ advice, they feast on the wine and herd 
animals stolen from the Ciconians at 9.45; they have simple meals of bread and drink at 9.86 and 10.57. They 
prepare a dais at 9.162 from their quarry of wild goats, at 9.557 from Polyphemus’ flock, and at 10.182 from the 
hart that Odysseus catches (in each case, with the formula ἥμεθα δαινύμενοι κρέα τ’ ἄσπετα καὶ μέθυ ἡδύ). 
Circe’s home has an endless supply and variety of food (10.371-73, 427); the companions spend an entire year 
there feasting (10.468) and feast there again after returning from the Nekuia (12.19).  
295 He captures a deer for them to eat on Aeaea (10.182), and it is only through his relationship with Circe that the 
crew is supplied with meat at her house (instead of becoming pork themselves). The exception proves the rule: 
after sacking the Cicones, they feast on meat for too long, in defiance of Odysseus’ orders, and suffer a terrible 
reprisal (9.45). 
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The pleasure of consuming meat draws the companions out of their traumatized, famished 
stupor (they have spent two days “eating their thumos,” 10.143). Odysseus assumes the role of 
a doctor prescribing food to ailing patients. But he is also establishing his role as the 
indispensable and unquestioned leader of the drastically reduced crew. The passage 
emphasizes how the offer of meat is met with the kind of rapid obedience (ὦκα ἐμοῖσ’ ἐπέεσσι 
πίθοντο) that Odysseus will subsequently demand of the companions. In effect, the communal 
dais serves its usual function—reinforcing the authority and prestige of the chief. 
The opposite also holds true: the companions are deprived of meat when they disobey 
Odysseus. Their first meal after opening the bag of the winds is exceedingly simple: only bread 
and water (sitos and hudōr); this is their fare again after the disastrous feast on the shores of 
Ciconia.296 The sheer austerity of these courses is almost unparalleled in Homer, as even the 
most modest meals generally include wine and meat.297 It is even simpler than the vegetarian 
feasts that Glaucon compares to pig food in the Republic. The tastelessness of the companions’ 
bread and water makes their destitution palpable: they are recuperating after self-inflicted 
disasters that, in both scenes, result from their attempts to undermine Odysseus. The 
companions progress through the Apologoi in conformity to a coercive law of flavor: when they 
                                                        
 
296 Most fundamentally, sitos denotes grain or bread, as opposed to meat. It some cases it seems to mean “food” 
in opposition to drink (LSJ s.v. σῖτος). See Moritz 1955 and Sherratt 2004 (184 n. 9) on the semantics of sitos. 
297 Of the 69 cases of sitos in the Iliad and Odyssey, this is only one of two definite instances when a meal consists 
only of sitos and hudōr, with no wine or meat. When the hetairoi land on Aeolus’ island for a second time, they 
have an identical meal with identical formulae. Otherwise, characters in the Iliad who are famished after hard 
work sometimes desire sitos or, in deep grief, are reminded that they must eat (Il. 11.89, 19.162, 306; 24.129, 602, 
613, 619); in such cases, there is no mention of wine or meat, but the meals in question are hypothetical and 
would likely comprise more than bread and water. In the Odyssey, characters sometimes offer Odysseus-as-beggar 
sitos alone (without mention of any beverage), but such simple fare surely reflects his lowly status (17.558, 
18.360). 
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attempt to operate independently of Odysseus, their commensal experience deteriorates and 
becomes flavorless; if, however, they play the parts assigned to them and advance the telos 
nostoio, they enjoy sumptuous bounties of roasted animals.  
The Lotus Eaters practice a form of commensality that, like the companions’ meals of 
bread and water, is meatless and egalitarian. But it also offers a utopian alternative to the 
forced choice between equality and taste that the hetairoi face during their journey, because 
the Lotus Eaters, despite their vegetarianism, consume an irresistibly appetizing staple. The 
crew encounters this alluring alternative after sailing for days through stormy weather. Upon 
landing, they have their bland meal of bread and water: 
 ἔνθεν δ’ ἐννῆμαρ φερόμην ὀλοοῖσ’ ἀνέμοισι  
πόντον ἐπ’ ἰχθυόεντα· ἀτὰρ δεκάτῃ ἐπέβημεν 
γαίης Λωτοφάγων, οἵ τ’ ἄνθινον εἶδαρ ἔδουσιν. 
ἔνθα δ’ ἐπ’ ἠπείρου βῆμεν καὶ ἀφυσσάμεθ’ ὕδωρ, 
αἶψα δὲ δεῖπνον ἕλοντο θοῇς παρὰ νηυσὶν ἑταῖροι. 
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ σίτοιό τ’ ἐπασσάμεθ’ ἠδὲ ποτῆτος,  
δὴ τότ’ ἐγὼν ἑτάρους προΐην πεύθεσθαι ἰόντας, 
οἵ τινες ἀνέρες εἶεν ἐπὶ χθονὶ σῖτον ἔδοντες,  
ἄνδρε δύω κρίνας, τρίτατον κήρυχ’ ἅμ’ ὀπάσσας.    
οἱ δ’ αἶψ’ οἰχόμενοι μίγεν ἀνδράσι Λωτοφάγοισιν· 
οὐδ’ ἄρα Λωτοφάγοι μήδονθ’ ἑτάροισιν ὄλεθρον 
ἡμετέροισ’, ἀλλά σφι δόσαν λωτοῖο πάσασθαι. 
τῶν δ’ ὅς τις λωτοῖο φάγοι μελιηδέα καρπόν, 
οὐκέτ’ ἀπαγγεῖλαι πάλιν ἤθελεν οὐδὲ νέεσθαι,    
ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ βούλοντο μετ’ ἀνδράσι Λωτοφάγοισι 
λωτὸν ἐρεπτόμενοι μενέμεν νόστου τε λαθέσθαι. (9.82-97) 
 
Then I was carried for nine days by baleful winds 
upon the fish-laden sea; but on the tenth we set foot 
on the land of the Lotus Eaters, who eat a flowery food. 
Then we went to the mainland and drew water, 
and straight away the companions took a meal by the swift ships. 
But when we had enjoyed our food and drink, 
then I sent my companions to go and learn 
who the men are who eat grain upon the earth, 
selecting two men and sending along a third as their herald. 
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As soon as they had gone they mingled with the Lotus Eater men; 
The Lotus Eaters did not intend destruction for our companions 
but gave them lotus to enjoy. 
Whichever of them would eat the honey-sweet fruit of the lotus 
would no longer wish to report back nor to return home, 
but they preferred to remain there among the Lotus Eater men, 
feeding on the lotus, and had no thought for homecoming. 
 
As soon as they step foot on land, Odysseus anticipates the crew’s encounter with the Lotus 
Eaters, “who eat a flowery food” (γαίης Λωτοφάγων, οἵ τ’ ἄνθινον εἶδαρ ἔδουσιν, 84). But it is 
the companions’ meal that comes first, an insipid mix of bread and water that serves as a foil to 
the supernally sweet fruit of the lotus.  
Odysseus sends three of the hetairoi to find out who inhabits this region,298 selecting or 
separating (κρίνας) them from the crew; they then mix (μίγεν) with the Lotus Eaters as soon as 
they locate them. The juxtaposition of separation and mixture is deliberate. In his capacity as 
chief, Odysseus has the prerogative of assigning tasks, risks, rewards, and privileges to the 
members of his crew. Selecting a contingent for a scouting mission is fairly routine, but it draws 
attention to Odysseus’ fundamental role within the band as an enforcer of social stratification 
and division. The Lotus Eaters, by contrast, are referred to in the plural as a collectivity, 
Λωτοφάγοι (ἄνδρες). There is a certain eeriness to their undifferentiated anonymity. Whenever 
Odysseus or the Odyssean narrator introduce a new society during the first half of the epic, 
they invariably focalize the society’s elite members, especially the chief and the chief’s 
                                                        
 
298 As Kathryn Morgan points out to me, Odysseus phrases his command quite pointedly: the hetairoi are to 
determine “who the men are who eat grain upon the earth” (ἐπὶ χθονὶ σῖτον ἔδοντες, 89), a proleptic expression 
that may betray Odysseus’ expectation (or fear) of finding local inhabitants who do not eat meat. 
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family.299 In the case of the Lotus Eaters, however, Odysseus does not say whether they have a 
leader or notables, nor does he name any individuals. The Lotus Eaters collectively offer food to 
the companions, and their own dining practices—as far as the limited description suggests—
have no differentiation between portions, no “prime cut” or geras for guests or elites.  
Meignumi often signifies a kind of temporary intercourse between people—sexual 
union between lovers, martial conflict between enemies, and hospitality between guests and 
hosts.300 The mixing with the Lotus Eaters begins as a temporary connection between distinct 
groups of people, but it intensifies into a permanent social bond.301 Upon eating the lotus fruit, 
the hetairoi lose their old identities and merge with the collectivity. The sole condition of their 
membership is the consumption of the fruit, because this is the only distinct feature of the 
society of the Lotus Eaters. Thus the answer to Odysseus’ question to the scouts, “who are the 
Lotus Eaters?” (οἵ τινες ἀνέρες), is only “whoever eats the lotus” (ὅς τις λωτοῖο φάγοι). It is an 
indefinite community open to anyone—not only to princes and heroes—who participates in the 
vegetarian feast.  
It is usually assumed that the lotus fruit exerts an uncanny power over the hetairoi who 
consume it, erasing their memories of home and binding them magically or narcotically to this 
                                                        
 
299 During the Telemachy, the narratives set in Pylos and Sparta focus on the respective royal families. The scope of 
the narrative on Scheria is relatively expansive, but it also focuses on the personalities of Alcinous’ royal family. In 
the Apologoi Odysseus encounters two populous societies besides the Lotus Eaters: the first Laestrygonians whom 
the Ithacan scouts meet belong to the royal family of Antiphates, their basileus; the Cicones at Ismarus, raided at 
the beginning of Book 9, are mostly anonymous, but it is revealed later that Odysseus received a guest-gift from 
Maron, the Ciconian priest of Apollo.  
300 LfgrE s.v. μίσγω 2c, sich unter Menschen mischen. 
301 Loraux 2001: 108-11 relates the kinetics of separation and mixture to the concept of political stasis.  
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otherworldly place.302 But whereas magic and potions are used explicitly against the 
companions by Circe, for instance, there is no indication that the Lotus Eaters have to resort to 
such devices. The proximate cause of the companions’ attachment to the Lotus Eaters seems to 
be the intense sweetness of their staple food: “whichever of them would eat [φάγοι] the 
honey-sweet fruit of the lotus / would no longer wish to report back nor to return home” (9.94-
95). The experience of eating in Homer, as we have seen, is as much about the immediate 
perception of flavor as the social context that surrounds and informs it. It is difficult, then, to 
isolate what precisely about the “honey-sweet” fruit affects the companions so deeply that 
they no longer wish to return home, but it seems likely that the sweetness of the lotus fruit is 
sweeter to the hetairoi precisely because the fruit is consumed according to the kind of 
egalitarian ethos that they hold dear.  
The Lotus Eaters’ mode of commensality is thus a rebuke to Odysseus, the revenant 
chief, and to the practices of social distinction that are integral to his return. He responds to 
this challenge with physical force: 
τοὺς μὲν ἐγὼν ἐπὶ νῆας ἄγον κλαίοντας ἀνάγκῃ, 
νηυσὶ δ’ ἐνὶ γλαφυρῇσιν ὑπὸ ζυγὰ δῆσα ἐρύσσας.  (9.98-99) 
 
I myself led them wailing to the ships by compulsion, 
and dragging them into the hollow ships I bound them under the benches. 
 
The companions are forced to recommit themselves to the project of their nostos and, more 
importantly from the perspective of the Odyssean narrative, to Odysseus’ nostos. He resorts to 
the same kind of physical coercion (anankē) with which he enforces the narrative and social 
                                                        
 
302 Heubeck s.v.; see Bakker 2013: 26 on the “structural parallelism between the Lotus Eaters and Circe.”  
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order in the assembly scene of Iliad 2 (see Chapter 1). Indeed, the language in 9.98 is strikingly 
similar to the threat that Odysseus levels against Thersites after the latter challenges the 
authority of the Achaean princes in the name of the common soldiers: αὐτὸν δὲ κλαίοντα θοὰς 
ἐπὶ νῆας ἀφήσω (“I will send you away wailing toward the swift ships,” Il. 2.263). Odysseus’ 
violence in both scenes saves the plot from restive minor characters who pose a challenge from 
below to its fundamental social premises. But just as Glaucon and Socrates linger for a moment 
with the thought of a vegetarian, egalitarian alternative to their ideal city, so the Odyssey 
presents an alternative to the central project of Odysseus’ homecoming in the utopian feasts of 
the Lotus Eaters. 
 
Clear Noise 
When Odysseus praises the dais as a social institution at the beginning of Book 9, he 
includes among the vivid festivities the figure of the bard, to whom “the feasters throughout 
the hall are listening” (δαιτυμόνες δ’ ἀνὰ δώματ’ ἀκουάζωνται ἀοιδοῦ, 9.7). Along with meat 
and wine, song is one of the principal accoutrements of the grand royal feast. But the generous 
servings of food, as we have seen, are apportioned to the feasts’ participants according to their 
social rank. In the hierarchical space of the feast, the bard’s song seems to be the one thing that 
everyone can enjoy in equal portions. But aoidē is apportioned in a no less inegalitarian 
manner. It is a recurring topos in archaic hexameter poetry that the Muses possess an infinite 
knowledge of the past. And yet, the actual scope of the Iliad and Odyssey—and of the narrative 
songs represented within them—is restricted to the deeds of aristocratic heroes. In this section, 
I consider an exceptional instance in which the hetairoi encounter a song performance that 
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seems to escape this limitation and to assume a universal, egalitarian scope: the song of the 
Sirens. 
Every element in Odysseus’ ideal feast corresponds to the actual feast at which he is the 
honored guest; so the Phaeacians have their aoidos, Demodocus, who sings three songs during 
Book 8, the last of which tells the story of the Trojan horse and earns praise from Odysseus for 
its accurate rendition of events that he himself took part in. Alcinous twice interrupts 
Demodocus’ songs when he notices Odysseus weeping at the memory of the war that the songs 
elicit (8.94, 533). Jesper Svenbro has shown how, in episodes like these, the Odyssey reflects on 
the ways in which bardic performers must have shaped and selected their narrative material 
according to the tastes of their audiences.303 Sometimes the selection is determined by the 
individual tastes of audience members (like Odysseus in the case of Demodocus), but there is a 
more fundamental selection that depends on the social milieu of narrative song performance 
within Homer, which is, without exception, limited to aristocratic banquets.304 The elites want 
to hear about a select cast of elite characters. Andrew Ford pinpoints the how this selection 
affects the scope of the subject matter in the Iliad: 
Homer’s principle of selection is evident and may be termed aristocratic: 
out of the innumerable masses who came to Troy he chooses to name the 
chiefs and to ignore the plēthus. In this, Homeric aesthetics mirrors heroic 
politics: epic heroes and nobles are those who step out of the ranks into 
the forefront of battle; thus foregrounded they fight single combat to win 
fame and a name. (1992: 86) 
 
                                                        
 
303 Svenbro 1974. 
304 There are other genres of popular song in Homer besides heroic epic: paean, formal lament (thrēnos; Il. 24.720-
22), wedding song (humenaios; Il. 18.493; Od. 4.17), and women’s work songs (Od. 5.61; 10.221), among others. 
See Ford 1997: 400. 
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There is a vast body of potential stories that are presented only at the margins of the epic 
tradition as we know it—the stories of the non-elite characters, including the plēthus of 
common soldiers in the Iliad or the hetairoi in the Odyssey. What would be the implications—
aesthetically and politically—of an epic performance that overturned the principle of 
aristocratic selection and presented everything in the repertory of the Muses’ memory with 
perfect candor? 
This speculative problem is posed explicitly at various points in the Iliad and Odyssey. 
Each text recognizes the fact that any actual epic narrative must forgo a virtually infinite totality 
of associated narratives in the epic tradition.305 Nowhere is this clearer than in the proem to the 
Catalogue of Ships, where the Iliadic narrator famously invokes the Muses and praises their 
unerring knowledge of the events that took place around Troy: 
πληθὺν δ’ οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ’ ὀνομήνω, 
οὐδ’ εἴ μοι δέκα μὲν γλῶσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόματ’ εἶεν, 
φωνὴ δ’ ἄρρηκτος, χάλκεον δέ μοι ἦτορ ἐνείη, 
εἰ μὴ Ὀλυμπιάδες Μοῦσαι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο  
θυγατέρες μνησαίαθ’ ὅσοι ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον· 
ἀρχοὺς αὖ νηῶν ἐρέω νῆάς τε προπάσας.  (Il. 2.488-93) 
 
I could not relate the plēthus, nor could I name it, 
not if I had ten tongues and ten mouths, 
and an unbreakable voice and a brazen heart within me, 
unless the Olympian Muses, daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus 
should bring to mind how many came to Ilium; 
Now I will tell of the leaders of the ships and every one of the ships. 
 
                                                        
 
305 On the Homeric bard’s relation to the vast oral tradition that preceded him, see Ford 1992: 67-89. 
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In the context of the passage, plēthus refers to the multiplicity of common soldiers who can be 
included in the Catalogue only on the condition of their subordination to a leader.306 The bard 
cannot name each of these minor non-characters, but he can relate how many (ὅσοι) there are, 
with the Muses’ help. Thus in the Catalogue each leader is associated with a quantity of ships 
that approximates the number of common soldiers that he led to Troy. 
The image of the ten-mouthed, ten-tongued singer is typically understood from the 
perspective of oral performance—the bard would need a “quasi-mechanical superbody” to put 
the Muses’ infinite vision of the past into song-form.307 But there is also an aesthetic side to this 
figure: surely we are invited to wonder what a song sung with “ten tongues and ten mouths” 
would sound like to listeners. Unless, implausibly, such a singer only used one of its many vocal 
apparatus, its mouths would be sounding at the same time, emitting a noisy polyphony of 
songs. The content of this fantastical epic would thus determine its acoustic texture, because a 
song about an innumerable multiplicity would naturally involve a multiplicity of voices 
superimposed in the same performance. Perhaps these voices would sing simultaneously, or 
perhaps they would sing in responsion, with each voice turning on and off in rapid alternation. 
In either case, the auditory texture of this inhuman song would be intensely noisy—a listener 
                                                        
 
306 But see Heiden 2008, who reads these verses as an affirmation of the importance of the individual common 
soldiers: “the poet’s disclaimer carries the remarkable implication that a recitation of the common soldiers by 
name was both conceivable and desirable, even if unprecedented and impractical” (132). Heiden’s point is 
important, but he connects it to his larger claim that the Iliad has no aristocratic bias. This overstates the case. The 
evidence for aristocratic bias in the Iliad is overwhelming (see my Introduction, pp. 16-21). Even in the Catalogue, 
the fact that the poet in some sense attempts to represent the common soldiers hardly compensates for the fact 
that, in the end, the latter are represented only numerically, as a tally associated with the named aristocratic 
leaders. Even if the poet could not have named all of the plēthus, it would have been possible to name some 
subset of them (even randomly; for an example of this, cf. the final catalogue of the dead in Aeschylus, Persae 955-
1001). 
307 Purves 2010: 9. 
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would have difficulty processing the torrent of information or tracing any continuities in the 
narratives that it relates.308 
It may be useful at this point to define “noise” in more precise terms. The 
mathematician Claude Shannon developed a formal theory of information in the middle of the 
twentieth century whose practical applications were initially focused on the transmission of 
electromagnetic and acoustic signals—packages of information that a sender intends for a 
recipient.309 “Noise” is any perturbation that interferes with the transmission of signals, like the 
distortions in the background of a bad cell connection. Buzzing sounds are acoustically richer 
than the signals that they interrupt: to maintain its intelligibility, the speaking voice is 
constrained to a relatively limited range of sonic patterns, whereas noise (especially “white 
noise”) oscillates freely through a wide range frequencies and intensities. In the case of spotty 
phone calls, each blip of static registers the vagaries of the signal’s complex passage through 
the atmosphere and microwave receivers. In this sense, noise is rich in information, but the 
information that it carries is not useful to most listeners. It belongs to an inhuman order of 
electromagnetic fields and thermal fluctuations. The crucial insight of this formulation is that 
noise is not opposed to information or even to a kind of meaning. It is not, for instance, like the 
pure sonority of the voice (phōnē) prior to its articulation into signifiers (logos), like matter 
                                                        
 
308 See Purves 2010: 9-10, 24-96; Ford 1992: 75 (“In all these passages there is a gap between the multifariousness 
of experience and an account of it in speech; and this gap is repeatedly portrayed by Homer as a gap between the 
powers of sight and speech”). 
309 Gunders 2002: “For the communication theorists, as well as later critics, the most valuable part of Shannon and 
Weaver’s theory was the concept of noise. Quite simply, noise is any external input into the channel between 
sender and receiver, which has the potential to obscure the signal. One of the main aims of information theory was 
to find ways to overcome noise: to increase the probability of the message arriving in a form that could be 
accurately decoded.” 
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without form.310 Noise is overly formed and excessively meaningful, although it rarely has 
interpreters who would or could appreciate its meaning; it presents information so densely and 
candidly that it hinders the transmission of any consolidated, easily interpretable information in 
the signal. According to its formal definition, noise is not restricted to the domain of sound: an 
image could be noisy if it presents an unfiltered surplus of visual information—recall again the 
image of the desert playa in Blood Meridian in which a multiplicity of objects is illuminated in 
the foreground of the landscape. But it will be useful for our purposes to construe noise as a 
specifically auditory counterpart to visual candor in Homer.311 
Ford’s “principle of selection” can be recast as a statement about information and noise: 
by focusing on a narrow set of elite characters, the bardic voice presents a consolidated, 
focused signal to its audiences. The infinite totality of the Muses’ knowledge could not pass 
through such a narrow channel. It could only be presented through ten channels (or some 
arbitrarily large number) emitting sound at once. This is not to say that the epic signal is always 
clear, because sometimes the noise of the plēthus blares up and overwhelms the limpid tones 
of the primary narrative. Among the noisiest events in the Homeric soundscape are popular 
assemblies: in Iliad 2, the shouting of the assembled Achaean dēmos is compared three times 
                                                        
 
310 See Agamben 1998: 7-8 and 1993: 6-8 on ancient theorizations of the distinction between phōnē and logos. 
Butler 2015: 57 describes noise as the “residue” left over when meaning is extracted from the material substance 
of language.  
311 Similar to “noise” thus defined is the notion of “dissonance” in Gurd 2016: both terms designate a kind of sonic 
multiplicity that overwhelms the placid flow of narrative discourse. But dissonance emphasizes the “disruptive 
forces and presences” (133) of sonic materiality (the eruption of phōnē within logos; see, e.g. 5-9). By “noise,” I 
refer to the transmission of a vast surplus of information through sound. The information may be encoded as pure 
sonority (an asignifying cacophony, like Gurd’s dissonance) or in articulated logoi, that is, multiple voices speaking 
simultaneously or almost simultaneously. Thus narrative can be noisy because of its excess of orderly linguistic 
signification. In terms of its sonorous qualities, a noisy narrative may or may not be dissonant. 
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to the crashing of waves driven by storm-winds;312 and Thersites (as we have seen in Chapter 1) 
is described as speaking with an astonishingly loud and “measureless” voice.313 Homer thus 
stands at the beginning of a long tradition that associates democratic politics with the 
disorganized and destabilizing flux of voices.314 It is not surprising, then, that the bard refuses to 
sing the plēthus in the proem of the Catalogue. Even to articulate this information would 
require entering the sonic space of the popular assembly, whereas the Homeric bard—
according to the poem’s own representations of song culture—performs for a discerning 
audience of aristocrats. But the Muses are not subject to the sociopolitical constraints of mortal 
life. They possess a knowledge of the plēthus prior to any distinction between signal (the 
aristocratic heroes) and noise (the commoners), a totality that encompasses all of the 
happenings that belong to the world of epic. 
 The Odyssey invokes the Muse only once, in the proem, and never ascribes to her the 
capacity to access a noisy multiplicity of themes.315 Indeed, the songs performed within the 
Odyssey by human bards are models of single-mindedness and concision, each covering a well-
defined “path of song” (oimē). There is one exception, however—a song whose noisiness is one 
of its signal features, and the only narrative song that the hetairoi come close to hearing. After 
                                                        
 
312 Il. 2.144-48, 209-10, 394-97. 
313 Il. 2.212-13, ἀμετροεπὴς…ὅς ῥ’ ἔπεα φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἄκοσμά τε πολλά τε ᾔδη, “of unmeasured speech…who knew 
in his mind many disorderly words.” On the noisiness of Thersites, see Elmer 2013a: 96 and Ford 1992: 86-87. 
314 On the role of noise in democratic political theory, see Panagia 2008: 45-73. 
315 The (singular) Muse is said to inspire Demodocus when he performs his own songs (Od. 8.63, 73, 481, 488); the 
nine Muses also sing at Achilles’ funeral, recounted in Od. 24.60-62; Phemius declares that “a god has planted the 
diverse paths of song in my mind” (Od. 22.347-48). On the Homeric Muses and poetic inspiration, see Ford 1992: 
34; Thalmann 1984: 126-133. 
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the crew returns from the Nekuia to Circe’s island, the goddess gives Odysseus a preview of the 
dangers that he will face on his voyage home: 
Σειρῆνας μὲν πρῶτον ἀφίξεαι, αἵ ῥά τε πάντας  
ἀνθρώπους θέλγουσιν, ὅτίς σφεας εἰσαφίκηται. 
ὅς τις ἀϊδρείῃ πελάσῃ καὶ φθόγγον ἀκούσῃ  
Σειρήνων, τῷ δ’ οὔ τι γυνὴ καὶ νήπια τέκνα 
οἴκαδε νοστήσαντι παρίσταται οὐδὲ γάνυνται, 
ἀλλά τε Σειρῆνες λιγυρῇ θέλγουσιν ἀοιδῇ, 
ἥμεναι ἐν λειμῶνι· πολὺς δ’ ἀμφ’ ὀστεόφιν θὶς 
ἀνδρῶν πυθομένων, περὶ δὲ ῥινοὶ μινύθουσιν. 
ἀλλὰ παρὲξ ἐλάαν, ἐπὶ δ’ οὔατ’ ἀλεῖψαι ἑταίρων 
κηρὸν δεψήσας μελιηδέα, μή τις ἀκούσῃ 
τῶν ἄλλων· ἀτὰρ αὐτὸς ἀκουέμεν αἴ κ’ ἐθέλῃσθα, 
δησάντων σ’ ἐν νηῒ θοῇ χεῖράς τε πόδας τε 
ὀρθὸν ἐν ἱστοπέδῃ, ἐκ δ’ αὐτοῦ πείρατ’ ἀνήφθω, 
ὄφρα κε τερπόμενος ὄπ’ ἀκούσῃς Σειρήνοιϊν. 
εἰ δέ κε λίσσηαι ἑτάρους λῦσαί τε κελεύῃς, 
οἱ δέ σ’ ἔτι πλεόνεσσι τότ’ ἐν δεσμοῖσι διδέντων. (12.39-54) 
 
First you will come to the Sirens, who enchant all 
the people who reach them. 
Whoever approaches in ignorance and hears the voice of  
the Sirens—his wife and infant children 
will never stand beside him and rejoice at his homecoming, 
but the Sirens sing their enchanting songs, 
sitting in a meadow; and around them is a vast heap of bones 
of rotting men; and their skins shrivel away. 
But push past them, and anoint the ears of your hetairoi, 
kneading honey-sweet wax, lest any of the others listen. 
But if you yourself wish to listen, 
bind yourself on the swift ship about your hands and feet 
on the straight mast, and fasten bonds from it, 
so that you may hear the voice of the Sirens and enjoy it. 
If you beg and command your companions to release you 
 let them put you then in still more chains. 
Odysseus repeats this information, with some modifications, to the crew (12.154-64), and the 
actual encounter with the Sirens plays out as a nearly verbatim repetition of Circe’s advanced 
 157 
warning (165-200). Odysseus does, however, share a short clip from the song that the Sirens 
address to him as he sails by bound to the ship’s mast.316 
‘δεῦρ’ ἄγ’ ἰών, πολύαιν’ Ὀδυσεῦ, μέγα κῦδος Ἀχαιῶν,  
νῆα κατάστησον, ἵνα νωϊτέρην ὄπ’ ἀκούσῃς. 
οὐ γάρ πώ τις τῇδε παρήλασε νηῒ μελαίνῃ, 
πρίν γ’ ἡμέων μελίγηρυν ἀπὸ στομάτων ὄπ’ ἀκοῦσαι, 
ἀλλ’ ὅ γε τερψάμενος νεῖται καὶ πλείονα εἰδώς.  
ἴδμεν γάρ τοι πάνθ’, ὅσ’ ἐνὶ Τροίῃ εὐρείῃ  
Ἀργεῖοι Τρῶές τε θεῶν ἰότητι μόγησαν,  
ἴδμεν δ’ ὅσσα γένηται ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ.’ (12.184-91) 
 
 ‘Come here, much-praised Odysseus, great glory of the Achaeans, 
 bring your ship to land so that you may listen to our voice. 
 No one ever passes here in a black ship 
 before he listens to the honey-toned voice from our mouths, 
 but he enjoys it and returns home knowing more. 
 For we know, of course, every single thing that in wide Troy 
 the Argives and the Trojans suffered by the will of the gods, 
 and we know whatever happens upon the many-feeding earth.’ 
 
With their claim to know every happening in Odysseus’ world, past and present, the Sirens align 
themselves with the Iliadic Muses.317 But whereas the Muses only “bring to mind” (μνησαίαθ’) 
the facts of the past so that the bard may sing them, the Sirens themselves sing what they 
know. They are thus akin not only to the Muses but to the ten-mouthed, ten-tongued mecha-
bard that could translate the Muses’ knowledge into song.  
Indeed, in his description of the Sirens, Odysseus suggests that their song has a strange 
polyphonic quality. The passages about the Sirens contain three words referring to the sound of 
                                                        
 
316 See Schur 2014 on this paradox, the “silence of the Sirens,” who promise an infinite song but do not (and 
cannot) deliver it within the Odyssey. 
317 The similarities between the Sirens and Muses are well documented. See Pucci 1979: 126-28; Ledbetter 2003: 
30; and Doherty 1995: 83. 
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their song: φθόγγος (3x), αἰοιδή (3x), and ὄψ (5x).318 Of these, ops (“voice”) is most central to 
Odysseus’ aesthetic response. Circe instructs Odysseus to bind himself “so that, taking pleasure, 
[he] may hear the ops of the two Sirens” (ὄφρα κε τερπόμενος ὄπ’ ἀκούσῃς Σειρήνοιϊν, 52). The 
Sirens themselves promise a similar link between pleasure and voice.319 And as soon as 
Odysseus hears the ops himself, he “desires to listen” and wordlessly bids his comrades to 
release him, thereby triggering the second bondage.320 This is one of several terms for voice in 
early epic. It is the obvious choice for the Sirens’ voice, because ops is the voice of the Muses, 
especially when they sing in responsion.321 But ops is also the uncanny vocalization of animals, 
battlefield cries, and furious gods, less a voice qua intelligible utterance than a sonic force that 
induces surprise and trembling.322 In terms of its formulaic deployment in Odyssey 12, the 
Sirens’ ops is closer to this uncanny sense. The Muses generally sing “in responsion with a 
                                                        
 
318 The instances of ὄψ are at Od. 12.52, 160, 185, 187, 192. 
319 πρίν γ’ ἡμέων μελίγηρυν ἀπὸ στομάτων ὄπ’ ἀκοῦσαι, / ἀλλ’ ὅ γε τερψάμενος νεῖται καὶ πλείονα εἰδώς, “[no 
one sails past us] before hearing the honey-sounding voice from our mouths; but he will return pleased and 
knowing more” (Od. 12.187-88). 
320 ὣς φάσαν ἱεῖσαι ὄπα κάλλιμον: αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ / ἤθελ’ ἀκουέμεναι, λῦσαί τ’ ἐκέλευον ἑταίρους / ὀφρύσι 
νευστάζων, “thus they spoke, casting their beautiful voice: I wished in my heart to listen, and I bid my hetairoi to 
free me, nodding with my eyebrows” (12.192-94). 
321 Il. 1.604; Od. 24.60; h. Ap. 189; h. Artemis 18; Theogony 41, 68. 
322 There are 32 instances of ops in Homer, Hesiod, and the Homeric Hymns. These fall into a handful of contexts. 
(1) The voice of gods, often overheard by mortals: gods who appear beside a hero in battle and give advice (Il. 
2.182; 10.512; 20.380; Od. 24.535); Calypso, Circe, and the Sirens (Od. 5.61; 10.221; 12.51, 160, 187, 192); the 
Muses (see n. 321); unspecified gods (Il. 7.53). (2) Multitudinous, inarticulate vocalizations that inspire fear and 
trembling: the shouts of many men, often compared to animal sounds (see p. 159; Il. 3.152, 4.435, 14.150); a 
battle cry (Il. 14.76, 18.222); a woman wailing in distress (Il. 22.451; Od. 11.421; h. Cer. 67); Typhoeus’ polycephalic 
roar (Theogony 830). (3) Utterances of individual mortals that have an uncanny forcefulness: when a hero refuses 
to spare his captive and pronounces his fatal intention (Il. 11.137; 21.98); Odysseus’ “great voice” compared to 
falling snow (Il. 3.221; Od. 14.421). In general, ops may incidentally express intelligible content, but its essential 
mark is a sublime sonority; cf. LfgrE s.v. ὀπός. “Annahme einer Bed. ‘Äußerung’, ‘Wort’ (~ έπος, vgl. E), bes. für 
B182, H53, K512, Δ137, Y380, ω535, unnötig (s. zu den Stt.), auch wenn es sich im Kontext meistens um e. 
artikulierte Äußerung handelt.” The derivative ὄσσα ( < *okw-ya) has a related sense in Hesiod—a divine voice that 
exceeds human understanding (see Collins 1999; Goslin 2010). 
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beautiful ops” (ἀμειβόμεναι ὀπὶ καλῇ),323 but this formula does not occur with the Sirens. In 
four out of the five instances, the phrase applied to the Sirens is ὄπ’ ἀκοῦσαι (or a 
morphological variant),324 which occurs elsewhere, for instance, when Agamemnon refuses to 
spare the sons of Antimachus in battle and they “hear his pitiless voice” (ἀμείλικτον δ’ ὄπ’ 
ἄκουσαν, Il. 11.137); when Achilles refuses to spare Lycaon (ἀμείλικτον δ’ ὄπ’ ἄκουσε, Il. 
21.98); and when Demeter hears the cries of Persephone being abducted (τῆς ἁδινὴν ὄπ’ 
ἄκουσα, h. Cer. 67).325  
There is an internal unity behind the word’s disparate valences that hinges on a sense of 
choral uncanniness. The chorus of the Muses comprises a compound ops with many voices in 
responsion.326 This vocal multiplicity—that is, noisiness—is in other cases a mark of the 
uncanny: Trojan elders in assembly are likened to a mass of cicadas in the forest (Il. 3.152); the 
shouts of the Trojan army, to flocks of sheep (Il. 4.435); the battle cry of Poseidon, to the shouts 
of “nine- or ten-thousand men” (Il. 14.150). Finally, in Hesiod’s Theogony, the hundred heads of 
Typhoeus utter intelligible words mixed with assorted animal noises (Th. 830).327 The Sirens’ 
                                                        
 
323 Il. 1.64; Od. 24.60; H. Ap. 189; Theogony 68. 
324 The passages in question are Od. 12.37-54 and 154-200. 
325 It is significant that these voices of cruelty and horror are expressed with the same formula (ὄπ’ ἀκοῦσαι) that 
repeatedly marks the Sirens’ voice. The latent equivocity of ops—at once lovely choral song and terrifying 
vocalization—is brought to the surface in the Siren scene. As a singing duet, the Sirens produce something 
resembling a choral voice, but as monsters who pitilessly lure sailors to their death, they evoke the uncanny ops 
associated with the formula ὄπ’ ἀκοῦσαι. 
326 The participle ἀμειβόμεναι suggests that multiple voices alternate in such a way that only one voice is singing at 
any given instant. The Muses in Homer and the Hymns tend to sing “antiphonally with a beautiful voice” 
(ἀμειβόμεναι ὀπὶ καλῇ, Il. 1.604 = Od. 24.60 = h. Ap. 189).  
327 φωναὶ δ’ ἐν πάσῃσιν ἔσαν δεινῇς κεφαλῇσι, / παντοίην ὄπ’ ἰεῖσαι ἀθέσφατον, “There were voices in all of his 
terrible heads, casting every sort of unutterable noise” (Th. 829-30). Goslin (2010: 361) remarks, “With Typhon, 
body and voice are combined in an undifferentiated mass.” Ford (1992: 176) concurs that ops connotes a voice’s 
asignifying, acoustic intensity. See Gurd 2016: 32-36 on the sonic patterning of the Typhonomachy and the vocal 
similarities between the Muses, singers, and Typhoeus; “with Typhoeus and the battles over universal power in 
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ops contains the voices of multiple singers (at least two, Σειρήνοιϊν, 52), but perhaps its 
polyphonic quality has as much to do with the possibility—as Anastasia Peponi has suggested—
that it is a pastiche of multiple generic forms: epic and lyric, choral and monody, divine repose 
and horrific desolation.328 As a sonic body, the song has the same kind of monstrous 
polymorphism as hundred-headed Typhoeus. 
If the Sirens’ voice sounds like polyphonic noise on a phenomenal level, the content that 
it conveys is also noisy in the sense that it presents an unconsolidated surplus of information. 
When they address Odysseus as he sails by, the Sirens know his name and his reputation 
(πολύαιν’ Ὀδυσεῦ, μέγα κῦδος Ἀχαιῶν, 184), but they do not offer to adapt their song to suit 
his specific interests. The Trojan War is of universal interest to characters within the world of 
the Odyssey, and the Sirens’ second topic has an absolutely universal scope and address: ὅσσα 
γένηται ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ (“as many things as come to be upon the earth that nourishes 
many”). Unlike human bards who sing at royal banquets, the Sirens offer information without 
any hint of selectivity or aristocratic bias, an encompassing vision of every being—elites and 
commoners, humans and things—that has come to be (γένηται) upon the earth. And just as a 
                                                        
 
whose sounds Hesiod revels, song becomes a vibrant sensuous presence even as it disturbs desires for stillness and 
peace” (35). 
328 Peponi (2012: 76-80) has argued that the Siren’s performance is “on the cusp between gods and mortals, idyll 
and horror, monody and choral song, epic and lyric.” Their song plots a diagonal across the grid lines of archaic 
mousikē. It is performed in a beautiful meadow (like the locus amoenus in Sappho 2), but the meadow is scattered 
with rotting corpses; it is sung by a duo of singers that “does not fall under any of the known archaic genres of 
musical performance” (Peponi 2012: 81); and, in terms of content, the song mixes lyric invocation (δεῦρ’ ἄγ’ ἰών, 
184) and lyric rhythms with epic vocabulary (πολύαιν’ Ὀδυσεῦ, μέγα κῦδος Ἀχαιῶν, 184). The Siren song is 
manifestly a song, but it does not coincide with the performative, occasional, and generic predicates of song. See 
Scodel 1998, who argues, on somewhat different grounds, that “the Sirens represent a sort of anti-song, which can 
define normal song by what it is not” (188). 
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human bard would require a monstrous body to transmit such a song, so the bodies of the 
song’s human listeners lose their organic coherence when exposed to such divine candor. 
If, in the Odyssey, ordinary bardic songs relate stories about princes to audiences of 
princes, for what kind of audience is the Sirens’ universal noise intended? Circe claims that 
“anyone who reaches them” (ὅτίς σφεας εἰσαφίκηται, 12.40) and “anyone who approaches and 
listens to their voice” (ὅς τις ἀϊδρείῃ πελάσῃ καὶ φθόγγον ἀκούσῃ / Σειρήνω, 41-42) is drawn 
into the baleful community of listeners that surrounds the Sirens. This is not a “community” in 
the ordinary sense, of course, because most of its members are dead, but this qualification 
does not detract from the sense that all of the Sirens’ audiences, dead and alive, are still 
present together, strewn in heaps of bone and withering flesh. Unlike the participants in the 
royal dais, these listeners are made absolutely equal by the levelling agency of death. We have 
already encountered this notion of an aesthetic community open to “anyone” who sees, tastes, 
or listens: when the hetairoi desire to open the bag of Aeolus, “any one of them” could look 
and speculate about its contents; and the commensal customs of the Lotus Eaters appeal to 
“whoever” of the companions tastes the lotus fruit. Here as well, the Sirens’ egalitarian 
aisthēsis and the form of community that it entails are presented by Odysseus as the extinction 
of nostos. 
 In the event, the companions do not actually face this risk: with Circe’s guidance 
Odysseus conspires to monopolize the song for himself and to ward off its harmful effects.329 
                                                        
 
329 In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer recognize the exploitative quality of Odysseus’ position 
as the sole audience of the Sirens at the expense of his hetairoi. As a proto-capitalist, Odysseus submits his rowing 
crew to factory-like working conditions (“workers must look ahead with alert concentration and ignore anything 
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The famous contrivance of the wax and bonds turns Odysseus into the privileged recipient of a 
song that would otherwise be addressed to all perishable human life. He receives here a special 
portion, a geras of song, once again at the expense of his crew. The song is thus deprived at 
once of its egalitarian promise and of its fatal power.330 The scene is a mise en abyme for the 
way in which the Apologoi regard each of the dangerous experiments in egalitarian aesthetics 
that we have examined: as fragments of another world, utopian or dystopian, and in either case 
impossible. 
 
Conclusion: Egalitarian Aftermath 
 The proem of the Odyssey announces as the poem’s central theme the travails of a 
single anēr in his encounters with a multiplicity of peoples and places (πολλῶν δ’ ἀνθρώπων, 
1.3). To adapt to multiplicity, Odysseus makes himself multiple—polutropos, polumētis, 
poluainos, polutlas.331 I want to suggest, by way of conclusion, that in the aftermath of the 
destruction of the hetairoi, the problem of equality continues to surface in the narrative as an 
especially intractable and antagonistic variant of the thematics of number, of one versus many. 
                                                        
 
which lies to one side,” 2002: 26) while Odysseus, freed from work, attends to the Sirens’ performance with the 
self-discipline of a bourgeois moralist (25-29). See Grethlein 2017: 3-4; Porter 2010c. 
330 But perhaps Odysseus’ efforts to isolate the egalitarian threat of the Siren song are not entirely successful. The 
mechanism that he uses to safely listen puts him at the mercy of his crew. He is bound and they are not; he must 
trust them not to obey his order that they release him while he is under the spell of the Sirens. The scene thus 
stages an inversion of the unequal power dynamic that has gradually rendered the hetairoi utterly subordinate to 
Odysseus over the course of their journey. For a brief interval, the hetairoi are notionally in charge of the ship and 
its destiny. 
331 See Peradotto 1990; Pucci 1987: 14-17. Cf. Adorno and Horkheimer on the development of Odysseus as a 
fragile, unitary subject through perilous encounters with and immersion in a multiplicity of experiences: “that is 
the secret underlying the conflict between epic and myth: the self does not exist simply in rigid antithesis to 
adventure but takes on its solidity only through this antithesis, and its unity through the very multiplicity which 
myth in its oneness denies” (2002: 38). 
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As the story reaches its violent conclusion in the final three books and Odysseus decisively 
triumphs over the suitors and other more numerous opponents, the significance of equality 
changes as well, gradually losing its utopian valences and becoming a figure for sheer collective 
devastation.  
The egalitarian tendency of Odysseus’ hetairoi can serve as a paradigm for his 
encounters with other masses and communities in the epic,332 and this is especially true of the 
resonances between the hetairoi and Penelope’s suitors. Like the hetairoi, the suitors belong to 
a band of violent men, drawn from various families, many of them Ithacan, who will perish 
because of their reckless opposition to Odysseus. As Egbert Bakker has observed, Odysseus 
echoes the language of the proem when in Book 22 he attributes the destruction of the suitors 
to their atasthaliē (413-16).333 Odysseus’ opponent in the second half of the epic is a new kind 
of collectivity, this time divested of the social affinity that an Homeric chief is supposed to feel 
toward his followers.334 
If the hetairoi maintain an imperfect but robust mode of egalitarian camaraderie, the 
suitors appear as a mass of self-interested individuals who more often regard each other as 
rivals than as allies and who cooperate only to guard their common agōn against the defenders 
of Odysseus’ legacy. What is more, a handful of named suitors (chiefly Antinous and 
Eurymachus) are the contest’s manifest frontrunners and direct nearly all of the group’s 
                                                        
 
332 Odysseus’ narrative of his wanderings in the Apologoi often seems to be in dialogue with the poem’s larger 
frame narrative; see Bakker 2013: 3-12; Nagler 1990. 
333 Bakker 2013: 127. The suitor Leocritus explicitly invokes the theme of “one versus many” in the assembly scene, 
referring to Odysseus’ doom if he should ever return and “fight against a greater number” (εἰ πλεόνεσσι μάχοιτο 
2.245, 251). 
334 Haubold 2000: 126-44. 
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narratively consequential actions.335 But this very asymmetry means that the majority of the 
suitors are less interested in marriage per se than in dividing up various goods among 
themselves. Chief among these diversions is the activity of feasting, which constantly 
apportions a shared store of resources among the whole group according to the principal of 
commensal equality (see pp. 137-38).336 The prize of marriage is closely related to other 
objectives—political power and wealth—that are more amenable than marriage to egalitarian 
appropriation and division. 
 Ruth Scodel has shown how the suitors’ objectives shift over the course of the narrative 
in response to the actions of Penelope and Telemachus.337 For most of the narrative, the suitors 
plan, sometimes fancifully and sometimes with deadly seriousness, to murder Telemachus and 
divide Odysseus’ still-substantial wealth among themselves.338 This collectivization of risk and 
reward recalls the implicit compacts between Iliadic warriors or Odysseus’ hetairoi during raids 
(e.g., against the Cicones in Book 8), according to which all participants are guaranteed some 
share of the venture’s profits. It is especially noteworthy that the first voice that entertains the 
                                                        
 
335 Antinous’ ambition is denounced by Eurymachus and blamed for the suitors’ misdeeds at Od. 22.48-52; see 
Thalmann 1998: 187-88. 
336 On feasting among the suitors, see Bakker 2013: 42-47, 52-57. See further Saïd 1979: 23–41 and 2011 : 64–69 
on the suitors’ dining practices as a perversion of the heroic dais. 
337 Scodel 2001. In her account, the suitors’ designs evolve through three distinct “games,” or strategic situations. 
In the first, which precedes Telemachus’ assertion of maturity in Books 1 and 2, the suitors vie with one another 
for Penelope’s hand, a prize that would empower the victor to expropriate Telemachus’ patrimony and to claim 
the kingship on Ithaca. After Telemachus forcefully claims his patrimony in Book 2, the suitors band together to 
murder Telemachus. In this “second game,” the suitors are exposed to enormous risk, which they can sustain only 
on the condition that the spoils of their plot are shared equitably. In the third game, which Penelope initiates by 
announcing the bow contest, the only prize is marriage to Penelope. See further Rose 1992: 101 and my 
Introduction, pp. 1-4. 
338 See Od. 2.332-36, 4.663-70, 13.376-82, and 16.371-86; Scodel 2001: 315-19. 
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possibility of dividing up Telemachus’ patrimony does not belong to one of the named suitors. 
An anonymous suitor mocks Telemachus (ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκε νέων ὑπερηνορεόντων, 2.324) at 
the prospect of his voyaging abroad to gather supporters; a second suitor, still unnamed, adds 
that such a voyage might benefit the suitors: 
ἄλλος δ’ αὖτ’ εἴπεσκε νέων ὑπερηνορεόντων: 
“τίς δ’ οἶδ’, εἴ κε καὶ αὐτὸς ἰὼν κοίλης ἐπὶ νηὸς  
τῆλε φίλων ἀπόληται ἀλώμενος ὥς περ Ὀδυσσεύς; 
οὕτω κεν καὶ μᾶλλον ὀφέλλειεν πόνον ἄμμιν·  
κτήματα γάρ κεν πάντα δασαίμεθα, οἰκία δ’ αὖτε  
τούτου μητέρι δοῖμεν ἔχειν ἠδ’ ὅς τις ὀπυίοι.”  (Od. 2.331-36) 
 
Another of the arrogant young men would say in reply: 
“who knows? Maybe he too will go on a hollow ship 
and perish far away from his relations, wandering just like Odysseus. 
This would add even more work for us; 
for we would have to divide everything up, and we would  
have to give the house back to his mother and whoever marries her.” 
 
The function of anonymity here recalls the “someone” (τις) in the scenes from the Apologoi 
that I examined earlier (see pp. 128, 133, 147; cf. Introduction, p. 4). The speaker could be any 
of the suitors and thus represents their generic interests subtracted from whatever individual 
objectives they might have as rival contestants for Penelope’s hand.  
It is remarkable that the anonymous suitors do not, at this point, have any plan for 
effecting Telemachus’ disappearance, and the plot to murder Telemachus at sea is devised only 
later by Antinous (4.662-72). But if the anonymous suitors’ talk is idle banter, idleness is 
paradoxically a kind of activity for them, a deliberate vocation and the source of their narrative 
impact. The minor suitors represent, within the poem, a mode of existence that is indifferent 
both to hierarchy and to narrative direction. To deliberately divide up Odysseus’ estate would 
be the best outcome of their venture, but any kind of conclusion would involve a degree of 
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“work” or “exertion” for them (πόνον ἄμμιν, 334) and would, they jokingly imply, bring a 
premature end to the fantastical abundance that they enjoy at Odysseus’ expense. It would also 
require them to turn over the greater part of this abundance (the οἰκία) to one of their number, 
elevating him above the rest of the group.  
In their egalitarian idleness, the minor suitors are contrasted with their ambitious 
leaders, with Antinous in particular playing a crucial role in transforming the rank-and-file’s 
chatter into an armed expedition to intercept and murder Telemachus at sea. Without his 
leadership it is unclear if any concrete plans to this effect would have materialized. Antinous 
functions like Odysseus to his hetairoi—a singular leader who by turns inspires and cajoles an 
anonymous mass of characters to advance through the plot, and this sense of forward 
movement is usually gained at the expense of the mass’s egalitarian inclinations. By Book 16, as 
far as Antinous is concerned, it is no longer possible for the suitors to enjoy their life of aimless 
consumption. They must commit either to murder Telemachus and divide his property or to 
leave the palace and court Penelope individually. Regarding the first plan, he remarks to the 
assembled suitors that, 
εἰ δ’ ὕμιν ὅδε μῦθος ἀφανδάνει, ἀλλὰ βόλεσθε  
αὐτόν τε ζώειν καὶ ἔχειν πατρώϊα πάντα, 
μή οἱ χρήματ’ ἔπειτα ἅλις θυμηδέ’ ἔδωμεν 
ἐνθάδ’ ἀγειρόμενοι     (Od. 16.387-390) 
 
If this plan displeases you and you wish instead 
that [Telemachus] live and have all of his patrimony, 
then let us no longer gather together here  
to eat up his pleasing property in abundance 
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The gustatory metaphor of “eating” Odysseus’ wealth is widespread in the poem.339 This is a 
vision of limitless abundance—and in particular, limitless meat (κρέα ἄσπετα)—illicitly 
transferred from the fantasy worlds of the Lotus Eaters and Aeaea to the materially restricted 
reality of Ithaca. “This means that the Suitors enjoy κρέα ἄσπετα too, but only from the 
perspective of their own destructive and unstable paradise” (Bakker 2013: 65). In that sense, 
the possibility of the egalitarian feast is premised on the same utopian material conditions that 
the hetairoi encounter during the Apologoi, but for the suitors, the situation is not 
sustainable.340 
Notice that Antinous refers to the suitors’ collective access to Odysseus’ wealth as 
θυμηδής, “pleasing to the heart.” The word is a hapax in Homer, but Eustathius notes that as a 
compound its formation resembles that of μελιηδής and θυμαλγής.341 It evokes the same kind 
of aesthetic enjoyment that the hetairoi experience when they encounter the egalitarian 
abundance of the Lotus Eaters and their μελιηδέα καρπόν (9.94). It is the pleasure of sharing a 
                                                        
 
339 See Bakker 2013: 46 on these metaphors of consumption: the suitors are said variously to “wear down” 
(τρύχειν), “devour” (δαρδάπτειν), and “eat up” (κατεσθίειν) the livelihood of Telemachus. 
340 Furthermore, by “dining to destroy” (Bakker 2013: 43), the suitors may be attempting to reduce the 
accumulation of wealth in the royal temenos to parity with other aristocratic households; see Rose 1992: 101, “It 
looks suspiciously as if they intend to break up the concetration of wealth which, as Odysseus states with almost 
embarassing bluntness, is a fundamental component of successful kingship.” It has also been suggested that the 
presence of the suitors is tolerated by the Ithacan dēmos because the broader community is punishing Odysseus 
(or Penelope) for some transgression. See Bakker 2013: 44, “There is also the possibility that the Ithacan 
community refrains from intervening because the Suitors’ actions are in themselves sanctioned by the 
community.” The relationship between the suitors and the Ithacan dēmos is generally hostile, however; e.g. Od. 
16.376-82 and throughout the assembly scene in Od. 2 (see Rose 1992: 100, who relates their hostility to an 
institutional conflict between oligarchs and popular assemblies). 
341 Eustathius remarks on the word’s derivation: Τὸ δὲ θυμηδὲς ὁμοίως παρῆκται τῷ μελιηδές. ἐναντίον δὲ πρὸς τὸ 
θυμηδὲς τὸ θυμαλγές (“θυμηδές is formed like μελιηδές, and contrarywise, θυμηδές is formed like θυμαλγές,”  
Book 2, pg. 128). Indeed, both μελιηδές and θυμαλγές are relatively common in Homer (22x and 13x, respectively), 
and so the hapax that combines one half of each might semantically resonate with both. Hence θυμηδές might 
connote—by way of its lexical associations—a mixture of pleasure and grief that would be ironically appropriate to 
the suitors’ precarious situation. 
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common good that is open to the equal enjoyment of every participant. Here, then, we have a 
brief reprise of the aesthetics of candor. But the lexical rarity of θυμηδής also underscores the 
general absence of candor from the suitors’ perceptions throughout the long sequence of 
events that lead to the mnēsterophonia. Their senses are occluded by a fatal opacity. Just as 
Hector dismisses Poulydamas’ reading of the bird-sign in Iliad 12 (see Chapter 1), the suitors 
dismiss or overlook the manifest portents of Odysseus’ return.342  
Nowhere is this clearer than in the moment when the suitors celebrate Telemachus’ 
announcement that he will accede to a wedding for Penelope. In the notoriously spooky scene, 
the suitors laugh uncontrollably (ἄσβεστον γέλω ὦρσε, παρέπλαγξεν δὲ νόημα, 20.346) and 
weep as they consume bloody meat, as if with “jaws not their own” (γναθμοῖσι γελώων 
ἀλλοτρίοισιν… ὄσσε δ’ ἄρα σφέων / δακρυόφιν πίμπλαντο, 347-49). Divided from themselves, 
split into unequal parts, the thumos of each diner can discern the “grief” of the situation (γόον 
δ’ ὠΐετο θυμός, 349) even as the rest of his body cannot.343 A kind of inequality infiltrates the 
suitors’ innermost aesthetic capacities. The seer Theoclymenus observes what is happening and 
rebukes the suitors for their obliviousness (351-57), but they ridicule his speech and thereby 
underscore their vastly unequal ability to perceive and evaluate their own situation.344 
                                                        
 
342 For instance, Od. 2.146-83; 20.92-121. 
343 See Bakker 2013: 93, “Eating and laughing are performed mechanically as mindless functions performed by an 
‘external’ body, whereas thumos has a disjointed premonition of impending doom.” 
344 On Theoclymenus’ three prophecies and their relation to bardic performance, see Mitchell 2010. On Homeric 
prophecy and divination more generally, see Chapter 1, pp. 93-94. 
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The suitors are allowed, however, one final moment of brilliant candor. At the end of 
Book 21 and the wedding contest, the beggar effortlessly strings the bow, fires an arrow 
through the axes, and reveals himself to be Odysseus. 
ὡς ὅτ’ ἀνὴρ φόρμιγγος ἐπιστάμενος καὶ ἀοιδῆς  
ῥηϊδίως ἐτάνυσσε νέῳ περὶ κόλλοπι χορδήν,  
ἅψας ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐϋστρεφὲς ἔντερον οἰός,  
ὣς ἄρ’ ἄτερ σπουδῆς τάνυσεν μέγα τόξον Ὀδυσσεύς.  
δεξιτερῇ δ’ ἄρα χειρὶ λαβὼν πειρήσατο νευρῆς·  
ἡ δ’ ὑπὸ καλὸν ἄεισε, χελιδόνι εἰκέλη αὐδήν.  
μνηστῆρσιν δ’ ἄρ’ ἄχος γένετο μέγα, πᾶσι δ’ ἄρα χρὼς  
ἐτράπετο. Ζεὺς δὲ μεγάλ’ ἔκτυπε σήματα φαίνων·  (21.406-13) 
 
As when a man skilled at the phorminx and song 
easily stretches a string on a new peg, 
fastening the guts of a sheep twisted well at both ends,  
so Odysseus stretched the great bow without effort; 
and taking it with his right hand he tested the string; 
it sang forth beautifully, like the voice of a swallow. 
There was a great feeling of pain for the suitors, and their complexion 
changed. Zeus thundered, showing forth great sēmata; 
 
In an instant, Odysseus emerges from his self-concealment and makes his presence manifest to 
the discernment of every suitor. His first object is not (yet) to kill but, with Zeus’ support (413, 
415), to be seen and heard by his audience with an unambiguous clarity—in this he appears like 
the petrified sēma that Poseidon manifests to the assembled Phaeacians, an apparition that 
addresses its baleful threat to an entire community.  
The simile that compares Odysseus to a singer has been much commented on as 
metapoetic figure for the proximity between protagonist and composer, hero and poet in the 
Odyssey.345 But what the comparison also brings out here is the aesthetic dimension of equality 
                                                        
 
345 On Odysseus styled as a singer within the song, see Schein 1996: 19 and Segal 1996: 212-13; on the role of 
swallows in the simile, see Austin 1975: 247, 251. 
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and the deadly valences that have accreted around it over the course of the poem. The suitors 
become the audience of a beautiful song (ὑπὸ καλὸν ἄεισε, 404) voiced by the weapon that will 
kill them, much as the beautiful song of the Sirens (λιγυρὴν δ’ ἔντυνον ἀοιδήν, 12.183; ὄπα 
κάλλιμον, 192) addresses an audience that rots in a homogeneous heap of bones (πολὺς δ’ 
ἀμφ’ ὀστεόφιν θὶς, 12.45). Both audiences are reduced to a kind of equality in death, a point 
that Odysseus underscores for the suitors by his refusal to spare any of them in the 
mnēsterophonia. Candor, as the aesthetic aspect of equality, carries this note of fatality with it. 
This is perhaps how the aesthetics of equality functions in the second half of the Odyssey—not 
to produce visions of utopian alternatives to the story of Odysseus’ return, but to figure the 
desolation of his collective enemies. With Odysseus’ spectacular self-revelation, the fatal 
triumph of the single protagonist against his plural opponents—“one among many more” 
(μοῦνον ἐνὶ πλεόνεσσι, 22.13)—is nearly accomplished. 
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Chapter 3. Utopian Poverty in Works and Days 
 
 Hesiod’s Works and Days is constructed from an assortment of autobiography, technical 
instruction, allegory, personal appeals, and mythical narratives.346 In this patchwork of genres 
and styles, what stands out as a constant base note is the text’s relentless use of imperatives. 
There are commands to Perses, Hesiod’s ne’er-do-well brother, to “listen,” “heed,” and 
“attend” to his ethical advice, and large sections of the text are instructions, communicated 
through commands, about when and how to perform the various tasks that constitute a life 
sustained through agricultural management. Indeed, Hesiod is not the only voice in Works that 
issues directives: the cries of swallows and cranes, the light of Arcturus, and the rising of Orion 
and Sirius each signal the start of a new labor in the farming calendar.347 Hesiod speaks the 
didactic language of injunctions and exhortations, but beyond these explicit directives, the 
farmer is lead toward the proper form of life by the sensuous phenomena of the world he 
inhabits. Hesiod draws our attention to this didacticism of appearances immediately after the 
invocation to Zeus that opens the poem. The first image in Works and Days that captures the 
farmer’s attention is that of his neighbor, “whom he sees hasting to plow and plant and set his 
homestead in good order.”  
ἥ τε καὶ ἀπάλαμόν περ ὁμῶς ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει·  
εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τίς τε ἴδεν ἔργοιο χατίζων  
πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει μὲν ἀρώμεναι ἠδὲ φυτεύειν 
οἶκόν τ’ εὖ θέσθαι· ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων 
                                                        
 
346 Martin (1992) calls this genre parrhēsia, which also appears in Homer and Hesiod as a kind of advice-giving and 
truth-telling that freely mixes personal anecdote, allegory, aphorism, and mythical narrative. 
347 On the natural signs that measure out the farming calendar, see West 1978: 253. 
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εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ’· ἀγαθὴ δ’ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν. 
καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, 
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ. (Op. 20-26) 
 
[Good competition] rouses even the helpless man to work; 
for one person lacking work looks at another 
who is rich and who hastens to plow and to plant 
and to set his home in good order; and neighbor envies neighbor 
hastening to wealth; this Eris is good for mortals. 
And potter is wroth with potter and builder with builder, 
and beggar begrudges beggar and bard bard. 
 
The farmer gazes with jealous fascination at the speed and productivity of his wealthier 
neighbor, but his jealousy does not lead him to visit, confront, befriend, steal from, or 
collaborate with the neighbor whom he watches. Each farmer becomes a monad absorbed in 
his own work but at the same time reflecting and reflected in the mirror of his fellow 
proprietors. This form of alienated vision plays into Hesiod’s notorious aversion toward 
communal institutions—he advises the farmer to avoid the agorē, the club house (leskhē), and 
the meeting hall (thōkos),348 because in those venues, the farmer risks entangling himself in 
social activities (lawsuits, arguments, loans, idle talk) that endanger his private substance. To 
ward off the threat that the communal poses to the private, Hesiod envisions a kind of 
denatured community in which individuals relate to one another at a safe distance, through the 
mediation of instructive images.  
This example touches on one of my central interests in this chapter: how Hesiod uses 
sensory experience—and vision in particular—to promote work, ergon. For Hesiod, ergon and 
related terms do not refer simply to “physical exertion,” or to “labor” in pursuit of a livelihood, 
                                                        
 
348 See Edwards 2014 on the “ethical topography” in Works and Days. 
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but more specifically to practices of agricultural management that presuppose the ownership of 
land and the ability to purchase slaves and animals. Hence not everyone in Hesiod’s world can 
“work”: the addressees who can answer the imperative at 382—“work work upon work!” 
(ἔργον ἐπ’ ἔργῳ ἐργάζεσθαι)—must already belong to the class of land-owning farmers. This 
narrow ethical vision implies a certain kind of society, one that jealously guards the interests of 
property and private agrarian estates against encroachments from the broader community.  
In pursuit of this ethical project, Hesiod draws on the resources of spectatorship. 
Instead of expropriating the actual property of his neighbor, the good farmer should appreciate 
the image of this property as a distant spectator. He should experience the vision of his 
prosperous rival as an imperative addressed to himself: “keep to your own work,” “persevere in 
being as you are.” This imbrication of aesthetic experience and ethical formation is what 
Jacques Rancière calls the “ethical regime of images.”349 Each individual, by virtue of engaging 
in his private ergon, is reflected in his neighbors and thereby affirmed as identical to himself, a 
self-sufficient proprietor kept reasonably safe from expropriation. Thus Hesiod puts the 
farmer’s senses to work for the regime of private property. 
But this is not the whole story. One of the striking features of Hesiod’s discourse is its 
resolute open-endedness, its refusal to form a univocal ethical system. The text is riddled with 
ambiguous dyads and uncertain alternatives: there are two kinds of Strife, two plows for the 
farmer, and two alternative logoi about human decline. Even Hesiod’s boosterism for ergon is 
                                                        
 
349 “In this regime, it is a matter of knowing in what way images᾽ mode of being affects the ethos, the mode of 
being of individuals and communities” (Rancière 2004a: 21). On Rancière’s concept of aesthetic regimes, see my 
Introduction, pp. 33-38. 
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shadowed by his depiction of ergon’s double, aergiē, “worklessness.” It is a shameful thing, in 
the Age of Iron, to be unemployed, and workless people suffer poverty and desperation. But 
humans in the Golden Age lived “worklessly,” and communities that practice justice may still 
prosper with very little labor. I argue that Hesiod’s attention to worklessness at various points 
in Works and Days is part of a larger utopian impulse that explores the possibility that human 
life and community could be configured along radically different lines. 
We can better understand Hesiod’s utopianism by returning to the question of vision 
and visual aesthetics. Hesiod routinely trains his audience’s powers of sight on images that 
promote an ethics of work, but worklessness has its own forms of visual expression. I focus in 
particular on the suggestive imagery in Hesiod’s depiction of the winter (493-563), the only 
season when work out of doors is impossible. It is here, I argue, that Hesiod explores the 
aesthetic and ethical possibilities of worklessness. Commentators have puzzled over this 
section because, despite its length, it offers little guidance to farmers about the topic of ergon; 
it thus appears superfluous to Hesiod’s ethical project.350 Compounding these interpretive 
difficulties is the section’s profusion of obscure and evocative figures: there are the shivering 
old men with three feet, the impoverished man whose limbs are at once emaciated and 
swollen, the “boneless one” who gnaws its foot in its fireless home.  
These figures are usually interpreted as negative exempla: they illustrate the 
depravations suffered by those who fail to attend to their work. But by sifting through the 
                                                        
 
350 Marsilio 1997 discusses the poetics of the winter section in detail. On the distinctiveness of this section 
compared to the fall and spring sections that surround it, see Marsilio 1992: 36-37. Heath (1985: 256) remarks 
that, “it is not easy to see why a poet genuinely set on instruction in arable farming would have lavished so much 
care and so many lines (almost a third of the whole farming calendar) on this section.” 
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aesthetic content of Hesiod’s winter, I argue that the section’s phenomenal details do not 
coincide with the ethical use of images. Because of their strangeness and obscurity, the winter 
figures resist being appropriated by the ordinary coordination between sensory experience and 
ethical instruction. Their cryptic forms and indecipherable habits expose the parochialism of the 
agrarian ēthos that prevails in the other sections of Works. In particular, what the winter figures 
have in common is that they lead lives without ergon, without the combination of private 
property and agricultural management whose promotion is the central project of Works. This 
cast of figures intimates in various ways that an ēthos without ergon is possible and perhaps 
even desirable. They are part of a larger utopian aspiration in Works that explores the 
possibility that the social and economic inequalities of the Iron Age are not eternal verities but 
a passing condition for a species that has no intrinsic relation to work.  
 
The Ethics of Property 
For the addressees of Hesiod’s ethical instruction, farm work consists primarily in giving 
orders. The domestic and agricultural slaves, dmōes, are variously “set in motion” (δὴ τότ’ 
ἐφορμηθῆναι, ὁμῶς δμῶές τε καὶ αὐτός, 459), “indicated to” (δείκνυε δὲ δμώεσσι, 502), 
“roused” (δμῶας ἐγείρειν, 573), “stirred” (Δμωσὶ δ’ ἐποτρύνειν, 597), and “told” (πεφραδέμεν 
δμώεσσι, 766-67) to perform various tasks.351 This is the same kind of language that Hesiod 
                                                        
 
351 Concerning Hesiod’s work ethic, van Wees observes that “The landowner may occasionally have shared his 
slaves’ labor, and his sons might help out on the farm (379-80) or take the livestock to graze on the mountainside, 
as according to the Theogony Hesiod himself did in his younger days (22-26). Otherwise, his commitment to work 
evidently takes the form of energetic supervision of the laborers: he rises before the slaves do (W&D 573), reminds 
them of work to be done (502-3), and issues instructions (597). His job is ‘to arrange (kosmein) tasks in due 
measure’ (306), i.e. to organize the work to be done by others” (2009: 447). 
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directs at his own audience: they must be told when and how to perform the various erga that 
constitute a life earned through agricultural management.352 Hesiod assumes the persona of a 
taskmaster for whom the commands “attend to work!” and “follow the rule!” are as important 
as the technical details of work and justice. Hesiod’s discourse regards work, then, as a set of 
procedures that are both technical and imperative, and his task as a poet is to inform and 
command.353 He represents the other central topic of the poem, dikē, in a similar manner. 
Gagarin (1973) argues that dikē in Hesiod does not designate “justice” in an abstract sense but 
only the concrete steps of the legal process and its settlement.354 These notions of work and 
justice are almost compulsively formalistic: just as the farmer must plow, sow, and harvest at 
particular times or face poverty, so a society must obey the divinely ordained protocols of 
jurisprudence or face the wrath of Zeus.  
I will return to the imperatival modality of Hesiod’s discourse later on. For now, I want 
to argue that these piecemeal prescriptions about “work and justice” are oriented toward an 
                                                        
 
352 See Canevaro 2015: 88 on the couplet at 597-98: “the poet instructs the farmer (598 δινέμεν—jussive infinitive) 
who must in turn instruct his workers (597 ἐποτρύνειν—infinitive in indirect command).” 
353 Hesiod’s project is didactic in the sense that he claims to be imparting useful information to his audience about 
how to farm and make a just living, but the information that he imparts is not intended to be used in a piecemeal 
fashion. The farming calendar (Op. 382-694), for instance, contains cursory instructions about how to build a 
wagon, how to plow, when to perform various tasks, and so forth, but as Malcolm Heath notes, “the ‘hard’ 
information that [this section] conveys is unbalanced and astonishingly lacunose” (1985: 255). Beyond these bits of 
information, Hesiod’s discourse has the more fundamental and integral purpose of molding the ēthos, the form of 
life, of the addressee. The central maxim of his ethics is to persevere with one’s own work. There is a special 
emphasis on “own,” on what is proper to a particular kind of self, a private person, a proprietor. It means that one 
must not expropriate the property of others (ἀλλοτρίων κτεάνων, 316) but must produce one’s own livelihood 
through one’s own work and property. Heath (1985) discusses the problems with classifying Works and Days as 
“didactic.” The text is formally didactic because its narrative persona claims, at least as a pretense, to instruct its 
addressees about farming; but it is difficult to discern whether this formal didacticism is intended actually to 
instruct anyone. That is, the text may not be finally didactic. 
354 Gagarin’s interpretation has been contested by, e.g., Claus 1977 and Dickie 1978. Heath (1985: 245 n. 2.) gives 
qualified support; Canevaro (2015: 183) sides with Claus and Dickie. 
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integral purpose. In his seminar on ethics and psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan remarked that 
moral experience involves “not only an articulated law but also a direction, a trajectory, in a 
word, a good that [a person] appeals to, thereby engendering an ideal of conduct” (1992: 3). 
Lacan uses the vocabulary of space (“a direction, a trajectory”) to conceptualize the unitary 
disposition that ethical prescriptions are supposed to effect. The term ēthos has a well-known 
polysemy that illustrates this idea: an ēthos is a way of life or disposition and also a space for 
living in or abode; or more synthetically, it is a way of arranging in space the activities that 
make up a life.355 Pietro Pucci describes the spatiality of ethics in a chapter on Hesiod’s dikē. It 
will be useful to relate his account in full: 
But dike is also associated with the solitary life in the country that represents 
Hesiod’s ideal. By settling the claims of individuals through persuasive discourse, 
dike divides and parts (diakrinesthai) former combatants and then reconciles 
them, leaving all content (see Th. 91-92). The result of this discourse points at the 
formation of private enclosures where τὰ ἑαυτοῦ are present, inside, at hand 
(Erga 361 ff.), in the house or in the barn. The mingling and gathering of people, 
especially in the agora or in the meeting place, is not encouraged. … Thus Hesiod’s 
dike supports the private enclosures that enjoy the presence of abundance, of the 
gods, and of truth, rather than the public enclosures where people make common 
decisions or listen to the words of the basileis. (Pucci 1977: 54) 
 
Pucci pinpoints the inner logic that unites dikē and ergon in a single project. The crucial notion 
is separation: dikē is a procedure for separating individuals who have entered into a public 
dispute and for returning them to their private domains; ergon is a procedure for maintaining 
this private domain in its separateness. In this spatial schema, what is “one’s own” is held in 
                                                        
 
355 There are seven instances of ἦθος in Works and Days: Pandora’s “thieving disposition” (67, 78), human customs 
and especially sacrifice (137), the idyllic dwelling places of the deceased heroes (167), the abodes of humans 
visited by vengeful Dike (222), the woeful abode of the “boneless one” (525), the respectable duties of a new wife 
(699). See Verdenius s.v. 67 and 137. It is striking that the non-spatial meaning of “disposition” is applied only to 
women. 
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reserve in the inner space of the oikos, protected by the immunitary procedures of work and 
justice from external encroachments. This set of concerns is summarized by Hesiod’s well-
known aphorism, “it is better at home since it is dangerous outside” (οἴκοι βέλτερον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ 
βλαβερὸν τὸ θύρηφιν, 365). 
This ethical project inflects the most basic vocabulary of Works. For instance, whereas in 
Homer the term ergon encompasses virtually any kind of action, in Hesiod most of its uses are 
restricted to the activities of an independent farmer who owns his land and capital.356 Indeed, 
ergon can refer to the land itself and to the productive, private sphere of the farmer centered 
in the oikos.357 Within this sphere the farmer can safeguard the indefinite range of things 
denoted by Pucci’s apt expression, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, “one’s own”: property (khrēmata, kteana), food 
and sustenance (bios), dependent persons (dmōes, gunē, tekna), and the body of the 
proprietor.  
All of these private substances are threatened by “the outside” (τὸ θύρηφιν), which is 
precisely the space beyond the oikos that belongs to no single proprietor and is filled with their 
mutual dealings, collaborations, extortions, and violence. In the outside is the “the mingling and 
gathering of people” as a community. I use the term “community” here with important 
qualifications. In Aristotle, community (koinōnia) is a relationship formed around a koinon, 
shared good like land, sustenance, protection, exchange, or the administration of justice.358 
                                                        
 
356 On the semantic development of ergon from Homer to Hesiod, see Descat 1986: 175-93. 
357 On the polysemy of ergon, see Edwards 2014: 97-104. “Hesiod places ἔργον, both labor and the site of labor, at 
the ethical center of his poem. Given the identity of labor in Works and Days with cultivation of the fields, Hesiod 
clearly spatializes moral values in the poem” (104). 
358 See Riesbeck 2016 on Aristotle’s notion of koinōnia.  
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Modern political thought takes up this notion in many guises: in theories of the social contract, 
for instance, or in the populisms that trace national belonging to a common identity. 
Communities exist because their members allegedly share in some collective substance or 
pursue a collective goal. The political philosopher Roberto Esposito argues that, alongside this 
positive notion of community, there is a more originary meaning that accentuates the 
contradiction between the community and its members:  
The common is characterized…by a voiding, be it partial or whole, of property into 
its negative; by removing what is properly one’s own [depropriazione] that invests 
and decenters the proprietary subject, forcing him to take leave of himself, to alter 
himself. (2010: 7)  
 
What individuals “share” in a community is not a good but a privation. To be in contact with 
other people, to enter into any kind of social intercourse, is to expose the self to various forms 
of loss: one’s material property can be expropriated through theft, debt, gifts, and other 
collective ventures; more profoundly, the “properties” that constitute one’s identity can be 
transformed through exposure to the ideas and actions of others. The whole edifice of law, 
policing, and sovereign power is supposed to protect individuals from the expropriation that 
they suffer from one another in a community (but only by subjecting them to a different kind of 
danger—state-sanctioned violence).  
The early Greek vocabulary for “common” already bears witness to this privative 
meaning. In Iliad 18, Hector proclaims that the god of war Enyalios is “common to all” (ξυνὸς 
Ἐνυάλιος, 309) and hence impartial: even Achilles could perish in this community of violence 
that treats the distinction between Achaean and Trojan with utter indifference. Archilochus 
echoes this sentiment (ἐτήτυμον γὰρ ξυνὸς ἀνθρώποις Ἄρης, fr. 110). The Myrmidons in Iliad 
16 are compared to an agitated swarm of wasps that create “a common evil for many,” for 
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“anyone who travels on the road” (ξυνὸν δὲ κακὸν πολέεσσι τιθεῖσι…τίς τε κιὼν ἄνθρωπος 
ὁδίτης, 261-62).359 The travelers share nothing with one another except for their exposure to a 
common danger. The notion of the “communal” and “common” in Works, likewise, is 
essentially privative: it is where a subject’s properties—his belongings, his capital, and his 
identity—are exposed to privation. What is more, Hesiod does not trust in communal 
institutions to protect the individual from the community, since law and justice are often 
exercised crookedly and rulers are often unjust. The ethical response is to extricate oneself 
from the space of the common and attend to the private domain of “one’s own.” 
This is not to say that Hesiod is an individualist. His discourse is sometimes assimilated 
by scholars, perhaps unconsciously, to a libertarian defense of the social and economic 
autonomy of individual persons. It has been argued, for instance, that the antithesis between 
self-sufficiency and dependence is at the center of Hesiod’s poetic (and metapoetic) projects: 
“Hesiod discourages an individual’s dependence on other people to provide sustenance that he 
ought to provide for himself.”360 “Dependence” in Works, however, is not a relation between 
generic individuals but one in which a freeborn man loses or risks losing his property to a 
wealthier patron. In particular, Perses errs not only by attempting to expropriate the property 
of others, but by making himself dependent on powerful aristocrats, the basilēes, whose 
ravenous appetite for “gifts” Perses has foolishly attempted to satiate. In the process of 
                                                        
 
359 See LfgrE s.v. ξυνός (2), as characterizing “pain, danger.” But not every instance of xunos in Homer and Hesiod 
has a privative quality. In Hesiod, xunos occurs only in fr. 1, referring to the common feasts of gods and mortals 
(ξυναὶ γὰρ τότε δαῖτες ἔσαν, ξυνοὶ δὲ θόωκοι, 6); koinos occurs only once, at Op. 723 (see pp. 184-85). 
360  Marsilio 1992: 1. Canevaro 2015 (especially 83-89) also investigates this theme of self-sufficiency in Works. 
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gratifying his patrons, Perses has sold off or otherwise alienated his share of the inheritance.361 
The problem is that this asymmetrical relationship exposes him to the loss of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ.  
Conversely, Hesiod has no issue with the fact that his farmers rely on the labor of their 
slaves (dmōes) and wives and that they sometimes employ wage laborers, because these 
relations of economic dominance are turned in the farmer’s favor.362 None of this is surprising: 
Hesiod’s discourse is addressed to a particular socioeconomic figure, the middling farmer who 
owns a plot of land, farming equipment, and slaves.363 Such a person is in no sense 
“dependent” on the labor of the individuals whom he exploits. Whatever resources the farmer 
can command within the private domain of his ergon become “his own,” an extension of his 
propertied, patriarchal self. In the following discussion, I use “farmer” and “proprietor” 
interchangeably to refer to the ideal beneficiary of Hesiod’s discourse, conceived not as an 
abstract individual, but as an agent embedded in a socioeconomic system, the perpetuation of 
which is more important to Hesiod than the success of any individual person. 
To protect their private domains, proprietors are advised to avoid various public spaces 
outside of the home: the agorē, where litigants submit their disputes to communal judgment; 
the thōkos, a shared lodging where neighbors can stay warm in the winter and cool in the 
summer (493, 574); and the leskhē, a club-house used for public deliberations and as an 
                                                        
 
361 The text leaves the exact details of Perses’ biography notoriously open to interpretation. See Clay 2003: 34-35. 
362 Marsilio (1992: 26-27) notes that while the presence of the dmōes seems to undermine the value of self-
sufficiency, in fact they amount to little more than tools at the master’s disposal (“the δμῶες are extensions of 
their master”), akin to oxen (a connection that Aristotle makes when he quotes Op. 405 at Politics I.1252b. See 
Nussbaum 1960 on the status of dmōes in Hesiod. 
363 It is simply assumed that the addressee can easily obtain this private capital and labor: the first instruction in 
the farming calendar is to “first of all purchase a house, a woman, and an ox for plowing” (οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα 
γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ’ ἀροτῆρα, 405). 
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informal meeting space (493, 501).364 These locales are in every way opposed to the property 
regime that Hesiod’s ethics is intended to promote. The shade and warmth of the thōkos are 
public goods available to all-comers, not the preserve of a private individual. The goods that the 
leskhē and thōkos offer—relaxation and idle talk—are economically unproductive and distract 
farmers from the vital work of accumulating private capital. Worst of all is the agorē, where 
parasites like Perses can steal their neighbor’s property through litigation. In each of these 
common spaces, private substance is exposed to theft and waste. The solution is to “pass them 
by” (πὰρ δ’ ἴθι χάλκειον θῶκον καὶ ἐπαλέα λέσχην, 493). This command exemplifies the spatial 
logic of Hesiod’s ethics: one must separate oneself from common spaces and pass into the 
privacy of ergon. 
As van Wees (2009) argues, the thōkos, leskhē, and agorē represent not only an 
occasional respite from work but a lifestyle with its own values and priorities. “Better-off 
landowners might well feel, as many did in classical Greece, that a life of leisure was more 
appropriate to their status than a life of work, and indeed that physical labor was shameful” 
(446).365 But van Wees also notes that “physical labor” is not really what Hesiod understands by 
“work.” His farmer works primarily by managing slaves and hirelings without applying himself 
                                                        
 
364 See Edwards 2014: 112-13 on these public locales. 
365 There are other ways to fill out the historical content behind Hesiod’s bare sketch of Boeotian society. For van 
Wees, Hesiod regards leisure and worklessness as a new, emerging lifestyle that threatens the traditional values of 
productivist discipline. For Descat (1986), by contrast, worklessness is associated with the basilēes, representatives 
of the old Homeric aristocracy, who engage in risky military ventures rather than agricultural “work.” By entering 
into this antiquated milieu, Perses has effectively become a lower-status client to powerful patrons, and this 
relation of social and economic subordination has jeopardized his private wealth. 
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directly to farm labor.366 Conversely, mere idleness is not necessarily objectionable. Hesiod 
advises farmers to nap in the summer under shady trees (592-96); in winter he does not assign 
any concrete tasks despite his insistence that the responsible farmer must never neglect 
household management (493-503). Leisure is permitted so long as it is private. It becomes a 
problem when it involves the farmer in public life—in the activities of the thōkos, leskhē, and 
agorē—and thereby compromises the fundamental autonomy of proprietors.367  
 
 The preceding discussion may make Hesiod’s ethics appear more dogmatic than it really 
is. His maxims are tactical and provisional. No one can entirely disavow communal life, and 
Hesiod recognizes that there is a limit to this simple retreat into the oikos. Between the polis 
and the oikos, there is the ethically ambiguous space of the farmer and his neighbors.368  
Τὸν φιλέοντ’ ἐπὶ δαῖτα καλεῖν, τὸν δ’ ἐχθρὸν ἐᾶσαι· 
τὸν δὲ μάλιστα καλεῖν ὅστις σέθεν ἐγγύθι ναίει·  
εἰ γάρ τοι καὶ χρῆμ’ ἐγκώμιον ἄλλο γένηται, 
γείτονες ἄζωστοι ἔκιον, ζώσαντο δὲ πηοί. 
πῆμα κακὸς γείτων, ὅσσον τ’ ἀγαθὸς μέγ’ ὄνειαρ·  
ἔμμορέ τοι τιμῆς ὅς τ’ ἔμμορε γείτονος ἐσθλοῦ·  
οὐδ’ ἂν βοῦς ἀπόλοιτ’, εἰ μὴ γείτων κακὸς εἴη. (Op. 342-48) 
 
Invite your friend to a feast, let your enemy be; 
                                                        
 
366 See van Wees (2009: 445) on the composition of agricultural labor in Hesiod. I find van Wees’ account of 
economic conditions in Hesiod convincing. He argues that the ideal farmer in Works is a proprietor and manager 
rather than a struggling, subsistence farm-laborer: “Works and Days thus addresses a farmer who owns a sizeable 
estate and employs at least half a dozen laborers, free and slave; the poem tells him to devote himself to work in 
order to maintain his property and independence” (van Wees 2009: 445-46). 
367 Hesiod’s discourse aims to immunize the farmer against this danger by instilling in him a proper “economic 
ethics.” “Hesiod’s exhortations to work hard were thus aimed at landowners who aspired to a leisured life style – 
whether or not they could afford it – which involved spending time away from the farm and taking an active part in 
public life” (van Wees 2009: 446). 
368 Edwards 2014 (105-6) associates the community of neighbors with the village (κώμη), a term that Hesiod uses 
to describe Ascra (Op. 639). 
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invite especially those who dwell near you; 
for if you have some issue at home, 
your neighbors will come ungirded; your in-laws will get girded first. 
A bad neighbor is a pain just as much as a good one is a great boon; 
one’s share of honor is proportional to one’s share of good neighbors; 
no cow would go missing except for bad neighbors. 
 
Neighbors are subject to the intense ambivalence that characterizes many of the central terms 
in Works. They can be “a great boon” only to the extent that they provide security against 
private loss; they are equally likely to create such losses themselves, if they are bad. Neighbors 
figure into the calculus of private production just like acts of god, wavering unpredictably 
between blessing and calamity. In rare cases, however, neighborly relations can appear to be 
uneconomic and motivated by the pure pleasure of camaraderie: 
μηδὲ πολυξείνου δαιτὸς δυσπέμφελος εἶναι: 
ἐκ κοινοῦ πλείστη τε χάρις δαπάνη τ’ ὀλιγίστη  (Op. 722-23) 
 
Don’t be stormy at feasts with many guests: 
pleasure is greatest from the commons and the expense is smallest 
 
This kind of dais is not depicted at any length in Works, but we could imagine something like 
the sympotic, egalitarian feasts among the hetairoi or the suitors in the Odyssey [see Chapter 
2]. Meat and wine are contributed by and divided among all of the participants in the manner 
of a potluck. The only instance of the word koinos in the Hesiodic corpus appears here, to 
describe the pleasures of feasting among neighbors. If this enthusiasm for communal cheer 
seems out of character, it is immediately qualified by a cost-saving rationale (δαπάνη τ’ 
ὀλιγίστη) that affirms the ambivalence attached to every engagement between the farmer and 
his neighbors. It is as if the pleasure of the communal is not a positive substance in its own right 
but only the negation of a negation: a loss minimized (δαπάνη…ὀλιγίστη) and a stormy mood 
temporarily calmed (μηδὲ…δυσπέμφελος). Hesiod, then, is not dogmatically opposed to 
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community, especially when it offers a source of enjoyment that does not strain one’s private 
resources. The whole difficulty consists in exploiting the resources of communal life—without 
falling victim to its expropriative effects—as a support for the ethics of private production. 
This problem is crystalized in the famous account of the Erides, the two races of strife 
whose existence is announced at the beginning of Works (11-26). The bad Erides are 
responsible for “war and destruction” but also for the quotidian activity of the agora. Hesiod 
predictably conflates the conflictual modes of ordinary communal life with their most extreme 
limit, the violence of war and hubris. The good Erides, however, preside over a healthy and 
productive form of competition that inspires neighbors to emulate their harder-working 
neighbors.  
ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων 
εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ’· ἀγαθὴ δ’ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν. 
καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, 
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ.  (Op. 23-26) 
 
Neighbor envies his neighbor  
who hastens toward wealth; this Eris is good for mortals. 
Potter begrudges potter and builder builder, 
and beggar envies beggar and bard bard. 
 
There is a subtle formalism at work here involving what Giovanni Ferrari has called “fair 
exchange.”369 The ultimate purpose of good emulation is to replace one’s rival—a successful 
farmer, for instance, aspires to buy out his neighbor and take over his operations.370 This 
                                                        
 
369 Ferrari 1988. 
370 Hesiod says as much at 33-34: τοῦ κε κορεσσάμενος νείκεα καὶ δῆριν ὀφέλλοις / κτήμασ’ ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις. σοὶ δ’ 
οὐκέτι δεύτερον ἔσται / ὧδ’ ἔρδειν (“when you have taken your fill of [bios], you may concern yourself with 
disputes and strife for the property of others. There will be no second chance for you to do so.” Bad Eris, however, 
involves the substitution of dissimilars: Perses, a reckless lout, attempts to take the place of his respectable 
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exchange is only “good” when the terms involved are equivalent (neighbor/neighbor, 
potter/potter, etc.). Why does Hesiod valorize this special class of relations that connect 
exchangeable terms? The overriding imperative for his discourse is that communal life not 
compromise the productivity and the integrity of the proprietor. Under bad Eris, communal life 
is characterized by rampant expropriation: rivals steal each other’s property and harm each 
other’s bodies; hawks eat nightingales, kings eat gifts, and savage winds penetrate the skin. The 
proprietor and his property are thus disassembled piecemeal without being exchanged for a 
substitute, and the whole regime of private production—which must be organized around the 
intact oikos—is thereby weakened. Under good Eris, however, communal relations are 
constrained by a principium individuationis: terms may relate to each other only as complete 
individuals, and the relation in question culminates not in an exchange of parts but in a 
complete substitution. In the final calculation it is of no consequence which particular person 
owns and manages a given domestic enterprise, so long as the enterprise itself and the regime 
of private property that it instantiates are not compromised. If this principle stands, a farmer 
may benefit from the appetitive drives that animate communal life without abridging the 
fundamental ethical separation that protects the proprietor from the community. 
 
The Image of Property 
Under the good Erides, then, tautology is raised to an ethical principle. Again and again 
the point of Hesiod’s maxims is: let each thing subsist in itself, but if it must enter into relations 
                                                        
 
neighbors. Hesiod predicts that, during the terminal stages of the Iron Age, human society will degrade to the 
point that just, equivalent relations will be displaced by unjust relations between dissimilar terms (Op. 174-201). 
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with external terms (e.g., neighbors), let it commune with its equals as equivalent wholes. This 
idea appears in unexpected guises. At the beginning of the previous section, I discussed the 
centrality of verbal commands in Hesiod’s ethics; but I want to demonstrate here that there are 
modes of ethical direction in Works that consist not in linguistic meaning but in the patterns 
and rhythms of sensory experience. To convey a preliminary idea of how this works, it will be 
useful to consider the acoustic texture of the Erides passage. Commentators have noted its 
highly mannered use of polyptoton: κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, καὶ πτωχὸς 
πτωχῷ φθονέει.371 Each rival imitates the phonic contours of his rival, and their shared 
agonistic identity is inscribed in the very verb that denotes their rivalry (κερ/κερ/κοτ, 
πτωχ/πτωχ/φθον). Polyptoton features in a number of other contexts in which Hesiod advances 
ethical prescriptions concerning work or community: one should show friendship to friends and 
visit visitors (τὸν φιλέοντα φιλεῖν, καὶ τῷ προσιόντι προσεῖναι, 353); the labor power of larger 
families is itself larger (πλείων μὲν πλεόνων μελέτη, μείζων δ’ ἐπιθήκη, 380) and the key to 
productivity is to “work work upon work” (ἔργον ἐπ’ ἔργῳ ἐργάζεσθαι, 382). The acoustic 
texture of language redoubles its propositional content: each term resonates with itself, even 
as the proprietor is instructed to keep to his own erga or, if necessary, to commune with his 
equivalents. Sensory experience can become ethical in this way even when Hesiod is not 
himself issuing maxims: the call of the cuckoo bird repeats itself four times to signal the second-
best opportunity for plowing (κόκκυξ κοκκύζει, 486). The noisy, prelinguistic sēmata of the 
                                                        
 
371 On verbal echoing in Hesiod, see Katz 2013: 22-23, Watkins 1995: 30-31. See as well Canevaro 2015: 107 n. 77, 
who notes that there are other cases of polyptoton at Op. 25-26, 51-53, 182-83, 189, 353, 380, 382. Cf. Th. 380, 
742; Il. 13.130-31, 16.111, Od. 1.313, 7.120-21, 9.47, 10.82, 17.217. 
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natural world communicate the same ethics of self-identity that Hesiod expresses with linguistic 
propositions. 
What Hesiod locates here is a vast field of possibilities for appropriating sensory 
experience in the service of the regime of private property. The senses are made ethical not 
simply through the content that they apprehend but through the very form in which they are 
exercised (for instance, through the form of polyptoton). What is especially important for our 
purposes is the way in which Hesiod represents the proprietor gazing at the image of his rival. 
The description of the rival potters, builders, beggars, and bards immediately follows a striking 
scene that I discussed in the introduction. In it, a man without resources (ἀπάλαμόν) is driven 
by the good Eris to emulate his wealthier neighbor:  
εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τίς τε ἴδεν ἔργοιο χατίζων  
πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει μὲν ἀρώμεναι ἠδὲ φυτεύειν 
οἶκόν τ’ εὖ θέσθαι·      (Op. 21-23) 
 
for one person lacking work looks at another 
who is rich and who hastens to plow and to plant 
and to set his home in good order; 
 
This vignette exhibits two formal traits that promote an ethics of private production: 
 
(1) The poor farmer gazes at his rich neighbor from a distance. Under bad Eris, one or 
both of the neighbors would attempt to pass over the boundary between their estates and 
steal the other’s property, either literally or through legal fraud. Under good Eris, one contracts 
a desire for the other’s prosperity but then turns this desire back toward the productive 
apparatus of his own ergon. The very line of vision that connects the two farmers ethically—
that turns the image of one into an ethical directive for the other—also keeps them materially 
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separated and thereby preserves the integrity of their private erga. Hesiod uses the metaphor 
of “turning” (trepein) to describe the movement by which the farmer-spectator directs his 
attention away from his neighbor and back toward his own erga: 
εἰ δέ κεν ἐργάζῃ, τάχα σε ζηλώσει ἀεργὸς 
πλουτεῦντα: πλούτῳ δ’ ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ. 
δαίμονι δ’ οἷος ἔησθα, τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι ἄμεινον,  
εἴ κεν ἀπ’ ἀλλοτρίων κτεάνων ἀεσίφρονα θυμὸν 
ἐς ἔργον τρέψας μελετᾷς βίου, ὥς σε κελεύω.  (Op. 313-16) 
 
If you should work, the workless man will soon envy you 
when you are wealthy: honor and fame attend wealth. 
Whatever your lot in life, it is better to work, 
if you should turn your stupid mind away from the property of others 
and toward work, attending to your livelihood, as I bid you. 
 
Perses is himself one of these “workless” persons who gazes with envy at the wealth of his 
neighbors. In itself, this preoccupation is ethically neutral: of course, it is to be promoted if it 
inspires him to persist in his work, proscribed if it inspires him to acts of expropriation. The 
difference between these outcomes hinges on the comportment of the farmer’s thumos, the 
seat of his affective and appetitive drives. Just like the farmer who emulates his richer neighbor 
at 21-23, Perses should regard his neighbor’s property not as harpakta, “subject to 
expropriation” (320) but as an image that issues a directive back at him that echoes Hesiod’s 
own instructions: “attend to your own erga.”  
In this sense, verses 315-16 instruct the farmer in how to relate to his neighbors and to 
communal life at large through the mediation of images.372 What does it mean to treat an 
                                                        
 
372 One must avoid turning the vulnerable surfaces of the body toward harmful forces: μηδ’ ἄντ’ ἠελίου 
τετραμμένος ὀρθὸς ὀμιχεῖν / αὐτὰρ ἐπεί κε δύῃ, μεμνημένος, ἔς τ’ ἀνιόντα (“Don’t piss upright turned opposite 
the sun / but remember to do it when the sun sets and when it rises,” 727-28). In certain instances, it seems that 
this turn toward the self can be directed to an interior space of the psyche and the personal affects. But for the 
most part, Hesiod is not concerned with representing the person as a subjective interiority whose passions and 
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object as an image? It means to engage in a particular form of seeing that admits an irreducible 
distance between the object and the appearance of the object, and this distance is itself a 
matter of ethical concern. Consider the semantics of eidos in archaic Greek poetry. As an 
“image,” an eidos is distinct from the object that it outwardly represents and hence has the 
potential—not always realized—to be at variance with it. It is commonplace in the Iliad and 
Odyssey for a person to have a beautiful eidos but a cowardly or foolish character, or less often, 
to have an ugly eidos but a great facility of speech or intelligence.373 In Works, Hesiod advises 
that in social interactions “one must not let one’s mind belie one’s eidos” (σὲ δὲ μή τι νόος 
κατελεγχέτω εἶδος, 714); when the gods manufacture Pandora, she is given “the eidos of a 
virgin girl, beautiful and attractive” (παρθενικῆς καλὸν εἶδος ἐπήρατον, 63) but “the mind of a 
bitch and the ēthos of a thief” (ἐν δὲ θέμεν κύνεόν τε νόον καὶ ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος, 67). These are 
the only two cases of eidos in Works,374 but the use of images is also signaled explicitly by the 
                                                        
 
appetites need to be managed. (This was, according to Foucault’s famous account, a preoccupation of Classical and 
Hellenistic Greek ethics). The person is an object of ethical concern insofar as he is a vulnerable surface facing 
outwards, exposed to errant forces from the outside. There are material forces that drain the body of life—wind, 
cold, the heat of the sun—but also social relations of dependency, theft, and any kind of communal involvement 
that would sap away the individual’s strength and expropriate his property. A core project of Works is to develop 
shelters around this vulnerable subject. 
373 In battle scenes, soldiers are sometimes accused of cowardly conduct that belies their beauty: concerning Paris, 
Δύσπαρι εἶδος ἄριστε (Il. 3.39 = 13.769), καλὸν / εἶδος ἔπ’, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι βίη φρεσὶν οὐδέ τις ἀλκή (3.44-45); as a 
battle cry for the Achaeans, αἰδὼς Ἀργεῖοι κάκ’ ἐλέγχεα εἶδος ἀγητοί (5.787 = 8.228); concerning Hector, Ἕκτορ 
εἶδος ἄριστε μάχης ἄρα πολλὸν ἐδεύεο (17.142). Conversely, Odysseus’ awkward speaking posture belies his 
immense powers of speech (οὐ τότε γ’ ὧδ’ Ὀδυσῆος ἀγασσάμεθ’ εἶδος ἰδόντες, 3.224); Dolon’s ugliness belies his 
speed (ὃς δή τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός, ἀλλὰ ποδώκης, 10.316). Odysseus articulates this pattern explicitly during 
the festive games on Scheria: ἄλλος μὲν γὰρ εἶδος ἀκιδνότερος πέλει ἀνήρ, / ἀλλὰ θεὸς μορφὴν ἔπεσι στέφει (“for 
a man may be inferior in his eidos, but a god crowns his form with words,” Od. 8.169-70), whereas his opponent 
Euryalus has a beautiful eidos (σοὶ εἶδος μὲν ἀριπρεπές) but a crooked mind (νόον δ’ ἀποφώλιός ἐσσι, 174-77). 
Eumaeus laments that Telemachus has left Ithaca in search of his father (δέμας καὶ εἶδος ἀγητόν, / τὸν δέ τις 
ἀθανάτων βλάψε φρένας ἔνδον ἐΐσας, 14.177-78). Antinous’ wits do not match his eidos (οὐκ ἄρα σοί γ’ ἐπὶ εἴδεϊ 
καὶ φρένες ἦσαν, 17.454). See West 1978: 331. 
374 There are four cases of eidos in Theogony at 153, 259, 619, and 908; one in Scutum (5); and several dozen cases 
in the fragments, especially describing women’s appearances in the Catalogue of Women. 
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verb ὁράω and other verbs of seeing (as at Op. 21); in other cases the act of seeing is implicit.375 
There is a recurring concern that an ontological cleft might open up between a body’s image 
and its interior dispositions and intentions. The same kind of distinction is at work in the 
passages where Hesiod distinguishes between the ethically instructive appearance of “the 
property of others” and that same property as a good that one could (but should not) 
expropriate. Of course, the notion that there is a separation between appearance and reality is 
not unique to Hesiod; what is notable is that he affirms and exploits this separation in the 
service of the ethics of private property.  
In the passages examined above (21-23, 315-17), Hesiod describes how proprietors 
should regard one another as instructive images. But to treat another person not as a 
collaborator, patron, friend, enemy, or menace but as a lesson presupposes a substantial 
degree of alienation. The proprietors are already situated at a spatial and ethical distance from 
one another, held apart by the atomizing ēthos that Hesiod recommends to the private farmer. 
Once this separation is established, it allows proprietors to assume the vantage point of a 
spectator and to treat one another as distant images. By acting as ethical directives (“persist in 
your own work”) these images in turn reinforce the initial separation. Spectatorship thereby 
assumes a central role in this society. When the proprietor obtains a wife, for instance, he is 
supposed to take care that she has a good reputation:  
παρθενικὴν δὲ γαμεῖν, ὥς κ’ ἤθεα κεδνὰ διδάξῃς,  
τὴν δὲ μάλιστα γαμεῖν, ἥτις σέθεν ἐγγύθι ναίει 
πάντα μάλ’ ἀμφὶς ἰδών, μὴ γείτοσι χάρματα γήμῃς. (Op. 698-700) 
 
                                                        
 
375 Conversely, not every exercise of sight engages with the problem of images. There are purely instrumental, non-
ethical ways of seeing (for instance, the predatory gaze denoted by παπταίνειν). 
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Marry a virgin so that you may teach her good character, 
and in particular marry someone who lives near you, 
and look all around lest your marriage bring malicious joy to your neighbors. 
 
It is not surprising that the members of a village community should be anxious to guard their 
reputation, to appear respectable and scandal-free in the eyes of their neighbors. But the 
phrase πάντα μάλ’ ἀμφὶς ἰδών brilliantly condenses many of the idiosyncrasies of Hesiod’s 
spectatorial social order. If ἀμφὶς ἰδών means “looking around oneself [from a fixed vantage 
point]”376 we are supposed to imagine the proprietor situated in his oikos and gazing at the 
affects of his neighbors dwelling around him. The communal space of the village becomes a 
kind of circular stage on which the neighbors are at once separated and connected by lines of 
sight, each regulating his own oikos by gauging the image of his neighbor’s reactions to his own 
conduct. Other instances of kharma in early Greek poetry suggest that the prospect of 
becoming a source of joy to one’s enemies is particularly loathsome,377 but for Hesiod’s farmer 
it is vexing enough simply that a neighbor should experience more joy than oneself. To see a 
neighbor feeling a surplus of joy is like seeing a neighbor prospering (as at Op. 21-23): in both 
cases, the farmer responds by refocusing his attentions on “his own”—on his erga or his choice 
of bride. It may be that “looking around” is meant as a metaphor for a more concrete sort of 
inquiry (the prospective groom might inquire about his bride’s reputation at a feast or while 
visiting a friend), but the choice of metaphor matters. Hesiod chooses to represent communal 
                                                        
 
376 That is, the expression either means, “look around your neighbors” (where the looker circles around the 
neighbors, inspecting them) or “look around from your vantage point at your neighbors” (where the neighbors 
encircle the looker, who turns to observe each of them). There are examples of both usages in Homer, but the 
latter seems more probable here. See West 1978: 328.  
377 See West’s note on Op. 701 (1978: 328): “The idea of being laughed at or of giving unsympathetic persons cause 
for rejoicing is abominable to the Greek.” 
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inquiry as a distant visual inspection, one that allows the farmer to remain ensconced within his 
private enclosure without losing access to the community as a source of ethical direction. 
There are only a handful details in Works about how this imaginary mediation affects 
communal life as a whole, but they suggest that Hesiod’s use of images contributes to his 
overarching project of maintaining an ethical separation between proprietors and communal 
life. In this sense, Hesiod’s conception of society is a spiritual precursor to the modern “society 
of the spectacle.” The critical theorist Guy Debord (1994) argued that under late capitalism, 
subjects relate to social life through the mediation of a vast body of commodified images, 
exemplified by mass media, entertainment, and advertising. The essence of spectacle is 
separation: like Plato’s shadow-watching cave-dwellers, modern subjects are separated from a 
certain kind of reality—not a metaphysical reality of Ideas, but the reality of social production 
and domination. As passive receivers of a flood of images and representations, we cannot help 
but experience social life through an alienating mediation that conceals the reality of capitalist 
exploitation. It must be admitted that the magnitude of the capitalist spectacle dwarfs the 
relatively meagre cultural production of pre-capitalist societies like Hesiod’s. Hesiod belongs to 
a world that is not just materially poor but also “poor in images.”378 Because the images that 
proprietors experience are not commodities (they do not circulate in a market for visual media) 
or even representations, they must be produced by and for singular agents through singular 
acts of vision. One of the criticisms of Debord’s theory is that it construes spectatorship as 
                                                        
 
378 Jameson 2015 (15-16), referring to cultural production during the Baroque period, but also applicable to any 
period “before technical reproduction…[with] no radio, no newspapers, not even a bourgeoisie.”  
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intrinsically passive, as mere seeing rather than doing or acting.379 This concern does not apply 
to Hesiod’s use of imagery, because, unlike spectacle, it presupposes ethical agency: each 
proprietor must choose to separate himself from communal life through a deliberate program. 
But like Debordian spectacle, Hesiod’s images depend on a practice of alienated seeing that 
atomizes community into a collection of individual proprietors. 
 
(2) There is no indication that Hesiod imagines that his imperatives should be obeyed 
categorically, as intrinsic and invariable goods; rather, they are a means to deliver the 
proprietor into a secure and desirable form of life.380 So the ethical use of images, despite its 
ascetic foundations (“turn your mind back to your own work!”) is sweetened by a certain kind 
of affective enjoyment in the act of seeing. In contrast to the poor farmer, who “lacks ergon,” 
the image of his neighbor at Op. 21-23 is filled with activity and detail. In fewer than two verses, 
he “hastens,” “plows,” “plants,” and “sets in order” (ὃς σπεύδει μὲν ἀρώμεναι ἠδὲ φυτεύειν / 
οἶκόν τ’ εὖ θέσθαι, 21-22), where each step is discernible as an essential movement in the 
farming calendar (plowing in fall, planting in spring, household work in winter). It is as if Hesiod 
is trying to press words together until they attain the phenomenal density of an image.  
The image’s protreptic function is inseparable from its phenomenal form: the 
compactness and clarity of the visual description presents the farming life as a routinized cycle 
and elides the precariousness that features so centrally in Hesiod’s own pessimistic reckoning 
                                                        
 
379 Rancière 2009a: 6-7. 
380 Hesiod’s pragmatism is neatly summarized in the parable of the difficult road and the easy road (286-92): the 
difficult road is better because it ultimately leads to prosperity, whereas the easy road leads to ruin (kakotēs). See 
Verdenius 1985: 149-51. 
 195 
of the human condition. His persona is committed to a brand of realism that expresses the hard 
“truths” of Iron Age life (ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην, 10). Bad weather, disease, and theft can ruin 
even the most scrupulous of farmers. Thus Hesiod never asserts that the poor neighbor’s 
perception of the rich neighbor’s stable existence is accurate or that the latter can actually be 
attained. In this image, it does not even seem to matter that the neighbor is rich (where are the 
accoutrements of wealth, his khrēmata, his kudos?), only that the life he is living is routinized 
and therefore normal.  
But the very fantasy of such a life, rendered palpable in the form of an image, is 
precisely the kind of encouragement suited to someone struggling to live in a precarious and 
crisis-prone economic order. Lauren Berlant has theorized how a “feeling of normalcy” shapes 
the ethical and political outlook of subjects in contemporary neoliberal societies: 
It’s a feeling of aspirational normalcy, the desire to feel normal, and to feel 
normalcy as the ground of a dependable life … That feeling does not require any 
particular forms of living to stimulate it; nor does it depend on the flourishing of 
the forms of living to which it attaches. Optimism attaches to their mere existence 
(2011: 170) 
 
Berlant’s formulation is part of an effort to understand why, despite decades of mounting 
inequality, joblessness, and financial crises, contemporary capitalism faces little organized 
political opposition. She traces the impasse to a pervasive attachment to the promise of 
security that capitalism offers, even if it cannot deliver on this promise. This is precisely the 
paradox at the heart of Hesiod’s discourse, which combines a pessimistic acknowledgement 
that the current order of things is terminally broken with an optimistic commitment to that 
same order and to the fragile feeling of normalcy that it represents. The image of a routinized 
life offers a sense of affective security that allows the Hesiodic subject to persevere in an 
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uncertain livelihood. In this respect, “good Eris” does not personify envy at the flourishing of 
rivals or a desire “to be the best” but a more modest aspiration “to feel normal,” to emulate 
the stable life evinced by the image of one’s neighbor.381 
This feeling has as much to do with the exercise of sight as with the object that sight 
discerns. As the wealthy farmer flies effortlessly through his erga, everything that he does is 
available to the gaze of his neighbor, who catches each act and composes it into an image. Even 
if one cannot actually live a normal life, one can at least assume the position of a spectator 
whose powers of ethical evaluation can discern what a normal life would look like. In effect, 
there is a feeling of normalcy in the act of seeing and evaluating that reflects, on the side of 
aisthēsis, the normalcy of the neighbor’s ideal praxis.382 This claim becomes more plausible if 
we consider another instance in which distant spectators gaze eagerly at the form of life of 
communities and private individuals. At 267-69, Zeus’ all-seeing eye inspects the ethical 
character of a city and its inhabitants:  
πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας  
καί νυ τάδ’, αἴ κ’ ἐθέλῃσ’, ἐπιδέρκεται, οὐδέ ἑ λήθει 
οἵην δὴ καὶ τήνδε δίκην πόλις ἐντὸς ἐέργει.  (Op. 267-69) 
 
The eye of Zeus sees everything and knows everything 
and if he wishes can even look into this: it does not escape his  
notice 
what kind of justice a city encloses within itself. 
 
                                                        
 
381 Works is not entirely consistent on this point. On the ambiguous valences of Good Eris, see Gagarin 1990 and 
Nagler 1992. 
382 Stylistically, the description of the prosperous neighbor belongs with other utopian images in Works that 
compile a dense sequence of successful activities: the flourishing city (227-39), or the account of the golden age 
(109-26). 
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The proem of Works celebrates the omnipotence of Zeus, his power to elevate or ruin mortals 
at a whim (1-10); here this supremacy is realized in the power of vision.383 It is significant that in 
this unique description of his omniscient gaze, Zeus is scrutinizing the ēthos of the city: he 
wants to know whether the inhabitants respect the juridical customs that safeguard private 
property or if they allow property to be expropriated by communal violence. In this respect, he 
is exercising the same kind of gaze that the poor farmer directs at his rich neighbor (21-23) and 
that is directed at the prospective groom by his neighbors (698-700): in both cases, as we have 
seen, spectators discern the ēthos of their neighbors as a visual object. This gaze involves an 
evaluative and normative dimension, which is emphasized in the case of Zeus by the pairing of 
ἰδὼν with νοήσας.  
What I want to suggest is that the very act of visual evaluation produces a pleasurable 
“feeling of normalcy.” The description of Zeus is a model for this: Hesiod’s account takes special 
interest in the fact that, in order to access this exhaustively detailed image (πάντα ἰδὼν), Zeus 
peers into the hidden space of the city, beyond its external enclosure (ἐέργει), and discerns the 
form of its dikē. One may detect a note of voyeurism here, especially because dikē is often 
personified in Works as a virgin goddess,384 and in Op. 256 it appears that she is raped by civic 
leaders who pervert their city’s themistes.385 Zeus is ultimately a supporter of Dike, but his own 
                                                        
 
383 See West’s (1978: 223-24) extensive note on the theme of “all-seeing Zeus.” Zeus is also said to have “thrice 
ten-thousand” spies observing the deeds of mortals (252-53). 
384 See Gagarin 1973: 89, “in several of these cases Hesiod clearly personifies and deifies Δίκη either partially (9, 
219, 217, 275) or fully (220, 256; cf. Theog. 902).” She is described as a virgin at 256 (παρθένος ἐστὶ Δίκη). 
385 See Verdenius 1985: 128. The passage is ambiguous: τῆς δὲ Δίκης ῥόθος ἑλκομένης ᾗ κ’ ἄνδρες ἄγωσι / 
δωροφάγοι, σκολιῇς δὲ δίκῃς κρίνωσι θέμιστας (“there is an uproar when Dike is dragged where men lead her 
away, gift-eaters, and they issue judgments with crooked justice,” 220-21). Verdenius compares the language to 
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proclivity for dragging away virgin women and goddesses aligns him and his voyeuristic gaze 
with the sexual outrage of Dike’s violators.386 But in place of committing such a violation 
himself, Zeus reinvests his libidinal drives in an act of ethical seeing and evaluating. If any god 
projects a feeling of normalcy, an affective investment in the prevailing order of things, it is 
Zeus. Just as Zeus’ kingship provides a model for mortal rulers, so his exemplary powers of 
ethical evaluation—with the complex mix of affects that it involves—can be exercised to a 
lesser degree by middling proprietors. We will encounter such a case of ethical voyeurism on a 
human scale later on at Op. 519-525. 
This enjoyment in ethical images depends on a factor discussed in the previous section: 
the distance that Hesiod recommends between proprietors and their community. Zeus only 
gazes, from his sublimely distant vantage point, at the figure of Dike contained within the city; 
by contrast the wicked men who assault her transgress the minimal distance that should 
separate members of a community. The whole ethical order that Hesiod advances as the basis 
of human prosperity can exist only on the condition that this separation is maintained. The 
image, then, supports a way of seeing, an aesthetic regime, that complements the ethics of 
private production.  
                                                        
 
passages in which women are dragged off as spoils of war, which certainly implies sexual violence (Il. 6.465, 22.62 
and 65), and at Od. 11.580, where ἕλκειν is used of the attempted rape of Leto by Tityus. 
386 The semantics of eidos are illuminating here as well. An eidos is apprehended with sight (εἶδον) and traced with 
the eyes; hence it is never used in archaic poetry to denote an abstract shape (independent of visible bodies) or a 
vague impression taken in with a glance. The image is clear and its contours are distinct because the eyes have 
time to evaluate its details, to comprehend it as a whole, and to subsume it under a cognitive category. In this 
sense the archaic usage anticipates the Platonic doctrine of eidos and idea as ideal forms “visible” to the intellect. 
This is why the source of an eidos is often stationary—in extreme cases, a dead body: the Achaeans gaze with 
wonder at the eidos of Hector’s fresh corpse (οἳ καὶ θηήσαντο φυὴν καὶ εἶδος ἀγητὸν, 22.370). 
 199 
To anticipate how I develop this reading in the next section, it may be useful to compare 
it with a modern counterpart. Terry Eagleton has argued that the development of “aesthetics” 
as a philosophical and academic discourse was motivated by the rise of the bourgeoisie and 
their capitalistic ethics during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.387 In Kant’s canonical 
formulation, aesthetic judgments are supposed to be universally valid—in principle, everyone 
should find the same phenomena beautiful or sublime—but this validity cannot be related to 
any definite rule. There is no way to define in advance what will or will not inspire a properly 
aesthetic response. This conception of aesthetics reflects and reinforces the arrangement of 
bourgeois capitalism: a new laissez-faire market society that could flourish spontaneously 
without the imposition of “rules,” of external, statist controls. I have tried to reconstruct a 
comparable link between the ēthos of the landed proprietors in Works and their forms of visual 
perception. But for Eagleton, crucially, the imbrication between bourgeois ideology and 
aesthetics is not exhaustive: there is a utopian strain in aesthetic thought that looks beyond the 
narrow class interests that gave rise to it.388 Aesthetics delimits a field of sensuous experiences 
that are valuable in their own right and which every human—simply by virtue of being human—
can enjoy. It thus provides a utopian model for human life liberated from external authority and 
instrumentality. I argue in the next section that there is a similar utopian moment in Hesiod’s 
use of images. The practice of ethical seeing can look beyond the narrow confines of the 
propertied agrarian interests that initially motivate it. 
                                                        
 
387 Eagleton 1990. 
388 “The aesthetic is at once…the very secret prototype of human subjectivity in early capitalist society, and a vision 
of human energies as radical ends in themselves which is the implacable enemy of all dominative or 
instrumentalist thought” (Eagleton 1990: 9). 
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The Aesthetics of Poverty 
 The ethical maxim “attend to work!” seems to have a universal address. It seems that 
everyone, at least in principle, can practice an ergon, and hence that everyone can benefit from 
Hesiod’s program. But what does it mean to work? It does not mean simply to “labor” in pursuit 
of a livelihood.389 What in a capitalist society are known as “labor,” “capital,” and “land” are 
practically and conceptually inseparable in the world of Hesiod’s texts; their intersection is 
designated by ergon.390 One cannot labor (ergazesthai) to produce capital (ergon) without 
agricultural land (ergon). Not everyone, then, can “work”: the addressees interpolated by 
Hesiod’s imperative—ergazesthai!—must already belong to the propertied, land-owning class 
who possess the erga required to practice ergon. 
It is paradoxical, if not surprising, that although Works aspires to represent the universal 
human condition from its beginnings to its Iron Age nadir, the text’s ethical discourse addresses 
only a restricted class of economic actors. Below the propertied farmers, there are classes of 
people who do not possess the minimal qualifications to benefit from Hesiod’s ethics of private 
                                                        
 
389 J.-P. Vernant claimed that there was no notion of “labor” as such in archaic Greece, or indeed, in any pre-
capitalist society (2006: 275-98), because labor comes into existence only once there is a class of people—the 
proletariat—who do not possess any property of their own and who therefore must sell their productive power on 
a market in order to survive. Before this development, which is unique to capitalism, “labor” was inextricably 
embedded in social institutions that are not exclusively economic (the household, for instance). His argument 
follows the Marxian account of the development of the commodity form of labor. 
390 On the related notion of “embedded economy,” see Donlan 1982, who examines economic reciprocity in 
Homer (“Economic relations are a basic factor in the structure of all societies; in simple (i.e. pre-state) societies 
they have a correspondingly greater determining role in the formation, function, and interactions of other 
institutions. Accordingly, we cannot speak of the ‘economy’ as something separate from the social, political, 
religious, moral and attitudinal elements of early societies, since economic relations are indivisibly part of the total 
cultural pattern,” 139). 
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work. The household slaves and wage-laborers whom the proprietor manages on a daily basis 
cannot properly be said to work (ergazesthai) but only to perform specific manual tasks. Even 
though these figures are not addressed directly by Hesiod’s discourse, they are fully accounted 
for as cogs in its economic machinery. There is a hierarchy of ethical instruction that links 
together each stratum in this inegalitarian social order: Zeus and the Muses instruct Hesiod, 
Hesiod instructs the independent proprietors, and the proprietors in turn instruct their slaves 
and hirelings.391 Even the beggars, whom Hesiod otherwise regards as unproductive and 
parasitic, are included in the litany of demioergoi who strive against their competitors in the 
spirit of good Eris (πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει, 26). In their own way, beggars are professionals 
whose place in the social order is determined by their lack of property just as the farmers’ place 
is determined by their possession of it. The social world is divided up into determinate spaces 
and roles organized around the work of a particular class. 
 Against this stratified and privatized conception of society, Hesiod opposes the errant 
mingling of the community. In the thōkos, leskhē, and agorē, as we have seen, individuals enter 
into risky proximity with one another through chatter, lawsuits, and idleness; the boundaries 
that protect private erga from communal expropriation are habitually transgressed. In spaces 
like these, the imperative to work (ergazesthai) is inoperative. Hesiod does his utmost to 
repudiate these spaces because they represent, within the world of propertied farmers and 
private production, a rival form of life. I want to argue that Hesiod is not content simply to 
repudiate his rival. Beyond the narrow scope of its ethical address, his discourse sometimes 
                                                        
 
391 On the last step, the instruction that proprietors direct at their slaves and hirelings, see pp. 175-76. 
 202 
assumes a far more capacious attitude toward the world that humans inhabit and the possible 
configurations of human life.392 It is in this spirit that Hesiod runs a kind of thought experiment. 
What if the premises behind this communitarian alternative were provisionally accepted as 
true? What if a form life were imagined in which ergon—the “work” and the “works” made 
possible by the regime of private property—is a matter of indifference? Worklessness creates 
an opening in which the text can articulate, very provisionally, an ethics and aesthetics 
uncoupled from the parochial objectives of the class of propertied farmers. 
The most sustained effort to this effect appears in the “winter section” (493-563), the 
second season in Hesiod’s farming calendar. Nineteenth-century editors generally considered 
the section to be an interpolation because it seems to break from the didactic project of the 
surrounding poem.393 The winter section is richly descriptive but offers few concrete 
instructions. As Stephanie Nelson remarks, “the description stands out as exceptional among 
Hesiod’s vignettes. It occupies nearly a fourth of the farming section, ranges over the whole 
extent of the farmer’s world, and gives us nothing to do” (1998: 55). The reason for this is clear 
enough: it is almost impossible to obey the imperative to work when the North wind is scouring 
the landscape and bare survival is a greater concern than economic productivity.394 The club 
house and the market are always places of idleness, but during the winter, the entire space 
beyond the walls of the oikos becomes workless.  
                                                        
 
392 This is especially true, as we will see, in the winter section and in the myth of the ages of man. 
393 See Marsilio 1997: 411-12; Canevaro 2015: 73-76. 
394 There is a brief period in the middle of the summer when idleness is permitted (582-96), but it is sandwiched 
between two periods of work (see Canevaro 2015: 76-77). 
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Within this icy, inactive world, we encounter a series of enigmatic figures afflicted by 
hunger and cold: the impoverished man whose limbs are at once shriveled and swollen (496-
99), the “boneless one” who gnaws his foot in his fireless abode (524-26), and the shivering old 
man who walks on three feet (533-35). The most obvious way of interpreting these images of 
hardship is to suppose that they represent a negative exemplum for the Hesiodic proprietor: 
one must persist in work or risk economic and corporeal destitution. But the winter section is 
not a gallery of horrors; it is celebrated by commentators as the most aesthetically appealing 
passage in Works.395 Bodies assume new forms and take on new relations to their environment 
that cannot be easily assimilated to the ethical imaginary that dominates the other sections of 
Works. The aesthetic details in the section, I argue, intimate what it would look like if human 
life were not determined by the socioeconomic order organized around ergon.  
I am using the term “aesthetic” in a very restricted sense. In his canonical account of 
aesthetic judgments, Kant argued that most of our sensory experiences are keyed in to a 
system of cognitive and practical habits: our raw phenomenal inputs are processed into objects 
according to concepts and reason, and we experience pleasure or pain depending on whether 
these objects seem to help or hinder our desires.396 The senses have a determinate function—
an ergon—in the architecture of our subjectivity. But aesthetic judgments are distinctive 
because, in various ways, they result from the discoordination between sensory experience and 
                                                        
 
395 Marsilio (1997: 411) remarks that “one of the most admired passages in the Hesiodic corpus is the poet’s lush 
description of the winter season.” West (1978: 54) refers to its “succession of highly poetic pictures.” Heath (1985: 
255) admires the “long and lovely description of the mid-winter cold and its effects.” 
396 See Kant 1987 and Crowther 1989. 
 
 204 
the rest of our cognitive apparatus. This kind of aesthetics happens when sensory experience 
does not serve its allotted function. So in the case of Hesiod, the phenomena depicted in the 
winter section are “aesthetic” precisely to the extent that they do not contribute to the ethical 
apparatus that Hesiod constructs to support ergon. Because the function of these phenomena 
is so puzzling and undefined, they require us as readers to look beyond the confines of Hesiod’s 
ethical order. Why would this text exhibit an alternative vision of a world in which its own 
powers of ethical evaluation reach an impasse? I will return to this question in the conclusion, 
but for now it suffices to assert that there is, improbably enough, a utopian aspiration in Works; 
in a number of moments, almost in spite of himself, Hesiod imagines a version of the world in 
which work and the structures of inequality that support work are suspended.  
The first scene in the winter section opens with the advice to “pass by” the thōkos and 
leskhē, which we examined above.  
Πὰρ δ’ ἴθι χάλκειον θῶκον καὶ ἐπαλέα λέσχην 
ὥρῃ χειμερίῃ, ὁπότε κρύος ἀνέρα ἔργων 
ἰσχάνει, ἔνθα κ’ ἄοκνος ἀνὴρ μέγα οἶκον ὀφέλλοι, 
μή σε κακοῦ χειμῶνος ἀμηχανίη καταμάρψῃ 
σὺν πενίῃ, λεπτῇ δὲ παχὺν πόδα χειρὶ πιέζῃς. 
πολλὰ δ’ ἀεργὸς ἀνήρ, κενεὴν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδα μίμνων, 
χρηίζων βιότοιο, κακὰ προσελέξατο θυμῷ. 
ἐλπὶς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένον ἄνδρα κομίζει, 
ἥμενον ἐν λέσχῃ, τῷ μὴ βίος ἄρκιος εἴη.   (Op. 493-501) 
 
Pass by the bronze-smith’s club and the cozy meeting hall 
in the winter season, when cold checks a man from his works, 
when the resolute man should be greatly concerned with his oikos, 
lest the helplessness of bad winter overtake you 
with poverty, and you squeeze your swollen foot with spindly hand. 
The workless man who lingers on his empty hope, 
lacking livelihood, ponders many evils in his mind. 
The hope is not good that attends the impoverished man, 
whose livelihood is insufficient while he sits idly in the meeting hall.  
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Hesiod suggests that there is still work to be done during the winter, but he never specifies 
what this might consist in.397 Perhaps he cannot: during the winter, “work” in the ordinary 
sense is stymied because of the wind and cold (ὁπότε κρύος ἀνέρα ἔργων / ἰσχάνει, 494-95). At 
554, the farmer is told to finish his work hastily and return home in order to avoid sudden 
winter storms (τὸν φθάμενος ἔργον τελέσας οἶκόνδε νέεσθαι). Survival becomes more 
important than production. But Hesiod is still committed to the ethics of work precisely 
because, as I discussed earlier, the absence of work is not an empty negation but a form of life 
in its own right closely associated with community (in its pejorative sense). This explains 
Hesiod’s almost gratuitous opposition to the communal space of the clubhouse, which is simply 
a warm shelter to be enjoyed at a time when there is essentially no work to be done. 
The most striking detail of this passage is the image of the man afflicted by the 
deprivations of winter. The association between swollen feet and starvation is well attested in 
Classical sources.398 But the juxtaposition of the swollen feet and emaciated hand is harder to 
explain, as is the act of “pressing” (πιέζῃς) the afflicted foot. An instance of piezein in the 
Odyssey makes a revealing comparandum. During the nostos that he relates to Telemachus, 
Menelaus tricks the sea god Proteus into helping him return home. The plan, formulated by 
Eidothea, famously involves seizing Proteus and holding him fast even as the god 
metamorphoses into various animate and inanimate forms—he becomes a lion, snake, panther, 
boar, water, and tree (Od. 4.455-58). Menelaus is told to “press” the god until he returns to his 
                                                        
 
397 See Nelson (1998: 55), referring to 493-503: “above all, what Hesiod’s transitional paragraph does is to make us 
uncomfortable. We are told to work, but we are not told what we can do.” West 1978: 283 notices this as well. 
398 See West 1978: 284. 
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neutral form (μᾶλλόν τε πιέζειν, 419). Pressing is meant to check Proteus’ morphological 
errancy, his power to jettison any particular form and become a shifting, indeterminate 
material. This case graphically illustrates a more abstract function for piezein: it can designate 
an effort to forestall the abandonment of one shape, one form of life, for another. At another 
point in Odyssey 4, Menelaus recounts how Odysseus, hidden in the Trojan horse, once pressed 
(piezein) one of his comrades to prevent him from calling in response to the phantom voice of 
his wife. By pressing, Odysseus attempts to inhibit a change in his comrade’s ēthos from that a 
warrior to that of a husband.399 
When the poor man presses his foot, he is perhaps attempting in vain to suppress his 
physical metamorphosis into something inhuman as well as his ethical metamorphosis into 
something alien to the ēthos of propertied farmers. The severity of the transformation is 
emphasized by the close proximity between λεπτῇ and παχὺν.400 We will see that as the winter 
progresses, this figure resembles another, even more enigmatic figure who “gnaws on his foot” 
like an octopus or cuttlefish. The poor man’s misshapen limbs are the first term in an 
intensifying sequence of protean resemblances that destabilize the boundary between humans 
and animals. The physical metamorphosis into something inhuman hints at an ethical 
metamorphosis into something alien to the ēthos of propertied farmers. When Hesiod directs 
his audience’s attention at the impoverished man’s foot and hand, then, he seems to be 
employing the same kind of ethical gaze exchanged between neighbors, but now with a 
                                                        
 
399 There is another example at Od. 12.164, when Odysseus encounters the Sirens. He instructs his comrades to 
“squeeze him with more bonds” (πλεόνεσσι τότ’ ἐν δεσμοῖσι πιέζειν) to prevent him from abandoning his role as 
sailor and captain and becoming a fatally enraptured aesthete.  
400 West (1978: 283) remarks: “a clever arrangement of contrasted words.” 
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negative force: “attend to your work—or else!” But in the very strangeness and obscurity of the 
image, there is also a sense that something is being presented here in excess of negative 
exemplarity, a sense that only becomes more certain as the section progresses. It is as if the 
impoverished figure is metamorphosing into a being whose form of life is so alien that we do 
not know how to evaluate it ethically.  
During the milder seasons, when the regime of work is in full force, Hesiod promotes an 
economics of private household production and a politics—or an anti-politics—that maintains a 
separation between the proprietor and his community. But in the winter section, when work is 
suspended, it becomes apparent that Hesiod’s ethics does not necessarily coincide with 
agrarian political economy; it can address a broader range of problems concerning the 
maintenance of human life and subjectivity. The farmer protects his economic resources from 
expropriation by turning inward to his private holdings, and the same movement of separation 
protects his body from the elemental forces of nature. Hesiod lingers for fifty verses on 
strategies for warding off the winter’s intense wind and cold (504-53). The wind that 
inaugurates winter is Boreas:  
Μῆνα δὲ Ληναιῶνα, κάκ’ ἤματα, βουδόρα πάντα,  
τοῦτον ἀλεύασθαι καὶ πηγάδας, αἵ τ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν 
πνεύσαντος Βορέαο δυσηλεγέες τελέθουσιν,  
ὅς τε διὰ Θρῄκης ἱπποτρόφου εὐρέι πόντῳ  
ἐμπνεύσας ὤρινε, μέμυκε δὲ γαῖα καὶ ὕλη· 
πολλὰς δὲ δρῦς ὑψικόμους ἐλάτας τε παχείας 
οὔρεος ἐν βήσσῃς πιλνᾷ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ 
ἐμπίπτων, καὶ πᾶσα βοᾷ τότε νήριτος ὕλη· 
θῆρες δὲ φρίσσουσ’, οὐρὰς δ’ ὑπὸ μέζε’ ἔθεντο· 
τῶν καὶ λάχνῃ δέρμα κατάσκιον· ἀλλά νυ καὶ τῶν 
ψυχρὸς ἐὼν διάησι δασυστέρνων περ ἐόντων· 
καί τε διὰ ῥινοῦ βοὸς ἔρχεται οὐδέ μιν ἴσχει, 
καί τε δι’ αἶγα ἄησι τανύτριχα· πώεα δ’ οὔτι, 
οὕνεκ’ ἐπηεταναὶ τρίχες αὐτῶν, οὐ διάησι  
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ἲς ἀνέμου Βορέω·      (Op. 504-18) 
 
The month of Lenaion, evil days, all bull-flaying— 
avoid it and the frosts that flourish, ruthless 
upon the earth when Boreas blows, who stirs and blows 
through horse-rearing Thrace on the wide sea, 
and earth and forests groan; 
Many oaks with lofty foliage and thick firs 
it brings near the nourishing earth in the mountain glens 
and falls upon them, and all the infinite woodland roars; 
beasts shiver and tuck their tail between their legs, 
even those whose skin is shadowed by wool; but now 
the wind—it is so cold—blows through them too 
though they are very shaggy;  
it even passes through the hide of an ox, which does not check it, 
and it blows through the fine-furred goat; but not sheep— 
because their fur is so abundant, the force of the wind Boreas 
does not blow through them. 
 
The winds traverse vast spaces between human settlements; they afflict everyone, humans and 
animals alike. In a word, the winds are common. With their deterritorializing power, they 
actively break down the barriers (skin, wool, clothes) that shield individual bodies from the 
space around them. Diseases are depicted in similar terms, as autonomous powers that 
permeate the expanses of the earth and sea: 
ἄλλα δὲ μυρία λυγρὰ κατ’ ἀνθρώπους ἀλάληται· 
πλείη μὲν γὰρ γαῖα κακῶν, πλείη δὲ θάλασσα·  
νοῦσοι δ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐφ’ ἡμέρῃ, αἳ δ’ ἐπὶ νυκτὶ 
αὐτόματοι φοιτῶσι κακὰ θνητοῖσι φέρουσαι 
σιγῇ, ἐπεὶ φωνὴν ἐξείλετο μητίετα Ζεύς.   (Op. 100-4) 
 
Thousands of other woes wander among humans; 
for the earth is full of evils, and the sea is full of them; 
in the day and at night, diseases circulate among humans, 
automatically, bringing evils to mortals 
silently, since wise Zeus stole their voice. 
 
Winds and diseases belong to the same “outside” as litigation and idle talk, but magnified on a 
sublime scale. Human communities belong to a community of nature: on both scales, the 
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private subject is exposed to powers that belong to no one and that threaten to expropriate his 
belongings and his life. The only way to ward off these powers is to turn inward and to separate 
oneself from common spaces.401 But during the winter, it becomes difficult to carve out a 
private space separated from the commons, because the latter has expanded to encompass the 
totality of nature. The domain of the private thus contracts to the boundaries of the 
proprietor’s house and body, and the latter only when insulated by an expertly woven cloak: 
verses 536-46 relate how to manufacture a “protection for the body” (ἔρυμα χροός, 536) 
against wind and rain that can imitate the wooly coats of animals (512-18). But there is a limit 
to these techniques, and the farmer is advised to curtail his work outdoors to avoid sudden 
storms that render even the most water-resistant coverings useless. 
Hesiod was one of the earliest practitioners of the sublime in antiquity, a literary and 
rhetorical tradition that depicts, among other things, the enormous magnitudes and energies of 
nature that dwarf the finite existence of humans.402 We have seen how Hesiod’s aesthetics is 
insistently concerned with ēthos, the spatial and practical dimensions of human life. The effect 
of the sublime phenomena in the winter section, then, is to diminish the private individual’s 
pretensions to have insulated himself and his own from “the outside.” As the private sphere is 
                                                        
 
401 Jenny Strauss Clay observes that the spatial dimensions of Works and Days gradually contract over the course of 
the poem. The first section deals with just forms of community, with life in the polis; the second with farming and 
the management of the oikos; and the final section turns to superstitious injunctions regarding the hygiene and 
integrity of the body. “Spatially too there is a narrowing of horizons from the city to the oikos to the human body 
viewed from its lowliest physiological needs, which brings the work to a close on a far more pessimistic note” (Clay 
2003: 48). 
402 See Porter 2016: 412, 452 on the material sublime in Theogony. 
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infringed upon and forced to retreat in the face of these common deprivations, we attain a 
fleeting perspective on nature that composes all human lives in a single space. 
οὐ γάρ οἱ ἠέλιος δείκνυ νομὸν ὁρμηθῆναι, 
ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ κυανέων ἀνδρῶν δῆμόν τε πόλιν τε 
στρωφᾶται, βράδιον δὲ Πανελλήνεσσι φαείνει.  (Op. 526-28) 
 
For the sun does not show [the boneless one] pasture for  
venturing into, but it turns over the land and the city of the dark men, 
and it shines later on all the Hellenes. 
 
The text’s perspective suddenly zooms back from the miserable locality of Ascra and fixes on 
the community of the Hellenes, which is in turn part of a planetary community, “everything 
under the sun.” The movement of the sun away from Hellas at once deprives the whole region 
of agricultural ergon and also reveals the aesthetic unity of humankind under the variable 
illumination of a single celestial body. It is significant that the “dark men”403 belong to a dēmos 
and polis: they are envisioned as part of a political community whose institutions and habits are 
left unspecified. 
Beyond the community of humans, the winter section reveals the common ethical life of 
humans and animals. Lilah Canevaro neatly summarizes this dynamic: 
That man and beast are in it together is emphasized by thematic shifts from 
animals to people and back again, by a simile at 533-5 which likens the beast of 
the forest to a man with a stick, by the common vocabulary used to describe them 
(516 τανύτριχα, 517 τρίχες, 539 τρίχες), by the explicit link between the two at 
558, and by the balancing of their rations at 559-60. (2015: 75) 
 
We could add that what unites humans and animals in this passage is not simply their common 
vulnerability to winter, but the fact that, in a more positive sense, all life must grapple with the 
                                                        
 
403 Perhaps Ethiopians; for interpretations see West 1978: 292. 
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xunon kakon of winter using the same techniques of bodily insulation and sheltering. Our ēthos 
becomes indiscernible from that of animals. This is the essential movement of the winter 
section: the suspension of work and the diminution of the private sphere open up a broader 
aesthetic conception of human and natural community. Within this community, the form of life 
employed by agrarian proprietors—and by humans in general—appears as merely one ēthos in 
a world of possible ēthea that are equally equipped to endure the violence of nature.404  
Immediately after the account of the sublimity of winter weather, Hesiod shifts to the 
image of a virgin girl in a warm home, juxtaposed opaquely with a cold home inhabited by “the 
boneless one”: 
καὶ διὰ παρθενικῆς ἁπαλόχροος οὐ διάησιν, 
ἥ τε δόμων ἔντοσθε φίλῃ παρὰ μητέρι μίμνει, 
οὔπω ἔργα ἰδυῖα πολυχρύσου Ἀφροδίτης, 
εὖ τε λοεσσαμένη τέρενα χρόα καὶ λίπ’ ἐλαίῳ 
                                                        
 
404 Hesiod’s description of winter weather culminates in an impressive sequence at 548-53. The passage is 
sandwiched between two descriptions of the impossibility of work: the farmer is assailed by Boreas (546-47) and 
instructed to finish his labors and return home (554). But the cessation of work frames a sublime apparition in 
which cloud, mist, and moisture levitate over the surface of the earth:  
ἠῷος δ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἀπ’ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος 
ἀὴρ πυροφόροις τέταται μακάρων ἐπὶ ἔργοις,  
ὅς τε ἀρυσσάμενος ποταμῶν ἀπὸ αἰεναόντων, 
ὑψοῦ ὑπὲρ γαίης ἀρθεὶς ἀνέμοιο θυέλλῃ, 
ἄλλοτε μέν θ’ ὕει ποτὶ ἕσπερον, ἄλλοτ’ ἄησι, 
πυκνὰ Θρηικίου Βορέω νέφεα κλονέοντος.  (548-53) 
 
At dawn upon the earth, from starry skies, 
There is spread over the wheat-bearing erga of fortunate [mortals] a mist 
Drawn from the ever-flowing rivers, 
Lifted high above the earth by gusts of wind; 
Sometimes it rains at dusk, other times it becomes windy, 
When Thracian Boreas sets to flight dense clouds. 
 
The material forces that make ergon impossible at the same time draw a common surface over the disparate erga 
(farmsteads) of private farmers (τέταται μακάρων ἐπὶ ἔργοις). It is the apparition of the utopian possibility that 
humans could be composed into a community with one another and with nature, a possibility that becomes 
available upon the suspension of work. But this unity is as delicate and fleeting as mist, and its effects are 
ambivalent—an enthralling image but a cold presence that harbors dangerous winds. 
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χρισαμένη μυχίη καταλέξεται ἔνδοθι οἴκου, 
ἤματι χειμερίῳ, ὅτ’ ἀνόστεος ὃν πόδα τένδει 
ἔν τ’ ἀπύρῳ οἴκῳ καὶ ἤθεσι λευγαλέοισιν·   (Op. 519-25) 
 
And Boreas does not blow through the soft-skinned virgin girl 
who stays within her home beside her mother 
not yet knowing the erga of very golden Aphrodite, 
and washed about her tender skin and anointed  
with olive oil reclines in the depths of her oikos 
on a winter day, when the boneless one gnaws his foot 
in a fireless home and in woeful abodes. 
 
This scene belongs with other images in the regime of private property that we examined in the 
previous section: the virgin girl is one of the proprietor’s “own,” along with the land, capital, 
slaves, and women that fall under his patriarchal command. As an image, the virgin is seen from 
a distance, or at least, seen by the immaterial presence of the narrator’s eye; she has not yet 
been appropriated sexually, but her image, like other ethical images, is appropriated as an 
emblem of the desirability of the prevailing property regime. Just as the eye of Zeus peers into 
the interior of the city and discerns the image of its feminized Justice (267-69, see pp. 197-98), 
so the poet’s eye peers into the inmost recesses of the home and discerns the image of the 
virgin girl. Not even the wind can pass through the walls of the house or through the skin of the 
maiden, but the penetrating gaze of the poet-voyeur can touch everything. 
In a limited sense, the global suspension of work during the winter is mirrored within 
the oikos. The girl is said to be “not yet experienced in the works of Aphrodite” (οὔπω ἔργα 
ἰδυῖα…Ἀφροδίτης, 521). Just like the farmers who cannot practice their agricultural ergon, she 
is unemployed in the ergon of sexual production assigned to women in Works. But her 
unemployment belongs to a different temporal cycle that happens to coincide with the cycle of 
the seasons: “not yet” suggests the imminence of her sexual maturity, which would progress in 
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tandem with the turning of the seasons and the return of agricultural productivity. The interior 
of the oikos is kind of time capsule, a vessel in which the image of private property is forever 
clear, distinct, and alluring even as the rest of the world becomes temporarily inhospitable. 
 The image of the virgin throws the scene that follows into stark relief. Immediately after 
peering into the private oikos, we encounter the figure of “the boneless one,” a grotesque and 
cryptic being that dwells in a “fireless house,” exposed to the winter cold. The anosteos has 
resisted the efforts of philologists, ancient and modern, to definitively fix its identity. The name 
may be a kenning for an animal, perhaps an octopus, which was thought in Antiquity to eat its 
own arms.405 But the sexual overtones of the previous scene (“the works of golden Aphrodite”) 
and evidence that pous and tendein can have lewd connotations have led some scholars to 
suggest that the boneless one is a penis.406 It has also been interpreted as a cuttlefish, a snail, 
or a dog.407 In all likelihood the word is deliberately indeterminate and riddling. Without bones, 
this figure lacks somatic or even ontic fixity; it can be identified only by the privation of a 
definite property.  
In this scene, Hesiod engages in a speculative reconfiguration and displacement of the 
terms that organize the ethical project of Works. The boneless one, after all, does inhabit an 
oikos, a space that, for a propertied farmer, serves as the center of his ethical existence. The 
boneless one’s home is formally similar to an ordinary oikos—but without functioning in the 
context of a private domestic economy. For instance, the “woeful” space of its oikos is 
                                                        
 
405 West 1978: 289-90.  
406 Campanile 1989 and Watkins 1978. 
407 See Bagordo 2009 for a comprehensive review of interpretations of anosteos. 
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contrasted with the pastureland outside. Interiority is the indispensable mark of all domestic 
spaces in Hesiod. Indeed, the figure inside does not stir from its abode, implicitly obeying 
Hesiod’s injunction to the farmer to shun τὸ θύρηφιν. And yet, Hesiod does not supply any 
additional marks to distinguish the interior of the home from its exterior. Both are equally dim 
and barren under the winter sun, and, unlike the typical descriptions of domestic space 
elsewhere in Works, this home is not said to be warmer or safer than the pasture that 
surrounds it.  
The boneless one’s home becomes a nascent, indeterminate precursor of the 
proprietor’s oikos in which the individuated functions of domestic life have been folded into an 
autoaffective contortion. Thus while the ordinary farmer-proprietor enjoys his home as an 
enclosed space for private satisfactions, particularly food and sex,408 the appetites of the 
boneless one are turned more intensely inward. It eats its own body rather than seek to 
produce sustenance from external labor. If commentators are right to associate anosteos with 
male genitalia, then the act of autophagy would have masturbatory connotations.409 All of the 
subject’s external relations have become intransitive, folded back into its own body. In one 
sense, the anosteos and its autophagic habits are clearly meant to elicit disgust. But this 
response reaches a limit: I do not think that any Hesiodic audience, ancient or modern, would 
be able to discern exactly what this being is or what form of life it leads; yet it exhibits an 
uncanny proximity to the domestic life of a respectable farmer. The mix of familiarity and 
                                                        
 
408 Op. 733-36 describes sexual taboos in the household. 
409 See Watkins 1978.  
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strangeness perplexes the confident stance of ethical evaluation that Hesiod offers to the 
audience outside of the winter section. Is this being’s ēthos worthy of our disgust as a negative 
exemplum about the pitfalls of worklessness? Or does it represent an obscure alternative to the 
life of agrarian labor, one in which every appetite can be satisfied without ergon, merely by 
turning inward to one’s own body? 
The transition between the virgin girl and the boneless one involves a jarring aesthetic 
modulation. The image of the girl is illuminated in crisp detail: we see even the texture of her 
skin and the oil that coats it (εὖ τε λοεσσαμένη τέρενα χρόα καὶ λίπ’ ἐλαίῳ / χρισαμένη μυχίη, 
522-23). This is typical of the ethical images in Works, which tend to represent bodies as clear 
and distinct forms fully present to the eye. The anosteos seems to be presented through a 
blurry lens or under poor lighting. There is also a sense that the figure’s obscurity is more 
profoundly aesthetic than this: Hesiod could keep supplying more phenomenal detail without 
dispelling the inherent obscurity and strangeness of a figure who is gnawing its foot. It is just as 
plausible to categorize anosteos as a human, one of several animals, or a body part. Hesiod’s 
audience is supposed to have the experience of aesthetic incapacity, of being unable to 
subsume this appearance under a definite cognitive category or ethical valuation.  
One of the final scenes of the winter section will help us account for this mode of 
aesthetic obscurity. After the description of the winter sun, Hesiod returns to the forests: 
καὶ τότε δὴ κεραοὶ καὶ νήκεροι ὑληκοῖται 
λυγρὸν μυλιόωντες ἀνὰ δρία βησσήεντα, 
φεύγουσιν, καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ τοῦτο μέμηλεν, 
οἳ σκέπα μαιόμενοι πυκινοὺς κευθμῶνας ἔχουσι 
κὰκ γλάφυ πετρῆεν· τότε δὴ τρίποδι βροτῷ ἶσοι, 
οὗ τ’ ἐπὶ νῶτα ἔαγε, κάρη δ’ εἰς οὖδας ὁρᾶται· 
τῷ ἴκελοι φοιτῶσιν, ἀλευόμενοι νίφα λευκήν.  (Op. 529-35) 
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And then horned and unhorned woodland dwellers 
chatter woefully up and down the thickets of the glen 
in flight, and this is the single concern for every heart: 
seeking shelter they hold narrow hollows  
under rocky caverns; then they are equal to a three-footed man, 
whose back is broken, and whose head looks down at the ground; 
like these they roam about, avoiding the white snow. 
 
This passage contains a rare reversal of the ordinary structure of animal similes in Homer and 
Hesiod, which generally use animals as vehicles for human tenors. Here, animals are compared 
to humans whose bodies are already modified by the supplement of a third foot (presumably, a 
walking stick). Just like the poor man who squeezes his foot at 497, there is a referential and 
morphological drift in these lines that undermines our aesthetic certainties. I discussed earlier 
how Hesiod’s fondness for polyptoton and tautology advances his ethical project. In the regime 
of work and property, images serve the concrete ethical function of directing proprietors back 
to their erga; this function, as we have seen, is served by the images’ tautological clarity and 
distinctness. But during the winter, there is a moment when phenomenal experience becomes 
unmoored from any definite ethical purpose. Because of their very obscurity, the appearances 
of the anosteos and the other denizens of winter cannot be appropriated ethically, even as 
negative exempla. During the seasonal suspension of work, the text discovers a cast of figures 
who intimate in various ways the possibility of forms of human life that escape the narrow 
ethical outlook of the landed proprietors. 
 
Conclusion: Work and Utopia 
 Hesiod’s persona in Works appears to be practically minded and partial to concrete 
problems and solutions. It may be difficult to believe that such a figure could have any interest 
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in envisioning, even if only aesthetically, an alternative to the fundamental parameters of 
human life and community. And yet, I want to argue in this conclusion that Hesiod is a utopian 
thinker, and that this characterization is not as paradoxical as it might appear. It is true that 
Hesiod’s commitment to the value of ergon can appear categorical: ἔργον δ’ οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, 
ἀεργίη δέ τ’ ὄνειδος (“Work is no disgrace; worklessness is a disgrace,” Op. 331). But there was 
a time, in Hesiod’s own reckoning, when this maxim was untrue, when abstaining from work 
(ἀεργίη) was not a disgrace. Before the present era, in the golden age or (according to a 
different account) before Prometheus angered Zeus, the means of life were available to 
humans with hardly any input of labor.410 The earth provided such plentiful resources that one 
could live for an entire year not working (ἀεργὸν ἐόντα) after working for a single day.411 The 
humans of the golden age experienced no pain or toil, and although they did engage in work of 
some kind, it was done “restfully” (ἥσυχοι ἔργ’ ἐνέμοντο, 113) and evidently was not the kind 
of agricultural toil that typifies work during Hesiod’s age. Under ideal conditions, freed from the 
necessity of acquiring bios, humans do not have any particular work to do. We do not become 
artists, poets, warriors, or craftsmen; we certainly do not continue to farm.412 There is no 
definite vocation for our species. Animals and plants are always employed in the work of 
                                                        
 
410 Hesiod gives several accounts of the happy days before the toilsome, degenerate conditions of the present. In 
the myth of the ages (Op. 106-201), the golden genos enjoys life “far away from toil and pain” (νόσφιν ἄτερ τε 
πόνων καὶ ὀϊζύος, 113). In a complementary account (42-105), Hesiod tells Perses that before the gods “hid away 
the livelihood of humans” (κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισιν, 42) as punishment for Prometheus’ 
wiles, one could obtain enough substance in a day to live for an entire year without work (ὥστε σε κεἰς ἐνιαυτὸν 
ἔχειν καὶ ἀεργὸν ἐόντα, 44). 
411 ῥηϊδίως γάρ κεν καὶ ἐπ’ ἤματι ἐργάσσαιο, / ὥστε σε κεἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἔχειν καὶ ἀεργὸν ἐόντα (“for you could easily 
do enough work for a day to last you a whole year, despite being workless,” 44). 
412 Descat 1986: 188. 
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growth and reproduction,413 but Hesiod infrequently concerns himself with the creation and 
rearing of human offspring,414 and he treats it in certain respects as a necessary evil: the first 
and best iteration of the human race did not even produce children; they went extinct after one 
generation and were happier for it.415  
The term aergiē identifies a far-reaching set of a problems in Hesiod’s discourse. It 
obviously designates laziness or idleness, that is, an actual state of wasteful inactivity that in the 
present age deserves rebuke, but it also designates, more profoundly, the absence of any 
particular form of work that humans should or must be engaged in. Hesiod’s project in Works is 
to instruct his audiences, and Perses in particular, to commit themselves to securing livelihood 
through particular forms of work. But if this commitment is not a fact of nature, then it is an 
artifact of Hesiod’s discourse, a norm that he must constantly, laboriously reaffirm (hence, 
ἔργον ἐπ’ ἔργῳ ἐργάζεσθαι, 382). He heaps scorn on the workless, especially on Perses and the 
“gift-eating” kings, who consume the products of others’ labor. But Hesiod is acutely aware that 
his moral indignation does not disqualify worklessness as a viable form of life. Workless drones 
live happily in their beehives (303-6). 
                                                        
 
413 As Aristotle puts it, the distinctive nature of humans must be defined apart from what it shares in common with 
plant and animal life, that is, “life defined by nourishment and growth” (τήν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν, 
Nic. Eth. 1098a). 
414 In particular, Hesiod’s didactic program does not address the raising and education of children except in the 
most cursory fashion. In his depiction of a prosperous and peaceful city, mothers are fertile (Op. 227-28) and 
children resemble their fathers (τίκτουσιν δὲ γυναῖκες ἐοικότα τέκνα γονεῦσι, 235) as a matter of course. 
415 On the incapacity of the golden race to reproduce, Clay (2003: 87) remarks, “the golden men were mortal, but 
death came upon them as gently as sleep. Here indeed their sole imperfection surfaces: the men of the race of 
gold (and they appear indeed to have been males, since otherwise they could not have lived in such a state of 
bliss!) did not have the ability to reproduce themselves; and without this ability, they quickly became extinct.” But 
the incapacity to reproduce is an imperfection only in the sense that it necessitates the creation of subsequent and 
inferior iterations of humanity. The golden race itself lives and dies happily, and its spirits linger on as benefactors 
of mankind. 
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Later conceptions of the human condition managed to circumvent the problem of 
worklessness by positing particular kinds of work as essentially human. In the Nichomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle famously grounds his definition of human happiness in an account of human 
nature, in what is proper and distinctive (idion) to humans in contrast to other species of life 
(1097b). To define this nature, he asks whether there is some generic work (ergon) for all 
humans, just as carpenters, sculptors, and shoemakers are defined by their specific erga. He 
decides that humans do have work to accomplish, “the exercise of our soul’s faculties in 
accordance with reason” (1098a). But the alternative—that humans have no intrinsic function, 
that we are “workless” (argia) beings—is dismissed out of hand.416 Hesiod takes up this same 
polarity between work and worklessness (ergon ~ argia/aergiē), but he implicitly asserts what 
Aristotle denies: that humans have no intrinsic ergon.  
What is more, whereas Aristotle conceives of the human ergon an ahistorical, fixed 
condition for our species, for Hesiod our history bears witness to the fact that the relation 
between human life and work is changeable. It has undergone periodic revolutions as the 
generation of gold passed to silver, then to bronze, heroic, and finally to iron.417 Perses’ refusal 
to work would have been appropriate in the Golden Age, but now, in the toilsome Iron Age, it is 
                                                        
 
416 “Therefore do the builder and the shoemaker have definite works and activities, whereas humans have none 
but are by nature without any ergon [ἀργὸν]? Or, just as the eye and hand and foot and in general every part seem 
to have some ergon, so do humans too have some ergon beyond all of these parts? Then what would this be? For 
living seems to be common to plants as well; but what we are seeking is the distinctive feature of humans” 
(Aristotle Nic. Eth. 1097b). See Agamben 2007: 1-2. 
417 Clay (2003: 85-95) argues that the myth of the races follows the premise that each generation of humans has 
been manufactured by the gods for a purpose. “The purpose of the gods in fashioning mankind was to create a 
race not only inferior to the gods, but also conscious of that inferiority; without an awareness of their inferiority, 
human beings would not, as was the case with the silver age, see any reason to honor the gods” (95). 
 220 
untimely. Untimely figures stand in an ambivalent relation to their times: as exceptions, they 
presuppose the authority of the rule; but they can also expose the rule as impotent or 
ephemeral. It is no accident that Hesiod seems to think that the Iron Age is almost over, or at 
least, that he and his audience are situated at some inflection point in the temporal regime that 
rules over the conditions of mortal life.418 Perses and other aergoi are not simply out of joint 
with the times; they intimate that time itself could be out of joint, that the verities of the Iron 
Age could be overturned and that some other relation between humans and work could 
emerge in its place.419 
This thought about the historicity of human nature puts Works and Days in the company 
of Karl Marx’s early writings. For Marx, humans are the only species whose essence is 
indeterminate, whose species-being (Gattungswesen) is non-being (Unwesen).420 In any given 
historical situation, however, we are born into an ensemble of social and material relations that 
imposes a kind of provisional essence—particular ways of living, working, and acting—onto the 
void of our species-being. What commonly passes as “human nature” is actually the parochial 
nature of a given class, with its historically constituted interests and particularities. But under 
certain conditions, humans can be stripped of their particularities and reduced to a kind of 
indeterminate, universal humanity. Such are the conditions that capitalism creates: by 
brutalizing and impoverishing the working class, it deprives the workers of everything except 
                                                        
 
418 See Clay 2003: 37-38. “We are, then, at a pivotal moment of human history; unless Perses can be won over to 
the side of justice, disaster is imminent” (38). 
419 The iron age is literally haunted by the ghosts of the golden age (Op. 121-26); on the temporalities of haunting, 
see Derrida 1994. 
420 For this reading of Marx, see Ruda 2009. On early Marx’s commitment to theoretical humanism (which 
prioritizes the question, “what is man?”) see Balibar 1995: 28-30. 
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their bare humanity. Therein lies their untimely, revolutionary significance: because the 
proletariat lacks property, it aspires to institute a society without property; because it does not 
represent the interests of any class of civil society but of humanity in general, it intimates the 
possibility that society could be reconstituted without classes.421  
Of course, Marx represents a kind of emancipatory politics that is entirely alien to 
Hesiod’s worldview. The poet from Ascra is a reactionary thinker who cherishes nothing more 
dearly than the rights and the ēthos of the class of propertied farmers.422 But he recognizes, 
with Marx, the radical communitarian significance of the workless poor. There is no proletariat 
in Hesiod’s world, but the aergoi occupy a similar role: within the prevailing property regime, 
they are destitute and miserable, and they are easily appropriated by ethical discourses as 
negative exempla. But they also appear as living testaments to the intrinsic absence in human 
species-being of a determinate relation to ergon. This second, emancipatory valence is open-
ended. Hesiod does not have a distinct vision of how society could be constituted around 
worklessness; even his depiction of the Golden Age is disappointingly spare. There is a poverty 
of imagination and language that hinders his (and our) ability to conceive of a radically better 
world, and under these constraints utopia appears as an obscure negation of the present order. 
It is in this sense that Hesiod is both reactionary and utopian. He accepts and promotes the 
inegalitarian Iron Age order as the best available configuration of human life and community, 
                                                        
 
421 In its struggle for emancipation, likewise, the Marxian proletariat aspires to expropriate the property of the 
bourgeoisie and to reconstitute society on a communitarian basis. This void of pure humanity offers a kind of 
clearing or opening within the existing order, a site on which some radically egalitarian form of community could 
be assembled through the struggles of communism (see Ruda 2009). 
422 Rose 2012: 166-200. 
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but he knows that it is not the only possibility. He is therefore willing, in the coldest months 
when the imperative to work has been lifted, to dream of figures at the limits of human life 
who embody the residual promise of the Golden Age. 
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Chapter 4. Song, Beauty, and the Logic of Reaction in the Theognidea 
 
The previous chapters examine moments in Homer and Hesiod when characters who 
lack the social qualifications to occupy the poems’ attentions briefly claim or obtain equality 
with the central characters. These egalitarian moments are quickly suppressed on a narrative 
level, even as their fleeting utopian designs are registered in the medium of aesthetic 
semblance. The corpus of elegies attributed to Theognis, however, situates itself in the 
aftermath of an irrevocable breakdown of the system of social qualifications that restricted 
participation in Megaran political life to the ancestral nobility (esthloi), as “inferior people” 
(kakoi) have taken center stage in the polis. In archaic hexameter poetry, such a leveling of 
social distinction is represented only briefly or in the aesthetic margins of the narrative, but in 
the Theognidea it is treated as a permanent feature of the new social order.423 This text poses a 
striking problem for the purposes of the present study, because the relation between 
sociopoetic equality and inequality evinced in Homer and Hesiod has been reversed. For 
Theognis, the first-person voice of the corpus, the status quo in Megara involves an errant 
mixing of high and low, base and noble, rich and poor. Anyone, in principle, could exercise 
                                                        
 
423 The dating and formation of the Theognidea is still a matter of debate. The most prevalent view is that the 
corpus is drawn from numerous sources and is largely composed of excerpts from longer elegiac compositions. See 
Lane Fox 2000; van Wees 2000: n. 2; Hubbard 2007. Part of the corpus is usually regarded as its historical core and 
attributed to Theognis; these so-called “Cyrnus blocks” frequently use the name Κύρνος, the speaker’s primary 
addressee, and Πολυπαίδης, his patronymic. The oralist position, elaborated in Nagy et al. 1985, treats the 
Theognidea as the synthesis of a Megaran oral tradition spanning centuries. I do not adopt any specific oralist 
premises, but I do proceed as if its general thesis regarding the unity of the corpus were true. I do not think that it 
is possible to isolate with any certainty which parts of the corpus are authentically Theognidean and which are not, 
and efforts to do so seem to be based on untested preconceptions about the distinctiveness of individual authors. 
In any case, more is lost by regarding portions of the corpus as inauthentic than by treating all of it as potentially 
valuable for reconstructing a Theognidean aristocratic mentality. 
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political power. As a proponent of social distinction, Theognis becomes a putatively 
marginalized voice, insistently concerned with reacting to the catastrophe of non-elite 
enfranchisement by developing new forms of elite discernment and association. 
I first consider how the corpus represents its own relation to political history. Theognis 
rejects the conservative project, advanced by Alcaeus, of attempting to restore aristocratic 
dominance as it was before the breakdown of social distinctions. Rather, Theognis’ politics are 
reactionary: he affirms that time has been split between “before” and “after” the kakoi gained 
political power, because this event effected a rupture in the binary logic of social exclusion. The 
corpus’ reactionary project involves working through the novel consequences of this rupture. 
Much of this novelty, I argue, consists in the figure of “the middle” (τὸ μέσον). In concrete 
terms, the expression traditionally designates the common offices, resources, and spaces of the 
polis, but Theognis refashions it as a formal or logical device. He uses it to affirm that there exist 
“middle” values that cut across the terms of every polar opposition in traditional political 
language—subjects who are neither esthlos nor deilos, neither agathos nor kakos. “The middle” 
designates, in the logic of political action and association, a new space for maneuver that 
rejects both the discredited binary coordinates of the ancien régime and the errant 
homogenization of social difference. 
Finally, I argue that Theognis finds an ideal medium for his reactionary political logic in 
the aesthetic reception of his own songs. The audiences of Theognidean elegy who are able to 
discern and imitate its aesthetic excellence are represented as distinct from the ancestral elites 
as traditionally conceived. Exploiting the logic of “the middle,” Theognis constructs the 
categories of song appreciation (sophiē, kalon) to be formally incongruent with the categories 
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of partisan political affiliation: neither agathoi nor kakoi are necessarily qualified to discern the 
beauty of song. The collective subject that Theognis assembles around the divisiveness of 
aesthetic taste thus subtracts itself from partisan politics, but in doing so it supports the 
broader project of political reaction by promoting and circulating an anti-egalitarian ethos. 
 
Reactionary Times 
The typical polis of the early archaic period was dominated by a narrow circle of 
ancestral elites—a group that Theognis designates as the esthloi or agathoi—who considered 
themselves the members of the community most qualified by virtue of their birth, wealth, and 
ability to govern and to participate in factional struggles to gain control of the state. Taken 
together, these exclusionary qualifications form what Rancière calls the “police order” (see 
Introduction, p. 29), an implicit system that regulates what categories of people—in terms of 
class, status, gender, and so forth—have a part to play in public life and in the exercise of state 
power.  
Near the end of the seventh century, this system of qualifications came under increasing 
pressure from below, from non-elite populations that began to demand a share in the process 
of governance.424 The opening verses of the Theognidea situate the corpus in the aftermath of a 
successful popular challenge against the privileges of the ancestral nobility: 
πόλις μὲν ἔθ’ ἥδε πόλις, λαοὶ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι 
                                                        
 
424 See Donlan 1997: 21 for this chronology. It seems likely that popular agitation against elite hegemony was 
filtered through and mediated by the existing system of aristocratic partisanship, such that certain aristocratic 
factions could champion the popular cause in order to outmaneuver their elite rivals. See Vernant 2006: 242 
concerning Cleisthenes; Herodotus reports that “he bound the dēmos to his hetairia.” See further Forsdyke 2005: 
48. 
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οἳ πρόσθ’ οὔτε δίκας ἤιδεσαν οὔτε νόμους, 
ἀλλ’ ἀμφὶ πλευραῖσι δορὰς αἰγῶν κατέτριβον, 
ἔξω δ’ ὥστ’ ἔλαφοι τῆσδ’ ἐνέμοντο πόλεος. 
καὶ νῦν εἰσ’ ἀγαθοί, Πολυπαΐδη· οἱ δὲ πρὶν ἐσθλοί 
νῦν δειλοί. τίς κεν ταῦτ’ ἀνέχοιτ’ ἐσορῶν; 
ἀλλήλους δ’ ἀπατῶσιν ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοισι γελῶντες, 
οὔτε κακῶν γνώμας εἰδότες οὔτ’ ἀγαθῶν   (53-60) 
 
The city is still this city, but the people are different, 
those who before knew neither justice nor laws, 
but rubbed away hides of goats around their flanks, 
and like deer dwelled outside of this city. 
Now they are noble, son of Polypais; and the previously good 
now are bad. Who could endure gazing at these things? 
They deceive each other and laugh at each other, 
possessing the judgments neither of bad people nor of good. 
 
The savages who formerly occupied a non-place outside of the polis have now taken a central 
position in civic life.425 It is unclear exactly what has happened in sociological terms. The most 
common interpretation is that the upstarts belong to an emerging class of wealthy 
merchants,426 but it is not necessary to identify the precise situation. The Theognidea create a 
picture of social upheaval that is generic enough to fit diverse scenarios throughout space and 
time, and this referential flexibility has likely contributed to the corpus’ historical popularity and 
dissemination.427 What is important is that some group that previously lacked a determinate 
place in the polis has come to match or even supplant the ancestral nobility. 
                                                        
 
425 Cf. 289-92, 679, 1109-14. 
426 For the interpretation involving a new class of wealthy merchants, see Forsdyke 2005: 53 and Redfield 1986: 52-
57. In verse 677, Theognis announces that “merchants rule, and the kakoi are above the agathoi” (φορτηγοὶ δ’ 
ἄρχουσι, κακοὶ δ’ ἀγαθῶν καθύπερθεν). Van Wees (2000) disputes the conventional interpretation of the social 
disruption depicted in the Theognidea as stemming from the development of an upstart class of nouveaux riches 
who challenged the prerogatives of a closed hereditary elite. He sees it rather as violent in-fighting among mafiosi-
like factions for control of wealth and power, a contest in which hereditary status had little bearing.  
427 See Nagy 1985. 
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In this revolution, the upstart group has not simply traded places with the old ruling 
class. Such an inversion would allow the existing categories of social distinction to remain 
intact, with different people occupying the same structural positions. To be sure, there is a 
rhetorical symmetry (οἳ πρόσθ’… νῦν, οἱ δὲ πρὶν… νῦν) in the passage that contrasts the 
upward fortunes of the newcomers and the downward fortunes of the old nobility. But the 
expression is not truly symmetrical: the nobility has clearly fallen in social standing from high 
status (esthloi) to low (deiloi), but the newcomers, who are now agathoi, did not originally 
occupy a place in the social hierarchy of the polis at all. They had no part in the city, or even in 
humanity, but are compared to deer who roam without law or custom through the hinterlands. 
This hyperbole has real significance. The upstarts belonged to the community as a nameless, 
unclassified element (“those who dwell outside”), without a determinate place in the social 
order defined by nomoi and dikai. The introduction of this supplementary element into the 
center of the polis has precipitated a crisis of political representation, because the existing 
distinction between agathoi and kakoi cannot accommodate it. 
Indeed, the crisis that preoccupies Theognis consists precisely in the breakdown of this 
distinction. The abrupt ascent of the outsiders to political and economic preeminence has 
invalidated the equation between wealth, birth, and virtue that underlies Theognis’ ideal 
definition of agathos and esthlos.428 Those born from noble lineages may now become 
                                                        
 
428 See Cobb-Stevens 1985, who argues that birth (genos), wealth, and virtue (aretē, dikaiosunē) are the ideal 
characteristics of the aristocratic agathoi; in the “unsettled world” of the Theognidea, these traits are no longer 
correlated with one another. See Cerri 1968 on the intertwining of political and ethical valences in agathos/esthlos 
and kakos/deilos; see Morgan 2008 as well on the unsettled value coordinates in Theognis’ Megara (“ethics, 
politics, fortune, and wealth interact to create a situation where standards of value are unclear,” 34). 
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impoverished and of bad character, and the low-born may become rich (but they never, it 
seems, attain any degree of character). At certain points in the corpus, we can discern how this 
uncoupling of status distinctions follows a causal sequence. Cobb-Stevens (1985) argues that 
wealth is the first disruptive element. As the kakoi became rich, they aspired to higher social 
status, both by seeking greater political influence and by marrying into older noble lineages. As 
the agathoi became poorer, they became more willing to compromise their innate virtue 
(aretē) and morality (dikaiosunē) in pursuit of wealth.429 But the effects of the crisis are not 
always so linear. There is often a sense that the old social distinctions have been hollowed out 
from within and are not necessarily fine-grained enough to process the shifting social situation. 
For instance, distinctions based on birth are undermined by the “mixing” in marriage between 
wealthy low-born and impoverished high-born families.430 In terms of virtue, it is exceedingly 
difficult to discern the character (ēthos) of a man and to determine his effectiveness as an ally 
or his moral integrity. The new denizens of the city “know the judgments neither of kakoi nor of 
agathoi” (οὔτε κακῶν γνώμας εἰδότες οὔτ’ ἀγαθῶν, 59). As we will see in more detail below, 
the stakes of this formulation are logical: the law of the excluded middle no longer holds, and 
between the polar terms of the old social taxonomy have been intercalated a new set of fuzzy, 
undefined middle terms, “neither X nor not-X.” 
                                                        
 
429 On the use of aretē and dikaiosunē in the Theognidea, see Robertson 1997: 84: “Arete is used far more often in 
the Theognidea with a general meaning, and the moral and social connotations become explicit: the word is 
beginning to be adopted by the nobility to assert their superiority. Arete in its sense of general excellence is 
equated with general moral virtue and claimed by the old aristocracy as their own.” 
430 See 183-92 (πλοῦτος ἔμειξε γένος), 193-96. 
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The same triangulation of birth, wealth, and virtue is evident among the aristocratic 
protagonists of the Iliad and Odyssey.431 The basilēes are scions of noble houses, often 
exceedingly wealthy, and usually adept at combat. As Peter Rose has shown, the relative value 
of these features is not settled, and in particular the contrast between inherited prestige 
(genos) and personal ability (aretē) is a site of ideological contestation.432 The talent of Achilles 
is opposed to the ancestral nobility of Agamemnon, and a schism opens up between them. But 
these tensions can be processed and elite consensus can be restored: the Iliad concludes with 
Achilles tentatively reintegrated into Achaean society and reconciled with his king. The story of 
division and reconciliation is so productive on a poetic level that it drives the plot from its 
inception to its conclusion.433 Thus the nexus of birth, wealth, and virtue weathers its internal 
contradictions and secures for Homeric elites their place as poetic protagonists. 
It is only with Thersites’ sedition in Iliad 2 that a more radical unbinding of this nexus 
briefly appears possible. But in Homer and Hesiod, challenges to the system of social and poetic 
exclusion are temporary and reversible—Thersites is silenced (Chapter 1), the hetairoi perish 
(Chapter 2), and the Winter ends with the workless poor consigned again to invisibility (Chapter 
                                                        
 
431 See Introduction, pp. 16-17. 
432 Rose 1992. 
433 Donlan 1985b sees a thematic continuity between early epic and Theognidean elegy in this regard: “there is a 
tradition in archaic Greek poetry, traceable from Homer on, which is concerned with the deterioration of the 
institutional ties that knit the community of men together” (228). He cites the example of Achilles refusing to help 
his philoi in Iliad 9 and the outrages committed by the suitors in the Odyssey. In Theognis, this crisis is represented 
in more pessimistic but broadly similar terms. One could object, however, that the “deterioration of institutional 
ties” is a threat not only to the social bond (philia) that underlies collective unity and interpersonal trust; it also 
throws into question the forms of social domination that exclude marginal groups from political and poetic 
representation. Theognis in this respect is not merely more pessimistic than Homer: Homeric social crises are 
generally resolved without permanently undermining elite privilege. In Theognis, the same crisis has deepened to 
the point of opening up the political sphere to groups who lack the traditional rights and qualifications to rule. 
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3). Theognidean elegy situates itself in the aftermath of an event that—like the egalitarian 
claims in Homer and Hesiod—has unsettled the coordinates of political exclusion,434 but unlike 
Homer and Hesiod, for Theognis there is no possibility of turning back time and restoring the 
world as it was before the kakoi challenged the qualifications of the agathoi to rule the city.  
Within the political imaginary of the corpus, history is split between “before” (πρόσθεν, 
53; πρίν, 57) and “now” (νῦν, 57, 58). Almost all of the verses are devoted to the now: it is a 
discourse of advice, protreptic, and strategy, about how to cope in a world in which aristocratic 
ideology is not equipped to deal with the consequences of an event that has undone the 
traditional correlation between birth, wealth, and virtue. Conversely, there is a deficit of 
historical memory in the Theognidea. One does not find wistful recollections of better days 
gone by, as there are in Homer and Hesiod.435 The discourse’s present tense contains a handful 
of historical references that have been used—with divergent results—to situate the 
composition of the corpus in stretches from the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries. But there is 
little effort to articulate a personal or collective past. Even if parts of the corpus were 
composed over the course of more than a century by a variety of contributors,436 its lyric voice 
is always situated in a present moment of crisis.  
                                                        
 
434 Concerning the disintegration of social ties in Theognis, Donlan 1985b notes, “The obsessive and deeply 
pessimistic attitude toward friendship in the Theognidea…appears to reflect the belief that the social universe 
once integrated by blood, affinal, and close personal ties (the kinship community) is now threatened with 
disintegration” (229). 
435 Theognis does recall his education as a boy among older agathoi at symposia (26-37), but the system of 
aristocratic education has not been lost and is still very much in operation; Theognis is instructing the boy Cyrnus. 
436 See Nagy et al. 1985, contested by Hubbard 2007. 
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This temporality is a symptom of the Theognidean subject’s comportment toward 
political change, according to which it is no longer possible to restore the political order of the 
old aristocracy, to affirm its bygone verities, or to suppress the nouveux riches. It is essential to 
emphasize that the clause “it is no longer possible” is not a description of an objective political 
situation but a performative, axiomatic prescription. According to a different political 
persuasion, it is always possible to restore the old order by restricting the qualifications for 
political participation on the basis of wealth or birth. This is the essence of conservativism and 
the guiding assumption of the countless aristocratic parties and regimes in Greek history.437 The 
Theognidean subject, however, is not conservative but reactionary.  
A number of political theorists and historians have recently addressed the topic of 
political reaction,438 but the most useful for our purposes is Alain Badiou.439 His approach is 
appealing because it links reaction directly to the disruptions of old political certainties that 
figure so centrally in the Theognidea. Badiou would agree with Mark Lilla’s characterization of 
reactionaries as “radical,” that is, as political innovators less interested in conserving the old 
                                                        
 
437 I take Alcaeus as a prototype for this kind of conservative politics; see pp. 232-35. See Simonton 2017 on 
oligarchic regimes in the Classical period and the ways in which they developed and maintained themselves 
institutionally in opposition to the threat of dēmokratia. 
438 In his work on twentieth-century reactionary thinkers, Mark Lilla argues that “they are, in their way, just as 
radical as revolutionaries and just as firmly in the grip of historical imaginings” (xii). But whereas revolutionaries 
aspire to force the present order of things to give way to a utopian future, for reactionaries the future can only be 
regarded with dread because it contains the consummation of an ongoing movement of social, cultural, or 
civilizational decline. Corey Robin (2011) reinterprets a number of Anglo-American conservative thinkers as 
committed less to the ideals of limited government, the free market, and social traditions than to the anti-
egalitarian principle “that some are fit, and thus ought, to rule others” (18). Reaction is less a commitment to the 
past than the creation of novel ideologies to head off democratic challenges from below. 
439 His theory of reactive subjectivity and political reaction is developed in Logics of Worlds (2009: 54-58).  
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order than in instituting a new order with a particular relation to history.440 Reactionaries react, 
precisely, to the threat of egalitarian revolution and develop innovative political apparatuses to 
suppress its possibility.  
I too shared for a long time the conviction that what resists the new is the 
old. … But this view of things underestimates what I think we must term 
reactionary novelties. In order to resist the call of the new, it is still 
necessary to create arguments of resistance appropriate to the novelty 
itself. From this point of view, every reactive disposition is the 
contemporary of the present to which it reacts. (Badiou 2009: 54) 
 
As a reactionary, Theognis is preoccupied with contemporary novelties, with personal and 
collective adaptability to new political conditions. In some sense, all (political) subjects are 
engaged in adaptation and self-fashioning; the question, however, is how they represent their 
own relation to time and novelty. Reactionaries self-consciously affirm that novel forms of 
political organization and discourse have been opened up by the very egalitarian challenge that 
reaction aims to suppress. 
In this respect, Theognis is a distinctive voice in the corpus of archaic lyric and elegy. 
Solon shares Theognis’ claim to be a voice of factional moderation, but he steers clear of the 
“lost world” trope that underlies both reactionary and conservative politics.441 The Solonian 
                                                        
 
440 See n. 438 on Lilla. These two thinkers, it must be noted, have markedly divergent political outlooks. Lilla 
includes Badiou in his catalogue of reactionary thinkers (92-101), and Badiou would doubtless reciprocate the 
gesture. For Badiou, who is a committed communist and sometime revolutionary, “reaction” is a call for 
moderation driven by a kind of deflationary thinking about what is politically possible. This description matches 
Lilla’s political outlook. Badiou, for his part, recognizes that the revolutionary impulse is formally similar to 
reaction. 
441 On the other hand, if Solon’s system of property-classes opened up participation in the state to broader 
segments of the Athenian community, these reforms may have actually served a conservative purpose. Rather 
than abolishing the system of qualifications that limited access to politics, he amended the system by degree and 
thereby preserved many of the privileges of the ancestral nobility. I follow Mitchell’s (1997: 75) interpretation of 
Solon’s reforms: “Solon was being much more conservative than is generally allowed, and that, rather than looking 
forward to the creation of a new social order through his reforms, he was in fact looking backwards to the 
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program is devoted to ameliorating civil strife through the reform of political institutions, 
without any reference to the catastrophic loss of an earlier, better world. I will return to this 
comparison below.442 The other elegists rarely touch on political topics, but among the lyric 
authors Alcaeus bears the most similarities to the persona of the disenchanted aristocrat 
developed in the Theognidea.443 One of the crises that exercises Alcaeus is the rise of the tyrant 
Pittacus, a former associate who betrayed Alcaeus and was subsequently elected as a kind of 
sovereign arbitrator by the Mytilenian people: 
   τὸν κακοπατρίδαν 
Φίττακον πόλιος τὰς ἀχόλω καὶ βαρυδαίμονος 
ἐστάσαντο τύραννον, μέγ᾿ ἐπαίνεντες ἀόλλεες  (fr. 348) 
 
They set up the base-born Pittacus as tyrant 
of that gutless, ill-fated city, expressing strong approval all together. 
 
Alcaeus laments and despises the tyranny of Pittacus as the event that destroyed the world of 
aristocratic Mytilene, in which he and his hetairoi could compete with rival elite factions for 
control of the state.444 On a material level, Pittacus’ ascension resulted in the defeat of Alcaeus’ 
                                                        
 
maintenance of an older order, even if this was at the cost of allowing some sections of the community access to 
political power which they had previously been denied.” 
442 See Irwin 2005 (esp. 226-30) on the resonances and tensions between Theognis and Solon, especially regarding 
the role of tyrants as euthuntēres in Theognis 39-52 and Solon 4. Whereas Solon sees tyrants as correcting the 
injustices of the astoi in general, Theognis distinguishes between the guiltless agathoi and the culpable kakoi (and 
the hēgemones associated with them).  
443 Elmer (2013b: 153) remarks, “Theognis and Alcaeus share more than just a preoccupation with politics. They 
also share a particular perspective on the politics of their communities: both speak from the point of view of the 
disenfranchised, alienated aristocrat, and in both cases the speaker’s experience of political estrangement is tied 
to some betrayal by former friends, that is, a rupture in the social group to which the speaker once belonged.” 
444 On the political history of Mytilene and its representation in Alcaeus, see Kirkwood 1974: 55-60; Parker 2007: 
13-17; Forsdyke 2005: 40-46. 
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faction and in his exile and impoverishment.445 But it seems that Alcaeus was frequently exiled 
during the ordinary cycles of intra-elite conflict, which had also seen the rise of at least two 
other tyrants. Pittacus, however, represents a more profound challenge to the aristocratic 
dominance of politics. In the fragment above, Pittacus is called kakopatris, “of ignoble 
ancestry,” the same term that Theognis applies to the daughter of a wealthy, low-born family 
(193).446  Alcaeus makes a more detailed attack on Pittacus’ genos in fr. 72, and fr. 429 records 
a list of colorful insults that center on his opponent’s grotesque, Thersitean physiology. 
Whatever the reality of these epithets, they suggest that Pittacus appears, to Alcaeus at least, 
as an outsider who lacks the ancestral qualifications to exercise power. What is more, Pittacus 
apparently owes his power to the acclamation of the whole population of the city (μέγ᾿ 
ἐπαίνεντες ἀόλλεες), which implies a broad popular consensus among the non-aristocratic 
dēmos.447 According to later sources, the tyranny of Pittacus marked an end of the aristocratic 
strife of the previous decades.448 There is not enough evidence to conclude that, after Pittacus, 
Mytilene was in any sense governed by the dēmos or that aristocratic power came to an end; 
                                                        
 
445 The passage above, fr. 348, is cited by Aristotle (Pol. 1285a32-38), who claims that Alcaeus and his supporters 
attempted to return from exile and seize power in Mytilene; to repel them, the demos elected Pittacus as tyrant. 
The account is meant to illustrate the office of elected tyrant, aisumnētēs. Forsdyke (2005: 45-46) discusses 
discrepancies in this account but ultimately supports it. Apart from the question of historicity, Aristotle’s account 
seems to broadly reflect what is represented in Alcaeus’ poetry; note that in fr. 129, Alcaeus in exile prays for 
vengeance against Pittacus. 
446 In 193-96, Theognis describes how an impoverished aristocrat, “compelled by powerful necessity,” marries for 
money into a wealthy, low-born family. 
447 Alternatively, the phrase may mean that some rival aristocratic faction unanimously supported Pittacus. In any 
case, the demos seems to have been crucially involved in Pittacus’ tyranny, even if through the mediation of a 
sympathetic aristocratic faction. Cf. Theognis’ euthunētōr (38). 
448 Forsdyke (2005: 46) remarks, “the stability of Mytilene following Pittacus’s election, as well as the traditions 
that gathered around Pittacus demonstrating his wise rule, seems to suggest that something unusual happened in 
Mytilene, and this unusual element may indeed have been the intervention of non-elites in the conflict between 
rival elite factions” (46). 
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but it does appear that non-elites intervened decisively in public life to curtail the excesses of 
“well-born” aristocrats like Alcaeus. 
 In the wake of this event, Alcaeus’ objective is to turn back the clock and restore the 
unchallenged preeminence of his faction and, more broadly, of his class. In a number of the 
fragments, Alcaeus promotes the conservation of ancestral tradition: in fr. 130b, he complains 
that exile has deprived him of a role in civic affairs (ἰμέρρων ἀγόρας ἄκουσαι / καρ̣υ̣[ζο]μένας 
ὦγεσιλαΐδα / καὶ β[̣ό]λ̣λ̣ας, 18-20) and that his ancestral property (τὰ πάτηρ καὶ πάτερος 
πάτηρ) has been expropriated by his fellow citizens. But even this despondency betrays a 
sustained commitment to the world that he has lost. In fr. 6, he famously compares his city, 
wracked by civil strife, to a ship caught in a storm, and he rallies his hetairoi by invoking their 
aristocratic ancestors: 
 καὶ μὴ καταισχύνωμεν ἀνανδρίᾳ  
ἔσλοις τόκηας γᾶς ὔπα κειμένοις·   (6.13-14) 
 
And don’t bring shame through cowardice 
to your noble parents lying beneath the earth. 
  
The world of the aristocratic polis can be restored if only Alcaeus and his companions remain 
committed to the memory of the past.449 
 
Political Novelty and the Logic of the Middle 
If Theognis is not concerned with restoring a bygone past, what kind of political novelty 
is he committed to? How does he work through the present consequences of the break in 
                                                        
 
449 Alcaeus expresses shock at Pittacus’ betrayal, at an hetairos who violated the oaths that he swore to his fellows; 
but Theognis assumes that among political allies, betrayal is the norm, loyalty the exception. 
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political time? These questions are difficult to address if we frame them in relation to concrete 
power-politics or partisan interests. The Theognidea begin with a reflection on social change 
and civic crisis, but after verse 56 there are few observations about the specific political 
situation of the Megaran state.450 The same pessimistic diagnosis is repeated at irregular 
intervals: the city is in dire straits, and the old aristocratic class has declined precipitously. 
Alcaeus and Solon, by contrast, share a programmatic interest with state politics, that is, with 
the city’s public institutions and the contests among various factions and leaders to control 
them.451 Theognis’ vagueness is not an accident or oversight, however. As we will see, it is a 
consequence of his efforts to develop an alternative strain of political affiliation that cuts across 
the discredited social categories that formerly regulated participation in the aristocratic state. 
This is a labor in discourse and logic and that does not yet, in the corpus’ internal temporality, 
have a concrete referent in the domain of Realpolitik. 
Theognidean political novelty is organized around the figure of “the middle.” Theognis 
advises Cyrnus to take the middle road (219-20) and claims to take the middle road himself 
(μέσσην ὁδὸν, 331). He laments that the mismanagement of the state is not in the common 
                                                        
 
450 The word polis appears twenty-five times in the corpus. There are seven instances in the block from 39-68, 
which discusses the social transformation of the city and the imminent threat of tyranny. After this, it appears less 
frequently: in four cases lamenting the degradation of the city’s laws and institutions (236, 287, 541, 604); in 
prayers to protect the city from war (855), including four instances from verses 757-82 invoking Apollo and Zeus to 
save the city from the Medes; in verses attributed to Solon (947) and Tyrtaeus (1005), and in a variation on an 
earlier usage in the corpus (1081 = 39). In several instances, the polis is used as a setting in what seem to be 
fragmentary narratives (951, 1042, 1210, 1216). 
451 Theognis’ referential indeterminacy is frequently noted and sometimes explained as a strategy for promoting 
the reperformance of the poetic material. For instance, Kurke 2007: 149, “The political struggles Alcaeus’ lyrics 
chronicle with great specificity and detail are echoed in more generalizing and schematic form in the elegiac verses 
of Theognis.” Bowie and Rist (2006), “his failure to name either the predicted tyrant or the enemies on whom he 
desires revenge (337-340) (contrast Alcaeus’ naming of both categories), though ensuring that his poems can be 
easily reperformed, frustrate identification.” 
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(“middle”) interest (ἐς τὸ μέσον, 678).452 This language of moderation recalls that of Solon, who 
advises ethical and political restraint and claims to occupy a liminal position in the public space 
(meson) between feuding factions.453 But Solonian moderation is ultimately part of a 
constructive policy of reforming the state’s police order by including more segments of the 
population in the political process. For Theognis, the floodgates have already opened: the kakoi 
have free reign in state politics at the expense of the agathoi, and it makes no sense to merely 
adjust which categories of people have a part to play in governance.  
The Theognidean notion of moderation and τὸ μέσον has a more privative character. It 
is associated with negative injunctions, like the expression at 335, which is echoed at 219, 401, 
and 657: 
μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν· πάντων μέσ’ ἄριστα. 
Do not be excessively zealous; the best things of all are in the middle. 
 
The avoidance of extremes is as much an ethical principle directed at Theognis’ audience as a 
stylistic principle of the corpus itself, which contains numerous polar expressions that negate 
an adjective or phrase and its opposite.454 As a linguistic figure, polarity comes in many 
                                                        
 
452 See further at 496, where Theognis advises mingling with all of the guests at a symposium “in common” (εἰς τὸ 
μέσον φωνεῦντες); it is best to “steer a middle course” between thirst and drunkenness (τὸ μέσον στρωφήσομαι, 
839). 
453 See Kurke 2007: 155 on Solon fr. 37 W. 
454 Expressions of the type οὔτε…οὔτε are very common. Not all of them negate two opposites, but many do (e.g. 
265, 177, 749, 801, 874, cf. 948-53). Some examples in the corpus include: οὔτε δίκας ἤιδεσαν οὔτε νόμους (54); 
οὔτ’ ὄλβιος οὔτε πενιχρός / οὔτε κακὸς (164-65); οὔτε τι εἰπεῖν / οὔθ’ ἕρξαι δύναται (177); οὔτ’ ἀγαθοῖσιν 
ἐπίσταται οὔτε κακοῖσιν (443); οὔτε τι δειλόν / οὔτ’ ἀγαθόν (463); οὔτ’ εὔνουν οὔτε τὸν ἐχθρόν (641); οὔτε τευ 
ἀνδρός / οὔτε τευ ἀθανάτων μῆνιν (749); Οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων οὔτ’ ἔσσεται οὔτε πέφυκεν (801); οὐδέ με πείσεις / 
οὔτε τι μὴ πίνειν οὔτε λίην μεθύειν (839-40); οὔτε ποτ’ ἐχθαίρειν οὔτε φιλεῖν (874 = 1092); οὔτ’ αἰδοῦς οὔτε δίκης 
(938); οὔτε λύρης οὔτ’ αὐλητῆρος ἀκούων (975). The positing of an intermediate value that neither affirms nor 
negates a proposition is attested in Homer. For instance, at Il. 3.218, Odysseus is said to “wield his scepter neither 
forward nor behind but hold it firmly in front” (σκῆπτρον δ’ οὔτ’ ὀπίσω οὔτε προπρηνὲς ἐνώμα). At Od. 9.117, the 
goat island is situated “neither close nor far from the land of the Cyclopes” (γαίης Κυκλώπων οὔτε σχεδὸν οὔτ’ 
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varieties.455 Some polarities admit intermediate values, like the shades of grey between white 
and black. Other polarities are strictly binary and apparently exclude middle terms: integer 
quantities must be either even or odd, and well-formed propositions must be either true or 
false, never in between. In critical cases, Theognis makes the deliberately paradoxical 
assertation that he has committed to a middle course of action between alternatives that do 
not ordinarily admit a middle course: 
πρήξας δ’ οὐκ ἔπρηξα, καὶ οὐκ ἐτέλεσσα τελέσσας·  
  δρήσας δ’ οὐκ ἔδρησ’, ἤνυσα δ’ οὐκ ἀνύσας.  (953-54) 
 
Although I acted, I did not act, and I did not finish even though I finished; 
Having done the deed, I did not do it, and I succeeded but did not succeed.456 
 
Cases like these, in which Theognis paradoxically conflates affirmation and negation, signal that 
a phrase like “middle things” (335) should not be conceptualized simply as a spatial median in a 
spectrum of well-defined possibilities. The middle course—like “acting and not acting”—may be 
bound up in paradox and therefore not entirely well defined. Indeed, the injunction μηδὲν ἄγαν 
σπεύδειν (335) can be understood alongside Theognis’ tendency to advise abstinence from 
partisan endeavors (see pp. 242-44). To commit to a moderate course is effectively to abstain 
from any course, because “the middle” is not yet available in the landscape of political praxis. 
This abstinence from political action, however, is a kind of meta-politics waged at the level of 
                                                        
 
ἀποτηλοῦ). In both cases, an object is situated between two spatial extremes. In the Theognidea, v. 948-53 
describe a sequence of self-defeating, uncompleted initiatives culminating in four logical paradoxes (953-54; see p. 
238). 
455 See Aristotle Cat. 11b-13b on four types of opposition: (1) correlatives, e.g. “double” vs. “half,” (2) contraries, 
e.g. “good” vs. “bad,” (3) positives and privatives, e.g. “blindness” vs. “sight,” (4) and contradictories, e.g. “he is 
sitting” vs. “he is not sitting”; see further Lloyd 1966: 161-62. 
456 Van Groningen 1966: 361-62 comments on the indeterminacy of this language and suggests erotic 
connotations. 
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discourse. It is an effort to designate an elusive tertium quid between the polarities that seem 
to exhaust the field of political and social reality. 
The substance of this effort is, in the first instance, logical, because it is concerned with 
the semantic force of negation and contradiction. The notion that some contraries categorically 
do not admit intermediate terms is one of the central principles in formal logic. It is named—
felicitously for our purposes—the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM), which Aristotle 
formulated canonically in Metaphysics:457 
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ μεταξὺ ἀντιφάσεως ἐνδέχεται εἶναι οὐθέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη ἢ φάναι 
ἢ ἀποφάναι ἓν καθ᾽ ἑνὸς ὁτιοῦν. (Meta. IV, 1011b) 
 
There cannot be any intermediate value between contraries, but given one thing, 
it is necessary either to affirm or deny one thing, whatever it may be. 
 
That is, any particular subject x is either P or not-P—a Megaran citizen is either agathos or not-
agathos (i.e. kakos).458 There is no μεταξύ or μέσον. Tertium non datur.459 The LEM is one of the 
                                                        
 
457 Aristotle discusses the LEM elsewhere in Metaphysics (1012a, attributing the denial of the LEM to Anaxagoras, ὁ 
[λόγος] δ᾽ Ἀναξαγόρου [λέγων] εἶναί τι μεταξὺ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως; see n. 459) and also in De Interpretatione IX; see 
Lloyd 1966: 161-69; Geach and Bednarowski 1954. The LEM is closely related to the “Law of Non-Contradiction” 
(LNC), which holds that a proposition cannot be both true and false). So-called classical logics hold both the LEM 
and LNC. But there are also contemporary formalizations of logic that deny the LEM (“intuitionist”); those that 
deny the LNC are “paraconsistent.” For a broader philosophical discussion, see Badiou 2008a; 2009a: 531-32. On 
Badiou’s position vis-à-vis the LEM, see Vartabedian 2018. 
458 There are several ways of expressing the LEM that differ in their logical and semantic implications; see Geach 
and Bednarowski 1954: 59. A crucial aspect of Aristotle’s contribution was his analysis of the various forms of 
contradiction; see n. 455. 
459 Aristotle articulates this principle in Metaphysics in part by rejecting certain conceptions of mixture and polarity 
that he attributes to Heraclitus and Anaxagoras but that might just as well describe some of the content of the 
Theognidea: 
ὁ δ᾿ Ἀναξαγόρου, εἶναί τι μεταξὺ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, ὥστε πάντα ψευδῆ· ὅταν γὰρ μιχθῇ, οὔτε 
ἀγαθὸν οὔτε οὐκ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μῖγμα, ὥστ᾿ οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἀληθές. (Meta. 1012a) 
 
The [discourse] of Anaxagoras, by asserting that there is an intermediate value between contraries, 
holds that everything is false; for whenever things are mixed, the mixture is neither good nor not 
good, and so no statement is true. 
 
 240 
foundations of classical logic. Indeed, it is so foundational that it cannot be demonstrated using 
prior principles, only asserted as an axiom. If one refuses this axiom, it is entirely possible to 
construct alternative logics that rest on different foundations and that do not admit the LEM.460 
If the LEM were valid in Theognis’ political logic, then the polarities of partisan affiliation would 
not admit intermediate values—one would have to be either agathos or kakos. But Theognis’ 
upstart low-born antagonists manifestly defy the LEM by occupying a middle value between 
baseness and virtue (οὔτε κακῶν γνώμας εἰδότες οὔτ’ ἀγαθῶν, 59), a development that has 
fractured political time into prosthen and nun. As a reactionary discourse, the Theognidea are 
concerned with how to respond to and appropriate the possibilities opened up by this novel 
political situation. Although he laments the errant mixing of the base and noble, Theognis 
seems to accept the confounding of opposites as the new status quo of political logic: hence his 
“middle” position is articulated as a paradoxical negation of polarities, and in particular, as the 
rejection both of the kakoi for their baseness and of the agathoi for their undependability. 
Theognis’ technique of double negation, his μηδὲν ἄγαν, is colored by the associations 
between τὸ μέσον and the notion of “the common” in early Greek political thought. These 
                                                        
 
In Anaxagoras’ materialist cosmology, substances (khrēmata) are the universe’s imperishable, elemental 
ingredients. They come in an infinite variety, but many kinds are organized into contraries, including qualities like 
hot/cold, dry/wet, light/dark, etc. These substances are always mixed with each other in varying proportions, 
down to the most infinitesimal scales of reality (Interpretations of Anaxagoras are, naturally, contentious. See 
Furley 2002: 121; Curd 1998: 113, 133 n. 13; Graham 1994: 99; Barnes 1979). Every material body x, then, is in 
some sense both P and not-P, both hot and cold, heavy and light, etc.; for Aristotle, this seems to imply the 
inverse: that every x is thus neither P nor not-P, therefore violating the LEM. Anaxagoras’ notion of universal 
mixture (μῖγμα) and his preference for double negations (of the οὔτε…οὔτε type) are strongly reminiscent of 
themes in the Theognidea (on mixture, see p. 228; on double negation, n. 454). This is not to suggest that the 
Theognidea and the Presocratics had any particular historical exchange, only that they shared certain tropes that 
belonged to a widespread interest in early Greek thought with the confounding of polarities; Lloyd 1966 surveys 
this broader cultural and intellectual context (while omitting from discussion, however, the Theognidea). 
460 See n. 457. 
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associations are in turn complicated by Theognis’ ambivalent attitude toward political 
participation in the city-state. The “state” in “city-state” refers to a system of public institutions 
and offices that outlast the particular individuals who control or institute them.461 The 
rudiments of states exist already in the chiefdoms of the Iliad and Odyssey,462 but it is only with 
the rise of the polis during the eighth and seventh centuries that formal, impersonal political 
institutions regulated by law took shape. As Detienne and Vernant have argued,463 the 
development of these institutions coincided with a new conception of public space, a shared 
domain in the middle (meson) of the community. This “middle” could be a literal public space, 
such as an agora or the open area in the center of a council meeting, or a figurative space 
comprising the public institutions and offices shared by an agonistic community of aristocratic 
citizens, each of whom could in principle occupy the middle for themselves. 
The civic institution of the meson could also become a space for factional politics and 
civil conflict, as Nicole Loraux has established.464 Elites participated in archaic states through 
the mediation of parties or factions, staseis or hetairiai. These collective bodies struggled for 
control of the state, each constituted and animated in opposition to its opponents. Stasis can 
also refer to the situation of “civil war,” which fractious aristocrats like Alcaeus regarded as a 
kind of evil, even as they participated in it with gusto. As a rule, the archaic form of state 
                                                        
 
461 There is an enormous literature on this topic. My interpretation of this notion of “state” and the rise of the 
Greek polis depends on Runciman 1982, Donlan 1989 (esp. 17), and Davies 1997: 16.  
462 See Runciman (1982) on Homeric “semistates” and Donlan (1989) on “pre-states.” 
463 See Detienne 1996: 98-106 on meson and the development of public space in early Greek thought; Vernant 
2006: 235-59; Loraux 2001: 98-104. 
464 Loraux 2001: 98-100. 
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politics is partisan and conflictual, and the only objection to stasis is its excessively destructive 
intensity, especially for the losing side.465 Loraux has observed that stasis is distinct from what 
the Romans called bellum civile, because whereas the latter is ideally a conflict between cives, 
individual citizens, stasis is a conflict between more or less unified parts or subsets of the 
citizen body.466 Indeed, Alcaeus construes the civil conflict in which he is involved as an 
opposition between factions, each of which is internally unified by powerful oaths of loyalty.467 
In that sense, partisanship obeys the law of the excluded middle: one must choose a side, 
because for most political actors, there is no position of neutrality—except, perhaps, for the 
rare figure of the heroic mediator, like Solon, who positions himself between rival factions and 
mends their differences.468 
It is often assumed that Theognis represents himself as the leader of an aristocratic 
faction fighting for control of the Megaran state, the shared meson of the city.469 But this 
interpretation assimilates Theognis and his concept of “the middle” too closely to the modes of 
archaic partisanship represented in Alcaeus. Theognis apparently has no faction: for him, to 
affirm τὸ μέσον means negating each of the existing terms of partisan affiliation and its 
opposite. Thus, in concrete terms, Theognis expresses intense distrust for his philoi and hetairoi 
                                                        
 
465 Indeed, Loraux 2001 has shown that stasis, particularly in a classical Athenian context, was ideally an all-or-
nothing affair that involved the whole city. Rose 2012 (34-42) suggests that the archaic state simply was a means 
of mediating intra-elite factional conflict. 
466 Loraux 2001: 108. 
467 For images of factional unity in Alcaeus, see 6.12, 6.7; see 129.16-28 for oaths of solidarity. 
468 To remain neutral in partisan conflict was apparently proscribed by Solon’s Law; see Van ‘T Wout 2010 and 
Loraux 2001: 102-3. On Solon as mediator, see Kurke 2007: 155. 
469 See, for instance, Donlan 1985b and van Wees 2000. 
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and never expresses an ambition to control the state. This alone suggests that politics in the 
usual sense—partisan and concerned with state power—is not his objective. It is true that in 
several instances in the Theognidea the speaker appears to be strategizing about how to 
engage in partisan conflict. For instance, Walter Donlan interprets the phrase spoudaion 
prēgma, “a serious matter,” to refer precisely to the risky ventures involved in stasis.470 This is a 
reasonable gloss, but it is never spelled out by the text in explicit terms. It is typical for Theognis 
to abstain from articulating what, exactly, his prēgmata are supposed to achieve—politically or 
otherwise.471 He refers frequently to his hetairoi or to hetairoi in general, but almost exclusively 
with the purpose of commenting on how rare they are (79, 115, 643-45) and how 
untrustworthy and unreliable (91, 95, 113, 209, 332a, 595, 851, 941). He proclaims himself a 
perfect hetairos—too perfect, since he cannot find anyone who can reciprocate the ideal 
qualities that he finds in himself (415-16, 529-30), which in general involve a mixture of 
exceptional fidelity and courage (97, 411, 753). 
This crisis of friendship is first announced in one of the longest intact stanzas in the 
corpus (52-67)—the same passage in which, as we have seen, Theognis laments that “different 
people” (λαοὶ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι, 52) now occupy Megara and that the aristocratic class has lost its 
monopoly on civic power. The excerpt examined above (p. 226) ends with the declaration that 
this new citizen body, an indiscernible mixture of kakoi and agathoi, is inveterately deceitful 
and morally ambiguous. The passage continues below: 
                                                        
 
470 The phrase occurs at 70, 116, 642, and 644. See Donlan 1985b: 230. 
471 Theognis also expresses his hatred and desire for vengeance against enemies (e.g. at 337-40, 562-63; see 
Edmunds 1985: 103); the vitriol is intense but imprecise.  
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μηδένα τῶνδε φίλον ποιεῦ, Πολυπαΐδη, ἀστῶν 
  ἐκ θυμοῦ χρείης οὕνεκα μηδεμιῆς·  
ἀλλὰ δόκει μὲν πᾶσιν ἀπὸ γλώσσης φίλος εἶναι, 
  χρῆμα δὲ συμμείξηις μηδενὶ μηδ’ ὁτιοῦν  
σπουδαῖον· γνώσηι γὰρ ὀιζυρῶν φρένας ἀνδρῶν, 
  ὥς σφιν ἐπ’ ἔργοισιν πίστις ἔπ’ οὐδεμία,  
ἀλλὰ δόλους ἀπάτας τε πολυπλοκίας τ’ ἐφίλησαν  
  οὕτως ὡς ἄνδρες μηκέτι σωιζόμενοι.   (61-68) 
 
 Don’t make any of the townspeople your sincere friend,  
son of Polypais, out of sheer necessity; 
but seem in your tongue to be philos to everyone 
 and do not mix in business with any of them nor 
 in anything important; for you will learn the minds of wretched men, 
 how there isn’t any trust for them when it comes to action, 
 but tricks and deceits and complex traps are philos to them 
 just as men beyond salvation. 
 
The text implies that there was once a time, before the crisis of aristocratic identity, when one’s 
philoi were more trustworthy, when it was not necessary to take these extraordinary 
precautions against betrayal. This is presumably because birth was more perfectly correlated 
with virtue among the agathoi such that anyone born into a noble lineage would also have a 
trustworthy character. There would have been what Donlan calls “ideologically sure and 
dependable loyalties” (1985b: 230).472 Similar sentiments are reiterated in a block of fragments 
from 70-128 and then at frequent intervals throughout the corpus.473  
                                                        
 
472 This is certainly a fantasy on Theognis’ part. Intra-elite competition was always fierce, and it seems unlikely that 
there was ever a time when agathoi did not betray one another with abandon when it suited their interests. 
473 The deterioration of friendships creates a predictable melodrama of personal betrayal. Even Theognis’ 
addressee, his erōmenos Cyrnus, is rebuked in several passages for betraying his erastēs; see further 811-14. But 
because factional politics is built on a foundation of philos-bonds, the stakes of such betrayals are more than 
personal—they undermine the very possibility of political action in a state. The most generic term in Greek for a 
social bond is philia, and philos is anyone with whom one shares a relationship that involves a degree of trust: 
relatives by blood or marriage, friends, lovers, business associates, and political allies (See Donlan 1985b: 225 for a 
complete list of passages that discuss philoi in the corpus). The valence of philos that most concerns Theognis is 
surely the relation of belonging to a political faction that struggles for control of the polis against other partisan 
groups. This partisan meaning of philos is especially in evidence when the adjective is paired with hetairos: a “dear 
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If the deceptiveness of his hetairoi undermines the forms of factional solidarity required 
for state politics, it might seem that Theognis’ response would be to withdraw from τὸ μέσον 
and be done with the corrupted and corrupting space of the civic commons. In such an 
interpretation, when Theognis refers to moderation, it is an apolitical, ethical virtue that 
retreats from the polis into the private world of aristocratic pastimes. Although I do not 
subscribe to this reading, it has played an important role in research on the politics of archaic 
lyric poetry. Leslie Kurke and Ian Morris, for instance, have argued that archaic lyric and elegy 
are a battleground between two rival aristocratic ideologies:474 one represents an “elitist,” anti-
polis position opposed to the relatively egalitarian institutions of the emerging city-state. 
Evident especially in Alcaeus, Sappho, and Anacreon, this ideology privileges the symposium as 
a venue for elite social activity independent from the polis. In opposition to these values is a 
“middling” ideology that valorizes τὸ μέσον and civic moderation, eschews eastern habrosunē, 
and celebrates the hoplite phalanx over the heroic individual.475 For the “elitist” ideologues, the 
community celebrated in sympotic lyric constitutes a city unto itself, a kind of secessio of the 
ancestral elite from the city at large and their refuge from a politics that has gradually become 
intractable and distasteful because of its infiltration by the nouveux riches. 
                                                        
 
comrade” with whom one can risk entering into the high-stakes game of factional politics. Donlan (1985b) has 
shown in detail how the Theognidean corpus is preoccupied with the untrustworthiness of most philoi. They are 
outwardly amiable but inwardly deceptive; they pledge great oaths over wine but falter as soon as times get 
tough; see 1985b: 224-25 for a thorough accounting of the terms philos and hetairos in the Theognidea. On the 
primarily social value of philos, see Benveniste 1969a: 337-53. 
474 Morris 1996; Kurke 1999, 2007. For a detailed critique of both author’s positions, see Hammer 2004. I agree 
with Hammer’s critique. 
475 Its representatives are numerous, including Archilochus, Hipponax, Tyrtaeus, Simonides, Pindar, and 
Bacchylides. 
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Theognis, for both scholars, is caught between these two positions in an ideological tug-
of-war, sometimes advocating one ideology and sometimes the other depending on the 
evolution of the corpus and its varied performance contexts.476 One consequence of this 
approach is that it renders the Theognidea ideologically and perhaps conceptually incoherent, 
an accidental amalgam of contradictory voices.477 In an article criticizing this elitist-versus-
middling schema, Dean Hammer points out that there is no consistent link between 
membership in symposia and opposition to polis politics.478 I might add, following an argument 
by the anthropologist Gilbert Herdt (2003), that it is a reflex of the political culture of modern 
liberal democracies to regard secret societies and private clubs as intrinsically inimical to the 
public sphere. This was probably not the situation in the archaic poleis. I thus agree with 
Ηammer’s conclusion that “we cannot, in turn, conclude…that the exclusivity and 
distinctiveness promoted by the symposium can be read as an expression of an anti-polis 
ideology” (2004: 493). 
We can take the consistent focus on the polis in the Theognidea at face value. Theognis’ 
project is committed to operating in “the middle,” in a space of political action that can exist 
only in the polis. But he has altered the notion of the middle such that it is no longer a tangible 
                                                        
 
476 Morris 1996: 36 and Kurke 1999: 27-28. This hypothesized polyvocality is not objectionable per se, especially for 
Kurke’s approach, which incorporates it elegantly into a broader account of ideological contestation during the 
archaic period. 
477 This is not really an objection if one believes that the Theognidea were assembled from disparate sources 
whose only common designation is that of gnomological elegy.  
478 “A long scholarly legacy has associated sympotic relations with oligarchic conspiracy… Morris and Kurke, 
though, do not develop their case by looking at the overtly political activities of sympotic members. This may be 
because almost no evidence exists that participants in symposia were engaged in anti-political activities, in any 
consistent during the archaic period. Quite the opposite: the symposium yielded a steady supply of quite different 
civic leaders who sought office through legal and democratic means” (Hammer 2004: 491-92). 
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object—the common offices and resources of the city—but a formal possibility, a space for 
maneuver between the terms of every social antithesis. This modified meaning takes on 
significance in relation to what it implicitly opposes. I noted earlier how the notion of τὸ μέσον 
valorized in the Theognidea resembles the paradoxical mixing of social attributes effected by 
the disaster of anti-elite enfranchisement. The polis has become a melting-pot in which all 
categories of social discernment blend into their opposites (see pp. 227-30); hence the old 
criteria of birth, wealth, and excellence can no longer exclude anyone from the exercise of 
power. This is how the breakdown of the law of the excluded middle can actually have 
egalitarian consequences. Because no one can be identified with the terms of the old polar 
oppositions of wealth/poverty, high-born/low-born, and virtuous/base, any kind of person 
could, in principle, control the Megaran state.  
No figures in the Theognidea explicitly promote or endorse this outcome, but as an 
objective situation it functions as one of Theognis’ antagonists throughout the corpus. Theognis 
accepts the breakdown of the classical logic of exclusion (the LEM), but he disputes its 
egalitarian consequences. If the dēmos now comprises a confused mixture of contradictory 
predicates, it does not follow that everyone has an equal claim to participate in the state. The 
Theognidean disgust at the mixing of opposites anticipates the opponents of radical equality in 
Classical Athens (as I discussed in the Introduction, n. 16). Plato’s Socrates remarks in the 
Republic that democracy is 
ἡδεῖα πολιτεία καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ποικίλη, ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις 
διανέμουσα. (Rep. 8.558c) 
 
a pleasant constitution—and anarchic and motley, which distributes a kind of 
equality alike to the equal and the unequal. 
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“Pleasant” is surely meant ironically, since democracy is represented here as the second-to-last 
stage in the inevitable degeneration of the ideal constitution. Isocrates uses similar language 
when he laments the latter-day degeneration of the notion of “equality” in democratic Athens, 
which in prior generations valued virtue and was attuned to differences in ability. Law-givers 
like Solon and Cleisthenes 
τὴν μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσαν τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ τοὺς πονηροὺς ἀπεδοκίμαζον ὡς 
οὐ δικαίαν οὖσαν (Isocrates, Areop. 7.21) 
 
rejected as unjust the [form of equality] that deems bad people deserving of the 
same things as worthy people. 
 
The defect of the unjust form of equality is that it grants all things to all people, to “both X and 
not-X” (“equal and unequal,” “bad and worthy”). This scandal elicits Socrates’ and Isocrates’ 
disgust on an essentially logical level: the identification of opposites violates the law of non-
contradiction. 
Against this image of a Megaran civic space open to any kind of person and to that 
kind’s opposite, Theognis traces a negative path that denies political competency of both 
parties. Neither kakoi nor agathoi make for reliable associates. The elusive third term, the 
excluded middle, is thus a very rare kind of person. The political community that Theognis 
hopes to construct around the figure of τὸ μέσον is not the whole city but a vanishing fraction 
of its most virtuous members. We can better understand Theognis’ political project, then, if we 
regard it less as a position in concrete power-politics than as an intervention in the logic of 
political association and action. What Theognis has in mind is a kind of meta-politics that 
operates at a remove from the functions of the state and that endeavors to renovate the 
possibilities of political action on a formal level.  
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If there is a certain opacity in Theognis’ account of politics, it is because he does not 
articulate concrete plans and stratagems and seems deliberately to restrict his intervention to 
the field of political form. But form, as Caroline Levine has suggested, tends to be mobile and 
transposable, “by moving back and forth across aesthetic and social materials” (2015: 4-5). This 
appealing notion could help us recover something more concrete from Theognis’ abstract 
account of politics. Just as the egalitarian claims in Homer and Hesiod resound in the domain of 
aesthetic experience, I will argue that the anti-egalitarian logic of Theognidean reaction can be 
traced again in the corpus’ depiction of the beauty of song. 
 
The Aesthetics of the Middle 
It is widely recognized that the partisan songs of Theognis and Alcaeus were composed 
for and performed in the context of aristocratic symposia.479 This context is depicted 
abundantly in the corpora themselves, with their frequent descriptions of collective drinking 
and singing. Hence it is often argued that the symposium—and the songs performed there—
served to strengthen bonds of solidarity between its members in opposition to other groups 
and to the civic community at large.480 Theognidean song could also serve as a repository of 
aristocratic mores authorized by a tradition of performance in an elite, sympotic context.481 The 
                                                        
 
479 This connection is made in virtually all of the modern literature on these authors. Bowie’s fundamental article 
(1986) showed that non-narrative elegy was performed almost exclusively in symposia, even when the speaker 
conjures up other kinds of performance contexts. 
480 For concise elaborations on this premise, see Bowie 1986: 34 and Elmer 2013b: 157. The intersection between 
elegy, symposium, and politics is a recurring topic in Nagy and Figueira’s 1985 volume, Theognis of Megara: Poetry 
and the Polis. See in particular the articles by Nagy, Ford, Levine, and Edmunds. See as well, Hubbard 2007. 
481 See Ford 1985. 
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implicit assumption of these accounts—one that I have tried to question—is that Theognis’ 
political project is essentially factional and statist. Thus the performance of his songs would 
amount to a kind of cultural technology that strengthens the solidarity of audiences of the 
ancestral aristocracy, both in their individual factions and as a class opposed to challenges from 
below. I want to consider the alterative possibility that Theognidean elegy represents its 
audience as distinct from the agathoi as traditionally conceived. Its goal is not to individuate its 
audiences as partisan factions conforming to the existing police categories but to galvanize a 
new kind of collective body through the aesthetic pleasure of song. 
Lowell Edmunds has suggested that Theognis addresses his songs to an audience of 
sophoi, “discerning people” who can comprehend his hidden messages and thus form a 
community of insiders subtracted from—but residing in—the broader community of the polis. 
David Elmer likewise emphasizes how the Theognidea’s internal audience is set apart from the 
community of the polis (2013b: 157). These suggestive interpretations depend in part on an 
important passage at 679-82: 
φορτηγοὶ δ’ ἄρχουσι, κακοὶ δ’ ἀγαθῶν καθύπερθεν.  
  δειμαίνω, μή πως ναῦν κατὰ κῦμα πίηι. 
ταῦτά μοι ἠινίχθω κεκρυμμένα τοῖσ’ ἀγαθοῖσιν· 
  γινώσκοι δ’ ἄν τις καὶ κακός, ἂν σοφὸς ἦι. 
 
Merchants rule, and the kakoi are above the agathoi. 
I am afraid lest somehow a wave should drink down the ship. 
Let these riddles be hidden for the agathoi; 
anyone, even a kakos, could understand [them], if he is sophos. 
 
In this atmosphere of social disruption, in a city whose hierarchies have been compromised by a 
non-elite revolt, Theognis turns toward a select community of listeners who can comprehend 
the political premises behind his song. The “riddle” in question is presumably the ainos of the 
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ship assailed by a storm and taking on water, a metaphor for stasis that also figures 
prominently in Alcaeus.  
It is surprising, on an ideological level, that the final verse concedes that “even a kakos” 
could have the ability to appreciate Theognis’ song. It is true that the manuscripts read κακόν in 
682 (“anyone can know [an impending] misfortune”), but almost all recent editions amend it to 
κακός.482 The latter reading is easier to understand syntactically, but does Theognis really mean 
that the kakoi can be sophoi—that they are, potentially at least, members of his discerning 
audience? The crucial issue here is whether the sophoi are simply the ancestral elite opposed, 
as one would expect, to the uncomprehending, low-born kakoi, or if the sophoi do not neatly 
correspond to the traditional criteria of birth that distinguish the agathoi.483 In support of the 
second possibility, verses 368-70 explicitly assert that Theognis’ songs are divisive even among 
the members of his class: 
οὔτε γὰρ εὖ ἔρδων ἁνδάνω οὔτε κακῶς· 
μωμεῦνται δέ με πολλοί, ὁμῶς κακοὶ ἠδὲ καὶ 
ἐσθλοί· μιμεῖσθαι δ᾿ οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀσόφων δύναται. (368-70) 
 
For I do not please by doing good nor by doing bad; 
Many blame me, the kakoi and the esthloi alike;  
But no one who is undiscerning is able to imitate me. 
 
                                                        
 
482 The amendment to κακός was proposed by Bruck, who judged κακόν an inepte dictum; see van Groningen 
1966: 267. The latter follows Bruck but for different reasons. He concludes that the surprising extension of 
understanding to “even the kakos” follows logically from Theognis’ premises and strikes a rare note of optimism 
for the city (“par contre, dire que même le méchant, le prolétaire, pourrait se rendre compte de tous les dangers 
que le poète évoque dans sa longue métaphore, est une conclusion logique qui répand encore une lueur d’espoir 
pour la cité”). Cf. Nagy 1985, who prefers the ms. kakon but does not cite editions except Young. 
483 Nagy 1985: 24-25 reads kakon at 682 and therefore takes the first position: “the kakoi ‘base’ are excluded from 
understanding the poetry of Theognis.” 
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Note that the statement in 368 is true not because the community of the polis is divided 
between elites and non-elites. Even among elites, Theognis is divisive. His songs appeal to some 
subset of the community that does not fall under any of the conventional categories of the 
police order. Further evidence of this is the fact that Theognis advises Cyrnus to value sophiē 
over aretē (κρεῖσσόν τοι σοφίη καὶ μεγάλης ἀρετῆς, 1073), the latter being one of the values 
most prized as a mark of the agathoi. Likewise, consider Theognis’ boast that he is inimitable: 
none of the asophoi—presumably those kakoi and esthloi who condemn him—are able to 
reproduce his songs. The simplest explanation for the boast is that the songs carry novel 
political valences that someone familiar with only the received language of the state would be 
unable to comprehend. In other words, if the song-audience constitutes a “polis within the 
polis,” the two communities are situated at a kind of conceptual distance from each other and 
speak different political languages. 
But this distance is compatible with a certain kind of proximity. Edmunds (1985: 110), as 
we have seen, describes the sympotic audiences of the Theognidea as constituting a community 
set apart from the polis that contains them, but his account correctly emphasizes that these 
two communities are closely entangled with one another: “the poetry of sophiē establishes its 
reciprocity with the city. Each polis provides a place in which the poetry can be remembered, at 
least by the sophoi; in return, the poetry establishes…the true city in that city” (1985: 110). The 
relation between poetry and society is raised in the last of the three proems that open the 
Theognidea, addressed to the “Muses and Graces.”484 The poet explicitly relates “what is 
                                                        
 
484 See Nagy 1985: 26-28. 
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philon” to “what is kalon” by recalling the moment when the goddesses attended the marriage 
of Cadmus and Harmonia that marked the founding of Thebes:485 
Μοῦσαι καὶ Χάριτες, κοῦραι Διός, αἵ ποτε Κάδμου 
ἐς γάμον ἐλθοῦσαι καλὸν ἀείσατ’ ἔπος, 
‘ὅττι καλόν, φίλον ἐστί· τὸ δ’ οὐ καλὸν οὐ φίλον ἐστί,’ 
τοῦτ’ ἔπος ἀθανάτων ἦλθε διὰ στομάτων.   (14-17) 
 
Muses and Graces, maidens of Zeus, who once 
came to the wedding of Cadmus and sang a beautiful utterance, 
“what is beautiful is dear; what is not beautiful is not dear,” 
this utterance passed through the mouths of the immortals. 
 
Nagy (1985: 28) observes that philon refers to the “institutional and sentimental bonds that 
integrate society.” He thus interprets the passage to mean that “the beauty of the Muses’ song 
is equated with the social integration of Thebes and, by extension, the beauty of Theognidean 
poetry is equated with the social integration of Megara.”486 Ideally, at least, the city would be 
restored through song to “an ostensibly integral community of philoi” (27). This reading poses a 
problem for interpretations, like Edmunds’ or my own, that would see the community of 
Theognidean audiences as heterogeneous to the community of the polis.487 There are details in 
the proem, however, that help our case. 
                                                        
 
485  This is one of the few references to mythical narrative in the corpus. There is another such instance at 699-718 
regarding Nestor and the denizens of Hades. 
486 Edmunds 1985: 102-4 and Ford 1985: 84 discuss the passage as well. The central verse, 16, is cited by Plato in 
Lysis as an “ancient proverb”; a variant of the first clause is sung by the Chorus in Bacchae (ὅ τι καλὸν φίλον ἀεί, 
881, 901). 
487 Edmunds (1985) resists Nagy’s reading by detecting a trace of partisan aggression in the Muses’ language (102-
3).  
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The “utterance of the immortals” in verse 16 (‘ὅττι καλόν, φίλον ἐστί· τὸ δ’ οὐ καλὸν οὐ 
φίλον ἐστί,’) has an elegant symmetry that might evoke for contemporary readers Keats’ 
notorious statement at the end of his “Ode to a Grecian Urn,”  
Beauty is truth, truth beauty 
Keats’ first three words make beauty a subset of truth, while the second two, conversely, make 
truth a subset of beauty. United, the expressions imply that if one drew a Venn diagram, the 
circles representing truth and beauty would overlap without remainder. The statement of the 
Muses and Graces is almost the same kind of assertion, but it differs because the second clause 
(τὸ δ’ οὐ καλὸν, οὐ φίλον ἐστί) is the inverse rather than the converse of the first clause: the 
two terms (φίλον and καλόν) are left in the same order and negated rather than put in reverse 
order.488 In a poetic corpus so preoccupied with deception, ainigmata, and logical paradox, the 
Muses’ peculiar phraseology should raise alarm bells, because the Muses themselves, who 
                                                        
 
488 “Inverse” and “converse” designate two of the standard types of conditional statements, diagrammed in the 
table below. The first column (“positive” and “inverse”) are the statements that the Muses and Graces make at v. 
16. The second column contains two other permutations of these semantic elements not found in the Theognidea 
(and thus marked with *). 
 
 Positive  Contrapositive  
 α → β ⇔ ~β → ~α  
 ὅττι καλόν, φίλον ἐστί   * ὅττι οὐ φίλον, οὐ καλόν ἐστί  
 
 Inverse  Converse 
 ~α → ~β ⇔ β → α 
 τὸ δ’ οὐ καλὸν, οὐ φίλον ἐστί  * ὅττι φίλον, καλόν ἐστί 
 
In classical logic (i.e., assuming the LEM and LNC) the positive implies the contrapositive; if one of these statements 
is true, then so is the other. Likewise, if the inverse is true, then so is the converse, and vice versa. A translator of 
Theognis might take the liberty of substituting “what is philon is kalon” (converse) for “what is not kalon is not 
philon” (inverse), since the two statements imply each other; she could thus render the verse, “what is kalon is 
philon; what is philon is kalon,” approximating Keats’ formulation. But if the LEM does not hold, then the inverse 
and converse are not interchangeable. 
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boast to Hesiod that their truths are indiscernible from their falsehoods, are not necessarily 
being forthright. In particular, why do they not assert with Keatsian clarity that “what is philon 
is kalon”? Why do they resort to the negative expression in the inverse (οὐ καλὸν, οὐ φίλον)?  
It turns out that the negations introduce a subtle loophole into the Muses’ declaration. 
The converse (“what is philon is kalon”) and inverse (“what is not kalon is not philon”) are 
equivalent only under certain logical conditions, namely, if “what is beautiful” and “what is not 
beautiful” exhaust the whole field of aesthetic phenomena that can be described using the 
concept kalon. But this implication requires the law of the excluded middle. For Theognis, the 
middle (“neither X nor not-X”) is not excluded: there could exist a class of things that cannot be 
called beautiful or not beautiful, neither kalon nor ou kalon, but that belong to some third 
kind—“undefined for beauty,” “sort of beautiful.”489  
Hence, Theognis could not have said that “what is philon is kalon,” because the 
inference would be false. There is presumably a set of things that are philon but are neither 
kalon nor not-kalon, that is, which belong to the meson of beauty, its intermediate state. If we 
entertain this interpretation, its major consequence is to drive a wedge between what is philon 
and what is kalon. The two categories overlap substantially, but kalon is more restrictive. 
According to the Muses’ riddling expression, one may have philoi who are neither kalos nor 
kakos, but something in between. By extension, one might suppose that the set of people who 
appreciate the beauty of Theognidean song forms of a smaller subset out of any given circle of 
                                                        
 
489 There are probably several ways of formalizing in logical terms what Theognis is doing here. For instance, 
logicians have developed non-classical logics in which the law of the excluded middle (“a proposition is either true 
or not true”) does not hold, or in which there are more than two truth values (e.g., true, false, and undefined; in 
“three-valued” or “fuzzy” logics).  
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philoi.490 This supposition is confirmed by Theognis’ frequent declarations that the philos-
relation is intrinsically unreliable and that one must select only the most trustworthy from 
one’s philoi with whom to join in common endeavors. 
μηδένα τῶνδε φίλον ποιεῦ, Πολυπαΐδη, ἀστῶν 
  ἐκ θυμοῦ χρείης οὕνεκα μηδεμιῆς·  
ἀλλὰ δόκει μὲν πᾶσιν ἀπὸ γλώσσης φίλος εἶναι (63-65) 
 
Don’t make any of the townspeople your sincere friend,  
son of Polypais, out of sheer necessity; 
but seem in your tongue to be philos to everyone  
 
Ten verses below, a similar note of caution: 
Πρῆξιν μηδὲ φίλοισιν ὅλως ἀνακοινέο πᾶσιν· 
  παῦροί τοι πολλῶν πιστὸν ἔχουσι νόον.    (72-73) 
 
Do not make your business common even to all your philoi alike; 
Few of the many, you know, possess a trustworthy mind. 
 
These declarations recall the broader concern that the rise of the kakoi has compromised intra-
elite bonds of friendship (see pp. 243-44). But we can now understand that Theognis is not 
necessarily interested in restoring the integrity of these bonds but in forging a new and more 
discerning form of social connection. “Making common” (ἀνακοινέο) does not imply “common 
to the whole city” or even “common to one’s faction,” but common to some indeterminate 
community of the elect. The aesthetic category of kalon provides an ideal basis for this kind of 
“making common.” Theognidean song models itself on the utterances of the Muses, which are 
called kalon in the third proem (καλὸν ἀείσατ’ ἔπος, 15). Through its beauty, this song 
“pleases” (handanein) certain audiences: 
                                                        
 
490 It is smaller in the sense that even though not all phila are necessarily kala (they could be “neither kalon nor not 
kalon”), all kala are definitely phila by the Muses’ explicit declaration (ὅττι καλόν, φίλον ἐστί). 
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  ἀστοῖσιν δ’ οὔπω πᾶσιν ἁδεῖν δύναμαι· 
οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, Πολυπαΐδη· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ Ζεύς  
  οὔθ’ ὕων πάντεσσ’ ἁνδάνει οὔτ’ ἀνέχων.  (24-26) 
 
I am not at all able to please all the townspeople;491 
it is not surprising, son of Polypais; for Zeus 
does not please everyone by raining or by withholding rain. 
 
Presumably, the townspeople who are pleased by Theognis’ song are the sophoi who can 
decode its message. For everyone else—and these include some esthloi, as we have seen—the 
song is displeasing and blameworthy (μωμεῦνται, 368). Taste, in this sense, is necessarily 
divisive.492 Even Zeus in his omnipotence cannot compel the community of humans to enjoy his 
meteorological decisions universally. The expression οὔθ’ ὕων… οὔτ’ ἀνέχων, “neither raining 
nor not raining,” precisely matches the logical value that I hypothesized for the Muses’ 
utterance—the “neither beautiful nor not beautiful” that creates a disjunction between philon 
and kalon.493 Just as the divisiveness of the middle value between raining and not-raining 
proves that it is not possible to please all mortals, so the existence of a middle value between 
being-kalos and not-being-kalos implies that aesthetic pleasure divides the community of philoi 
into those who approve of Theognidean song and those who do not.  
                                                        
 
491 Nagy (1985: 34-35) and others take οὔπω as “not yet” and relate this to the projected Panhellenic appeal of the 
corpus; but the word might just as well mean “not at all” (LSJ s.v. οὔπω). 
492 David Elmer has shown that handanein in Homer tends to have a “counter-consensual,” politically divisive effect 
(2013a: 42-44). He reads vv. 24-26 in Theognidea along similar lines (2013b: 148, 154-55). 
493 Admittedly, one could interpret οὔθ’ ὕων… οὔτ’ ἀνέχων to mean “nothing whatsoever,” under the assumption 
that the weather has no third value between rain and no-rain (hence, nothing Zeus can do pleases everyone). But 
clearly, it is possible to conceive of the statement “it is raining” as having more than two truth values, i.e., apart 
from true and false. It could be raining lightly, misty, stormy but dry, snowing, etc.; or it could be raining in some 
places but not in others. Any of these meteorological conditions could be used to interpret the expression “neither 
raining nor not raining.” With this interpretation, even the condition of indeterminate weather does not please 
everyone—the implication being that the two limit conditions (raining, not raining) also fail to please everyone. 
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The collective subject that Theognis assembles around the beauty of his song (kalon) 
thus maintains both a proximity and a distance from the sociopolitical (philon). How does 
Theognis imagine that the community of sophoi will relate to the broader community of 
aristocratic philoi to which they belong? How are they supposed to alter the polis in favor of 
reaction? These issues are most lucidly addressed in a passage that imagines the transcendent 
afterlife of the Theognidean corpus and its poetic subjects: 
Σοὶ μὲν ἐγὼ πτέρ’ ἔδωκα, σὺν οἷσ’ ἐπ’ ἀπείρονα πόντον 
  πωτήσηι, κατὰ γῆν πᾶσαν ἀειρόμενος  
ῥηϊδίως· θοίνηις δὲ καὶ εἰλαπίνηισι παρέσσηι  
  ἐν πάσαις πολλῶν κείμενος ἐν στόμασιν, (240) 
καί σε σὺν αὐλίσκοισι λιγυφθόγγοις νέοι ἄνδρες   
  εὐκόσμως ἐρατοὶ καλά τε καὶ λιγέα  
ἄισονται. καὶ ὅταν δνοφερῆς ὑπὸ κεύθεσι γαίης  
  βῆις πολυκωκύτους εἰς Ἀίδαο δόμους,  
οὐδέποτ’ οὐδὲ θανὼν ἀπολεῖς κλέος, ἀλλὰ μελήσεις (245) 
  ἄφθιτον ἀνθρώποισ’ αἰὲν ἔχων ὄνομα,    
Κύρνε, καθ’ Ἑλλάδα γῆν στρωφώμενος, ἠδ’ ἀνὰ νήσους  
  ἰχθυόεντα περῶν πόντον ἐπ’ ἀτρύγετον, 
οὐχ ἵππων νώτοισιν ἐφήμενος· ἀλλά σε πέμψει 
  ἀγλαὰ Μουσάων δῶρα ἰοστεφάνων. (250) 
πᾶσι δ’ ὅσοισι μέμηλε καὶ ἐσσομένοισιν ἀοιδή  
  ἔσσηι ὁμῶς, ὄφρ’ ἂν γῆ τε καὶ ἠέλιος. 
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ὀλίγης παρὰ σεῦ οὐ τυγχάνω αἰδοῦς,  
  ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ μικρὸν παῖδα λόγοις μ’ ἀπατᾶις. (237-54) 
 
To you I granted wings with which on the boundless sea 
you will fly, rising over the whole earth 
easily; in every feast and banquet you will be there 
reclining on the mouths of many men, 
and young men full of desire will sing expertly 
with clear voiced auloi 
of you, beautiful and clear. 
And when you pass beneath the depths 
of the murky earth to the home of Hades 
with its tremendous wailing, though perished you will never 
lose your kleos, but you will be a concern to people 
with your immortal name, 
Cyrnus, whirling over the Greek earth, and through islands 
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passing over the fishy barren sea, 
without being seated on the backs of horses; but 
the splendid gifts of the dark crowned Muses will send you along. 
For all who care and for future generations alike 
you will be subject of song, so long as there is an earth and sun. 
But I get no respect from you, even a little, 
but you trick me with words as if I were a child. 
 
The songs transcend their original locale, presumably Megara, and yet they retain the aesthetic 
divisiveness of their origins. The songs become universal in the sense that they are performed 
at every symposium in Greece, but they are sung there by “many” of the symposiasts, not all. 
Likewise, the fact that Cyrnus will be “an object of concern” (μελήσεις, μέμηλε) to everyone 
could mean that his name will be just as divisive as Theognis’ own name and poetry (22-26, cf. 
368-70). Universal recognition does not imply universal appeal or acceptance.494 In each of the 
symposia that Cyrnus reaches, a new community of aristocratic philoi is once again divided 
between those who understand and are pleased by Theognidean song and those who are not, 
between sophoi and asophoi. 
It is not clear whether the sophoi are the rare men of trustworthy character whom 
Theognis requires for his unspecified political ventures (the spoudaia prēgmata; see p. 243). It 
seems more likely that the aesthetic subject—the community of sophoi—is in itself a form of 
political reaction. Because the community of elite philoi has been compromised by the opening 
of the state to participation by the low-born, Theognis’ sophoi represent a new, more exclusive 
community united by a divisive form of aesthetic appreciation. Even if they do not directly 
                                                        
 
494 Pace Nagy 1985: 35 and Elmer 2013b: 156. 
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intervene in public politics, the sophoi could support the project of political reaction in the long 
run by promoting and circulating its anti-egalitarian values.  
The passage above (vv. 237-54), however, seems to contemplate the possibility that the 
reactionary project of the Theognidea could succeed too well and relapse in a kind of aesthetic 
conservatism. Its widespread popularity will make the song that names Cyrnus “a matter of 
concern for those to come” (καὶ ἐσσομένοισιν ἀοιδή / ἔσσηι ὁμῶς). At least in this description, 
the imagined afterlife of the corpus is dominated by Cyrnus’ poetic memorialization; the 
laudandus supplants the laudator.495 Between this envisioned future and the past that it 
memorializes, the urgency of the present—Theognis’ emphatic νῦν (57-58)—is lost. Cyrnus’ 
kleos conserves the world of their fractious relationships and alliances in Megara, just as the 
kleos of Homeric heroes conserves a trace of their bygone world and freezes it for all time. The 
urgency of political innovation evident throughout the corpus is thereby subsumed by the 
intrinsically conservative task of memorializing a philos. It is telling that the name of Cyrnus 
circulates among “earth,” “sea,” “islands,” “feasts,” and “banquets,” but never poleis. This 
Panhellenic geography of the future is populated with feasts and aesthetic enjoyment but not 
politics—a conservative fantasy of the pre-polis world of the Homeric aristocracy. But the final 
two verses (253-54) abruptly snap back to the more familiar register of personal and political 
betrayal, to the density of the hic et nunc of reactionary innovation. Even though Theognis 
regards philoi as almost invariably untrustworthy and participation in state politics virtually 
                                                        
 
495 But cf. 22-24, where Theognis anticipates his own universal recognition; the absence of the term kleos, 
however, is telling. 
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impossible, the Theognidean subject must be stationed in the vast and shifting contexture of 
social affinities that make up the polis.496 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
496 It is perhaps this combination of traits in the Theognidean ēthos that constitutes the famous “seal” that he sets 
upon his utterances at 19-21. See Ford 1985, Pratt 1995, and Hubbard 2007 for recent interpretations of the seal. 
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